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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0. Globalisation and financial accounting in Japan 
1.1. Hypothesis development 
1.2. Analytical framework 
1.3. Purpose, perspective and importance of this study 
1.4. Methodology and organisation 
 
 
1.0. Globalisation and financial accounting in Japan 
Globalisation has been made possible by ongoing development in transportation, 
communication and information technologies, and relies partly on the 
acceptance of global standards. Internationalisation is premised on the 
existence of nation states, and depends on effective national and international 
institutional infrastructure. Although trade over long distances is as old as the 
Silk Road, international trade took off between 1870 and 1920. After World War II 
international institutions such as the UN and the IMF were established and 
international direct investment increased substantially. In the 1980s international 
capital and financial markets boomed with the deregulation of financial markets. 
Global markets, like any market, are subject to market failure. Anti-competitive 
behaviour is a source of failure that the WTO, GATT and numerous bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and organisations attempt to right. Information 
asymmetry is another cause of failure. Financial statements are an important 
means of supplying useful and relevant information issued and audited in 
accordance with internationally accepted standards to minimise information 
asymmetry within and across borders. 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was 
established in 1973 by professional accounting organisations from nine 
countries 1  but has grown over the years. Initially the IASC opted for 
harmonisation rather than unification and issued basic standards. Partnership 
between the IASC and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) resulted into a set of core standards since the mid-1990s. From April 
2001 the IASC has been replaced by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and its pronouncements go under the name of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Recently, the IASB seems to aim at 
global standards. 
Internationalisation of business, financial and capital markets made 
comparability of financial accounting information across borders an important 
issue in the era of rapid growth after World War II, but even more so since the 
early 1980s when financial and capital markets started to overtake product 
markets in size. Managers of companies that are listed on overseas stock 
exchanges or issue bonds abroad must comply with the local accounting 
requirements either by issuing secondary financial statements or by issuing 
reconciliations according to local formats. Investors that venture into foreign 
                                                   
1
 The founding members came from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the USA. 
 2 
stock and financial markets have to put considerable effort into understanding 
local financial statements. Local companies may obligingly issue financial 
statements that have been conveniently translated into English, restated into 
dollar or euro amounts, that partly follow US or international accounting 
standards, or that are complete secondary statements.2 Accounting regulators 
find themselves faced with the political issue of balancing harmonisation of 
financial accounting and disclosure standards with the demands from local 
constituencies. 
Both the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) and 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) were involved in 
founding the IASC. Ironically, neither the US nor Japan have adopted the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the IASB3. The US 
regards her standards as the highest and strictest in the world (Schroeder, Clark 
and Cathey, 2001, p. 191-192). Japan Business Federation considers IFRS 
unsuited to her particular business environment and complains that the IASB is 
not willing to listen to non-western proposals. Furthermore, the general opinion 
in Japan is that the recent overhaul of its accounting standards should suffice to 
make its standards comparable to IFRS (Japan Business Federation 2003). 
This is important because in 2002 the EU announced that it requires 
companies listed in the EU to issue their financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS from January 2005. Foreign companies shall present their financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS or standards deemed equivalent as of 
January 1, 2007. In response the Study Group on the Internationalisation of 
Business Accounting of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
issued a report advocating the acceptance of Japanese Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (JP-GAAP) as equivalent to IFRS in June 2004. According 
to the report, the scope of consolidation, tax effect accounting, accounting for 
financial instruments, accounting for impairment of assets, accounting for 
business associations, and accounting for R&D costs and intangible assets, are 
comparable to IFRS, but are in fact more conservative and therefore better 
comparable to US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) (METI 
Study Group on the Internationalisation of Business Accounting 2004). 
Convergence projects between the IASB and the FASB, and the IASB and the 
ASBJ are underway but will not produce the required results before January 
2007. 
 In light of the claim of the METI report present study examines the extent 
of convergence between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP and analyses the role of 
internationalisation. Convergence implies the accounting and disclosure 
standards under the two systems moving toward each other. This study shows 
that in practice it meant the Japanese system taking on institutional 
characteristics and standards of the US financial accounting system and not the 
other way around. 
A second issue that this study addresses is the motivation for voluntary 
                                                   
2
 Many international classification studies that used the English language version of financial 
statements by Japanese companies seem unaware of this fact and may therefore have 
overstated Japanese disclosure practices. 
3
 The International Accounting Standards Board is the IASC’s new name. 
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disclosure. Japanese companies that were already listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange before 1978, are allowed to issue their Japanese consolidated 
financial statements under the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law in 
accordance with US-GAAP. 4  These companies have been issuing their 
unconsolidated financial statements in accordance with JP-GAAP and their 
consolidated financial statements following US-GAAP. Until the Accounting Big 
Bang, consolidated disclosure under US-GAAP was much more extensive and 
of a higher quality than under JP-GAAP. Following US-GAAP amounted to 
practicing voluntary disclosure for Japanese companies. From the above arises 
the question: What motivated these Japanese companies to engage in the 
voluntary disclosure of audited financial accounting information? This study 
empirically investigates the relations between disclosure and the cost of capital, 
and between disclosure and corporate governance. Findings indicate that at 
least in the case of Japan, capital structure and corporate ownership seem to 
influence disclosure practices more strongly than cost of capital considerations. 
 
 
1.1. Hypothesis development 
International comparability of financial statements increases with the 
international convergence of financial accounting and disclosure standards. 
Accounting standards are set by the regulatory institutions of an accounting 
system. Regulatory and other institutions bear characteristics commensurate 
with a country’s development pattern and phase. However, political, economic or 
social crisis sometimes brings about institutional change. In Japan such crises 
have resulted in abrupt or cumulative change in institutions and accounting 
regulations. The central hypothesis in this study is that the direction of such 
change depends on the function that financial accounting information performs. 
In a market economy financial reporting serves to minimise the transaction, 
information and monitoring costs related to information asymmetry. Therefore 
corporate governance and financial accounting standards fulfil complementary 
roles. Corporate governance supplies the accountability, incentive and 
monitoring mechanisms to minimise the cost of exchange for all parties to the 
nexus of contracts that constitutes a firm. Financial accounting standards 
provide the recognition, measurement and the minimum public disclosure of 
information to base the exchange on. In sum, in a market economy financial 
accounting is an indispensable and reliable means for public information 
disclosure. On the other hand, in a state-led economy private information 
exchange takes precedence over public information disclosure. Financial 
accounting then becomes primarily a means for taxation, policy implementation, 
and the calculation of distributable income. The function of accounting 
institutions and standards will oscillate between being a means for public 
information disclosure in order to address the problems of imperfect information 
on the one hand, and an instrument in policy implementation on the other. 
Increased international comparability of financial statements is 
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 US-GAAP is still allowed for Japanese companies listed in the US but abolishment of this rule 
has been delayed several times already. 
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commonly regarded as beneficial to the users of financial statements. For some 
issuers of financial statements however, the costs outweigh the benefits. In 
product markets, the costs of disclosure are primarily associated with the 
proprietary nature of information (Healy and Palepu, 1993, p. 5). In other words, 
disclosing too much information is feared to harm a company’s competitive 
position. Obviously, companies that do not sufficiently disclose risks, liabilities or 
losses hope to benefit from the adverse selection problem that lack of 
transparency poses to investors. Benefits to high disclosure levels come in the 
form of international investor confidence, and easier access to international 
capital and financial markets. Voluntary disclosure of accounting and other 
information at par with the highest internationally recognised standards is 
therefore practiced by companies that operate in international markets, raise 
capital at international markets, and practice accountability and transparency to 
accommodate their international investors. 
The hypothesis with regard to the question why some Japanese 
companies choose high disclosure levels and others choose the legally required 
minimum disclosure levels is again based on the function of accounting 
information. Companies that depend primarily on direct financing (the market) 
show higher disclose levels than companies that depend on indirect financing 
(the main-bank system). Direct financing provides an important role for the public 
disclosure of accounting information in assessing risk and returns to investors in 
equity, bonds or other financial instruments. On the other hand indirect financing 
depends more on private information exchange between borrowers and lenders. 
In this case the role of accounting information is geared toward the protection of 
creditors and the calculation of distributable income. Hypotheses regarding a 
negative association between higher disclosure levels and lower cost of capital 
are premised on the role of financial accounting information in direct financing in 
a market economy. As mentioned above, this role is to mitigate the 
consequences of imperfect information by enabling better risk assessment and 
uncertainty reduction. This hypothesis may not hold in a period when most 
Japanese companies depend on indirect financing and the role of financial 
accounting is to determine income for distribution rather than as information to 
base investment decisions on. 
 
 
1.2. Analytical framework 
Crisis can bring about change in the institutional environment that provides what 
Williamson calls “the rules of the game” of economic organisation (Williamson, 
1998, p. 27-28). Financial accounting and disclosure standards constitute “the 
rules of the game” with regard to information asymmetry. Present study identifies 
the crises that brought about institutional change in the Japanese accounting 
system inspired by Williamson’s ideas on institutions and transaction cost 
economics. In Williamson’s theory culture plays an important part in institutional 
change. Although this study acknowledges the validity of research on the 
influence that culture has on financial accounting standards with regard to 
measurement, recognition and disclosure (Gray, 1988), it builds on comparative 
studies of economic development (Gerschenkron, 1962), accounting 
 5 
development patterns (Mueller, 1967; Nobes, 1983, Doupnik and Salter, 1993), 
institutions (La Porta et al., 1997), and corporate governance (Ball, Kothari and 
Robin, 2000). 
Relative economic backwardness provides a role for the state to replace 
functions of the market, especially financial and capital markets. In countries that 
were late to industrialise, generally code-law countries, companies depend more 
on indirect financing whereas in common-law countries enterprises make more 
use of capital and financial markets. Hence the function of financial accounting 
information in code-law countries focuses on the computation of distributable 
income and creditor protection, and may serve macro-economic policy purposes. 
Commensurate with the larger role of capital markets in common-law countries, 
the role of accounting and disclosure standards is to minimise the costs of 
problems related to asymmetric information. 
Using the above dichotomy for the comparison between the Japanese 
and US accounting systems, this study builds a framework for analysing the 
extent of convergence. It is expected that a common-law country will have an 
accounting system that has private regulators and predominantly informal 
regulations. Such an accounting system focuses on information that is useful for 
investors and attaches higher importance to consolidated financial statements. 
In a code-law country the government (often the Ministry of Justice) establishes 
the accounting standards as legal requirements. These standards focus on the 
protection of and information needs of creditors, and attach primary importance 
to unconsolidated financial statements. In this way accounting institutions 
influence the accounting concepts and how accounting numbers are perceived. 
For example, are profits viewed as distributable earnings or as an indicator of 
corporate performance? To what extent is the distribution of dividends 
restricted? Is equity narrowly or broadly defined? Internationalisation comes with 
deregulation, which actually means a more market-oriented approach to 
regulation. As code-law countries progress on the path of internationalisation 
they adopt more institutional characteristics that hitherto were associated with 
common-law countries. New institutions establish new regulations which make 
convergence possible. 
Internationalisation of markets eventually limits the extent to which a 
government can play a hands-on role in resource distribution and economic 
development. Instead a government then takes it upon itself to facilitate a level 
playing field for companies competing in the international arena. 
Internationalisation has induced deregulation and growth of financial and capital 
markets in Japan, and increased use of direct financing raised the demand for 
transparency and disclosure. Financial accounting and disclosure standards did 
not keep up with this demand because of institutional rigidity in the early 1990s. 
Therefore at the time there was ample room for voluntary disclosure. 
In an overview of capital market research related to disclosure, Healy 
and Palepu (2001, p. 420) identified six forces that motivate or demote 
managers to engage in voluntary disclosure in a capital market context. These 
are capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock compensation, 
litigation, proprietary costs, and management talent signalling. Presently, only 
capital market transactions and proprietary costs apply to the case of Japan. The 
 6 
others could become relevant in studies that cover a period after the completion 
of the accounting big bang. Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 429) mention three types 
of capital market effects related to increased voluntary disclosure. These include 
improved stock liquidity, reduced cost of capital, and increased analyst following. 
Voluntary disclosure benefits the users of information by reducing information 
asymmetry and estimation risk. This in turn is expected to reduce uncertainty 
and lower the cost of capital, which is beneficial to the company. 
Traditionally, institutional economics has centred on the legal institutions 
protecting property rights. Transaction cost economics, originally views the firm 
and the market as two alternative modes of production as a way to explain 
vertical integration and internationalisation of companies. Accounting institutions 
protect ownership rights by guaranteeing a minimum level of reliable and 
relevant information. Viewing the firm (debt) and the market (equity) as two 
alternative (Williamson, 1998, p. 32) and complementary modes of governance 
fits the idea that the firm is a nexus of contracts. When the firm is the mode of 
governance, private information exchange is used to keep transaction, 
information and agency costs low. In case the market is the mode of governance, 
transparency and public disclosure of information minimise transaction, 
information and agency costs. A transaction cost perspective to capital and 
ownership structures provides an important role for public information in 
mitigating the problems associated with information asymmetry that cannot be 
solved through private information exchange. 
 
 
1.3. Purpose, perspective and importance of this study 
In essence this study aims to draw attention to how internationalisation interacts 
with accounting institutions, financial accounting and disclosure standards, and 
corporate governance structures. Furthermore it provides a framework with 
which to analyse and predict accounting and disclosure standards and practices, 
based on the function of publicly available financial accounting information in the 
resource allocation process. 
Japan’s case proves that as globalisation progresses truly international 
companies choose to follow international rather than local accounting standards. 
Benefits include better access to international financial and capital markets, and 
greater freedom from the imposing main-bank based block-holder type of 
corporate governance system. In this particular Japanese case, a higher 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) indicates the price of freedom. 
Although convergence has increased, the WACC differential has not altogether 
disappeared. This indicates that the association between disclosure and 
corporate governance is stronger than between disclosure and cost of capital. It 
also means that the JP-GAAP group of large international companies still 
benefits from indirect financing and relationship investing. As such this study 
purports to contribute to the growing body of voluntary disclosure literature that 
seeks to find economic rationales motivating higher disclosure levels. 
 Although the fundamental orientation in this study is an accounting one, 
it sits comfortably in the field of business economics and borrows theory and 
methods from the economics and finance disciplines. In addition present 
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analysis makes use of studies in economic history and development, and 
cultural anthropology, to illustrate that international crises and national 
paradigms explain changes in environmental factors, accounting institutions and 
standards better than culture does. 
This does not mean that I believe that globalisation eventually causes 
total convergence in the economic and political sense. States and markets 
perform complementary functions and therefore the tug of war in the areas 
where they overlap is likely to continue. However, unification of accounting and 
disclosure standards for participants in international financial and capital markets 
has its merits. International comparability of financial statements of multinational 
companies does facilitate better resource allocation decisions across borders.5 
In some countries adopting IFRS will lead to a dual structure with a national set 
of disclosure standards for small and medium sized companies and an 
international set of standards for large and multinational corporations. In other 
countries such a dual structure already exists because of the small number of 
large companies and the large number of SMEs. 
The fundamental contribution of this study to the field of financial 
accounting is that it distinguishes between the roles that financial accounting 
information and standards perform under different modes of financing and 
different corporate governance systems. Analysing accounting and disclosure 
standards with regard to the functions they fulfil provides a useful framework for 
assessing financial reporting convergence. Applying this framework to the US 
and Japan, this study provides a comparison of the development and the 
financial accounting and disclosure standards of US-GAAP and JP-GAAP. It 
shows that convergence is progressing but not complete. 
Furthermore, the comparatively long time-frame for this study into the 
association between the WACC and voluntary disclosure shows how the relation 
changes in nature and importance over time. Another important contribution is 
that this study investigates the relation between disclosure and the WACC 
whereas other studies analyse the associations between disclosure and the cost 
of equity or the cost of debt. In doing so present study shows that the cost and 
benefits of voluntary disclosure best be analysed with reference to institutional 
and corporate governance frameworks. The association between disclosure and 
corporate governance proves stronger and more stable, which indicates a 
certain reluctance or difficulty on the part of the companies in the JP-GAAP 
group to compete in global markets on international terms. 
Finally, extensive use of Japanese language sources on Japanese 
accounting and the Japanese economy has provided this study with an angle 
and depth that would otherwise have been impossible to achieve. 
 
 
1.4. Methodology and organisation 
Part 1 of this study consists of Chapters 2 and 3 and is concerned with analysing 
the environmental and institutional changes to Japan’s accounting system. 
                                                   
5
 In Japan, the JICPA even prescribes unified formats for financial statements and supporting 
schedules. From a user perspective this greatly simplifies searching for specific information and 
the comparison thereof. 
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Illustrating the progress, explaining the standards, and quantifying the extent of 
convergence between US-GAAP and consolidated JP-GAAP is the task set in 
Part 2 and carried out in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 constitutes Part 3 and 
seeks economic rationales for voluntary disclosure. A summary and conclusions 
follow in Chapter 7. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 present an analysis of the period 1868 to 2003. To 
structure the narrative this long period breaks down into four sub-periods as 
follows. The first period runs from 1868 to 1945, which forms the historical 
background for Japan’s modern accounting system. Japan’s accounting system 
came into being as a consequence of the Meiji Restoration and was part of a 
series of reforms to put Japan on equal footing with the West. After 1945 Japan’s 
post-war accounting system developed into a means to support economic 
growth and increase investment and fixed capital formation in certain industries. 
This second period ended around 1980 after the introduction of consolidated 
financial statements, which signifies a reluctant step toward decision-usefulness 
of financial accounting information. The transition from accounting as a policy 
instrument to a financial accounting system that takes into account the needs of 
investors proceeded slowly from 1980 onward until in 1996 Prime Minister 
Hashimoto announced financial and administrative reform. Plans for Japan’s 
new financial accounting system were announced in 1996 and implementation 
has taken place since 1998. The fourth period extends from 1996 to 2003. 
Chapter 2 consists of a narrative discussing developments of each 
environmental factor in chronological order. It identifies the crises, institutions, 
policy objectives and paradigms that shaped the environmental factors of 
Japan’s accounting system. Analysis of these environmental factors is based on 
predominantly historical and economic literature study using English and 
Japanese sources. Supporting data has been obtained from the Bank of Japan 
and Ministry of Finance downloadable statistics, and from the System of National 
Accounts through various sources. The role of accounting in the national 
paradigms and policy objectives, and the function of accounting standards and 
information as a tool for policy implementation indicate the direction in which the 
environmental factors and the Japanese financial accounting system itself 
developed. 
Based on the changes in the functions of financial accounting standards 
and accounting information, Chapter 3 analyses Japan’s financial accounting 
system with regard to the characteristics of the institutional framework from the 
viewpoint that accounting in Japan developed first as a macro-economic policy 
tool. Japanese accounting literature study provides the main source for analysis 
of Japan’s accounting system’s characteristics. Study of accounting theory 
literature and Japanese accounting theory literature forms the basis for the 
discussion of accounting concepts and approaches and how they in the past 
supported macro-economic policy objectives and are presently more oriented 
toward micro-economic development and supporting Japanese companies’ 
competitive advantages. 
Chapter 4 discusses convergence of accounting standards between 
US-GAAP and JP-GAAP using a similar approach and the same sources as in 
Chapter 3. Findings indicate that as the functions of accounting standards and 
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financial accounting information in Japan have grown more similar to those in 
the US, measurement and recognition standards have also become more 
similar. 
Analysing the convergence of disclosure standards is the topic of 
Chapter 5. Detailed study of the disclosure standards under US-GAAP and 
JP-GAAP focused on the disclosure requirements in the notes and supporting 
schedules to the consolidated financial statements over a period from 1985 to 
2003. Differences in disclosure standards are discussed in detail. Tables with 
references to accounting standards under US-GAAP, consolidated JP-GAAP 
and unconsolidated JP-GAAP indicate that disclosure requirements in Japan 
were definitely less than in the US but the gap has narrowed significantly since 
the year 2000. 
In Chapter 6 statistical and regression analysis provide the means for 
exploring the associations between disclosure and cost of capital, and between 
disclosure and corporate governance characteristics. The period under analysis 
extends from 1985 to 2003, and was chosen because of limited availability in the 
years between 1978 and 1984. Data sources include the Nikkei Electronic 
Economic Data System (NEEDS), the Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance 
downloadable statistics, and the CD-rom by the Japan Securities and Economic 
Research Centre. Data to estimate the disclosure levels of the sample 
companies are the product of the arduous labour of going through the 988 
financial statements of all fifty-two companies in all 19 years at the Diet Library in 
Tokyo. 
Chapter 7 will summarise and integrate the findings of all three parts of 
this dissertation. Recommendations for further research will be made based on 
the findings of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Environmental Factors and Paradigms 
2.0. Introduction 
2.1. International relations 
2.2. Economic growth and development 
2.3. Financial system 
2.4. Taxation system 
2.5. Corporate governance 
2.6. Functions of accounting standards under different paradigms 
2.7. Conclusions 
 
 
2.0. Introduction 
There are many environmental factors that influence the development of an 
accounting system within a country. Mueller (1967) distinguished accounting 
development into a macro-economic and a micro-economic pattern. He then 
made a further distinction between accounting as an independent discipline 
where accountants made judgements and estimates, and accounting as a 
means for administration and control based on uniform accounting standards. 
Nobes (1983) further specified a law-based and an economics-based pattern of 
development. He found Japan hard to classify because the existence of the 
macro-uniform influence of the Tax Laws and the Commercial Code on the one 
hand and the micro-economic based influence of the Securities and Exchange 
Law inspired on the US versions on the other. His test of measurement practices 
placed Japan in the macro-uniform, continental, law-based group together with 
Germany. Doupnik and Salter (1993) then found that the accounting system 
development pattern dominated by macro-economic purposes and law-based 
uniform accounting standards was more prevalent in code-law countries. 
Accounting development spurred on by micro-economic purposes occurred 
generally in countries where accounting regulation by accounting professionals 
who left room for professional judgement and estimations. This pattern occurs in 
common-law countries, which also happen to have larger, more active and more 
developed capital markets. 
Patterns of accounting development provide a clue to environmental 
factors and the way in which they influence a country’s accounting system. 
Accounting system development is the subject of analysis in Chapter 3, but here 
in Chapter 2 the focus is on the role of environmental factors that influence 
accounting systems in general, and the Japanese accounting system in 
particular. Within the above framework, it is helpful to know that these studies 
classified Japan as a code-law country, and Japan’s accounting system 
development as macro-economy oriented, with uniform accounting standards 
that serve the purpose of administration and control in order to implement 
administrative guidance with regard to macro-economic policies. 
Radebaugh and Gray (1993, p.43-46) identified the following 
environmental factors; enterprise ownership, sources of finance, taxation, 
accounting profession development, political system, the nature and extent of 
economic growth and development, the legal system, inflation, culture, 
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accounting regulation, international factors, the social climate, and accounting 
education and research. Mueller, Gernon, and Meek (1994, p. 3-8) name the 
relationship between business and providers of capital, political and economic 
ties with other countries, the legal system, the level of inflation, the size and 
complexity of business enterprises, the sophistication of management and the 
financial community, and general levels of education. 
Comparative research on the influence of international differences in the 
institutional environment, such as the legal regime or the government’s 
participation in financial markets, on corporate transparency or on companies’ 
capital structures has shown some affirmative results. Bushman, Piotroski, and 
Smith (2004, p. 244) find that the intensity and timeliness of financial disclosures 
increase when a country’s government participation in its financial markets 
decreases. On the other hand, higher disclosure of governance related 
information occurs more in common law countries with high judicial efficiency. 
La Porta et al. (1997, p. 1137-1138) found that “common law countries 
provide companies with better access to equity markets than civil law countries”. 
Japan is classified as a German origin civil law country. Furthermore, stronger 
anti-director rights are found in common law countries, which also happen to 
have larger and broader equity markets. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000, p. 47) 
study the influence of political influence on transparency of accounting 
information defined as the timeliness and conservatism of accounting income. 
Political influence is expressed as the dichotomy of the common-law 
shareholder governance model and the code-law stakeholder governance model. 
They find that conservatism and timeliness play a larger role in common-law 
countries, and continue to explain that this is caused by asymmetric 
conservatism (greater sensitivity to economic losses). 
Culture as an explanatory factor seems to have lost favour with many in 
present day academia. For the influence of culture on accounting regulation and 
economic organisation one can refer to Hofstede’s (1988) identification of four 
pairs of cultural values that affect behaviour in work situations. Gray’s 
(Radebaugh and Gray, 1993, p. 67-76) translation into an identification of 
cultural values that affect the development of national accounting systems can 
be useful for a characterisation of corporate governance structures as well. 
Following is a brief discussion of Hofstede’s (1988) cultural values. Scores are 
quoted from Perera (1989, p. 53, reproducing data from Hofstede, 1983). 
Collectivism as opposed to individualism: collectivism is a value that 
could be found in large multinational companies that take care of their workers in 
providing them life-long employment, housing, education and a sense of 
belonging and security. Keiretsu are groups of companies that work together in 
order to support each other’s activities and to reduce contracting costs. 
Essentially they are the post-war version of zaibatsu. Japan’s score on 
individualism is 46 (rank 28-29) compared to that of the USA at 91 (rank 50 = 
highest). 
Large power distance as opposed to small power distance: large power 
distance can be traced to Confucian influences that warrant a willingness to 
accept hierarchy and unevenly distributed power. The organisational structure of 
Japanese corporations is usually very hierarchical, and seniority still is an 
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important aspect. In the relations between companies there is usually a main 
bank or a main company who acts as a monitor and if necessary provides 
financial, management or technical assistance. Japan’s score for power distance 
is 54 (rank 21) and that of the USA is 40 (rank 16). 
Strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance: strong uncertainty avoidance 
may be found in the strict adherence to company rules and procedures such as 
job rotation within the firm and enterprise unions instead of trade unions. At the 
corporate governance level one can identify the interlocking of shares which 
served partly to prevent hostile take-overs. Japan scored 92 (rank 44) for 
uncertainty avoidance, whereas the USA scored 46 (rank 11). 
Masculinity versus femininity: masculinity stands for achievement and 
material success, and femininity stands for relationships, modesty, and caring for 
the weak. According to Hofstede (1983, as reproduced in Perera, 1989, p. 53) 
Japan scored 95 (rank 50 = highest) on masculinity and the USA scored 62 (rank 
36).6 
Gray distinguished four pairs of culturally determined accounting values. 
These in turn are paired with relevance to authority and enforcement of 
accounting rules and to measurement and disclosure, according to which he 
classified the accounting systems in various countries.  
Authority and enforcement can be classified by statutory control versus 
professionalism. These refer to regulation by the state through laws on the one 
hand and regulation by the accounting profession through self-imposed 
accounting standards on the other hand. The other classification of the 
regulatory system is along the concept of flexibility and uniformity of accounting 
standards (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993, p. 74-75). The Japanese regulatory 
system is characterised by a legalistic approach towards uniform accounting 
standards. 
The pairs of “accounting” values with reference to measurement and 
disclosure are optimism versus conservatism with regard to measurement and 
recognition, and transparency versus secrecy with regard to disclosure practices. 
Gray classifies Japanese measurement practices as conservative, and 
Japanese disclosure practices as secretive. Chapter 3 of this study will discuss 
the characteristics of Japan’s financial accounting system in detail. 
A few last points about the influence of culture on the development of 
institutions need to be made. Informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, 
and religion form a society’s culture, and influence its institutional environment. 
Culture and cultural values are not static. Williamson (1998, p.26-27) postulates 
                                                   
6
 For what it is worth, based on my experience in Japan I would have expected Japan to score 
somewhat lower on individualism, much higher on power distance, and slightly lower on 
masculinity. Individualism is discouraged by Japan’s society and has only recently come to be 
somewhat appreciated in companies. Hierarchy is very strong in Japanese companies. There is 
some consultation with lower levels in the hierarchy but superiors will rarely encounter contrarian 
opinions from people in a lower position. As for masculinity, although I agree that achievement 
and financial success are highly valued in Japan, I think that this score may not entirely do justice 
to the strength of the concepts of on and giri in Japanese society and companies. Both concepts 
are based on reciprocal obligations in hierarchical relationships where the higher and stronger 
party is obliged to help the weaker (on) and the weaker party is obliged to show his gratitude in 
return (giri). 
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that changes in culture may be spontaneous rather than calculative. Culture is 
often a source as well as an object of national pride. Therefore I think that 
changes in culture and institutions are calculative in response to shifts in national 
paradigms as will be discussed in Paragraph 2.6. National paradigms in the case 
of Japan were the response to international changes that were perceived as 
crisis events. Such a response needs a critical mass the time for which to build 
up probably corresponds to the urgency of the crisis. 
As for influence of the political system, Japan is a constitutional 
monarchy. Until Japan’s defeat in World War II, Japan was not a parliamentary 
democracy pur sang. Powerful elite bodies were the army, the navy, the 
bureaucracy, the Meiji oligarchs, the zaibatsu, and the Diet which consisted of a 
House of Peers and a House of Representatives (Reischauer and Craig, 1989, p. 
224-225). After the depression from 1926 to 1931, the navy and army became 
stronger and stronger. After the war, the occupation authorities strived for 
democratisation. The Diet consists of the House of Representatives and the 
House of Councillors, whose members are elected. The Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) was continuously in power from 1955 until 1993, and has in one way 
or another been a government party since 1996. Although there has been ample 
internal strife by the various factions within the LDP, the survival of the LDP in 
government can be understood as a sign that both politicians and voters are 
striving for stability and continuity. 
According to Beason and James (1999, p. 159) “Politicians have 
generally concerned themselves only with the broadest outline of policy issues, 
leaving the details to be filled in by the bureaucracy.” Bureaucrats, especially of 
the Ministry of Finance and of the Ministry of Trade and Industry are said to have 
had frequent, formal and informal contacts with business and other 
constituencies. These contacts served on the one hand to obtain information on 
what the constituencies’ interests were, and on the other hand to implement their 
own policies. Hence terms such as “Japan Inc.” (Ishinomori 1992), “patterned 
pluralism” (Muramatsu and Kraus 1987), or “triad power” (Ohmae 1985) were 
used in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As we will see later, 1980 until 1996 is 
exactly the period where Japan’s business community had considerable 
influence over accounting regulation. 
MGM and R&G’s lists of environmental factors are rather long but 
provide a starting point for the decision which environmental factors to analyse. 
We have already established that Japan’s legal system is code-law based, and 
have briefly discussed Japan’s political system, the code-law stakeholder 
governance model, and the political clout of the business community and their 
influence of culture on Japan’s accounting system. Accounting regulation, 
education and research, as well as the development of the accounting 
profession are considered aspects of an accounting system in this study and 
shall be discussed in Chapter 3. The sophistication of management and the 
financial community as well as general levels of education are comparable to 
those in most advanced countries. Keeping in mind is that this study is 
conducted from the perspective of business economics, the remaining items 
listed by MGM and R&G can be succinctly summarised as follows.  
(1) International relations 
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(2) Economic development 
(3) Financial system 
(4) Taxation system 
(5) Corporate governance 
This chapter presents a discussion of the above mentioned 
environmental factors and their impact on the Japanese accounting system. 
From the perspective of the accounting regulators in Japan, the reforms of the 
accounting system over time represent a response to the transition of the 
economic system based on political capitalism characterised by government 
control to an economy increasingly based on rational capitalism. Transparency 
and disclosure of reliable information enable rational investment decisions in the 
market place. Clearly, the stages in the development of the Japanese economy 
reflect the transition from a developmental economy to a mature economy. This 
transition has been caused and characterised by the internationalisation of 
business with politics in its wake, and by the globalisation of financial markets. 
The developments within the sphere of each environmental factor will be 
discussed chronologically over the period from 1868 to 2003. A brief discussion 
of the pre-war period for each factor is in order to explain the origins and 
consequences of accounting development in Japan within a code-law and 
macro-economic policy oriented framework. Sections 2.1. to 2.5. will deal with 
the influence of international relations, economic growth and development, the 
financial system, the tax system and corporate governance practices 
respectively. Section 2.6. establishes the paradigms according to which the role 
of financial accounting information changed, after which Section 2.7. discusses 
the functions of accounting standards under different paradigms. Finally, Section 
2.8. presents a summary and conclusions. Appendix I, Table A provides a 
reference framework for this chapter at a glance. 
 
 
2.1. International relations 
Political and economic events in the international arena sometimes provide 
stimuli for institutional change. These stimuli may take the form of an acute 
sense of national crisis or a more gradual awareness that current practices are 
no longer producing desirable outcomes. Accounting institutions and regulations 
will change along with national policies. Furthermore, internationalisation in the 
sense of the enormous increase of cross-border transactions and investment 
contributes to the development of standardised procedures, practices and 
information. 
 
1868-1945 
In Japan’s modern history we find one overriding concern that has influenced its 
political and economic development over the past one hundred fifty years. It is 
the concern of maintaining independence and sovereignty in the face of foreign 
threats or demands. From 1639 to 1854 Japan had been a closed country. 
Foreigners were not allowed to enter, and Japanese were not allowed to leave 
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the country.7 As Reischauer and Craig (1989, p. 115) wrote, Japan was still free 
of serious external pressures in 1850. This changed when in July of 1853 a 
quarter of the US navy under the command of Commodore Perry reached Edo 
Bay and presented Japan with the demand to open up its ports for trade. 
Confronted with this problem, the Tokugawa shogunate was unable to produce 
national consensus on how to deal with Perry’s demands backed by an 
overwhelming military force. From then on until the present Japan has had to 
handle external pressures. Fear of occupation and colonisation motivated efforts 
toward modernisation in the last three decades of the 19th century. 
The period of Japan’s isolation that had started in 1639, officially ended 
when in 1854 Commodore Perry forced the Tokugawa Shogun to sign an 
unequal treaty with the USA. The treaty was unequal for it did not give the 
Japanese the right to set the tariff rates8 on the goods that were traded by the 
Americans in the extraterritorial concessions in Japanese ports. Similar treaties 
were signed with the British, the Russians, the French and the Dutch.9 The 
struggle to get rid of the unequal treaties lasted beyond the Meiji Restoration 
until the Tariff Act of 1897 abolished export duties, and “classified taxable 
imports into sixteen classes with rates varying from 5 percent to 40 percent” 
(Tsuru, 1995c, p. 45). Only in 1911 did Japan regain full tariff autonomy. 
The period between 1853 and 1868 is known as the bakumatsu, or “end 
of the shogunate”. Lack of consensus on how to respond to foreign pressure in 
1853 was one of the main reasons for the eventual demise of the Tokugawa 
bakufu. In 1868 the shogunate was overthrown and the “de facto” rule of the 
Meiji emperor restored. The Meiji leaders were determined to prevent Japan 
from being colonised, and to make Japan a first class country that occupied a 
leading position in the world. The slogan “prosperous country and strong 
military” (fukoku kyouhei) indicated what their idea of a first class country was 
(Tsuru, 1995a, p. 16-17). This ideal was to be attained through industrialisation, 
using Japanese spirit and Western technology (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 
17-18).10  
In pursuit of equality with the USA and European countries, Japan strove 
                                                   
7
 Except for those tiny places where Dutch and Chinese were allowed to reside for the purpose 
of trade. 
8
 The pre-Restoration agreement of 1867, which lasted until the Tariff Act of 1897 (effective from 
January 1, 1899), “applied a blanket 5 percent ad valorem rate on the value declared by 
importers at the place of origin. Extra-territoriality which went with the tariff agreement enabled 
foreign importers to stretch to the extreme its interpretation in their favor or even to smuggle with 
impunity.” Tsuru, Shigeo (1995c), p. 45. 
9
 Ishii et al., (1998), p. 228-229. See also Ito (1992), p. 11, and Allen (1946), p. 20, for a 
description of the possibilities for arbitrage. These resulted in the outflow of gold, and inflation, 
because the Tokugawa government had fixed the exchange rate for silver to gold higher than the 
exchange rate at the world market.  
10
 Morishima explains Japan’s very economic success as having been caused by the Japanese 
spirit and Western technology. He states that the nature of Japan’s Shinto religion is an ideology 
that provides “religious justification for the position of those in power and upholding the status 
quo” rather than “ religion founded on the basis of individuals with the aim of helping humanity”. 
“Since this areligiousness of the Japanese people led them to be materialistic, and since they 
were at the same time also nationalistic, they had no hesitation in working together for the 
material prosperity of Japan as a nation.” Morishima (1982), p.196. 
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to modernise its society and economy. To that end, the Japanese leaders were 
to establish administrative unification of the country. In order to put down internal 
rebellion and to be able to defend Japan against foreign encroachment, the 
leaders stimulated technical development of military weapons. In the wake of the 
military industries followed heavy and mining industries, with the helping hand of 
the state (Tsuru, 1995b, p. 64; Allen, 1946, p. 73). 
Regardless of Japan’s previous apparent disinterest in foreign affairs, it 
started to involve itself in the affairs of other Asian countries. Through the war 
with China in 1894/95 and with Russia in 1904/05, Japan became a major 
colonial power in Asia. Among its foreign territories were Taiwan (Formosa at 
that time), Korea (since 1911), the southern part of Sakhalin, and Manchuria 
(since 1931). Thus it secured export markets and sources for the imports of 
natural resources. Japan took part in World War I on the side of the Allied Forces. 
As we will see later in section 2.2., World War I brought about economic growth 
and stimulated investment in Japan as well as in its overseas territories. The 
Pacific War gave Japan the opportunity to effectively occupy a large part of Asia, 
ranging from Indonesia, present day Singapore and Malaysia, up to Manchuria 
in Northern China. The wars with China and Russia had fuelled imperialistic and 
nationalistic tendencies that resulted in Japan’s defeat in World War II, which in 
turn brought about the occupation that she had tried so hard to avoid in the 
preceding ninety years. 
The prosperous country, strong army ideal can be understood as the 
purpose for which the nation and its institutions were being built, and for which 
wars were fought and colonialism started. Naturally, the development of 
accounting standards in that period served to enable that very same aim. 
 
1945-1980 
After Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, the reforms under the Allied 
(American) Occupation Forces were aimed at democratising Japan. To this 
purpose the zaibatsu groups were dissolved, their shares sold to the public, and 
the Anti-Monopoly Act (promulgated on April 14, 1947 and fully implemented 
from July 20, 1947) was established. These measures dispersed economic 
power and increased demand for investment. The accounting regulations related 
to the dissolution of the zaibatsu had a great influence on the establishment of 
the Business Accounting Principles (BAP) in 1949 and on the improvement of 
the Japanese accounting system. 
Redistribution of wealth due to land reforms started with the First Land 
Reform Act (promulgated on December 28, 1945 and operative from February 1, 
1946). The emancipation of workers due to the Trade Union Law (promulgated 
on December 20, 1945, executed from March 1, 1946), the Labour Relations 
Adjustment Act of 1946, and the Labour Standards Law (promulgated on April 7, 
1947 and executed from September 1, 1947) was another cause of 
democratisation (Chiba, 1998, p. 150; Ito, 1992, p. 54-55). 
 Russia, a member of the eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission 
prevented an agreement on war reparations because it insisted that plant and 
equipment removals from Manchuria and Sakhalin were war trophies instead of 
reparations. In April 1947, the USA used its power to instruct SCAP to carry out 
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the Advance Transfer Program, which allotted 30 percent of the industrial 
facilities declared surplus to Japan’s needs to various East Asian countries 
(Cohen, 1949, p.421). 
Imports of foodstuffs and industrial resources that were indispensable to 
maintaining the bare standard of living were largely financed by GARIOA funds 
(Government and Relief in Occupied Areas). Therefore the American taxpayer’s 
interests may have contributed to the American government’s policies favouring 
Japanese economic independence. “In 1947 and 1948 this aid amounted to 
US$404 million and US$461 million, equivalent to 77 percent and 68 percent of 
the c.i.f. value of the total Japanese commodity imports” (Allen, 1965, p. 51). 
Upon surrender the Japanese economy came to a standstill, as there 
was no more purpose to 90 percent of the end-product output. Uncontrolled 
government spending during the war and the first six weeks after surrender on 
August 15, 1945 until the occupation authorities found out what was going on, 
had caused inflation. Initially, General Douglas MacArthur, who had been 
appointed the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (SCAP), only 
concentrated on democratisation and demilitarisation and left the responsibility 
for economic reconstruction in the hands of the Japanese people and 
government. After the Far Eastern Commission declared on January 23, 1947, 
that the standard of living should be restored to the level of the period 1930-1934, 
the responsibility to attain this goal rested with SCAP (Cohen, 1949, p. 417-419). 
The deterioration between the West and Russia, as well as the recognition that 
“China was unlikely to serve as a stabilising force in East Asia or an apt vehicle 
for American policy” (Allen, 1965, p. 17) caused SCAP to abandon its reformist 
zeal and concern itself with economic recovery. 
The Korean War supplied the Americans with a strategic motivation for 
maintaining military bases in Japan. For Japan it meant substantial special 
procurement from the American army and an incentive to the manufacturing 
industry. Special procurement equalled about 30 percent of the value of imports 
in 1951, peaked at 40 percent in 1952, and declined to 12 percent in 1960 and to 
5 percent in 1963. The value of imports rose from US$974 million in 1950 to 
US$1,995 million in 1951, to US$4,491 million in 1960 and US$6,736 million in 
1963 (Allen, 1965, table 20 on p. 278). This was very important because due to 
the procurement dollars Japan could import more natural and industrial 
resources. 
 Signing the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in September 1951, and the 
Japanese-American Security Pact in May 1952, made Japan an independent 
country again. As soon as the Occupation Authorities left, the Japanese 
government started to rid itself of SCAP legacies that did not agree with their 
ideas of the road towards economic development. Rendering the Securities and 
Exchange Committee ineffective (Tachi, 1993, p. 190) with the amendment of 
the Securities and Exchange Law in 1952, and the 1953 revision of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law which authorised depression cartels and rationalisation 
cartels (Nakamura, 1981, p. 47) are examples of such measures. 
 As we will see in section 2.2., the Korean War greatly contributed to 
economic recovery. The end of the Korean War led to the beginning of the Cold 
War. Thus, after Japan gained independence, the American government 
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continued to have military bases in Okinawa. 11  Art. 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution renounces Japan’s right to wage war. This is why, officially, Japan 
has self-defence forces instead of an army. The American military presence, 
which was a consequence of the Japanese-American Security Pact, exemplifies 
Japan's dependence on the USA. However, GARIOA aid stopped in 1953, and 
US procurement spending declined after the Korean War. 
Until 1971 everything seemed to go smoothly. The Japanese were 
concentrating on economic growth, using all the available means. In the 
meantime Japan reached agreements on war reparations, and re-established 
diplomatic and trading relations with countries of its former so-called “Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” in the mid 1950s. Credits, loans, aid and 
investment soon followed (Reischauer and Craig, 1989, p. 316). Furthermore, 
Japan entered the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bretton-Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates in August 1952. For a country aiming to be a 
trading nation, admittance into the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) was of the utmost importance. After initial resistance from Great Britain, 
Japan was allowed to enter the GATT in August 1955 under pressure from the 
USA, and became a member of the UN after normalisation of relations with the 
Soviet Union in 1956. By the mid-1960s, Japan had become the leading 
economic power in Southeast Asia. 
In 1964, Tokyo hosted the Olympic Games. This was an opportunity to 
show Japan's economic progress to the rest of the world. Normalisation of 
relations with South-Korea followed in 1965. Relations with the People's 
Republic of China were impossible because, under US pressure, Japan had 
recognised Taiwan in 1952. The announcement in July 1971 that US President 
Nixon would visit China in 1972, was called the "Nixon Shock" because it came 
without any prior notification, and added to a sense of insecurity. Nevertheless, it 
started a series of agreements leading to a peace treaty in 1978. The Japanese 
sense of insecurity was even strengthened when in August 1971 President 
Nixon unilaterally ended the Bretton-Woods system by terminating the 
convertibility of USD35 into 1 oz of gold. This "Dollar Shock" was followed by the 
"Oil Shock", starting in October 1973, when the OPEC countries announced an 
oil embargo. With this turn of events, the post-war era that had been 
characterised by high economic growth ended.  
By 1975 the Japanese economy was the third largest in the world after 
that of the US and the USSR. The First Oil Crisis had left Japan feeling very 
vulnerable to external supply shocks, and induced a national sense of crisis 
resulting in economic restructuring. The oil shock also marked Japan’s first 
departure from compliance with US foreign policies. In order to secure access to 
the oil its economy was so dependent on, Japan engaged in resource diplomacy. 
This kind of diplomacy took the shape of loans, technical co-operation, and 
financing of oil refineries (Hook et al., 2001, p. 32 and 96). 
In sum, after the occupation forces left, rebuilding Japan, making the 
country and its people prosperous, became the overriding national goal. This 
                                                   
11
 Okinawa was returned to Japanese administration in 1972, but only in 2005 did the US 
consider to leave their bases in Okinawa in order to redeploy their troops elsewhere because of 
the aftermath of the War in Iraq. 
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goal was exemplified by the Yoshida doctrine that gave primacy to economic 
growth (1948-1954) and “The Income Doubling Plan” (1960-1964) of the Ikeda 
Cabinet. 12  Accounting standards served the purpose of promoting capital 
investment, retaining funds within companies for reinvestment, and directing 
scarce resources according to economic policy priorities. Economic power gave 
the Japanese a source of national pride and leverage in the international arena. 
 
1980-1996 
The US had been Japan’s most important trading partner as well as its closest 
ally. Having taken the favourable trading terms for granted, Japan encountered 
increasing allegations of protectionism and dumping as the Japanese trade 
surplus increased. Especially in the 1980s anti-Japanese sentiments grew 
stronger as trade imbalances grew larger. Trade negotiations concerning textiles 
and steel had been conducted in the 1960s and 1970s. Machine tools and 
automobiles were the subjects of negotiations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Negotiations resulted in voluntary export restraints effectively limiting the yearly 
number of automobile exports to the US. The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry allotted export quota to the car companies (Ito, 1992, p. 370-371). 
An unanticipated consequence of the two oil shocks was an emerging 
awareness that the status of large economic power also includes political 
responsibilities towards the international community. Until then, Japan had been 
getting by under the wings of US international policies, but that policy proved 
increasingly unacceptable. Japanese style overseas development 
assistance(ODA) 13  and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asian countries 
consolidated Japan’s role in the region. ODA and FDI to East Asia often served 
the strategic and political purposes of market penetration and creating 
interdependent relationships. To a certain extent, the Japanese experience 
became a model and a source of inspiration for economic development in 
various newly industrialising Asian countries. 
Trade conflicts extended to political conflicts where the US considered 
Japan an unfair trading partner violating trade agreements, closing its home 
market, and practising dumping in order to destroy other countries’ industries. In 
turn Japan considered the US a bully as well as a cry-baby in need of critical 
self-examination in order to improve the productivity of its industries and the 
quality of its products.  
Trade frictions with the US and European countries culminated in the 
Structural Impediments Initiatives starting in the autumn of 1989. The talks 
resulted in a report in May 1990. The conclusions were that Japan should solve 
the following structural problems: “saving and investment patterns, land policy, 
the distribution system, exclusionary business practices, keiretsu relationships, 
and pricing mechanisms.” In turn, Japan pointed out what it saw as problems on 
                                                   
12
 Reischauer and Craig (1989), p. 285, 286, 288 (regarding Yoshida) and 310 (regarding Ikeda). 
13
 Overseas development assistance centred largely around exploiting the natural resources of 
East Asian countries, tying development assistance to the purchase of Japanese goods and 
services (explicitly until about 1980, or implicitly), which helped Japanese companies gain 
access to East Asian markets. See also: Hook, et all (2001), p. 194-196. For another reference 
see Research Committee into the Determinants of Foreign Policy (1999), p. 352. 
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the US side including “a lack of saving, a lack of worker training, and a deficient 
educational system” (Ito, 1992, p. 376-377). Segmental disclosure (since 1994) 
and related party disclosure requirements (since 1992) are a result of the 
Structural Impediments Initiatives. 
At the US-Japan summit in November 1983, a bilateral project team, “the 
Yen-Dollar Committee”, had been established in order to investigate the need for 
Japanese financial reform. The result was the Yen-Dollar Agreement in May 
1984, pointing out areas for deregulation in Japan’s financial system. September 
1985 saw the Plaza Accord, which called for intervention to bring about the 
appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar so as to have the exchange 
rates better reflect underlying economic conditions (Malcom, 2001, p. 88-89). 
The Louvre Accord of February 1987 was meant to stop the fall of the US dollar, 
but it was unsuccessful at putting an end to the rapid appreciation of the 
Japanese yen (Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, p. 226). It can be argued that the 
currency interventions combined with very loose monetary policy allowed the 
asset-inflated bubble economy to grow, until the bubble was finally burst due to a 
rise in interest rates. 
Changes in the communist countries starting with Gorbachev’s 
perestroika policies from 1985, and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, brought 
about renewed diplomatic relations between the USSR and South Korea, and 
China and South Korea. The Tienanmen Square Incident of June 1989 led the 
US and European states to impose sanctions. Although Japan did not oppose 
these sanctions, it did not criticise China as much as the other G7 countries did. 
This was possibly partly out of guilt over its own past actions in China such as 
the Nanking Massacre. Instead Japan tried to avoid international isolation of 
China. To the purport of which, Japan reverted to unofficial diplomacy (Hook et 
al., 2001, p.169-170). Part of which took place through private business relations, 
which makes one suspect that the attractions of the large Chinese market were 
another motivating factor. China’s open door policy and the apparent defeat of 
communism created new opportunities and markets. 
The year 1990 and 1991 saw the Gulf War giving the Kaifu and 
Miyazawa cabinets trouble deciding on their stance and on the actual 
contribution that Japan could make to support the peace keeping operations 
without violating Article 9 of the Constitution (Ishii et al., 1998, p. 360). 
After the burst of the bubble economy, competitive positions of Japanese 
financial institutions deteriorated gradually, although it still took the better part of 
the decade to find out how bad their situation actually was. However, the Clinton 
administration in the US took new initiatives for bilateral negotiations to open up 
Japan’s markets for automobiles, insurance and fund management between 
1993 and 1995. GATT’s Uruguay Round took place around the same time and 
ended on April 15, 1994. The yen remained relatively stable although strong 
against the US dollar at between 90-100yen per US dollar. 
Scandals related to payments by securities companies for compensation 
of losses sustained by privileged clients surfaced in 1989. These payments had 
been prohibited by law in October 1991, but that did not deter the companies 
from continuing these payments. New cases came to light in 1997 (Malcom, 
2001, p. 88-89). The international financial community watched several credit 
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co-operatives fail one after the other, and saw the capital erosion of Japanese 
banks due to the fall in stock and real estate prices. Allowing the failure of the 
Hyogo Bank in August 1995 meant the end of the “convoy system”. As a 
consequence of this change in attitude of the Japanese government, 
internationally active banks perceived loans to Japanese banks as increasingly 
risky, and therefore demanded a “Japan premium” on inter-bank loans to 
Japanese banks (Peek and Rosengren, 2001, p. 286). 
In the early 1980s, when 80 to 90 percent of the Japanese population 
considered themselves to be prosperous and middle-class (Ishii et al., 1998, p. 
360) it had become much harder to motivate everybody to work in a concerted 
effort to achieve economic growth. Social security issues, deregulation in 
response to internationalisation of business, fiscal deficits, trade frictions, and a 
changing world caused a lack in clarity of purpose, and made it impossible to 
identify and raise support for a single national goal. Furthermore, the old 
administrative and financial institutions that had served the paradigm of 
economic growth so well in the past turned out perverted and rigid in their 
approach to new circumstances. In the area of accounting standards we could 
see a piecemeal approach to unification of the system and the adoption of new 
standards for new financial products. 
 
1996-2003 
To make matters worse, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 affected Japan 
seriously. Japan conducted a larger part of its trade with Asian countries than did 
other G-7 countries. In 1998, the World Bank estimated that “loans to 
Asian-crisis countries account for 43 percent of the capital of Japanese banks 
(versus 27 percent for the G-7 countries as a group)” (Goldstein, 1998, p. 21). 
In 1999 the Diet passed a revision to the Self Defence Law so Japan 
could take part in the peace keeping operations in Kosovo. Art. 9 of the 
Constitution is more and more a topic of discussion. Although officially Japan 
does not have an army, its self-defence force is large and well-equipped and has 
the world’s fourth largest budget.  
The heavily debated Kimigayo and the Hinomaru became the national anthem 
and the national flag on September 9, 1999, and may be understood as a sign 
that for a part of the population nationalist sentiments are not a thing of the past. 
However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on US targets, and the 
ensuing war in Afghanistan again raised pressure on Japan to contribute to 
international security in a military way. This resulted in Japanese SDF staff going 
to Iraq in 2003 in order to assist reconstruction efforts. 
Japan’s government bonds have been downgraded several times by 
various rating institutions between 1998 and 2002. Although Japan’s national 
debt was already sky-high, the government planned to issue even more debt 
and also use public money to stabilise the bad loans situation in its banking 
system. It seems that the financial system has indeed stabilised and there is 
even room for cautious optimism about economic growth over 2005. In order to 
raise capital in the EU Japanese companies are required as of 2007 to issue 
their financial statements in accordance with IFRS or equivalent reporting 
standards. Presently, there is a project underway to study the remaining 
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differences between IFRS and JP-GAAP and investigate if further convergence 
is necessary. 
In response to the near collapse of the financial system due to an 
exacerbation of the bad loan problem towards the end of the first half of the 
1990s the government could no longer avoid taking action (see section 2.6.). 
Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a plan in 1996 “with the aim of revitalizing 
the Japanese financial market commensurate with the international markets of 
New York and London.”14 In its wake followed a huge overhaul of the financial 
accounting system. Both the financial system and the accounting system seem 
to be designed to at the very least create a level playing field for Japanese 
companies at international capital and financial markets.15 The functions of 
the accounting standards in this respect are providing transparency, and timely 
and full disclosure in accordance with international standards. 
 
 
2.2. Economic growth and development 
Like technological development, accounting has been an indispensable 
ingredient for industrialisation. Technology raised factor productivity, and 
financial accounting contributed to the development of joint stock corporations, 
capital markets and a more efficient distribution of scarce resources. GNP 
growth is an indicator of a country’s economic growth and activity. Interest rates 
provide a first indicator of the cost of funds and investment. Without barriers to 
international capital mobility, there is a relation between interest rates, exchange 
rates and rates of Inflation. Exchange rates are important for exports and imports, 
and provide accountants with the challenge of foreign currency translation. 
Inflation affects price levels, wage levels and thus the cost of raw materials and 
labour in productivity, but provides accountants with the challenge of accounting 
for the cost of inventory, work-in-process, and the cost of goods sold.  
Economic growth through industrialisation would not be possible without 
investment in productive capacity. Therefore, the final item that this paragraph 
touches on is capital formation. For an overview of long-term economic 
indicators see Appendix I: Table B. 
 
1868-1945 
Industrialisation in Japan started in earnest in the mid-1880s (Minami, 1994, p. 
84). Inflation had been a huge problem in the late 1870s but was brought under 
control by Finance Minister Matsukata in the early 1880s. The government 
started up businesses in strategic heavy industries that were soon sold cheaply 
to private entrepreneurs, many of whom benefited from this relationship. Figure 
1, which is based on Appendix I, Table B shows clearly that growth in Gross 
National Expenditure as well as in Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation were 
ignited by the Sino-Japanese War (1894/95), the Russo-Japanese War 
                                                   
14
 http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb1.htm 
15
 Porter, Michael E. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, USA, New York, The Free 
Press, may have had significant impact on the ideas regarding the regulatory functions of the 
Japanese state. Instead of trying to create national comparative advantages, the Japanese 
government is now trying to facilitate companies to build up competitive advantage. 
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(1904/05), and particularly World War I (1914/18) contributed to upswings in 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 1: GNE and Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (1875-1940) 
Gross national expenditure and gross domestic fixed capital
formation (in million yen)
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Looking at Appendix I, Table C, we find that the largest percentages in growth of 
military capital formation were in 1894 and 1897 (317 and 141 percent 
respectively), 1917 and 1918 (85 and 64 percent), 1932, 1937 and 1938 (75, 
210 and 96 percent respectively). In 1938 military capital formation constituted 
39.6 percent of total Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (See also Figure 
2).16 Appendix I, Table B further indicates that an enormous increase in exports 
caused a considerable trade surplus between 1915 and 1919. Hitherto and 
thereafter until the 1960s the trade balance showed predominantly negative 
figures. 
 
Figure 2: Military capital formation percentage of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 
percentage military capital formation of gross domestic fixed capital
formation
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Depression started in 1927 in Japan and was exacerbated by the world 
depression in 1929. Keynesian policies by Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo 
                                                   
16
 Estimations based on Ohkawa, Shinohara, with Meissner (eds.) (1979), Table A1 on p. 
251-260 as reprinted from LTES 1:213 (table 18), and Table A5 on p. 261-263, as reprinted from 
LTES 1:190 (table 6). 
 25 
induced an upswing, starting with the abandonment of the gold standard in 
December 1931. The war economy started from 1937 and made the munitions 
industry priority number one for which purpose special taxations measures and 
accounting rules were established. (See paragraph 2.4.) The national accounts 
for the World War II period may not be so reliable. However, for the period 1935 
until 1946, Flath (2000, p. 89, table 4.1.) states an average annual real GNP 
growth rate of –4.89, based on Economic Planning Agency data. 
 
1945-1980 
It is difficult to evaluate Japan's economic policy between 1946 and 1948. The 
government was trying to accelerate the recovery of productive capacity in major 
industries on the one hand, whilst trying to tame rampant inflation on the other. 
Appendix I, Table B shows that the price index with base level 1934-1936 rose 
from 3.5 in 1945 to 342.5 in 1951. Attempting the former took place through 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, for which the Reconstruction Finance 
Bank was the main vehicle (Ito, 1992, p. 58). See paragraph 2.3 and 2.4. for 
further discussion. Attempting the latter took the form of dissolving all private 
claims against the Japanese government arising from wartime procurement etc., 
and freezing assets and imposing a graduated tax ranging from 10 percent to 90 
percent on personal assets exceeding JPY100.000 (about USD15.000 in 1995 
prices) (Flath, 2000, p. 81). 
From 1950 until 1970 rapid economic growth prevailed in most 
developed countries. In the 1950s the growth rate in Japan was around 8 
percent, and in the 1960s it was around 11 percent. Economic growth, when 
defined as growth in GNP, is growth in aggregate demand. Aggregate demand is 
made up of the sum of consumption, investment, government expenditures, and 
net exports (exports – imports). Following the source approach to analysing 
economic growth, one looks at output (aggregate supply). Output should be 
equal to aggregate demand in the long run. The factors of production are capital, 
labour (working hours and employment), and technological level.  
When comparing the contributions of labour, capital and technological 
progress to the growth rates of GNP, Ito found that over the period between 1953 
and 1971, the production factor labour contributed 21 percent, capital 
contributed 23.8 percent, and technological progress contributed 55.2 percent. 
Knowledge in the form of technology transfers from Western countries, and 
scale economies constituting the lion’s share of technological progress. For this 
period, capital accumulation contributed more than labour. However, for the 
period from 1970 to 1980, the contributions for labour, capital and technology 
were 20.9 percent, 19.8 percent, and 52.5 percent respectively. Increases in 
employment and education accounted for the growing contribution from the 
labour factor. On the other hand, the “hours” component of labour input 
decreased from 2.4 percent for the first period to –5.3 percent for the second 
period. Thus indicates that the abundance of cheap labour of the 1950s and 
1960s had come to an end (Ito, 1992, p. 48-50). In the early 1970s the industrial 
structure had shifted from enormous capital investment in heavy industries to 
more knowledge intensive industries. The first oil shock accelerated this process 
significantly. 
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Figure 3: GNE and Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (1949-2003) 
Gross national expenditure and gross domestic fixed capital formation (billion yen)
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
19
49
19
52
19
55
19
58
19
61
19
64
19
67
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
GNE
GDFCF
 
 
Since 1973 the increase in Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation did not 
keep up with the increase in Gross National Expenditure (see Figure 3), which 
indicates that the importance of other input factors such as technology increased 
more quickly. 
Looking at aggregate demand, it is important to note that due to scarce 
foreign currency reserves and strict capital controls until about 1964, the 
possibility for net export growth was dependent on earning enough foreign 
currency to pay for imports of natural resources. Exports increased from 5 to 11 
percent of real GNP between 1955 and 1974. Furthermore, gross investment as 
a percentage of real GNP steadily increased from 16 percent in 1955 to 39 
percent in 1973. Inflation remained fairly stable at around 5 or 6 percent, except 
during the oil shock (Teranishi, 1999, p. 129, table A). 
The first oil crisis hit Japan very hard. In 1974 it resulted in negative 
economic growth (-1.4 percent), high inflation (GNP deflator 12.9 percent in 
1973 and 20.8 percent in 1974), and declining investment. Exports as a 
percentage of GNP halted briefly, and the increase in money supply was 
considerable. The effects of the second oil shock were not nearly as 
conspicuous, and the economy continued to grow albeit at slower rates than 
before. Soon after the second oil crisis the growth in exports recovered again 
(Teranishi, 1999, p. 129. table A). 
 
1980-1996 
It is likely that the somewhat slower growth in exports owed to the appreciation 
of the yen against the dollar after the Plaza Accord in 1985 (See Appendix II, 
Table A). Money supply growth of about 10 percent per annum between 1985 
and 1990 is one side of the loose monetary policy that caused the asset-inflated 
bubble economy. The other side is the official discount rate remaining at 2.5 
percent throughout the whole period (Ito, 1992, p. 133). See Appendix I, Graph A 
for changes in the discount rate. 
The asset inflated bubble economy got punctured when the discount 
rate was raised in several steps from 2.5 percent in May 1989 to 6 percent in 
August 1990. Stock prices plunged first, and real estate prices started to fall 
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dramatically in 1992. The Heisei-recession was a fact.17 Since 1995 deflation 
has been threatening the economy and has aggravated the bad loan problem. A 
strong yen has reduced the attractiveness of Japanese products. Therefore the 
share of exports in economic growth has remained somewhat lower than before 
the burst of the bubble. Investment in plant and equipment seems timid as a 
consequence of previous over-investment in production capacity and present 
low utilisation rates. Adding to this are the difficulty in raising capital at the 
depressed financial and capital markets and the fact that monetary growth is 
much lower than it was during the bubble years. 
 
1996-2003 
The bad loan problem and the deflationary pressure are destabilising the 
financial system and are severely damaging the economy as a whole. Japan’s 
national debt is currently hovering at about 160 percent of her GDP, and her 
bond ratings have been lowered from 2002. Japan’s Bond Dependency Ratio in 
2003 was 44.5 percent, compared to 27.6 percent in 1996.18  The official 
discount rate was lowered to 0.5 percent in 1995 and stayed there until January 
2001, after which it was lowered to 0.35, 0.25 and finally to 0.1 percent where it 
has stayed since September 2001. 
Japan was not alone in experiencing economic hardship, especially after 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 it became clear that the economies 
of the US and many European countries had also stopped flourishing. The Enron 
debacle and some other scandals turned the international public attention to the 
questionable quality of US accounting and auditing standards. Most stock 
market indices show a downward trend. After the completion of the Japanese 
Accounting Big Bang in 2001, revision of accounting and auditing standards is 
likely to continue as an ongoing process. An important task is to restore investor 
confidence in the market as well as the quality of financial and other information. 
 
 
2.3. The financial system 
A country’s financial system provides the infrastructure for the distribution of 
resources. Fund and capital distribution may depend on the market mechanism 
or may be subject to strict financial controls. Companies gain access to funds 
directly at capital or financial markets, or indirectly through bank loans. Countries 
with well-developed free financial and capital markets usually try to sort out 
information asymmetry problems through extensive accounting and disclosure 
standards. On the other hand, countries where companies depend more on bank 
lending provide a larger role for private information exchange and are likely to be 
less concerned with presenting a fair and true view of a company’s value and 
performance than with creditor protection. 
 
 
 
                                                   
17
 The first year of the Heisei period was 1989, and we are presently (2006) in the 18th year of 
Heisei and the recession is not over yet. 
18
 http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/brief/2004/2004f_01.htm, (April 4, 2006). 
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1868-1945 
Intending to realise its “rich country, strong army” ideals, the Japanese 
government planned the growth of a private banking sector through the 
establishment of national banks. In 1869 the government established the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). In 1872, the MOF promulgated Japan’s National 
Banking Act. And the following year the First National Bank was founded (Ito, 
1992, p. 31). The First National Bank was also the first joint stock corporation, as 
well as the first corporation to which accounting provisions applied. Many banks 
quickly followed. By 1880, about 32 percent of the total sum of national bank 
capital of JPY42.1 million belonged to the ex-samurai. In turn, 96 percent of this 
share was concentrated in the Fifteenth National Bank of Tokyo. Except for this 
“Nobles Bank”, merchants increasingly became the main proprietors in the 
national banks. The Mitsui Bank opened its doors in 1876 and was the first 
Western-style merchant bank in Japan (Tamaki, 1995, p. 38-41). 
In 1878 the Tokyo Stock Exchange opened. Initially most of the 
transactions concerned specie and public bonds, but already in the 1890s the 
larger part consisted of trading stocks. Although at the bourse, the transactions 
were mainly margin transactions of a speculative nature in leading stocks such 
as railways and spinning. Spot transactions in stocks were actually conducted 
over-the-counter in the area around the stock exchanges in Tokyo and Osaka 
(Shimada, 2004, p. 34-35). 
Finance Minister Matsukata, who had been appointed in October 1881, 
addressed the inflation by policies intended to balance the budget and increase 
the amount of silver and gold specie. The first step was to abolish inconvertible 
government notes. Next, he raised consumption taxes such as on tobacco and 
liquor (Suzuki, 1962, p. 38-39), and he sold government owned companies to 
the public. The function of the Yokohama Specie Bank became absorbing specie 
from abroad through handling the foreign bills of exchange connected with 
exports. This is what it successfully accomplished. The third pillar of Matsukata’s 
policy was a Central Bank. The Bank of Japan was founded in 1882. The Bank 
was under tight control of the Ministry of Finance. Art. 24 of the Regulations of 
the Bank of Japan stipulated that the government could stop activities contrary to 
the Regulations, as well as activities that are contrary to the interest of the State. 
The issue of silver-convertible banknotes from January 1886 marked the real 
start of the Japanese banking and financial system.  
In 1883, the National Banking Act was revised to include a clause that a 
bank’s license could only be renewed if the bank would give up the privilege of 
note issue. By 1899, the national banks were reformed into ordinary banks, 
liquidated, absorbed by other banks or wound up by the government. The 
distinction between ordinary banks, savings banks, and long-term credit banks 
dates from about 1890, which is when the Bank Decree and the Savings Bank 
Decree were promulgated (Tamaki, 1995, p. 63, 75, 77, and 104). 
The indemnity payments from the Sino-Japanese War enabled the 
adoption of the gold standard in 1897. China agreed to pay the indemnity in 
English pounds (£38 million) to the Japanese government in London in a series 
of instalments. Part of the foreign currency reserve was transmitted to Japan, 
part was spent as mentioned above for military and naval expansion 
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procurements abroad. The foreign currency reserve was also used to back large 
increases in note issue (Allen, 1980, p. 24-27). 
As can be understood from the above distribution of the indemnity 
payments, after the war with China, the government did not plan the return to a 
peacetime economy. In order to finance its plans, it decided to establish a 
number of special purpose banks. The Taiwan Bank and the Chosen (Korea) 
Bank were established for local development. The Hypotec Bank and the 
Agri-Industrial Bank were both established in 1896 to provide long-term loans to 
the agricultural and industrial sectors, and Hokkaido Development Bank 
provided the same services for the development of Hokkaido from 1900 (Tamaki, 
1995, p. 98-99; Suzuki, 1962, p. 77).  
From 1902, the Japan Industrial Bank started its operations aimed at the 
development of industrial capital. It also acted as a second specie bank and 
facilitated foreign investments (especially in South Manchuria), and investment 
by foreigners in Japan (Suzuki, 1962, p. 77). It sold its own debentures or 
debentures of public undertakings such as the South Manchuria Railway 
Company mainly on the London capital market to an amount of about 350 million 
yen between 1902 and 1911 (Allen, 1946, p. 49). 
Japan had financed its war with Russia (1904/05) by accumulating 
massive foreign debt. Due to World War I, the real interest rates on the world 
market rose dramatically, and a depreciation of the Japanese yen, enabled 
Japan to become a net lender by the end of 1919. The Japanese government 
issued considerable loans to allied governments and China. A large portion of 
the loans to China had been issued without security, and had to be written off. 
Loans to Russia were rendered unrecoverable by the Russian Revolution (Flath, 
2000, p. 45). 
At the end of the Meiji period in 1912, the Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Yasuda and Dai-Ichi banks had emerged as big commercial banks, and formed 
the base for the growth of the zaibatsu. “The Big Five, with a capital share of 16 
per cent, commanded 24 per cent of the total ordinary bank deposits and 21 per 
cent of the total advances on average in” the years between 1911 and 1919 
(Tamaki, 1995, p. 127). From the start of the depression in 1920, the number of 
ordinary and savings banks declined through mergers and liquidations. This 
development reinforced the “Big Five’s” positions even more. 
The Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, had disastrous consequences for 
the banks starting with the loss of many bank records of the 63 percent of the 
bank offices that were destroyed by fire. To provide relief for the businesses in 
the affected area, the government imposed a month-long moratorium on the 
collection of notes and other settlements. When the due date came around, the 
bill could be taken to a bank to be discounted. Then the bank would present the 
bill to the BOJ who would rediscount the bill and stamp it with the words 
“Earthquake Bill”. In case the BOJ suffered a loss from these transactions, the 
government would guarantee it up to JPY100 million (Nakamura, 1994, p. 28). 
Many companies were saved in this way, but a considerable part of the 
Earthquake Bills issued by the banks, seems have been used to finance the 
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growth of a comparatively small number of companies.19 As a consequence of 
the bad bills, a bank run started in 1927, and some 126 banks were closed. The 
rationalisation movement also promoted bank mergers and thus strengthened 
the amalgamation trend. The number of ordinary banks declined from 1,280 to 
377 between 1927 and 1937 (Tamaki, 1995, p. 154 and 161), and further to 69 in 
1945 (Minami, 1994, p. 115). For the securities market and non-banking financial 
institutions, the banking crisis meant growth. 
From the start of the war with China in 1937, the Japanese economy 
became more and more war oriented. The financial system served to 
accommodate these policies as a consequence of which the banks were no 
longer free to determine their own course. The stock market was closed towards 
the end of the war because shareholder influence on company management 
decisions and shareholder dividends did not serve the purposes of the wartime 
government 
 
1945-1980 
Inflation soared at 51.1 percent in 1945, 364.5 percent in 1946, 195.9 percent in 
1947, and 165.6 percent in 1948.20 Ishibashi Tanzan, the finance minister, 
argued that this was not “’true inflation’ as defined by Keynes in The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (demand in excess of supply under 
full employment conditions). Because resources were idle, much of the 
population was unemployed, and there was still room to increase production. 
The way to deal with it therefore was not to suppress demand but to increase 
production. To do so, Ishibashi advocated 1. using the Reconstruction Finance 
Bank to channel funds to priority industries, and 2. adopting ‘priority production 
plans’ that would encourage production of coal and steel” (Tachi, 1993, p. 33-34). 
Thus he proposed to drive the economy to full employment. 
For the government, the inflation had the beneficial consequence that its 
wartime debts were greatly reduced. On the other hand, the inflation also did 
away with a large part of private savings, and thus inhibited large-scale private 
investment. Wartime financial institutions had been closed for liquidation. The 
zaibatsu banks had been closed and were in the process of being re-organised 
in accordance with anti-monopoly requirements. Other commercial and special 
banks were short of liquid funds, and were unable to accommodate many large 
borrowers. The solution was found in the establishment of public financial 
institutions. 
The Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) was established on October 29, 
1946 (BOJ Research Department, 1969c, p. 385), and started operations on 
January 15, 1947. The RFB “was designed as an emergency source of credit for 
organisations considered essential to production for economic recovery but 
                                                   
19
 For a detailed accounts, please refer to: Tamaki (1995), p. 147-149, and Nakamura (1994), p. 
31. 
20
 Goldsmith (1983), p. 133. According to Goldsmith, the deficit of the central government 
equalled 14, 7, and 6 percent of GNP, whereas credits of the banking system to the government 
amounted to about 8, 13.5, and 5.5 percent of GNP in 1945, 1946, and 1947 respectively. (Ibid. p. 
133) The lions share of the burden was borne by the Bank of Japan, or in other words by the 
printing presses. 
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which do not have adequate financial condition, record of earnings, etc., to justify 
the amounts of desired credits from regular commercial banks” (BOJ Research 
Department, 1969a, p.403). The active life and therefore the loans were limited 
to a maximum of three years. The idea was that “at the end of that period normal 
banking facilities must be prepared to assume the full financing burden in all 
fields” (BOJ Research Department, 1969c, p. 391). 
The importance of the Reconstruction Finance Bank can be understood 
from the following quote: “In just a little over 18 months following the start of 
operations, the RFB had made loans totalling 82 billion yen. This figure 
represented over 24% of all loans made by all financial institutions in Japan 
(BOJ Research Department, 1969d, p. 674). According to Brown, by March 1949, 
the RFB was supplying 32.3 percent of all bank loans. Furthermore, from its 
establishment in 1946 through 1949, it supplied 23.8 percent of all bank loans 
(Brown, 1999, p. 54, and note 2 on p. 247). Loans outstanding had increased 
from 4,117 million at the end of January 1947 to 48,479 million at the end of 
January 1948. In March 1948, about 75 percent of its debentures were held by 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ Research Department, 1969d, p. 659). In other words 
most of its funds came from the printing presses. 
Joseph M. Dodge, an American banker who came to Japan as an 
advisor to the Occupation authorities in 1949, advocated a balanced budget, 
reducing Reconstruction Bank financing, and stopping price differential 
subsidies.21 In order to curb the inflation, the Dodge Plan was put into force in 
1949. This meant that the fiscal budget was drastically tightened. It is clear that 
the implementation of the Dodge Line in 1949 contributed to reduced 
government borrowing, monetary base growth rate and government budget 
growth rate. This caused the growth of GNP to briefly fall until the Korean War 
gave the economy a new incentive. 
The Dodge Plan prohibited the issuing of new debentures by the RFB, 
and restricted its lending to the industrial field and for capital investment 
purposes only.22 The Japan Development Bank was established on April 20, 
1950. Initially its main purpose was to refinance RFB loans. On January 16, 
1952, the Japan Development Bank absorbed the RFB (BOJ Research 
Department, 1969, p. 694). It became the important tool for long-term financing 
in the policies that promoted capital accumulation/investment in key industries. 
The Industrial Bank of Japan 23  was converted into a debenture issuing 
long-term credit bank following the Long-term Credit/Trust Bank Law of 1952. 
The Long-term Credit Bank of Japan also dated from December 1952. Other 
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 The government set official prices of goods lower than their production prices and 
compensated for the difference with subsidies. Tachi (1993), p. 34. 
22
 Operating loans constituted roughly half of the loans to industry. SCAP found that a 
considerable part of the operating loans was made for deficit financing. In addition, SCAP was 
concerned that the Reconstruction Finance Committee upon which recommendations the loans 
were made, practiced favouritism and served political interests. See BOJ Research Department, 
1969d, p. 659 and 664. 
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 The Industrial Bank of Japan had been one of the special banking institutions together with 
the Hypothec Bank and the Hokkaido Colonisation Bank. In 1950 the Industrial Bank of Japan 
was converted into an ordinary bank, and from December 1952 it became a long-term credit 
bank again. For reference see Suzuki, (1987), p. 200. 
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providers of long-term financing were trust banks. Trust funds were similar to 
fixed deposits with maturities of two to five years (Horne, 1985, p. 29-30). 
Other public financial institutions fulfilled their own specific purposes. For 
example the Export Finance Bank (from 1952 called Export-Import Bank) was 
established on December 15, 1950 and started operations in February 1951. 
The Small Business Finance Corporation, the Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery 
Finance Corporation, the People’s Finance Corporation, the Central Bank of 
Commerce and Industry24, and the Central Bank for Agriculture and Forestry25 
fulfilled financing tasks oriented towards the constituencies mentioned in their 
names. Their funds came from the Postal Savings Deposit Fund (Trust Fund 
Bureau) (Allen, 1980, p. 109-110; Suzuki, 1987, p. 287-288). 
Although postal savings had been used by the government for its various 
purposes including military investments, public spending, and industrial or 
economic policies on an ad hoc basis since 1885, this route was first 
institutionalised from the inception of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program in 
1953. 
SCAP had ordered closure of many banks, and refused to re-open the 
stock exchange until 1949. Capital was scarce and Japanese capital markets 
were strictly regulated. The priority production scheme by finance minister 
Ishibashi Tanzan directed funds to coal mining, electric power, steel and 
chemical fertiliser industries. Under the Emergency Financial Measures 
Ordinance of February 1946, private commercial banks were required to allot 50 
percent of their own loans to the so-called priority industries. Thus other 
industries were left with little access to funds. With few alternatives, 
over-the-counter trade however, continued vividly. 
Since there were few rules governing disclosure or the securities trade 
itself, many stockholders were basically unprotected and fell victim to scams or 
their own speculative tendencies. Although it was necessary to open the stock 
exchanges again, SCAP insisted on the establishment of a Securities and 
Exchange Law (SEL) and a Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) after the 
American model. The idea was that the SEC would supervise securities 
transactions independently from the MOF. Soon after the Occupation Authorities 
left, the role of the SEC was reduced to an insignificant office within the MOF. 
The Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 provided the rules for the 
securities and exchange transactions but also established a sharper than ever 
separation of banking and securities sectors. This part of the legislation was 
inspired by the American Glass-Steagal Act. Accounting and disclosure 
guidelines were laid down in the Business Accounting Principles and the 
Working Rules for Financial Statements.  
Following the above developments, at the beginning of the high-growth 
period the Japanese financial system displayed several characteristics. These 
characteristics were a consequence of severe capital shortage, the 
compartmentalisation of the financial system, and strict regulations. Various 
authors have described and analysed these characteristics in great detail26, so 
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 商工中銀 (shoukou chuugin) 
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 農林中銀 (nourin chuugin) 
26
 See for example Suzuki (1987), and Teranishi (1999). 
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the following explanation will be brief. 
“Over-borrowing” indicated the fact that companies relied primarily on 
bank loans to finance their operations. The banks extended more credit than 
they acquired from deposits or their own capital. Banks therefore borrowed most 
of this difference from the Bank of Japan. This situation was referred to as 
“over-loan”. In addition, an inter-bank market developed where city banks 
borrowed the surplus funds from regional banks, mutual savings banks, credit 
co-operatives and other financial institutions. Interest rate controls and 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions inhibited the development of open 
bond markets. On the other hand, interest rate controls together with the 
segmentation of various types of financial institutions prevented destructive 
competition (Suzuki, 1987, p. 21-25). 
Compartmentalisation of the financial system facilitated control by the 
Ministry of Finance. The government (starting with SCAP)27 kept interest rates 
as low as possible, in order to keep the cost of capital low and price levels stable. 
Over-loan gave the Bank of Japan the opportunity to impose credit ceilings and 
indirectly influence the city banks’ lending behaviour, especially in times of tight 
money. Window guidance in its simplest form imposed penalty discount rates on 
banks that surpassed their borrowing (and indirectly their lending) quota 
(Nakamura, 1981, p. 149). 
Some claim that the Ministry of Finance used window guidance “to direct 
capital to key industries”.28 In the period until about 1973, keiretsu companies 
relied heavily on their main banks or lending consortia headed by their main 
bank. As the main banks were involved in monitoring the companies, it is 
possible that the MOF may have had some indirect influence through the main 
banks. Whatever, the degree of success of these policies may have been, it is 
clear that it is the individual savers and investors were the ones losing out in the 
Japanese financial system. 
Nominal Japanese interest rates until about 1970 were higher than US 
interest rates. However, after adjustment for inflation, the real interest rates in 
Japan were lower than in the USA. Due to restrictions at the Japanese financial 
markets, foreign capital could not freely enter. Therefore, interest rate controls 
were sustainable. 
The low interest rates were a pity for depositors at city banks and the 
postal system29, but they had few options. They could not invest in government 
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 The Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law of December 1947 gave the government the 
authority to regulate interest rates in order to prevent interest rate competition in order to ensure 
profitability of financial institutions on the one hand, whilst suppressing so-called ‘unfair’ lending 
rates, on the other. See Suzuki (1987), p. 41. 
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 For example Brown (1999), p. 55. Furthermore, Tachi (1993, p. 82) writes: “It was easy for 
government authorities to control the economy. Corporations (…) were forced to depend on 
loans from financial institutions, so all the authorities had to do was exert pressure on institutions 
to make the entire economy fall into line.” Although on p. 91 he claims as follows: “Then there is 
‘moral suasion’ – direct regulation, ‘window guidance’, and lending ceilings that are used to 
control increases in the lending of private institutions, but are not coercive. Institutions do not 
have to follow moral suasion if they do not want to, but since the Bank of Japan is their lender of 
last resort, it is hard to ignore.” 
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 Postal saving ordinary deposits yielded 3.96 percent until 1960. From 1961 until 1971, the 
interest rate on postal savings was 3.60 percent. Goldsmith (1983), p. 155. 
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bonds for they hardly existed due to a balanced budget policy, and the ones that 
existed were held by financial institutions. In addition to that, there was no 
secondary market. A possibility was trust bank deposits. In 1954 and 1955 the 
five year deposit interest rate was 9 percent. From 1956 until 1973 it was about 7 
percent (Goldsmith, 1983, p. 155). 
Securities markets remained underdeveloped and played a secondary 
role in the financing of companies and the investment of savings alike. As 
explained elsewhere in this chapter, tax incentives promoted savings in the form 
of bank deposits. Most companies adhered to the practice of paying stable 
dividends of 5 yen per share. Until the first oil shock most shares were issued at 
a face value of 50 yen per share, and gratis distributions were very common 
practice. 
The percentage of stock-ownership by financial institutions and business 
companies increased considerably in this period. The practice of purchasing 
stocks for the purpose of mutual shareholding by banks and business 
corporations served to strengthen former zaibatsu ties into keiretsu or business 
groups. It is generally assumed that the reason was that Japanese companies 
wanted to protect themselves against national and especially foreign hostile 
take-overs when Japan joined the OECD in 1964 and agreed to liberalise its 
financial markets (Okumura, 1999, p. 123). 
A characteristic of the reciprocal shareholding system was that dividends 
could stay low because it would only make the cost of equity capital higher for 
each other to raise dividends. Minority shareholders did not have enough clout to 
demand higher dividends. Ever decreasing yields and a declining percentage of 
individual investors were the consequence. Since the 1962 revision of the 
Commercial Code, restrictions on dividend payments consisted of deferred 
start-up expenses, organisation expenses, bond issuing expenses, and R&D 
expenses (CC Art.286). 
The Anti-Monopoly Act of 1947 limited stock ownership by banks to 5 
percent of a company’s total stock. In 1953, this rule was changed to 10 percent 
(Okumura, 1999, p. 122). In 1977 the limit was set at 5 percent again, but for the 
period presently under discussion it is important to note that banks could hold up 
to 10 percent of a company’s stock. The fixed nature of corporate stockholdings 
can be illustrated as follows. In 1975 sales by individuals accounted for 61.4 
percent of the total sales of stocks at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and for 59.8 
percent of the purchases. Corporations accounted for 15.7 percent of the sales 
and 15.8 percent of the purchases (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 1998, p. 220-221). 
At that time corporations (including financial institutions except for securities 
companies and investment trusts) accounted for 62.3 percent of total 
stockholdings. 
The equity to total capital ratio improved to 39 percent in 1955. 
Personally I think that because of the Korean War boom many companies issued 
new shares. Perhaps especially the companies that were not in priority 
industries and that also wanted a piece of the pie. However, the enormous rate 
of plant and equipment investment could not be sustained by equity capital alone. 
Therefore, the average equity ratio deteriorated again to 20.7 in 1960, 19.0 in 
1965, 16.1 in 1970, and 13.9 percent in 1975 (Nakamura, 1981, p. 64, 65, 249). 
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Together with the increase in the percentage of stable stockholders such as 
financial institutions and business corporations, the declining equity ratios 
indicated the growing importance of banks. 
Yields on listed stocks (ratio of annual dividend to current price of a 
stock) decreased from 9.44 percent in 1954 to 3.93 in 1960. They gradually 
increased again to 5.92 in 1965. At 3.37 percent the yield on stocks fell under the 
postal savings deposits and stayed lower throughout the rest of the 1970s 
(Goldsmith, 1983, p. 155). Knowing that dividend income was and still is taxed, 
whereas interest income from postal and bank savings was largely tax-exempt 
(see above), it is understandable that the stock markets lost their attraction to 
individual investors.  
Bond markets too developed slowly. Due to a balanced budget policy 
until 1965, the government scarcely issued bonds from 1949. The Bank of Japan 
bought back most government bonds before their maturity. Until 1973 public 
sector deficits were small and financial institutions had no problems absorbing 
the bonds, nor did the Bank of Japan. Corporate bonds had to be backed by 
collateral, a practice dating from the 1920s. In the four years up to 1973, the 
amount of convertible bonds doubled every year. From then until the time that 
the level of stock prices showed clearly no sign of recovery convertible bonds 
remained extremely popular. Another factor that influenced both the Japanese 
economy and the financial system were the fixed exchange rates within the 
Bretton-Woods system. The collapse of this system in 1971 created 
opportunities for arbitrage and the use of new products. 
As mentioned above, the first oil shock marked the start of fiscal deficits. 
In its wake economic growth slowed down. This was also a period where 
companies increasingly relied on retained earnings. Investment halted. Even in 
the case of external financing, companies increasing sought and found access to 
sources other than bank loans. Managers were finally able to dispense with 
compensating balances and strict bank monitoring.  
Deregulation progressed in response to domestic pressure for reform as 
well as external pressure to open up Japan’s financial and capital markets.30 In 
1980 the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was revised to 
liberalise cross-border transactions. Particularly in 1984 with the abolition of 
regulations on yen conversion and the liberalisation of Euro-yen transactions, 
Japanese companies’ access to international financial markets improved 
drastically. 
A secondary market for government bonds was opened in 1977 as a 
result of a large increase in deficit bonds, but only developed in the 1980s. The 
issuance of corporate bonds required government permission and a large 
amount of collateral. Therefore only a few very large companies could issue 
bonds. In 1979 the bond eligibility criteria for unsecured bonds were so strict that 
only Matsushita and Toyota qualified (Campbell and Hamao, 1994, p. 330). 
 
1980-1996 
During the 1980s companies were increasingly allowed to issue unsecured 
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 For a description of the deregulation process see Hall (1998), p. 20-25. 
 36 
bonds, for which bond-rating agencies were first established in 1985. Japanese 
companies were able to issue warrant bonds overseas earlier than at home. 
They issued massive amounts of warrant bonds with low coupon rates abroad. 
Due to the expectation of a rising yen in the late 1980s, companies used forward 
contracts for the bond principal at maturity. This construction reduced the 
principal amount (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 232). Arbitrage activity between 
the regulated domestic and unregulated offshore markets resulted in 
deregulation of Japanese bond markets. Further deregulation of the Japanese 
system occurred in reaction to the need for financial intermediaries to offer more 
competitive rates of return to their asset holders (Teranishi, 1994, p. 112-115). 
After the Plaza Accord in 1985 the Japanese government gradually 
lowered the discount rate from 5 percent to 2.5 percent in order to increase the 
value of the yen towards the dollar. In hindsight that is what started the 
speculative asset-inflated bubble economy. A raise in the discount rate in May 
1989 is what punctured it. The Bubble economy its causes and consequences 
have been extensively described by other scholars (Teranishi 1994; Cargill, 
Hutchinson, and Ito 1997). During the asset inflation years, securities prices and 
land prices increased disproportionately to the prices of other assets and thus 
fed the bubble. Banks, other financial institutions extended loans backed by 
inflated collateral. When the bubble burst many of these loans went sour, thus 
destabilising the banks as well as the whole financial system. 
In Japan generally dubbed “the Lost Decade”, this period has shown 
deregulation of the financial system at a pace and to an extent never seen 
before. However, the bad loan problem has not been solved, nor has the 
economy been resuscitated. Interest rates are still close to zero, and over the 
past few years, deflation has been threatening to aggravate the bad loan 
problem. The number of corporate bankruptcies has been growing, creating new 
bad debts in addition to the already existing ones. 
What did happen during the lost decade? The Nikkei Stock Index came 
down from 38,915.87 in 1989 to 23,848.71 in 1990. The trend was downwards 
after that except for 1994, 1995 and 1996 when it returned to over 19,000. In the 
past three years the level has been particularly low, 13,785 in 2000, 10,542 in 
2001 and in the last week of November 2004 it reached 8,300 to go up again to 
about 11,000 in April 2005. Disposal of cross-shareholdings is causing supply to 
surpass demand. Poor corporate performance is further reducing the appeal of 
investment in stocks. 
Initially lending declined as a consequence of the bad loans. Since 1995 
the government has been keeping interest rates at near zero percent. Banks are 
not eager to lend out money as it will not generate satisfying returns, and 
because they are struggling with their bad loans. With the current zero interest 
rate policy, bond prices are not expected to rise and are therefore not attractive 
to invest in. 
Non-performing loans constituted a problem of which the size and 
impact remained shrouded in clouds even to the regulatory authorities for too 
long. As late as 1994 estimations on the size of the bad loan problem were 
based on disclosure banks rather than independent audits. In addition, the 
definition of non-performing loans reported on bank financial statements 
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included loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, and loans on which no interest 
or principal payments have been received for six months or more.31 From 1995 
to 1999, the definition of bad loans was broadened every year. The MOF’s 
indecisive attitude stemmed from the hope that stock and land prices would 
recover (Cargill, Hutchinson and Ito, 2000, p. 48-49). 
In June 1995, the size of the jûsen problem (the bad loans at the seven 
housing corporations of which many were affiliates of the city banks) made it 
clear that the hitherto taken stance of forbearance had severely endangered the 
stability of the nation’s financial system. Forty-nine percent of the total assets of 
the seven housing loan companies turned out to be bad loans. A total of 
JPY6,273,800 million was classified as unrecoverable (Shikano, 2001, p. 147). 
Another 25 percent were estimated to be non-performing. From the summer of 
1995 Japanese banks borrowing funds at the international capital markets had to 
pay a “Japan premium”. 
 
1996-2003 
In 1996, about JPY6.41 trillion of the bad loans of the jûsen were written off. The 
losses were borne by the founding institutions (JPY3.5 trillion), other financial 
institutions (JPY1.7 trillion), agricultural co-ops (JPY0.53 trillion), and the 
taxpayers (0.68 trillion) (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 269-271). The remaining 
assets were absorbed in the Jûsen Resolution Corporation, established in June 
1996, whereas the housing loan companies were liquidated. In November 1996 
Hanwa Bank was closed. Its assets were sold to the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and the Resolution and Collection Bank (successor to the Jûsen 
Resolution Corporation) was left with the task to recover the non-performing 
loans. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced a thorough deregulation of 
the financial system in November 1996. 
The Big Bang as the plan was popularly called, aimed at making the 
Japanese financial markets free, fair and global, at par with financial markets in 
New York and London. Deregulation was to be completed by March 2001. “Free” 
stands for a market shaped by the market principle. By that time the 
segmentation that had characterised the system for many years was supposed 
to have disappeared in order to free the range of products and financing 
methods for investors, savers and companies. The rules according to which 
transactions are to be carried out should be “Fair” and transparent. “Global” 
refers both to the degree of access as well as the level of standards governing 
transactions, disclosure and legal framework of the financial system (Horiuchi, 
2000, p. 234). An overhaul of the accounting and disclosure system dubbed “the 
Accounting Big Bang” between 1998 and 2001 provides a disclosure framework 
largely level with the International Accounting Standards. 
Formally, liberalisation of the financial system has indeed been 
completed on schedule. However, dealing with the faltering banks and the 
disposal of the bad loans has been lagging behind schedule to a worrisome 
extent. November 1997 saw the collapse of Sanyo Securities, the Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities (which the MOF allowed to be 
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purchased by Merrill Lynch). Immediately the Japan Premium soared (Cargill, 
Hutchinson and Ito, 2000, p. 58). In December 1998 nationalisation of the 
Long-Term Credit Bank and the Nippon Credit Bank heightened the sense of 
crisis because of the departure of the convoy-system and the idea that there are 
banks that are “too big to fail”.  
Two capital injections took place in March 1998 and March 1999 
respectively. The 1998 injection was criticised for being non-discriminating and 
ineffective. In March 1999 the standards for securing public funding were higher 
and banks had to submit reorganisation plans. As a consequence several 
mergers and acquisitions took place in the wake of which there are presently 
only four large city-banks left. Between April 2001 and March 2003 banks such 
as Sakura Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Asahi Bank, Daiwa Bank, Sanwa Bank or 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank all disappeared and merged in order to survive. As a 
consequence of the financial big bang, there are fewer bank offices nowadays, 
they bear names like Mizuho, Mitsui-Sumitomo (SMBC), UFJ, and Resona, and 
they are all part of different holding companies.32 The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
was the only one that was already in 1996 the result of a proactive merger 
between the Bank of Tokyo and the Mitsubishi Bank, in rare anticipation of things 
to come. 
The wave of mergers extended itself to trust banks and insurance 
companies. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, p. 297) make the observation that these 
mergers serve to create stronger positions bridging the traditional segmentation 
of the financial system. In part these mergers may be understood as a defence 
against foreign firms with many years of experience offering a broad range of 
products and services. 
In December 2004 the FSA issued its plans for Japan’s financial system 
in a document called Moving Toward a Financial Services Nation. The FSA will 
strive to strengthen the competitiveness of Japanese financial markets and their 
international position. It aims to enhance market functions and improve 
confidence in markets. Furthermore, it seeks active participation in international 
standard setting activities.33 
 
 
2.4. Taxation 
Taxation is one of a national government’s prime concerns with financial 
accounting. Governments depend in a large part on taxation for their revenues 
with which they can draw up budgets. A government can use these revenues to 
invest in infrastructure or other projects through which they can build up its 
country or stimulate the economy. It can also use tax credits, accelerated 
depreciation or other taxation measures to stimulate investment in general or 
even in productive capacity or research and development in certain industries. 
Traditionally, taxable income equalled business income. Increasingly countries 
are now determining taxable income separately because of the disturbing effect 
that taxation may have on business income, business investment, as well as on 
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 See FSA homepage: www.fsa.go.jp 
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the valuation and depreciation of assets for business purposes. 
 
1868-1945 
Before the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese Tokugawa administration levied 
taxes mostly in kind (rice) from the about 75 percent of the population that was 
engaged in agriculture, and forced contributions from merchants and artisans in 
the form of gold or silver. 34  The Boshin Wars (Restoration Wars) against 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu, the 15th and last shogun of the Edo period, who resisted 
the new government, ended in May 1869 (Ishii et al., 1998, p. 237). War 
expenses left the new government with a deficit of about JPY27 million, and the 
need to revise the tax system (Sato, 1997, p. 194-195).35 At that time the local 
han governments still preserved financial autonomy. “With the abolition of the 
han the Government assumed responsibility for local administration. Although 
the revenues which the daimyo had previously received from their subjects were 
henceforth due to the central exchequer, it was not easy at first to ensure the 
collection of these sums” (Allen, 1946, p. 34-35). Furthermore, the fact that the 
state also took on the responsibility for the notes that had been issued by the 
han governments added to its financial difficulties. 
In 1871, the tax system was changed to a money-based system. In 1875, 
the distinction between regional tax and national tax was established. At that 
time regional tax constituted 82% of total government revenue (Masakuma, 
1976, p. 28). The introduction of land tax instead of crop tax was a painful 
process. It took from about 1873 to 1880, when the rate was finally fixed at 2.5 
percent of the value of the land (Sato, 1997, p. 194-195). In 1877, the Satsuma 
rebellion broke out. In order to finance the military expenditures, the government 
issued notes to the amount of 27 million yen and took on a bank loan of 15 
million yen.36 According to Tsuru, the inflation following the Satsuma rebellion 
caused a general price rise of 60 percent in the period of four years (Tsuru, 
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 In 1872, about 77 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture. See Allen (1946), p. 
57. In 1622 the population consisted for 87.3 percent of peasants, 2.7 percent townspeople, 5.3 
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 According to Minami (1991), p. 15, central government expenditure amounted to 30 million 
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25 million and 3.7 million yen respectively. 
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 Allen (1946), p. 37. Ironically, the bank loan was wholly supplied by the Fifteenth National 
Bank, also known as the Peer Bank. Tsuru (1995), p. 51. 
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1995a, p.10-11). 
Matsukata’s deflationary policy, and the military expansionist line 
followed since the Ningo Military Troubles (Ningo Gunran), in Korea in 1882, led 
to an increase in tobacco and liquor taxes in December (Sato, 1997, p. 
198-199).37 The institution of the “Income Tax Law” in 1887, established a 
national instead of a regional income tax system. The regional business 
operation tax (営業税) of 1878, became a national tax in 1896 following the war 
with China. The Business Operation Tax Law applied to twenty-four kinds of 
businesses including trading, manufacturing, insurance, banking, transportation, 
and brokerage companies (Sato, 1997, p. 202). 
The Business Operation Tax Law and the Income Tax Law are probably 
the first national laws that included accounting standards on measurement of 
assets, and the calculation of profit. Business Operation Tax was abolished in 
1926, and replaced by Business Operation Income Tax38 (Masakuma, 1976, p. 
31). Corporation Tax was established in 1899 as a part of Income Tax (Sato, 
1997, p. 202). In the same year, the new Commercial Code was promulgated. 
The Commercial Code contained accounting provisions to which we will refer 
later. However, it is important to note the relation between the various tax laws 
and the Commercial Code, as final tax returns were based on accounting 
according to the Commercial Code. 
Tax increases accompanied military operations, especially when Japan 
entered the war with China in 1937, and in the course of the Second World War. 
During the first three months of the war with China, the government already 
spent the same amount as a whole year’s national budget on military expenses. 
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, was followed by the Special 
Taxation Law Concerning the Kitashi (Northern China) Incident39. And the China 
Incident was followed by the Special Taxation Law Concerning the Japan-China 
Incident40 in 1938 (Masakuma, 1976, p. 31-33). In 1940, the tax system was 
simplified and revised. Corporation tax became separated from Income Tax. In 
turn, Business Operation Profit Tax was abolished. The wartime control 
economy was characterised by high tax rates, and by many special taxation laws 
for industries and regional authorities. 
An interesting detail is that income from Liquor Tax increased from 285 
million yen in 1940 to 1,131 million yen in 1945. During the same period 
Corporation Tax increased from 182 to 1,162 million yen, and Income Tax from 
1,489 to 3,820 million yen. The total revenue from taxes increased from 3,653 to 
10,152 million yen (Sato, 1997, p. 250). It makes one suspect that either the 
sake consumption increased during the war period, or that the increased excise 
taxes did not deter people from maintaining a certain consumption level. Either 
way, until 1908 land tax accounted for the larger part of national taxes, after 
which the main source became indirect taxes such as those on alcoholic 
beverages. 
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1945-1980 
In April 1949, professor Carl S. Shoup of Columbia University visited Japan in 
order to investigate Japan’s tax system. The Shoup Mission recommended that 
personal and corporate income taxes account for 50 to 60 percent of 
government income. Before the larger part of government income came from 
indirect taxes such as liquor tax and customs duties (Tachi, 1993, p. 111). 
Furthermore, it emphasised equity and fairness of the system embodied in 
progressive and broadly based income taxes as the mainstay of the Japanese 
tax system. Other aspects were decentralisation and improvement of tax 
administration and revaluation of all assets in order to correct the consequences 
of inflation (Ishi, 2001, p. 27-29). At the same time taxation of share premium 
was abolished. 
Modifications of the Shoup tax system were implemented soon after 
1950 as a result of which “equity was sacrificed for the conveniences of 
incentives and administration” and the tax burden of big businesses was 
reduced in order to promote capital accumulation (Ishi, 2001, p. 29-30). The 
Enterprise Rationalisation Promotion Law of 1952 established a special 
depreciation system for important machinery thereby reducing the tax burden for 
new investments in plant and equipment. Other tax measures included a 
separate tax on interest and dividend (1951), and abolition of the tax on the 
reserves of non-family business firms (1952) (Nakamura, 1981, p. 44). 
Not only did the Shoup Report have an enormous impact on the 
Japanese taxation system, it also exerted a profound influence on the 
development of the accounting system. The recommendations in the Shoup 
report included the establishment of: 
1. a certified public accountant system 
2. a Securities and Exchange Committee 
3. a body to issue accounting standards within the National Tax Bureau 
4. an accounting curriculum at Japanese universities (Arai, 1999, p. 213-215) 
One of the main problems was that there were not enough people with the 
qualifications to implement and effectively operate a modern corporate taxation 
system. 
From about 1950 to 1973, there was wide agreement that the system of 
taxation should serve and promote economic growth. Computation of taxable 
income based on the accounting standards of the Commercial Code, 
supplemented by the Business Accounting Principles and the tax laws did not 
create any discord for any of the parties involved. Among others, Arai (1999, p. 
219) calls this the “honeymoon period”. 
Between 1951 and 1961, the Special Tax Measures Law allowed 
accelerated depreciation for designated equipment purchases. Companies in 
targeted industries could write off 50 percent of the purchase price of designated 
machinery in the first year, followed by 20 percent per annum in the next two 
years. Initial depreciation of one third of the purchase price was allowed from 
1962, and one fourth from 1964. Eventually, this system was abolished in 1973 
(Flath, 2000, p. 202-203). 
Furthermore, between 1953 and 1963, export industries enjoyed tax 
exemptions for the lower of 50 percent of export income or 3 percent of total 
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manufacturing sales (Flath, 2000, p. 203). Between 1955 and 1961, automobile 
and steel industries benefited most from the special depreciation measures. 
Shipbuilding and machinery industries benefited a little less. Between 1962 and 
1973 again automobile and steel industries benefited most, although special 
depreciation expenses were smaller than in the previous period. Ogura and 
Yoshino (1988) estimated that the present value of special depreciation 
amounted to between 0.5 and 4 percent of investment expenditures annually for 
these industries. 
From April 1, 1961, a split-rate system was introduced to make it easier 
for companies to raise equity capital and thus reduce reliance on debt. The 
general tax rate on profit retentions was 38 percent whereas profit distributions 
were taxed at 28 percent. If profits were below 2 million yen the applicable tax 
rates were 33 and 24 percent respectively. From 1966 these reduced rates only 
applied to companies with profits below JPY 3 million and with a capital stock of 
no more than JPY 100 million (Ishi, 2001, p. 120 and 173, table 10.3). 
Corporation tax, enterprise tax, and residents tax together make up the total 
taxes paid by companies in Japan. Tax rates including these regional taxes 
amounted to 48.6 percent in 1965, increasing to 48.7 percent in 1973. US 
companies had to pay 49.5 percent in 1965 and 50.5 percent in 1973 (Tajika and 
Yui, 2000, p. 118). 
In addition to promotion of investment, the government also aimed to 
stimulate household saving by reducing individual income tax, allowing special 
deductions for interest and dividend income and for capital gains on the sale of 
securities. Other favourable treatments included low tax rates on interest, tax 
exemption for capital gains (until 1988), and special treatment of dividends, 
insurance, housing investments and pension funds. It is not clear whether tax 
incentives have indeed affected the level of personal savings. However, 
Japanese households seem to have a preference for savings deposits over life 
insurance and pension plans or shares.41 
Fiscal deficits emerged after the first oil shock. Corporate tax rates were 
raised in an attempt to avoid heavier reliance on government debt. Only in 1986 
did the MOF reduce nominal corporate tax rates. The difference between the 
nominal tax rate and the actually paid tax rate seems to have been the largest for 
companies with a paid-in capital of over JPY10 billion. According to Ishi 
medium-sized companies had the least opportunities to benefit from tax-free 
reserves and accelerated depreciation. Accelerated depreciation decreased in 
importance whereas tax-free reserves and tax credits for experimental and 
research expenses became more important. Nevertheless, actual tax rates 
continued to increase until 1988. (Ishi, 2001, p.195, table 11.2) 
 
1980-1996 
April 1990 saw the re-introduction of a single corporate tax rate at 37.5 percent 
for both profit retentions and distributions. The reduced corporation tax rate by 
then applied to corporations with a capital stock of no more than JPY 100 million, 
and profits less than JPY 8 million (Ishi, 2001, p. 173). During the high-growth 
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 Ishi (2001), p. 77, 140, and Chapter 8 for a full description of taxation of investment income 
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period it seemed that amendments to the Corporation Tax Law incorporated the 
accounting rules of the SBAP and the Commercial Code without any problem. 
Towards the end of the era, economic growth was no longer the universally 
shared single adagio. The different purposes of the tax laws, the Commercial 
Code and the Securities and Exchange Law had become more pronounced. The 
SBAP had become to be associated with accounting under the Securities and 
Exchange Law, of which the main purpose was investor protection and 
information disclosure for investment decisions. For the Commercial Code it was 
creditor protection and accountability. On the other hand, the Corporation Tax 
Law and the other tax laws had become increasingly concerned with collecting 
taxes based on the principles of neutrality and fairness (Inoue, 1997, p. 55-56). 
During the Heisei recession, the need for revisions of the tax system 
became more apparent. Had the bond dependency ratio (the ratio of national 
bonds to government expenditure in the general account of the national 
government) been about 10 percent in 1990, it stood at about 28 percent in 1995 
and at around 43 percent in 1999 (Ishi, 2001, p. 323, fig. 17.1). The 1990s saw 
large-scale individual income tax cuts and increased government spending in 
order to promote economic growth. Neither was very successful. 
 
1996-2003 
Because of the large government deficit, consumption tax was raised from 3 to 5 
percent as of April 1997. It seems that 1997 was a particularly dramatic year with 
a debilitating effect on the economy. Failure of major financial institutions such 
as Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities Co. generated a sense of 
crisis. The bad loan problem added weight to the call for revision of the tax 
system.  
Banks needed to write off huge amounts of bad debt. However, the then 
existing system made it hard to write off large amounts at a time. Hence the 
introduction of tax effect accounting in fiscal 1998. At the same time the 
corporate tax rate was reduced from 37.5 percent to 34.5 percent, and further to 
30 percent in 1999. This reduction was motivated by the desire to make the 
corporation tax level internationally comparable and thus create a level playing 
field for Japanese enterprises competing on international markets. Measures to 
broaden the tax base by eliminating exemptions, deductions and credits are still 
being considered. 
The second major revision entails another new feature of Japan’s 
corporate taxation system, to be named taxation on a consolidated income basis. 
Due to netting off profits and losses of companies within the consolidation, it is 
expected that the group as a whole will have to pay lower taxes. Together with 
the lower tax rates mentioned above, these measures are hoped to have a 
positive effect on companies’ performance and investment, and thus stimulate 
the economy. However, consolidated taxation is not mandatory; companies can 
opt for the new system, once having made the choice they can not go back to 
the unconsolidated taxation system. 
In addition to an ailing economy, Japan is also facing the problem of an 
ageing society with the working population peaking in 2005, and with ever 
increasing medical expenses. A solution will probably be found in creating a 
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composition of direct and indirect taxes that better accommodates the needs of 
the present day Japanese society. 
Ever since the establishment of accounting regulations and the tax 
system, the relation between accounting standards and the tax system has been 
strong due to the system of definite settlement of accounts (kakutei kessan 
shugi). This is one of the main reasons that Japanese financial reporting and 
management gave priority to minimising tax expenses over decision-usefulness 
of their financial information. As of the year 2000 tax effect accounting applies, 
and this problem will be expected to disappear. 
Although income tax was instituted as early as 1887, at the time it 
contributed only to 1.5 percent of total national tax revenues. After World War 2, 
Carl S. Shoup recommended a tax plan placing more importance on direct 
taxation. Because Shoup’s comprehensive income taxation system was too 
progressive in the eyes of Japanese tax administrators, it was only short-lived 
and it quickly eroded when the American Occupation ended. The one thing that 
did remain was the higher dependence on direct taxation in the form of individual 
and corporate income taxes. 
After Shoup’s modification of the system corporate income taxes bore 
the lion’s share of national tax revenues during the high growth period, whereas 
the share of individual income taxes was higher during and in the aftermath of 
the Bubble period. (See Table 1) It is also interesting to note that the share of 
indirect taxes is on the rise again. A consumption tax (VAT) of 3 percent was 
introduced in 1989. In 1997 the rate was raised to a still very moderate 5 percent. 
Local taxes show similar patterns except that the share of revenues from taxes 
on wealth is substantially higher (Ishi, 2001, p.9). 
 
Table 1. : Sources of national tax revenues 
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000a 
National taxes       
 Taxes on income 54.4 53.6 64.3 69.5 70.7 56.5 
    Individual 38.8 21.8 31.2 38.1 41.4 36.9 
    Corporate 15.6 31.9 33.0 31.5 29.3 19.6 
 Taxes on consumption 43.4 42.2 30.9 25.2 22.0 36.9 
 Taxes on wealth 2.2 4.2 4.9 5.3 7.3 6.6 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ishi, Hiromitsu (2001), table 1.3, p.9. 2000a: estimated percentages. 
 
From the above, it follows that income has been taxed rather heavily in 
Japan. The corporate tax rate as proposed by Shoup was a flat rate of 35 
percent. In 1958 the tax authorities introduced a split rate system with different 
rates for profit retentions and profit distributions. Since 1990 there is a unitary 
rate again, and it has been dropping from 37.5 percent in 1990 to 34.5 percent in 
1998, to 30 percent in 1999. In addition companies have to pay regional taxes 
consisting of enterprise tax and inhabitants tax. Thus the total tax rate on 
corporate income has been just below or somewhat over 50 percent. Until 1986 
the situation was similar in the United States, but there the total tax rate dropped 
until about 40 percent in 1993 and to 34 percent in 2000. 
Judging from Japan’s high tax rates on corporate profits and its high 
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dependence on corporate and individual income, one would expect that tax 
levels (including social security contributions) as a percentage of GDP will be 
high as well. Surprisingly, this is not the case. The level for Japan has been 
about the same if compared with the USA, but is low if compared with Northern 
European countries. See Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Tax revenues including social security contributions as a percentage of GDP 
Country Japan USA UK Netherlands Denmark 
1970 19.7 27.4 36.9 37.1 40.4 
1980 25.4 26.9 35.3 45.2 45.5 
1990 31.3 26.7 36.4 44.6 48.7 
1995 28.5 27.9 35.3 44.0 51.3 
Source: Ishi, Hiromitsu (2001), table 1.2, p.7. 
 
Ishi mentions several explanations for the relatively low tax burden in 
Japan, such as the absence of military expenditures, a low level of welfare 
commitments, and the prevalence of direct taxation rather than indirect taxation 
(Ishi, 2001, p. 24-25). However, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP in the 
USA stands at about the same level as Japan, and the USA does bear large 
military expenditures. The modest level of welfare commitments and 
contributions in Japan is probably more important. In addition, VAT in EU 
countries is around 18 percent and therefore much higher than in Japan, so it is 
possible that the difference in indirect taxation accounts for part of the difference 
in tax burden. 
High income tax rates combined with application of the definite 
settlement of accounts principle have created a rationale to keep corporate 
profits low, and concentrate on market-share and turnover as measures of 
performance. (kakuteikessanshugi) as it is called in Japanese, is based on 
Corporation Tax Law Art. 74, which says that taxable income should be 
computed on the basis of corporate profits reported under the Commercial Code, 
and approved by the general shareholders meeting. This means that taxes 
during the period to which this research applies, taxes have been levied on the 
basis of the unconsolidated financial statements issued following the accounting 
rules for computing corporate profits in the Commercial Code. Tax collection 
based on consolidated profits, and tax effect accounting, were introduced as part 
of the Accounting Big Bang. 
 
 
2.5. Corporate governance 
The relation between corporate governance and accounting and disclosure 
standards centres on accountability, and the problems that arise from 
information asymmetry between corporate managers on the one hand and 
investors and creditors on the other. This situation is further complicated by the 
fact that financial statements have to satisfy the partly different information 
needs of investors and creditors. Large creditors such as banks make use of 
collateral, compensating balances and debt covenants to reduce the risk of their 
stake. Informal private information exchange seems to play an important role. 
Residual beneficiaries such as shareholders have to rely on public financial and 
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other disclosure, and on their right to choose and dismiss the members of the 
board of directors. Types of shareholders may also make a difference. For 
example if a large part of a company’s shares are owned by foreign investors, 
that company is likely to be more forthcoming with financial and other 
information than if a large part is owned by a block of investors in the same 
company group. Capital structure, ownership structure, and company groups 
such as zaibatsu and keiretsu constitute the main topics for this paragraph. 
 
1868-1945 
At the beginning of the Meiji period, modernisation and industrialisation were 
deemed necessary to make Japan a rich country with a strong military to avoid 
colonisation by and attain equality with the West. Initially, the government 
involved itself in numerous industrial and mining ventures that co-existed with an 
even much larger number of privately owned enterprises in various industries. 
Although important for diffusing imported technologies, most of these 
government-owned ventures were still loosing money in the 1870s. Already 
heavily burdened by the expenses for the Satsuma Rebellion and the former 
samurai bond payments, the government announced to sell off its non-strategic 
ventures on November 5, 1880 (Reischauer and Craig, 1989, p. 145-151). Due 
to lack of capital most were sold at prices that were much cheaper than the 
original investments to businessmen or government officials that were closely 
associated with the Meiji government leaders. In the next few years many of 
these businesses became profitable. Most of them were in the hands of only a 
few owners. The Meiji government seems to have stimulated oligopolistic 
mergers and cartel-like organisation of industries in order to reduce competition 
(Reischauer and Craig, 1989, p. 155; Allen, 1946, p. 126-128). 
Japan’s belligerence and imperialism, and government procurement 
during World War 1 contributed to the growth of heavy industries and industrial 
output, as well as a trend towards concentration. Concentration took place very 
rapidly during the Taisho period (1911-1926) and led to a dual structure. Small 
companies constituted the majority of all firms (71.1% in 1929), but their capital 
represented only a small part of the total (3.2% in 1929). Large firms occupied 
1.6% of the total number of firms, but accounted for 65.1% of total capital in 1929 
(Yamamura, 1974, p. 110-111). Among them were many companies not 
controlled by any zaibatsu. Financial crisis in 1927 was followed by the 
rationalisation period, lasting from 1930 until 1937. Rationalisation brought more 
cartels for the large firms and industry associations for the small firms. The 
rationalisation period was also the period in which the “zaibatsu established 
control over industry through control of the banking system” (Minami, 1994, p. 
114). Bank credit was the principal source of capital for Japanese industry, and 
equity markets were illiquid and not well developed. The four largest zaibatsu 
(Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda) owned about 25 percent of the 
paid-in corporate capital at the end of World War II (Ito, 1992, p. 179; Minami, 
1994, p. 114).42 
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 According to Allen (1965, p. 177), “in 1937 the ‘Big Four’ owned 15 per cent and the ten 
leading zaibatsu owned 25 per cent of the total paid-up capital in heavy industries, in 1946, the 
proportions were 32 and 49 per cent. In finance and insurance, the corresponding figures were, 
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 The families owning Mitsui and Mitsubishi initially organised their firms 
as limited partnerships to reduce their potential liability and preserve the family 
nature of the companies. The companies within these zaibatsu relied on internal 
financing within the group, or as Masaki called it: “closed financing”. Instead, 
non-zaibatsu firms were forced to use the capital market and depend on banks 
due to lack of internal funds.  
Around World War 1, first Mitsui and Yasuda followed by Mitsubishi and 
Sumitomo established holding companies. Then the zaibatsu companies started 
to reorganise their businesses into separate corporations of which the holding 
company owned all or most of the stock. In the case of mining and heavy 
industries capital was raised at the open market, otherwise shares were mostly 
sold to affiliates of employees of affiliates. “Open financing” was used by the 
non-zaibatsu firms, which were mostly engaged in railroads and textiles. Their 
stocks were bought on the open market by a limited number of wealthy investors. 
Due to a weak and undeveloped capital market the companies were forced to 
accept payment in instalments and use their stocks or other collateral to obtain 
bank loans. Non-zaibatsu companies also issued bonds, which were mainly 
bought by banks (Masaki, 1986, p. 294-301). 
Although estimations of capital structures of companies in the pre-war 
period differ in their outcomes, they agree that stocks constituted the largest 
source of funds. The ratio of equity declined from about 82 to 66 percent 
between 1902 and 1940. Bond financing grew from about 9.5 to 17.5 percent 
and borrowings from banks were between 3.2 and 6.7 percent. Bank financing at 
that time was even less important than trade credit which was between 5.1 and 
8.4 percent (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 36-38). 
Okazaki performed a study into the state of corporate governance in the 
10 largest zaibatsu and the 10 largest non-zaibatsu firms in 1935. The majority 
of the large firms in mining and manufacturing (especially cotton and silk) were 
non-zaibatsu firms. In both groups shares were heavily concentrated into the 
hands of the ten largest shareholders. In the case of zaibatsu firms the ten 
largest shareholders held 65.9 percent of all shares, among which holding 
companies held 43.1 percent. For non-zaibatsu firms the ratios were 32.1 
percent and 18.8 percent respectively. In zaibatsu firms there were hardly any 
cases of large shareholders becoming directors. Most of the directors were 
internally promoted, and some directors were dispatched from the holding 
companies. In non-zaibatsu firms more than 20 percent of the directors were 
among the largest shareholders. Therefore, the directors in non-zaibatsu firms 
monitored the execution of company business by the management from the 
shareholders’ viewpoint. In the case of the zaibatsu companies systematic 
monitoring was carried out by the holding companies (Okazaki, 1999, p. 
102-106). 
It is also interesting to note that in the pre-war period director’s bonuses 
were considerably higher and more closely related to profits than after World 
War 2. When compared with the non-zaibatsu firms, it is also clear that the 
zaibatsu firms paid higher bonuses. According to Okazaki that is because 
                                                                                                                                                     
for 1937 23 and 24 and for 1946 50 and 53 per cent. The ratio of loans of the four great Zaibatsu 
banks to those of all ordinary banks increased from 44 per cent in 1937 to 66 per cent in 1945.” 
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decision-making in the zaibatsu firms was more decentralised than in the 
non-zaibatsu firms, and zaibatsu firms therefore relied more on an incentive 
system (Okazaki, 1999, p. 106-108). 
 The war with China started in 1937. The Temporary Funds Adjustment 
Act of September 1937 was the first step towards government control over the 
allocation of long-term funds. The government also limited dividend payments 
and thus made stocks less interesting for investors. Furthermore, the 
government sought to consolidate and strengthen the banks. As a result of a 
wave of mergers in April 1943 the four major zaibatsu banks (Teikoku Bank for 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi Bank for Mitsubishi, Sumitomo Bank for Sumitomo, and 
Yasuda Bank for, of course Yasuda) controlled about half the capital of all of 
Japan’s financial institutions (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 56-59). 
The Company Accounts Control Directive in 1940, made dividends as 
well as directors’ bonuses unrelated to profits. In 1943 the government issued 
the Munitions Corporation Law. Designated munitions corporations received 
financing from a designated financial institution. These banks’ lending was 
covered by Wartime Finance Bank’s guaranteed bonds. Any profits made by the 
munitions corporations were to be used as incentives for employees in order to 
increase productivity. From 1944 dividends were limited to 5 percent of the face 
value of the shares. The rights of stockholders to decide the disposal of profits, 
the appointment of directors or the floatation of bonds were terminated (Okazaki, 
1999, p. 117-120). 
Towards the end of the war the influence of the holding companies had 
thus been diminished. The position of workers had become stronger and 
relatively independent. Banks had gained in importance although monitoring by 
the banks was delegated to the Wartime Finance Bank. Until 1938, the CC 
required that directors had to be shareholders too. Board of director composition 
in 1942 showed a sharp drop in directors that were externally appointed or were 
large shareholders (Okazaki, 1999, p. 113-115). Directors that had been 
internally promoted increasingly dominated the board of directors. Dividend 
control under the “Corporate Profits, Dividends and Capital Accommodation 
Directive” of April 1939 was replaced by even tighter dividend control under the 
“Company Accounts Control Directive” of October 1940. Companies that were 
capitalised at a minimum of 200,000 yen, required ministerial approval for 
dividends higher than 8 percent, or exceeding the rate of the previous year 
(Okazaki, 1999, p. 111 and 114). 
 
1945-1980 
The American occupation authorities sought to break up the zaibatsu and 
reorganise the banking and monetary system. The Stock Exchange was not 
allowed to be reopened until there were legislation and a Securities and 
Exchange Committee (SEC) in place to secure democratisation of Japanese 
securities markets. Dismantling the zaibatsu met with lack of co-operation from 
the Japanese government. Only 30 of the 83 companies targeted for dissolution 
were effectively dissolved. The other companies on the list managed to escape 
except for their holding structure as holding companies were no longer allowed. 
The financial institutions of the zaibatsu also survived more or less intact (Hoshi 
 49 
and Kashyap, 2001, p. 68). 
The zaibatsu families and companies had to transfer their stocks to the 
Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC) after which the Securities 
Co-ordinating Liquidation Committee (SCLC) sold the shares to the general 
public in a democratic manner. At the re-opening of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 
1949 it appeared that individuals held about 70 percent of listed stocks. 
According to Aoki, in many cases the very companies whose stock was being 
sold supplied the money to buy the stocks to the individuals. Many of these 
individuals were employees of the dismantled zaibatsu companies. The law did 
not allow holding companies or treasury stock, but it was not before long that 
these shares were again transferred to stockholders that had old zaibatsu 
connections (Aoki, 2000, p. 63). 
The large company groups that emerged after the war are the vertical 
keiretsu modelled on the old zaibatsu, the horizontal keiretsu including some of 
the non-zaibatsu companies from before the war, and enterprise groups centred 
around very large enterprises. The six keiretsu are Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo 
and Fuyo (all vertical), Sanwa, and Dai-ichi Kangyou (both centered around the 
banks after which they are named. Independent large enterprise groups include 
the Toyota group, Seibu group, Kyougin (the Industrial Bank of Japan) group, 
Shin Nittetsu group, Kintetsu group, and the Daiwa-Nomura group among 
others.43 
Characteristic activities of the keiretsu are the monthly or weekly 
meetings of the presidents of the companies belonging to the keiretsu or the 
regular meetings at management level. The list of participants is public, the 
agenda of the meetings is not. 
In a publication in 1976, Futatsugi (1976) mentions five characteristics of 
Japanese large companies and company groups as follows: 
1. most shareholders are legal persons 
2. cross-shareholding 
3. increase of the number of companies under a keiretsu 
4. exclusive transactions 
5. dependency on bank borrowing and financing within the keiretsu 
6. the inclusion of companies belonging to different industries within the keiretsu 
in order to limit competition (one-set-shugi)44 
As we saw above, in 1949, individuals held about 70 percent of all shares. 
According to Futatsugi, financial institutions and legal persons held only 15.5 
percent. By 1960 individual shareholding had decreased to 50 percent, and in 
1973 financial institutions and legal persons held 61.7 percent (Futatsugi, 1976, 
p. 14-15). Mutual shareholding also seems to have served as a defence against 
hostile take-overs since 1952. When in the mid-1960s stockholding by foreigners 
was liberalised, the practice of cross-shareholding became even more 
entrenched (Aoki, 2000, p. 64). 
Between 1960 and 1970 the number of affiliated companies and 
                                                   
43
 Sangyou Doukou Chousakai (1999), Nihon no Kigyou Shuudan ’99. Used here is information 
from the bekken (=appendix). The Nihon no Kigyou Shuudan (=Japanese Company Groups) 
appears annually for all six of the keiretsu plus the appendix for the independent groups. 
44
 shugi (主義) means: –ism. 
 50 
subsidiaries of the largest one hundred corporations increased remarkably. 
Shareholdings of between 25 and 50 percent increased from 857 cases in 1960 
to 3,063 cases in 1970. The number of cases with shareholdings of over 50 
percent increased from 1,576 to 2,818. Stockholdings by the six large general 
trading companies occupied a total of 141 percent of the book-value of their own 
capital stock in 1966. This percentage increased to 301 in 1971, and 604 percent 
in 1973 (Futatsugi, 1976, p. 20-12). Certainly these numbers show an increase 
in the number of companies under the umbrella of a keiretsu, but on the other 
hand also simply represent an aspect of economic growth. A characteristic of 
business operations in large Japanese companies and especially within the 
keiretsu was the fact that a large part of the business transactions took place 
between companies within the keiretsu. Stable relations between transaction 
partners were highly valued. 
After the war, banks were the first to be re-established. The Dodge Line 
had put and end to the deficit financing. Supported by the Bank of Japan, the 
banks stepped into the void left by the Reconstruction Finance Bank. The 
percentage of lending to large companies by the six largest city banks increased 
from 37.4 percent in 1950 to 52.4 percent in 1955. Among which lending to large 
companies by the Sanwa bank doubled from 21.6 percent to 43.9 percent over 
the same period (Suzuki, 1993, p. 20 and 58). 
Central in the keiretsu are the banks and the general trading companies. 
The trading companies for playing an intermediary role and extending trade 
credits. Providing bank loans and monitoring were the main tasks of the banks. 
The main bank holds shares and bonds, lends, provides bill discount and other 
financial services, and as such is the nucleus of an enterprise group. 
One-set-shugi grew out of the motivation to limit competition within the group, 
very much like the zaibatsu had done before. 
The role of the main bank in the governance structure of Japanese 
companies during the high growth period was in part a consequence of tight 
regulation of the securities markets in those days. Another important cause is a 
preference by the government for companies to raise capital by means of 
indirect financing via banks rather than direct financing through issuing bonds or 
shares (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 93). As most city banks were dependent 
on borrowings from the Bank of Japan, the discount window provided a 
possibility to exert some influence on the banks’ lending behaviour towards 
companies in industries most favoured by the government. The relatively high 
real tax rates may also have contributed to companies’ bias towards debt 
financing. 
Other banks than the main bank provided funds to the companies, but 
the monitoring function was delegated to the main bank.45 The main bank was 
expected to ensure the expected rate of return. Its role involved ex-ante, interim 
and ex-post monitoring where the main bank remained passive in case a firm 
was performing well and repaying its debt. At the sight of trouble, the main bank 
                                                   
45
 Teranishi (1994) claims that monitoring by the main banks is the logical outcome of loan 
syndication practices. Japanese banks seem to have resorted to loan syndication in rescue 
attempts in the early 1930s (p. 66) and as a means to reduce risk through loan diversification 
under the wartime financial system in the late 1930s (p. 70). 
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will renegotiate the debt claims of the firm in distress, provide financial 
assistance and demand higher compensating balances. If deemed necessary 
the main bank could send its own employees to serve as managing directors to 
formulate and implement restructuring measures which could include a merger 
or tie-up with a healthy firm (Sheard, 1994, p. 194-204). 
As main banks generally provided services to firms such as managing 
their settlement accounts, discounting their bills of exchange, and in case of 
foreign trade issuing their letters of credit or arranging foreign currency hedges, 
they were thought to be in a position to notice trouble at an early stage. 
Under “contingent governance” as Aoki (2000, p. 71-72) calls this type of 
monitoring, it is understood in advance that the main bank will gain control in the 
event that a firm falls into financial distress. The bank will take responsibility and 
bear the costs for restructuring efforts or for the liquidation process. Under such 
a system it would be very costly for banks to shirk their monitoring 
responsibilities. Nakano explains the situation following a mechanism that 
transfers corporate control from shareholders (as residual claimants) to creditors 
(as preferential claimants) when a company falls into financial distress. He then 
translates the mechanism into a Japanese version transferring corporate control 
from the group of employees and management to the main bank (Nakano, 1996, 
p. 86-87). 
It is generally assumed that business risk and financial risk were greatly 
reduced by the stable shareholding practise within the keiretsu and the inherent 
information sharing. Furthermore, there seems to have been a strong consensus 
that major companies should not be allowed to go bankrupt. This can be 
illustrated by the case of Yamaichi Securities’ near failure in 1965. The Bank of 
Japan extended an emergency loan of JPY28 billion in order to avoid liquidation 
(Brown, 1999, p. 75).46 
As the Japanese economy was growing, foreign exchange restrictions 
had been lifted, the internationalisation of financial markets continued, and 
companies were increasingly able to manage without the banks. Since 1970, 
Japan had been a net creditor nation. Japanese corporations invested overseas 
and were able raise capital overseas. Although the monitoring function of the 
main banks decreased in importance, there was no substitute readily available 
or deemed necessary by the company managers. Financial reporting and 
auditing standards had not kept pace with these developments, and still 
continued to protect creditors rather than investors in equity. From about 1973 
convertible bonds became an immensely popular means of raising capital. They 
remained popular until the a few years after the collapse of the bubble economy 
when the market participants realised that the singularly upward trend of stock 
prices was history. 
 
1980-1996 
Particularly in the second half of the 1980s equity financing gained importance 
through conversion of the above mentioned bonds or direct share issues. 
Shares were increasingly issued at a premium rather than at face value. The 
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 In the aftermath of this crisis, regulation of the securities industry became stricter. The number 
of securities firms fell from 1127 in 1949 to 277 in 1968. 
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companies that started this practice were the independent companies such as 
Sony. Although the amendment to the Commercial Code in 1950 established 
rules for issuing non-par value shares, this had not been widely practised 
because it was surrounded by a negative image of unreliability and management 
incompetence (Sugino, 1998, p. 18). 
Although the equity ratios in most companies’ balance sheets came 
substantially closer to what was considered prudent in many other countries, 
stockholder influence in the annual shareholders meetings remained rather 
limited. Companies also increasingly financed their operations with retained 
earnings. The decline of monitoring by main banks created a corporate 
governance void. Banks owned relatively small percentages of a company’s 
stock. The maximum allowed by law was 5 percent. Corporate managers were 
quick to fill up this governance vacuum as there were no new laws effectively 
strengthening the position of shareholders. 
The period of stable growth and the bubble years enabled managers and 
companies to comfortably get away with less than excellent performance. As 
mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, many investment decisions were made 
with the purpose of increasing turnover and market share in mind. The cost of 
capital used as a cut-off rate was extremely low due to the methods of estimation 
applied. Hence in many cases investment decisions may have yielded the 
expected returns but did not maximise the value of the firm. 
Banks had extended large loans against asset inflated collateral. When 
the bubble burst, many loans turned sour and eventually became uncollectible. 
However, the accounting standards at the time allowed the banks and other 
financial institutions too much room to decide on how to define bad loans. As a 
consequence of which many bad loans were not reported in the hope that the 
market would recover. 
It is not only the banks and other financial institutions that are now ridden 
with bad debt. The practice of extending liberal trade credits goes all the way 
from the top down and vice versa, and any large failure could trigger a knock-on 
effect of which the consequences are incalculable. 
 
1996-2003 
The financial Big Bang as announced by prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in 
the winter of 1996 induced an even greater need for accounting standards that 
were at par with international accounting standards. The main elements of the 
accounting Big Bang are: marked-to-market accounting for securities and 
derivatives, making consolidated financial statements the main financial 
statements, tax collection on a consolidated basis, disclosure of pension 
liabilities and assets, and last but not least the introduction of consolidated 
cash-flow statements. 
Ito (1999) describes possible consequences of the introduction of 
marked-to-market accounting for securities for Japanese management practices 
and corporate governance as follows. Traditionally the historical cost price was 
the basis for valuation of real estate and securities. Appreciation in the value of 
either was not reflected in the balance sheets, nevertheless the so-called 
“hidden assets” (fukumi-shisan) and hidden profits (fukumi-eki) were taken into 
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account as collateral by banks when extending loans. In the meantime corporate 
management excessively based their management decisions on the hidden 
assets. 
Management based on hidden profits was rendered irrational when from 
March 2001 available-for-sale securities were to be valued at the current market 
price. Any valuation differences would result in profits or losses. Shares held for 
cross-shareholding purposes will also need to be marked to market. In this case 
the valuation difference will appear as a positive or negative component in 
shareholder’s equity as an unrealised gain or loss. It will not directly have an 
impact on earnings, but it will influence return on equity, which is a factor that 
managers will have to take into account (Ito, 1999, p. 6-12). 
When managers start to make investment decisions taking a more 
realistic cost of capital into account, the present returns on the capital invested in 
mutual shareholdings may prove to be destroying value. Thus it is expected that 
companies will dispose of a large part of their cross-shareholdings. However, in 
regard of present economic conditions and low stock-prices, massive 
cross-shareholding sales will only depress the stock market even further. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the trend has begun as companies are asking their 
business partners for permission to sell off their shares. 
With interest rates approaching zero, and bad debt problems 
exacerbated by deflationary pressure, Japanese banks have found it 
increasingly difficult to provide loans. Many Japanese companies seem to have 
postponed investment until better times as much as possible. Capital is presently 
mainly raised through bond issuance because of the extremely bearish stock 
market. Notwithstanding the fact that this trend is causing equity to total capital 
ratios to go down again, most main banks are in dire straits themselves and are 
in no position to perform the role of monitor and lender of the last resort.  
The most active investors on the capital and financial markets are 
probably mutual investment funds and pension funds. Although they hold large 
percentages of shares in various companies, these funds are usually not 
involved in very active monitoring as they hold diversified portfolios. On the other 
hand, pension funds have had a reputation for realising ridiculously low returns 
on their investments. With the strong pressure of an ageing population, they 
might want to become more involved in monitoring in order to improve on their 
own performance as well as the performance of the companies they are 
investing in. 
Amendments to the Commercial Code in 2001 and 2002 are meant to 
strengthen the position of shareholders and statutory auditors, and to increase 
transparency of practices in the boardroom. Large corporations are given three 
choices. The first is to keep the governance system as it is. As a consequence of 
the amendment to the CC in 2001, the position of the statutory auditor has been 
strengthened. But other than that, nothing has to change. A second choice is to 
establish an “important property committee” within the existing governance 
structure. The task of this committee is to make decisions concerning the 
disposition or acquisition of important property, and issuing large amounts of 
debt. Establishment of such a committee is to be decided on by a board of 
directors with a minimum of ten members, the committee shall consist of at least 
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three members one of which is from outside the company. The statutory auditor 
will still be part of the governance structure. 
A third option is to establish three committees to advise and aid the 
board of directors in making their decisions. The committees are: a designated 
committee (shimei iinkai), an auditing committee (kansa iinkai), and a 
compensation committee (houshuu iinkai). In order to relieve the board of 
directors from some of its heavy responsibilities towards the shareholders, the 
designated committee decides on the contents of items presented to the annual 
shareholders meeting by the directors. In this structure the auditing committee 
will replace the statutory auditor. Third, the compensation committee decides on 
the remuneration of directors and executives (Ohta, 2002, p. 267-268). 
In spite of the recent amendments to the Commercial Code, and all the 
publications on the importance and the mechanics of creating shareholder value, 
company value, and managing for economic profit, the future of corporate 
governance in Japanese corporations still remains somewhat unclear. 
The mandatory increase in the number of external directors does not 
mean a necessary impulse of fresh opinions and more discussion, if an outside 
director comes from a subcontractor or another somehow related enterprise. If 
the outside directors still owe gratitude to the company president for being 
nominated, or simply if contradicting a more senior or experienced person is 
about the worst offence one could commit. 
Nevertheless, the new legal provisions make it possible for progressive 
companies to apply a new governance structure that opens new possibilities. 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, the concept that debt and 
equity represent two different corporate governance systems needs some 
qualification in the case of Japan. In the pre-war period, the government tried to 
contain shareholder influence and limit dividend payments in order to promote its 
own military objectives. In the post-war period, the same happened with the 
purpose of supporting its industrial policies. Shareholders had become docile. In 
addition, cross-shareholding practices and large shareholdings (maximum 5 
percent for one bank) by banks blurred the distinction between shareholders and 
creditors. Unwinding mutual shareholdings seem to have started, but the 
process is slow. This is partly in order to prevent the stock market from going 
down even more. 
Corporate governance practices in large companies are very much 
influenced by traditions, customs, and culturally defined behavioural aspects. In 
the case of Japan, hierarchy, a strong sense of obligation, and the practice that 
most members of the board of directors have been internally promoted have had 
two important effects. The first is that it is extremely hard to be critical of or even 
openly disagree with people higher up in the hierarchy or people whom one is 
obliged to. In good times this speeds up the decision making process, but in bad 
times independent inputs into the decision-making process serve to 
counter-balance moral hazard. Secondly, a board of directors consisting of 
people that have been trained and gained experience within the company only, 
may display characteristics of inbreeding. In the era of rapid economic growth 
this characteristic may have served companies well, because the directors knew 
the company inside out. Large companies have become extremely large and 
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complicated and may be served better if the inside people are balanced by 
people who know the market and the outside world well. 
Recent amendments to the Commercial Code are one step in the 
direction of more independence and better balance in the board room. In this 
way the concept of corporate governance and accountability to the shareholders 
is expected to shift more to the shareholder concept that is generally found in 
common-law countries. As such the function of financial accounting will be able 
to develop further to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry. 
Even in the pre-war period there was a dual corporate governance 
structure. Zaibatsu governance and non-zaibatsu governance were different. 
Presently the dual structure is more in terms of size. Large companies are 
increasingly dependent on market-based corporate governance where 
shareholder interests are recognised and protected. Small and medium-sized 
companies will continue to depend on bank loans and bank monitoring. 
Presently this relation is formalised in a plan to promote relationship banking for 
SMEs. 
 
 
2.6. Functions of Financial Accounting Standards under different 
Paradigms 
Paragraph 2.1. introduced the crises that caused the paradigms governing 
economic policy, regulations and economic activity. The subsequent paragraphs 
explained how these paradigms impacted the environmental factors of Japan’s 
financial accounting system. Present paragraph will evaluate the functions of 
financial accounting standards under the four different paradigms. 
 
1868-1945 
Making Japan a modern industrial country involved first and foremost financing 
and promoting economic development through setting up national banks. “Bank 
Bookkeeping Methods” issued by the MOF in 1873 provided the First National 
Bank, which was also the first joint stock company in Japan, a coherent and 
consistent accounting system based on double-entry bookkeeping. Amendment 
of the National Bank Act in 1876 established limited liability of shareholders. 
Stock-owned companies became very popular, and the number of banks 
boomed. The Tokyo Stock Exchange opened in 1878. The Commercial Code 
(CC) was established in 1890 and amended in 1899 to distinguish bonds from 
stocks and to permit bearer bonds (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 25-26). Art. 
190-193 of the CC stipulated the first financial accounting regulations that 
applied to all companies. 
 Initially, the Meiji government aimed to be a strong central authority that 
actively furthered growth through industrial policy and the introduction of foreign 
technology (Ito, 1992, p. 19-20), and that relied on a capitalist, market-oriented 
economic system. Following the war with China (1894/95) the Business 
Operation Tax Law was promulgated and special purpose banks such as the 
Taiwan Bank and Chosen (Korea) Bank established for local development of the 
colonies. According to Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara (1999, p. 2-3), the 
market-based economic system started to change gradually into a command 
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economic system under bureaucratic control, in the 1920s, accelerating to a 
war-time economy in the 1930s. 
 For accounting regulations, this had the effect that between 1931 and 
1942 many accounting standards for assets valuation, cost estimation, and 
accelerated depreciation were pronounced, and special taxation laws directly 
related to war incidents were established. Dividend restrictions were 
implemented in 1939 and 1940, and directors’ bonuses were regulated. The 
Munitions Corporations Law of 1943 restricted the rights of shareholders and 
instituted a profit-sharing system for employees (Okazaki, 1999, p. 117-120). 
 In the seventy-two years since the MOF issued the “Bank Bookkeeping 
Methods”, accounting standards served the fukoku kyouhei ideal in two different 
ways. Initially, it served the purpose of industrialisation through their functions of 
stewardship and accountability, and assisting the optimal allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities. After the war with China, an additional function of 
accounting standards was to help the government stimulate companies to 
develop Japan’s colonies. From about 1931, accounting regulations served as a 
tool for building a war-economy through changing corporate governance and 
directing funds into war industries. 
 
1945-1980 
During the US occupation, the occupation authorities (GHQ) aimed to make 
Japan a democracy with a market-based economic system modelled after its 
own. To this end it dismantled the zaibatsu47, sought to democratise corporate 
management, and demanded a Securities and Exchange Law (SEL), again 
modelled after its own, to be in place before it allowed the stock exchanges to 
reopen. The accounting and other provisions of the SEL sought to protect 
shareholder interests and existed side by side with the accounting rules of the 
Commercial Code (CC) and the tax laws. 
 According to Okazaki (1999) it was the Dodge Plan reforms that 
balanced the budget and made companies deal with over-employment and soft 
budgets. Employees yielded some of their power in order to avoid bankruptcies 
and getting laid off, and banks provided loans and monitoring. “So by the early 
1950s, a pro-growth corporate governance structure had been formed, its major 
players being growth-oriented lifetime employees and a similarly growth-oriented 
financing body of investors centred round a main bank” (Okazaki, 1999, p. 138). 
 Consensus on the overall importance of economic growth, the main 
bank system, and a high degree of financial regulation made for a financial 
accounting environment that was accommodating to industrial policies and 
measures that stimulated investment and capital formation. Economic growth 
was attained without any significant reliance on foreign capital inflow (Teranishi, 
1999, p. 99). On the other hand, this environment was less conducive to direct 
finance, public disclosure, and the protection of shareholder interests. Several 
revisions of the CC and SEL were carried out to unify both accounting systems, 
but the result was rather half-hearted as we will see in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 After the first oil shock (1973), fiscal deficits started to emerge and 
                                                   
47
 For disbandment of the zaibatsu see paragraph 2.5. 
 57 
economic growth slowed down. Companies relied more on retained earnings, 
but investment slowed nevertheless. Already from the mid-1960 it was clear that 
the audit function had to be strengthened, and consolidated financial statements 
needed to be introduced, because companies were using subsidiaries for 
window-dressing their own financial statements. The “Working Rules for 
Performing Audits” had indeed been revised in 1965, but consolidated financial 
statements were finally introduced for large and listed companies under the SEL 
in 1978, albeit as additional information to the unconsolidated financial 
statements.  
 In the thirty-five years between 1945 and 1980, the function of financial 
accounting standards was to support the policies and governance structure that 
brought about impressive economic growth and development. These were the 
result of a national consensus on the importance of national and personal 
prosperity. Accounting standards served as a tool in scarce resource distribution 
through the main bank system, retaining funds inside the company and through 
promoting investment in productive capacity. Instrumental were the Special 
Measures Taxation Law, the definite settlement of accounts principle, and 
specific provisions (Okada, 1999, p. 147). The priority of creditor protection over 
shareholder protection was expressed in the priority of the CC over the SEL, in 
dividend restrictions, and low priority on transparency and accountability. 
The introduction of consolidated financial statements, irrespective of 
their secondary status and extremely brief contents, marked a concrete step 
away from accounting serving industrial policies and the governance structure 
centred on main banks. It represents an acknowledgement of the increased 
importance of direct financing and shareholder interests, and a step towards a 
more market-based economic system. 
 
1980-1996 
In Japan, the first half of the 1980s were an era of deregulation of cross-border 
transactions and improved access to international capital markets (Teranishi, 
1999, p. 115-119; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 232-236). The second half 
marked the growth of the asset-inflated bubble economy that was punctured at 
the end of 1989 (Cargill, Hutchinson and Ito, 2000, p. 4). This was a time of little 
activity in the development of Japanese financial accounting standards and 
accounting institutions. Regulations could not or would not keep up with the 
development of new financial products such as derivative financial instruments 
or financial leases, which provided many opportunities for companies to 
manipulate accounting numbers. Hidden losses surfaced, such as the cases of 
Showa-Shell in 1993, Kajima Oil in 1994 (Ito, 1998, p. 36-39). 
 The Heisei recession brought to light the less than sound lending 
practices during and after the bubble period, and a related enormous bad loans 
problem. Initially, the government and all parties involved hoped for a soft 
landing (Cargill, Hutchinson and Ito, 2000, p. 4). It became clear that the 
monitoring function of the main banks had been hollowed out, and the 
monitoring function of the board of directors and the shareholders was not 
working properly (Wakasugi, 1999, p. 34-35). Existing accounting standards 
made it hard for the government to grasp the extent of the bad loan problem for 
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several years. When in 1996 the financial system was about to destabilise, swift 
structural change had finally become unavoidable. 
 Over the years between 1980 and 1996, financial accounting standards 
came to function in a corporate governance vacuum because the old paradigm 
had become obsolete without many people realising it. Because the regulations 
left so much room for arbitrariness it was prone to abuse. 
 
1996-2003 
The financial big bang was part of a plan for structural reform of Japan’s 
government and regulatory institutions as well as for deregulation of its financial 
markets so they would be up to par with those of London and New York. Japan’s 
financial markets were to become free, fair, and global. In order to make Japan’s 
capital markets fair (transparent) and global, there followed an overhaul of the 
accounting system that was meant to bring the financial accounting and 
disclosure standards level with US-gaap and IFRS. An important aspect of 
accounting institutional reform was the shift from public regulatory authorities to 
a private standard setting body in 2002. 
 A second objective was to promote free, fair, and global corporate 
governance. Fair value accounting was intended to be instrumental in bringing 
an end to mutual shareholding practices. Amendments to the CC included 
changes to the regulations concerning the composition and functioning of the 
board of directors, aiming to increase the number of outside directors. Based on 
the above it is fair to say that the function of financial accounting standards today 
is to create and maintain a level playing field for Japanese companies in global 
markets. 
 
 
2.7. Conclusions 
Chapter 2 set out to answer the question how the Japanese accounting system 
has responded to a changing international business environment by identifying 
these changes and their implications for the functions of accounting standards 
and financial information. Foreign political and macro-economic policies dictated 
the role of accounting in Japan until political power and economic strength were 
no longer an issue. Globalisation of business and internationalisation of financial 
and capital markets brought the issue of comparability of financial statements to 
the forefront of academic and regulatory awareness. In the 1980s and early 
1990s there were discussions about international harmonisation of accounting 
standards. Presently efforts are focused on convergence. 
 Japan’s financial accounting system itself has come about in response to 
the economic and institutional challenges that followed Japan’s opening up its 
borders. The government chose a legalistic approach over a professional 
approach to accounting and all other types of regulation because it suited better 
its purpose of government induced economic growth and development. A 
common law approach needs a democratic environment, and this was simply 
too remote from the Japanese path of cultural and economic development at the 
time. Equally important was the fact that the Japanese government was in a 
hurry. 
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 Before Japan’s imperialist phase started in earnest (1931), Japan’s 
accounting system developed at a similar level and pace as was the case in 
Germany and the US. The Great Depression was in part the consequence of 
weak monitoring and corporate governance functions. Both Germany and Japan 
sought the solution to the economic depression in war. After World War II the US 
occupation tried to force American models and solutions onto Japanese 
problems. Although this seemed to work fairly well, the Japanese government 
kept what they found useful and discarded what did not suit their 
macro-economic policy purposes as soon as the occupation ended in 1952. 
 The corporate governance model that had emerged during the war had 
actually been reinforced by the GHQ’s attempt to democratise the economy. 
Compartmentalisation of the financial system due to the SEL had fostered the 
main-bank system. Main bank financing and monitoring worked well during the 
high-growth era. Financial accounting did not play an important role in providing 
information for investment decisions by shareholders. Its main purpose was to 
compute distributable and taxable income. 
 The 1970s and 1980s were a period when accounting regulators in 
Japan could have kept pace with most developed countries or could have played 
a leading role, but chose not to. Although the signs of flaws in the corporate 
governance and reporting systems were already unmistakably there in the 
1960s, regulators were too strongly influenced by business interests. The 
long-overdue introduction of consolidated financial statements, their secondary 
status, and weak audit requirements (especially under the Commercial Code) 
facilitated abuse at the expense of shareholders. Main banks’ monitoring 
functions hollowed out and were filled by corporate directors giving rise to 
increased moral hazard. 
 Financial deregulation was slow and inadequate. Japanese companies 
enjoyed a freedom abroad that they did not at home in trying out new financial 
products such as options, futures, and unsecured bonds. Accounting standards 
for leases, options and futures were issued in pace with deregulation efforts at 
home when authorities realised that the sheer scale of off-balance sheet 
transactions was enormous and the business community was no longer able to 
stall their introduction. 
 Trade frictions, foreign demands for deregulation, increased disclosure 
and structural change yielded very few concrete results. In some cases the new 
regulations were formally pronounced but gave companies the option not to 
adopt the standard for a couple of years. For example the equity method took 
from 1978 to 1983 to become mandatory, and segment disclosure standards 
took nine years (1988 to 1997) to be fully implemented. Or in other cases the 
disclosure did not have to be audited by an independent auditor, which was the 
case with disclosures on options and futures, interim financial statements or with 
the unconsolidated cash-flow like statement. 
 The bad loan problem that appeared after the burst of the asset-inflated 
bubble economy of 1986 to 1989 was not effectively dealt with. In fact the 
government’s forbearance in the hope of a soft landing actually contributed to 
the problem growing worse and taking on crisis-like proportions. As a 
consequence Japan’s government bonds were downgraded, Japanese banks 
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had to pay a “Japan-premium”, and internationally faith in the Japanese 
economy and capital market fell drastically. Financial deregulation and the 
accounting big bang came about in response to these circumstances rather than 
in direct response to foreign pressures. 
Lower quality accounting and disclosure standards would damage the 
position of Japanese companies in international financial and capital markets. 
Therefore, international comparability of the financial statements issued by 
Japan’s multinational corporations became a major objective for Japan’s 
accounting regulatory authorities just before the turn of the century. When the 
EU announced that it would demand companies issuing securities within the EU 
to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS or equivalent 
accounting standards starting in January 2007, the keidanren and the ASBJ 
were first complaining. But in January of 2005 they embarked with the IASB on a 
convergence project. 
Having identified the international events that triggered the paradigms 
according to which the function of accounting standards in Japan changed, we 
have discussed how Japan’s economy, her financial system, taxation system, 
and corporate governance practices developed. Chapter 3 will analyse in detail 
how the characteristics and accounting concepts of Japan’s financial accounting 
system developed in response to the changes in these environmental factors. 
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Chapter 3: Japan’s Financial Accounting System 
3.0. Introduction 
3.1. Characteristics of Japan’s accounting system: 
3.1.1. Regulatory authorities 
3.1.2. Laws, standards, rules, and regulations 
3.1.3. Creditor protection 
3.1.4. Status of consolidated financial statements 
3.2. Accounting concepts and approaches: 
3.2.1. Determining profits 
3.2.2. Capital maintenance 
3.2.3. Definitions of liabilities and equity, and distribution of income concepts 
3.2.4. Clean surplus and clean profits concepts 
3.3. Japanese accounting regulations and standards in response to  
    internationalisation 
3.4. Conclusions for Part 1 
 
 
3.0. Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented a discussion of environmental factors that influenced the 
development of Japan’s accounting system. We found that events in 
international relations defined as “political and economic ties with other 
countries” triggered a clear response in the first two periods. This response 
easily translates into the first two paradigms of “rich country, strong army”, and 
“becoming a rich country” in the first and second period respectively. 
Internationalisation of business and financial markets has had a pervasive 
influence on Japan’s economic growth and development, financial system, 
taxation system, and corporate governance practices in all four periods under 
discussion. However, the third and fourth periods show international market 
forces gradually overtaking international relations in terms of their influence on 
business and capital market transactions and the factors that shape Japan’s 
accounting system. The third period was characterised by the lack of a clear 
paradigm, but in the fourth period the paradigm became “creating a level playing 
field” where the Japanese accounting and financial systems are supposed to be 
free, fair and global. 
In order to answer the question how Japan’s financial accounting system 
has responded to the changing international business environment, we will 
investigate what I consider the four main characteristics of Japan’s accounting 
system. The first and the second, being the regulators and the regulations, make 
up Japan’s financial accounting institutional framework. In addition the third and 
fourth, to be named creditor protection and the secondary status of consolidated 
financial statements, concern financial structure and corporate governance 
practices and indicate the nature of the role of accounting information. 
Furthermore, we will discuss the development of five of the accounting concepts 
and approaches that are instrumental in fulfilling the fundamental tasks of 
Japan’s financial accounting system. 
 International accounting systems classification studies provide some 
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guidance for determining the most important characteristics of Japan’s 
accounting system. Mueller (1967) pioneered a classification by distinguishing 
patterns according to which accounting systems developed, such as the 
macro-economic and micro-economic patterns. A second dimension of his 
analysis is a distinction between accounting as an independent discipline with 
room for judgement and estimate as opposed to the uniform accounting pattern 
where accounting is standardised and serves as a means of administration and 
control. The macro-economic and uniform accounting patterns apply to Japan 
and fit very nicely with the “rich country, strong army” and “rich country” 
paradigms of the first and second period under consideration. 
Nobes (1983) extended this research and placed Japan in a category 
with Germany under the macro-uniform based classification, further specifying a 
law-based pattern rather than an economics-based pattern of development. 
Based on an expert survey in fifty countries, Doupnik and Salter (1993) 
produced results consistent with Nobes’ findings. In addition they concluded that 
the macro-uniform and micro-based groups correspond with code-law and 
common law legal systems respectively. Furthermore, companies in countries in 
the macro-based group rely less on capital markets than those in the 
micro-based group. As we have seen in Chapter 2, until 1996 Japanese 
companies indeed relied more on bank loans and syndicated loans than on 
capital markets. 
 Empirical research carried out by Nair and Frank (1980) using 1975 data 
placed Japan’s measurement practices in the conservative United States model, 
but disclosure practices were much harder to classify. In Chapter 2 we already 
encountered the study by Gray that translated Hofstede’s cultural workplace 
values into cultural accounting values, according to which Japan’s accounting 
system was characterised by statutory control and uniformity with regard to 
authority and enforcement.48 In addition, Japan’s measurement and disclosure 
practices were characterised by secrecy and conservatism.49 
In both Radebaugh and Gray (1997, Chapter 3), and Choi, Frost and 
Meek (1999, Chapter 2), the legal system is mentioned as one of the 
environmental influences on accounting development. Legal systems are usually 
divided into common law and code law systems. The former is generally 
associated with a micro-economic pattern of accounting development the latter 
with a macro-economic approach. Whilst acknowledging the code-law legal 
system as an environmental factor in the development of Japan’s accounting 
system, Chapter 3 discusses the actual regulatory authorities, laws and 
regulations as the institutions of the accounting system itself. 
 Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) performed a study into the relation 
between corporate governance systems and timeliness and conservatism of 
accounting earnings. First, they looked at the extent to which current-period 
accounting income incorporates current-period economic income. Secondly, 
they addressed asymmetric conservatism by investigating the timeliness in 
incorporating negative economic income in accounting earnings. Their idea is 
that the stakeholder governance model prevalent in code law countries is 
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associated with earnings as “income for distribution” among the stakeholders. 
Therefore, income should be stable over time. Timely disclosure does not play 
an equally important role because direct communication between managers and 
stakeholders solves information asymmetry problems (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 
2000, p. 3). On the other hand, in common law countries the shareholder 
governance model is ubiquitous, and therefore timeliness and 
decision-usefulness are important properties of accounting information. 
Accounting income should then incorporate economic losses in a timely fashion 
so investors and shareholders can make their investment decisions. 
According to Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000, p. 3), the stakeholder 
governance model implies a larger political influence on accounting standard 
setting. Indeed the discretionary choice of measurement and recognition 
standards in Japan was partly due to the political clout of businesses in the 
standard setting process (Someya, 1993, p. 95 and 102). An explanatory factor 
for the focus on creditor protection is that the Commercial Code, which is the 
basis of all accounting in Japan, adheres to the legal entity view. For similar 
reasons, the tardy introduction and the secondary status of and limited 
disclosure in consolidated financial statements were intended to stall the 
information and accountability towards shareholders and arms-length investors. 
The authorities regulating Japan’s accounting and reporting system 
together with the actual standards, rules and regulations constitute the two major 
institutions in Japan’s accounting system. Perhaps the plural “Japan’s 
accounting systems” would be more accurate since the accounting system 
under the Commercial Code (CC) and that under the Securities and Exchange 
Law (SEL), serve distinctly different purposes and are governed by different 
ministries.50 It is important to keep in mind that the CC applies to all companies, 
whereas the SEL applies only to publicly listed companies. Paragraphs 3.1.1. 
and 3.1.2. will elaborate on these peculiarities, and the inconsistencies between 
the two systems will appear where applicable throughout this chapter. 
Turning back to the issue of institutional characteristics, Japan has 
generally been classified as a code law country with a legalistic approach to 
accounting regulation (Hiramatsu, 1994, p. 147-18). Public sector regulatory 
authorities set accounting standards until 2002, after which the privately funded 
Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) took over. For a large part of 
Japan’s accounting history, financial accounting standards have been 
established with reference to macro-economic purposes and legal definitions of 
distributable income, rather than accountability or public disclosure and 
decision-usefulness of information for investors. Therefore, her public sector 
regulators and her triangular legal framework shall be analysed as the two main 
institutional characteristics of Japan’s financial accounting system. 
As is common in code law countries, the Japanese accounting system 
stresses uniformity and the importance of form-over-substance. In other words, 
financial accounting information is presented in adherence to the words of the 
law, even in cases where this does injustice to the presentation of the underlying 
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 CC (administrated by the Ministry of Justice): creditor protection, calculating distributable 
income, providing income as the basis for taxation. SEL (administrated by the Ministry of 
Finance): shareholder and investor protection. 
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economic reality. Conservatism with regard to measurement and recognition of 
assets and liabilities in concurrence with the definite settlement of accounts in 
Japan is thought to serve creditor protection at the expense of shareholder 
interests (Hiramatsu, 1994, p. 150). A company viewed as a legal entity shall 
present its assets as potential collateral and shall value its assets objectively and 
conservatively (Takeda, 2003, p. 121). 51  Therefore, creditor protection is 
discussed in this chapter as a characteristic of Japan’s accounting system that 
contributes to conservatism in measurement and recognition. 
The importance of creditors over shareholders and other investors in 
Japan’s financial accounting and disclosure system is a reflection as well as a 
cause of the same phenomenon in the corporate governance structures of many 
Japanese companies. Strong creditor protection measures and the secondary 
status of consolidated financial statements represent two characteristics of the 
Japanese accounting system that are intimately connected to the fact that in 
code law countries companies are viewed as legal entities rather than economic 
entities. Eventually the weak position of shareholders in Japan contributed to 
corporate governance failures because of insufficient disclosure, transparency 
and accountability. Under the SEL, the importance attached to consolidated 
financial statements has slowly increased over time, thereby reflecting a gradual 
increase of direct financing and a growth in the importance attached to 
shareholder rights. 
Definitions of liabilities and equity, together with distribution of income 
concepts adhered to in an accounting system present clues to perceptions of 
ownership and corporate governance structures that may be prevalent within a 
country. Traditionally, the choice for presentation of clean surplus (all-inclusive 
concept of profits) or dirty surplus (current operating concept of profits) is closely 
connected to definitions of equity adhered to. The former comes with a narrow 
interpretation of equity which is related to the company as a legal entity concept, 
whereas the latter indicates a broader definition of equity which is connected to 
the company as an economic entity concept. Reconciliation of clean and dirty 
surplus through disclosure of comprehensive income serves to make company 
management’s performance more transparent. Changes in the definitions of 
liabilities and equity and in distribution of income concepts shall be discussed 
because they may indicate shifts in corporate governance practices and the 
demand for disclosure of information. 
Japanese disclosure practices have been labelled as characterised by 
secrecy instead of transparency (Hiramatsu, 1994, p. 147-148). One illustrative 
fact is that disclosure under the CC is less extensive than under the SEL, 
because its main purpose is the determination of distributable income. 52 
Nevertheless the general shareholders’ meeting is supposed to give its approval 
of the financial statements prepared in accordance with the CC. Only the 
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financial statements of large companies have been independently audited. But 
when statutory and independent auditors agree that the statements have been 
prepared in accordance with the law (CC), approval by the general shareholders 
meeting is not required. Because the financial statements under the SEL are 
issued about a month later than those under the CC, shareholders have to wait 
in order to learn more about the company they have actually invested in. 
Discrepancies between the CC and the SEL/BAP with regard to 
accounting and auditing took up much of the discussions, developments and 
attention between 1949 and 1981. The period between 1981 and 1996 
represents a fairly barren age for accounting development in Japan, 
characterised by a sense of accomplishment and complacency in the 
beginning 53  and a sense of crisis towards the end. Since 1998 Japan’s 
accounting system has modernised pervasively. Although the measurement and 
recognition systems are unified, the disclosure systems are still separate and 
different. Accounting and disclosure regimes under the CC and the SEL/BAP still 
make up Japan’s accounting system side by side. True unification may be 
unattainable, and in many eyes perhaps even unnecessary or undesirable. 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Paragraph 3.1. discusses the 
four characteristics of Japan’s financial accounting system indicated above. 
Secondly, the accounting concepts related to the definitions of liabilities and 
equity, as well as the distribution and presentation of income are subject of 
consideration in section 3.2. Finally paragraph 3.3. brings together the 
environmental factors of Chapter 2 with the characteristics and concepts of 
Chapter 3 in order to answer the research question for section 1 of this 
dissertation. 
 
 
3.1. Characteristics of the Japanese accounting system 
Japan’s financial reporting regulatory framework fits the code-law pattern 
because until 2002 it consisted of public regulatory authorities and its regulations 
took the form of legal requirements. Two other characteristics of Japan’s 
financial accounting system: creditor protection and the primary status of 
unconsolidated financial statements, reflect the role of financial accounting 
information under prevalence of bank-centred financing and economic policies. 
Below follows an analysis of the development of these characteristics in 
response to the environmental factors that have been discussed in Chapter 2. 
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 Ibayashi wrote: “Thus in Japan there exist two disclosure systems. However, compared with 
the situation in the rest of the world these two systems are not considered backward. If anything, 
Japan belongs to the group spearheading the advanced countries, and one could say that except 
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consolidated financial statements system in place. For differences in disclosure between Japan 
and the US from that time onwards, see Chapter 4. 
 66 
3.1.1. Regulatory authorities 
 
1868-1945 
The institutions of the Tokugawa shogunate were aimed at maintaining the 
status quo with regard to power, and at the collection of taxes. Disputes were 
settled in a manner characterised by dependence on the wisdom of the local 
magistrates. The magistrates functioned within a centralised framework of feudal 
laws. Separate codes existed for Imperial Court nobles, daimyo, samurai and 
commoners (Hendry, 1989, p. 187). 
After the Meiji Restoration new government institutions were founded, 
and the new Ministry of Justice established laws such as a Constitution, 
Commercial Code, Civil Code and Criminal Code in order to make Japan a 
modern though not primarily a democratic nation.54 All of these were modelled 
on Western laws, mainly the German model. As a consequence of which the 
legal system turned out to be very much code-based. Within this code-based 
legal system the Commercial Code, which set and governed financial accounting 
standards, was established as well as administrated by the Ministry of Justice. It 
is therefore not surprising that, at least in peacetime, accounting standards were 
set by legal specialists rather than by accounting specialists. 
 Code law is associated with a public sector regulatory system and high 
political influence in the process of setting standards. The stakeholder 
governance model that is a consequence of such political influence places more 
importance on accounting standards as a means to compute income for 
distribution than as a vehicle to disclose information for investment purposes 
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000, p. 3). A second role was the calculation of taxes. 
This was governed by the tax laws under the Ministry of Finance. Around 1941, 
the Japanese government found inspiration for its command economy in the 
communist laws and institutions through which the stakeholder governance 
model was strengthened, and the German war economy through which taxation 
became even more pronounced. Had accounting standards previously served 
macro-economic purposes, from around 1937 they served political and military 
purposes. 
  
1945-1980 
Democratisation of Japan’s society was the primary aim of reforms carried out by 
the Occupation Authorities (GHQ). Such reforms included land reforms, labour 
reforms, and the dissolution of the zaibatsu. Before GHQ allowed the stock 
exchanges to re-open it demanded securities regulations and accounting and 
disclosure provisions after the US model to be in place so as to enable 
democratisation of financial markets. The Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) of 
1948 made the compartmentalisation of financial institutions stronger than 
before the war. This coincided with the Japanese government’s idea of financing 
industrial development with funds from special purpose banks. 
 A Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) was supposed to 
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supervise securities transactions independently from the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) (Kawamoto and Ohtake, 2002, p. 8-9). The Occupation Authorities left in 
April 1952, the SEC was reduced to an insignificant office under the name of 
Securities and Exchange Deliberation Council (SEDC) within the MOF in August 
1952. The affairs of the SEDC were then to be carried out within the Securities 
Section55 of the Financial Affairs Bureau56 of the Ministry of Finance (Kawamoto 
and Ohtake, 2002, p. 9). 
In 1964, a Securities Bureau57 separated from the Financial Affairs 
Bureau, replacing the Securities Section. This elevated status within the Ministry 
of Finance followed a particularly unstable period in Japan’s securities market. 
For example, Yamaichi Securities only avoided failure through a bailout by the 
Bank of Japan. The Securities Bureau severely tightened regulation of the 
securities industry (Brown, 1999, p. 75). 
Accounting and disclosure regulations under the SEL consisted of the 
Business Accounting Principles 58  (BAP) the principles of which were 
incorporated into law by the Working Rules for Financial Statements59 in 1949. 
The Business Accounting Deliberation Council (BADC)60 had pronounced the 
above on July 9, 1949, to enable reopening of the stock exchange in 1949. The 
Financial Statement Regulations61 (FSR) provided more detailed regulations 
after the BADC pronounced them in 1950. 
 Accounting standards under the SEL only applied to the financial 
accounting statements in the securities reports that listed and very large 
corporations had to submit to the MOF and the stock exchanges. These 
companies and all other companies had to submit their financial statements 
based on the Commercial Code (CC) to the companies’ general shareholders 
meeting, the Ministry of Justice and then publish them in an official gazette. 
These statements were all unconsolidated and the net profits at the bottom line 
also formed the basis for taxation. In other words, the principle of the definite 
settlement of accounts means that unconsolidated net profits before taxation as 
submitted under the CC were the amount of profits that would be taxed under 
the tax laws. Therefore, the allowances, reserves, and accelerated depreciation 
measures under the Corporation Tax Law and the Special Measures Taxation 
Law made their way into the distributable earnings number. 
 The introduction of the Consolidated Financial Statement Regulations62 
in 1976 (effective as of 1978) only meant that consolidated financial statements 
had to be supplied as supplement to the securities report under the SEL within 
four months of the closing date of the accounting period. That was one month 
longer than for the unconsolidated financial statements under the SEL. 
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1980-1996 
A Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission63 was established under 
the Ministry of Finance in July 1992 (Arai, 1999, p. 79-80). Established after a 
series of securities scandals in 1991, its purpose was to ensure investor’s 
confidence in the fairness and increase transparency of securities transactions 
and the newly established futures market.64 
 
1996-2003 
As part of the institutional restructuring related to the financial big bang, June 
1998 saw the establishment of the Financial Supervisory Agency 65  (FSA) 
absorbing the Securities and Exchange Deliberation Council. The Securities and 
Exchange Surveillance Commission was then placed under the FSA. At the 
same time, the Securities Bureau combined with the Banking Bureau forming 
the new Financial Planning Bureau66  under the Ministry of Finance (Arai, 1999, 
p. 79-80). 
From June until December 1998, the FSA resided directly under the 
Prime Minister’s Office. Between December 1998 and January 2001 the FSA 
resided under the Financial Reconstruction Commission67. This commission had 
been called into a temporary existence to dispose of the bad loan problem and 
deal with ensuing bankruptcies. Currently, the FSA resides under the Cabinet 
Office together with the National Public Safety Commission and the Defense 
Agency.68 
Also a temporary institution, the Financial Planning Bureau was replaced 
by the Financial System Stabilisation Division of the Finance Minister’s 
Secretariat in July 2000. At the same time, the Japanese name for the Ministry of 
Finance changed from okurasho to zaimusho in order to better express the more 
limited role of the ministry. Furthermore, the Financial Supervisory Agency was 
renamed Financial Services Agency.69 
The Business Accounting Deliberation Council 70  was one of the 
advisory councils to the FSA. The Business Accounting Council, as it is called in 
the English language version of the FSA homepage, “establishes business 
accounting standards and audit standards, and at the same time conducts 
investigations and deliberations concerning the unification of cost accounting 
and the development and improvement of other aspects of the business 
accounting system, and reports the results to the Commissioner of the FSA and 
others.” 71  Before the reorganisation of the financial system, the Business 
Accounting Deliberation Council was an advisory organ to the Ministry of 
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Finance. 
On July 26, 2001 the Financial Accounting Standards Foundation 
(FASF) “was established in order to contribute to the sound development of 
financial practices in Japan and sound capital markets by making 
recommendations and contributions to the international accounting system 
(…). 72  The organisation consists of a board of directors, trustees, the 
Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ), and a theme advisory council. 
The idea was that the ASBJ would replace the BADC in its role of establishing 
financial accounting standards. More in line with the new financial system, 
financial accounting standards were to be established by a private sector 
organisation rather than by a government institution. Upon completion of its final 
project in 2002 (Opinion on Accounting Standards for the Impairment of Assets), 
the BADC has been dissolved, and the road opened for the ASBJ to function as 
a private organ to set accounting standards. 
The private sector organisations responsible for establishing the FASF 
include: Keidanren, JICPA, Tokyo Stock Exchanges, Japan Securities Dealers 
Association, Japanese Bankers Association, The Life Insurance Association of 
Japan, The Marine & Fire Insurance Association of Japan, Inc., The Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry, The Securities Analysts Association of Japan, and the 
Corporation Finance Research Institute. Sometimes dubbed the Japanese 
version of the FASB, the ASBJ consists of the International Issues standing 
Committee (six working groups), the Practical Solutions Standing Committee 
(one working group), and seven technical committees.73 
In 2001 the responsibilities of the Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission were greatly increased. They now also include overseeing and 
strengthening the quality of financial disclosure as well as of independent 
auditing, carrying out criminal investigations into misleading financial information 
in securities reports and insider trading (Yamaji, 2005, p. 85-86). 
Summarising the above, we find that accounting regulatory authorities in 
Japan as a code-law country were indeed located in the public sector. Only 
recently the overhaul of Japan’s financial and accounting system led to the 
establishment of the private sector Accounting Standards Board of Japan 
(ASBJ). The ASBJ is responsible for accounting standards insofar as they are 
not a part of the Commercial Code (CC), because the CC can only be amended 
by the Diet. After an absence since 1952, there presently is an organ responsible 
for ensuring the fairness of securities transactions and the quality of financial 
disclosure that resides under the FSA but is separate from the MOF. Although 
Japan’s accounting regulatory institutions have been transferred to the private 
sector, they stay firmly entrenched within the code-law legal system. 
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3.1.2. Laws, standards, rules and regulations 
 
1868-1945 
The CC (1890) and the Income Tax Law (1886, but revised in 1899) formed 
initially the legal accounting framework. The Business Operation Tax Law (1896) 
was added, and in 1926 replaced by the Business Operation Income Tax Law, 
which in turn was replaced by the Corporation Tax Law of 1940. 
Because of strong opposition to the 1890 CC, the Diet decided to 
postpone its enforcement in 1892. However, the parts concerning companies, 
bills and bankruptcy were in effect as of January 1, 1893. The new CC went into 
effect as of June 15, 1899 (Fujita, 1991, p. 43-44). The 1899 CC’s Art.190 
required the board of directors to present an inventory, balance sheet, 
operations report, profit and loss statement, and a proposal pertaining to the 
division of the legal reserve, profits, and interest to the statutory auditors one 
week before the general shareholders meeting.  
The above mentioned documents plus the statutory auditor’s report were 
to be available at the company’s head-office before the general shareholders 
meeting (Art.191). At the general shareholders meeting, the directors had to 
provide the shareholders with the above documents and obtain the 
shareholders’ approval, upon which the directors shall make the balance sheet 
public (Art.192). The shareholders meeting’s approval shall release the directors 
and the statutory auditors of their responsibility (Art.193). 1899 CC Art. 194 
stipulated the retention of a legal reserve, and Art.195 prohibited dividend 
payments after the legal reserve had been used for the recovery of losses. 
Measurement rules were set forth in Art.26. 
In 1899 income of legal persons was taxed at 2.5 percent, but after the 
introduction of the Corporation Income Tax Law in 1940 corporate income was 
taxed at 18 percent. Had the Income Tax Law in 1899 defined taxable income as 
‘total benefits minus total money losses’, in 1940 the Corporation Tax Law 
expanded the definition by stating that total benefits are the increase in a 
company’s net assets except for paid-in capital, and money losses are any 
decreases in net assets except for paid-in capital (Inoue, 1997, p. 14-16). 
 As of 1934, the Working Rules for Financial Statements provided the 
detailed guidelines that had been missing. From 1937 the Special Measures 
Taxation Laws helped to pay the bills for investment in buildings, machinery and 
ships by allowing one third of the purchase price to be written off immediately 
(Inoue, 1997, p. 17). The Working Rules for the Estimation of Manufacturing 
Prices (1937) and the Cost Estimation Standards74 of 1942 were only replaced 
by the Cost Estimation Standards75 of 1962. Later into the war the whole system 
was set up to favour the munitions industry. 
 
1945-1980 
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After World War II, the Commercial Code(CC), the Corporation Income Tax Law 
plus the Special Measures Taxation Laws, and the Securities and Exchange Law 
(SEL) constituted the three legs of the triangular system that forms the legal 
framework for Japan’s accounting standards. In 1948, the two legs that existed 
prior to the war were complemented by the SEL, which only applied to listed 
corporations and was influenced by American common law rather than 
Japanese code law. Financial statements prepared under the SEL will have to be 
in accordance with the Business Accounting Principles (BAP).The tax laws and 
the SEL are administered by the National Tax Bureau and the Securities Bureau 
respectively within the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the CC is under the 
jurisdiction of the Civil Bureau of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). 
 Taxable income is to be computed using accounting profits based on the 
Commercial Code. This so-called kakutei kessan principle is derived from the 
German Massgeblichkeit principle. The German principle means that accounting 
earnings should be the “measure” for the computation of taxable income. In 
Japan, the principle has been translated as kakutei kessan or definite settlement 
of accounts. In other words, taxable income is computed based upon net income 
resulting from the settlement of accounts as has been made final by the general 
shareholders meeting under the regulations of the CC (Corporation Tax Law 
Art.74) (Inoue, 1997, p. 41). 
 Under the definite settlement of accounts, tax laws influence accounting 
earnings as follows. In many cases assets are depreciated faster under the tax 
laws than the assets’ economically useful lives warrant. This causes a problem 
that is called “reverse standard”, meaning that in reality taxable income becomes 
the measure for accounting income (Arai, 1999, p. 71-72). In cases where the 
Special Measures Taxation Law applies these differences could be considerable, 
especially during the high growth period when industrial policy and financial 
policy were aimed at capital formation, export promotion, and the development 
of new products (Inoue, 1997, p. 60-61). 
 Upon recommendation by the Shoup Report in 1949, the Corporation 
Income Tax was amended in 1950. Share premiums, profits from capital 
reduction, and surplus from merger were no longer included in taxable income 
(Arai, 1999, p. 216). The Shoup Report had recommended that fixed assets be 
revaluated in relation to the extreme inflation in the early post-war period. 
Revaluation of fixed assets was allowed in three rounds in 1949, 1951 and 1953, 
but initially many companies chose not to participate. A possible reason could be 
that an increase in net assets due to revaluation was to be taxed at 6 percent 
(Kaneko, 1953).76 Corporate income was to be taxed at 35 percent and income 
from securities was taxed at 25 percent. Amendment of the rules for the 
depreciation of fixed assets had to be carried out because initially the 
Corporation Tax Law did not allow increases in depreciation charges due to fixed 
asset revaluation.  
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 Accounting under the SEL started with the pronouncement of the BAP 
and the Working Rules for Financial Statements in 1949, the Financial Statement 
Regulations and the Audit Standards in 1950, and the Annotations to the BAP in 
1954. Art. 24 of the 1949 SEL requires companies to submit their financial 
statements and other information within three months of the closing of the 
business year to the MOF. According to Art.193, these financial statements have 
to be prepared in accordance with the Financial Statement Regulations (FSR) 
and be audited by an independent auditor or audit firm (Art.193-2). The MOF 
established the Financial Statement Regulations following principles that are 
generally recognised as fair and proper (Art.193). This phrase means that the 
BAP, which are supposed to be selected from fair accounting practice, form the 
basis for the FSR. 
As the SEL applies only to a limited number of companies77, initially its 
influence on the financial accounting system as a whole was fairly insignificant. 
The distinction between capital surplus and earned surplus was adopted by the 
CC in 1950. Accrual accounting was only fully adopted by the CC in 1962. 
Accounting under the SEL adopted the proprietary concept of income distribution 
and the all-inclusive concept of profits in 1974 for the purpose of adjustment to 
the CC. (See section 3.2.3.) Presentation of an inventory was then no longer 
required. 
Since 1962 the general opinion was that the CC prevailed over the BAP 
because the CC did have legal authority and the BAP did not. On March 30, 
1963, the MOJ issued the “Regulations Regarding the Balance Sheet and Profit 
and Loss Statement of Joint Stock Companies” (CC Statements Regulations)78 
in order to formally establish legal superiority of CC accounting, and in the 
meantime make the BAP redundant for unlisted companies. Because in practice 
the BAP played second fiddle to the CC, it is not surprising that the MOF was 
more preoccupied with the tax laws, their effect on the nation’s coffers, on the 
national accounts, and on industrial policy, than with transparency and protecting 
shareholder interests.  
In the 1960s it became clear that window dressing of financial 
statements and moving losses to unconsolidated subsidiaries were a problem 
under both the CC and SEL accounting systems. This caused the BADC to 
revise the Working Rules for Performing Audits79  in 1965, and the Audit 
Standards80 and the Working Rules for Audit Reports81 in 1966. So the audit 
function was strengthened under the SEL, but it took until 1974 for the CC to 
introduce independent audits in addition to the already existing audits by a 
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company’s statutory auditor. The “Law concerning the exceptions to the 
Commercial Code regarding the audit of kabushiki kaisha” (CC tokurei) 
constituted the audit system for large and small joint stock companies under the 
CC.  
Chapter 2 of the CC tokurei applies to companies with a capital stock of 
over 500 million yen. Art.2 requires that these large joint stock companies be 
audited by an  external auditor (kaikei kansanin), being a CPA or accounting 
firm. Chapter 3 regulates the audit function for companies with a capital stock of 
less than JPY 100 million. Small-size companies only need an audit of the 
accounts by the statutory auditor(s).82 Medium-size stock companies, with a 
capital stock of between JPY 100 million and JPY 500 million, are apparently the 
only ones that are no exception under the CC.  
Medium-size joint stock company audit requirements under the CC 
include only audits by statutory internal auditors (kansayaku). These audits 
consist of an audit of the accounts (CC: Art. 281-4) and an audit of operations. 
(CC: Art.274) Auditing for medium-size stock companies is regulated by the audit 
provisions in the CC. As described above, Art. 273 to 280 stipulate the rules for 
statutory auditors, and Art. 281-283 lay out the regulations for the procedures of 
submitting the financial statements to the statutory auditors, and getting the 
approval of the general shareholders’ meeting.  
In order to effectively unify the CC and SEL auditing systems it was 
necessary to unify the accounting standards of the two accounting systems. Until 
the introduction of requirements for external audits under the CC in 1974, the 
inconsistencies between the CC and the BAP/SEL had been practically 
inconvenient as well as discomforting from a legal and theoretical perspective for 
as long as twenty-five years. A sudden “solution” to this problem was found in a 
newly established a blanket clause saying: “One must consider fair accounting 
customs for the interpretation of regulations concerning the preparation of 
commercial accounting books.” (1974 CC Art. 32-2)  
In the September 1973 issue of Kigyou Kaikei (Business Accounting) a 
special was dedicated to the question of what fair accounting customs are. 
Takamatsu (1973, p. 41) wrote: “Although the Business Accounting Principles do 
not in themselves constitute the ‘fair accounting customs’ that the Commercial 
Code speaks of, at least one could think that the (fair accounting customs) 
include the (Business Accounting Principles).”  About a year later Osumi (1974, 
p. 17 and 19) stated that with regard to business accounting, the CC demands 
that what is legal whereas the BAP demand what is just. Among corporate 
managers many declared that ‘lawful’ is sufficient and ‘just’ is not legally required. 
Many external auditors agreed. 
Finally in 1978, the SEL introduced consolidated financial statements. 
The Consolidated Financial Statement Regulations83 apply only to the relatively 
few listed companies. Furthermore, the disclosure requirements for consolidated 
financial statements were much less extensive than for unconsolidated financial 
statements. For a discussion of the difference between unconsolidated and 
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consolidated disclosure requirements see Chapter 5. 
 
1980-1996 
During this period several amendments to the CC, BAP, SEL and tax laws took 
place. The 1981 amendment to the CC included the establishment of Art. 16 of 
the CC tokurei. It purports that if the statutory and external auditors of large 
companies agree that the financial statements were in accordance with the law, 
directors do not need the annual shareholders meeting’s approval of the 
financial statements. Approval is still required for the appropriation of earnings. 
According to Kawamoto et al. (2002, p. 48), it was considered 
inappropriate to expect shareholders of large corporations to study the accounts 
extensively as the inspection of certain items in the accounts requires specialist 
and technical knowledge. On the other hand, Wakasugi (1999, p. 69) explains 
Art. 16 as a measure to strip the general shareholders meeting of its contents. In 
addition to capital stock of over 500 million yen, also companies with total 
liabilities of over 20 billion were included in the definition of large companies (CC 
tokurei Art. 1). 
As part of a movement toward improvement of disclosure, the BADC 
issued an Opinion on the Disclosure of Segmental Information in 1988 at the 
codification of which segmental disclosure was stepwise required in 
consolidated financial statements between 1994 and 1997. The BADC Opinion 
on Accounting Standards for Futures and Options Transactions in 1990 followed 
the introduction of “futures on long-term government bonds in 1985, stock index 
futures in 1988, and stock options in 1989” (Teranishi, 1999, p. 112). However, 
this information was supplementary in nature and not subject to an independent 
audit (Sakurai, 2001, p. 1771). An Opinion on Accounting Standards for Lease 
Transactions followed in June 1993, and became effective under the SEL as of 
April 1, 1994. Although opinions and standards issued by the BADC are 
generally recognised as fair and proper business accounting standards, they do 
not have any legal status unless they are codified by the MOF (Takeda, 2003, p. 
35). 
 
1996-2003 
The structural reforms that were announced in November 1996 did liberalise the 
financial system between 1998 and 2001. And in the tree years between 1997 
and 1999, there was an explosion in volume and quality of accounting standards 
that was unparalleled in the fifty years since the establishment of the BAP 
(Takeda, 2003, p. 131). Structural reform removed the power of the MOF from 
the standard setting process, and the accounting big bang made the accounting 
system more transparent. 
It also established the ASBJ as a private sector regulator in lieu of the 
BADC as a public sector regulator in July 2001. As we have seen above, 
accounting standards pronounced by the BADC had to be made into legally 
enforceable standards through MOF and later Cabinet office authorisation. This 
is not the case for the standards set by the ASBJ. 
 Even accounting standard setting under the CC underwent some 
transformation. Because the CC is a law, it can only be amended by the Diet. In 
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the 1990s business, financial and accounting developments followed each other 
up too quickly and the necessary knowledge became too specific for the lengthy 
process of pushing an amendment through the Diet. As of April 1, 2003 
accounting standards, except the ones that are important for creditor protection 
such as the legal reserve and the calculation of distributable earnings, under the 
CC can be amended through Ministry of Justice ordinance. 
In 2002 the CC was amended so that the valuation standards in Art.32 
to 34 and Art. 285-2. 285-4, 285-5, 285-6 and 285-7, and the standards 
regarding deferred assets as in Art. 286, 287, and 287-2 could be moved to the 
“Regulations Pertaining to the Implementation of the Commercial Code”84 . 
Effective as of April 1, 2003, these regulations prescribe the methods for 
valuation of assets and other accounting matters with regard to the calculation of 
profits. The accounting regulations that stay in the CC are Art.288, 288-2, 289, 
293-3 regarding legal reserves, and Art.290-1 to 290-3 regarding the calculation 
of maximum distributable earnings (Takeda, 2003, p. 138-142). 
The new and improved Commercial Code since 2004 requires large joint 
stock companies to issue consolidated financial statements (CC tokurei Art. 19 
No. 2). However large companies that do not need to file their securities report 
under SEL Art. 24-1 are for now exempt from the obligation to prepare 
consolidated financial statements under the Commercial Code (Ohta, 2002, p. 
294). 85  The contents of the consolidated balance sheet, profit and loss 
statement, and statement of retained earnings are to be prepared according to 
the “Regulations Pertaining to the Implementation of the Commercial Code” 
Ministry of Justice Ordinance No. 22. Consolidated supporting schedules or 
consolidated cash-flow statements are not required (Ohta, 2002, p. 294). 
With the BADC Opinion on tax effect accounting for listed companies 
(June 1998, effective as of March 2000) and the introduction of taxation on a 
consolidated basis (fiscal years starting April 1, 2002) a truly new era started. 
Listed companies can choose to apply for consolidated taxation. Consolidated 
taxation can only apply to 100 percent owned subsidiaries (Watanabe, 2002, p. 
23-25). 
In 2000, the definite settlement of accounts principle was partly 
abandoned and as a consequence the triangular system has now only two and a 
half legs. It may take some time for the situation to change for small and 
medium-sized companies. In Japan the purposes of the three laws have 
generally been regarded as ultimately different. For the tax laws fair and equal 
taxation is the theoretical aim. From that perspective, it is surprising that the 
definite settlement of accounts system was maintained for so long. Throughout 
the high-growth period and until the early 1980s it may have served economic 
policy aims. Only the need to rapidly write off bad debt that was the 
consequence of the collapse of the asset-inflated bubble finally convinced all 
parties involved that tax effect accounting was necessary and beneficial. 
Providing investors with better insight in companies’ economic reality has never 
been a convincing enough argument. 
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According to Takeda (2003, p. 19-20), the purpose of the CC is to protect 
creditors and to calculate disposable income, and that of the SEL is to protect 
investors by providing information that is useful for making investment decisions. 
To the casually observing outsider it may make little sense to maintain two 
separate accounting systems whose aims are not that far apart and that could be 
serviced by one accounting system as is the case in many other countries. The 
SEL was forced upon Japan in 1948 by the American occupation authorities, and 
the BAP were issued hurriedly to make it in time for the re-opening of the stock 
markets. Both the SEL and the BAP were as alien to Japan as democracy or 
sit-down toilets at the time of introduction. Once introduced, all were transformed 
to bear distinct Japanese characteristics, but they were there to stay. Initially, for 
the Ministry of Finance, the SEL and the BAP represented newly acquired turf as 
well as an additional means to shape capital and financial markets and further 
macro-economic objectives. 
Only when one considers the fact that the SEL applies to a little more 
than 2000 companies that produce about 70 percent of Japan’s GDP, but the CC 
applies to a thousand times as many companies that employ about 70 percent of 
the population, the scale of things starts to fall into some kind of perspective. 
High leverage ratios and the stakeholder corporate governance model 
contributed to the relative unimportance of the SEL/BAP accounting system in 
comparison to the CC accounting system. Internationalisation of business, 
financial and capital markets in addition to the imminent instability of the financial 
system in the second half of the 1990s finally made it clear that accounting 
standards should be established by accounting specialists rather than by legal 
specialists. 
Unity between accounting under the Commercial Code and the 
Securities and Exchange Law has been a topic of debate as well as a purpose of 
amendments in both laws during the past fifty years. Currently, the ASBJ sets the 
accounting standards for the listed companies that have to present their financial 
statements to the FSA and the stock exchanges that they are listed at. These 
standards have to be incorporated into the CC and the “Regulations Pertaining 
to the Implementation of the Commercial Code” because the accounting 
numbers have to be the same under both the CC and SEL accounting systems. 
And as we know, all companies have to prepare financial statements under the 
CC, have them audited, and present them to their general shareholders meeting. 
It is therefore fair to say that the highest ever degree of unity between the two 
accounting systems has been reached. Nevertheless, the SEL still does not 
apply to all joint stock companies, the CC only requires consolidated financial 
statements from the companies that already have to prepare them under the 
SEL, and external audit requirements do mainly apply to large listed 
corporations. 
In sum, the triangular system of tax laws, CC, and BAP/SEL breaks 
apart into tax laws and CC for all firms, and BAP/SEL for listed firms. Financial 
statements under the CC are presented to the general shareholders meeting. 
Only those CC statements of the large listed companies are subject to 
independent audits since 1974. Since April 1, 2004 the companies that issue 
consolidated financial statements under the SEL have to do so under the CC as 
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well. Financial statements under the SEL are issued for general investors, have 
been independently audited since 1948, and are submitted to the stock 
exchanges where a company is listed and to the MOF (after the Big Bang to the 
FSA). 
Because of the definite settlement of accounts principle, the tax 
deductions permitted under the Corporation Income Tax Law and Special 
Measures Taxation Law encouraged companies to minimise taxable income. 
Shareholders therefore had to make do with financial statements that were not 
prepared for presenting a company’s economic reality. Naturally, income 
numbers under the CC and SEL were not supposed to be different, so investors 
and future shareholders were faced with the same problem. Since the 
introduction of tax effect accounting in 2000, an important institutional barrier for 
financial accounting information to be decision-useful and to faithfully represent 
economic reality has been removed. It remains to be seen how the new 
accounting standards issued by the ASBJ will interact with the BAP and the CC. 
 
3.1.3. Creditor and shareholder protection 
Adjustment of creditor and shareholder interests as expressed by accounting 
standards centres on the recognition of deferred charges and provisions or 
allowances. Deferred charges such as bond issue costs are listed as assets and 
amortised based on the logic that they contribute to the earnings process 
(Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 313-314). On the other hand, creditors 
think of deferred charges as assets that do not represent any value as collateral 
in case of default or liquidation. Creditors care about retaining funds inside the 
company for liquidity and solvency purposes. Establishing reserves, provisions 
and allowances for purposes such as doubtful accounts, retirement benefits, 
price-level fluctuations, or simply for profit retention serve the aim of capital 
maintenance (Okada, 1999, p. 124-129). 
 Statutory legal reserves are established for the purposes of creditor 
protection and capital maintenance. Capital maintenance refers to the statutory 
requirement to retain net assets equal to the non-distributable reserves within 
the company (Elliott and Elliott, 1996, p. 393). Generally, reserves are divided 
into non-distributable reserves and distributable reserves. Due to 
inconsistencies between the CC and the SEL, Japan has been the scene of a 
debate regarding what reserves should be considered distributable and in what 
order distributable reserves could be used up, for most of the post-war period. 
From the very start in 1899, the CC established explicit dividend restrictions. 
With regard to corporate governance, the CC formally establishes the rights and 
obligations of shareholders, the board of directors, statutory and external 
auditors. In addition, there is the audit system under the SEL. 
Creditors need to be protected against undue and unlawful distributions 
of a company’s wealth to its shareholders. To creditors it is very important that 
there are restrictions on the distribution of profits and retained earnings. 
Secondly, creditors need to know the value of a company’s assets as collateral. 
On the other hand, shareholders are merely residual beneficiaries of the 
company. Shareholders are protected by their limited liability and the possibility 
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to sell their stock and salvage their initial investment. Of the highest importance 
to them are dividend payments and timely high quality disclosure of financial and 
other information from the company so they can make optimal investment 
decisions. Accounting standards regulating legal reserves are primarily a 
function of the relative importance of bank financing in a financial system and the 
political clout that creditors have in the regulatory process. 
 
1868-1945 
The 1899 CC allowed dividend payments only after the retention of at least one 
twentieth of total profits into the legal reserve (1899 CC Art. 194). In 1899 the 
legal reserve was made up of these profit retentions and share premium. 
Periodical profit retention into the legal reserve had to take place until it 
amounted to one fourth of total capital stock. Share premium was treated as 
profits by both the CC and the tax laws. When the legal reserve was being used 
for recovery of losses, which was the only purpose legal reserves could be used 
for, dividend payments were not allowed (1899 CC Art. 195). 
Although dividend payments became more and more restricted in the 
late 1930s, this was motivated by a shift toward the stakeholder corporate 
governance model rather than purely for the purpose of creditor protection. The 
asset-liability approach to the determination of profits, and the preparation of an 
inventory were additional means for creditor protection, as these help creditors 
estimate the value of assets for collateral. 
 Between 1921 and 1936, in the years before the second war with China 
started in 1937, companies paid out sometimes as much as 70 percent of their 
profits as dividends. In this period dividends greatly exceeded capital increases 
whereas capital increases exceeded dividends between 1937 and 1943 
(Okazaki, 1999, p. 108). In many companies the board of directors was 
increasingly made up of internally promoted directors rather than directors who 
were also large shareholders. In addition, the main bank system had 
spontaneously developed between 1939 and 1941 in the form of loan consortia, 
and was formalised and placed under the National Finance Control Association 
in 1942 (Teranishi, 1999, p. 74-78). Thus governance structures shifted in favour 
of creditor protection. 
 Under the 1899 CC the financial statements were to be audited by the 
statutory auditor and to be presented to the general shareholders meeting 
together with the statutory auditor’s opinion (1899 CC Art. 183). Both the 
statutory auditors and the board of directors were chosen by the general 
shareholders meeting, who also decided on their remuneration (1899 CC Art. 
179 and 189). The statutory auditor was chosen for a period of one year, after 
which he could be re-elected (1899 CC Art. 180). In 1938 this period was 
changed to two years. 
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1945-1980 
In 1949 the BAP adopted the stance that capital surplus and earned surplus86 
should be kept separate in order to prevent capital stock to be hollowed out by 
dividend or tax payments. With the introduction of this new concept, possibly the 
most debated of discrepancies between the BAP and CC was born. Hitherto 
reserves under the CC had simply consisted of non-distributable legal reserves 
and distributable voluntary reserves.87 Through the 1950 amendment to the CC, 
the legal reserve came to be made up of a capital reserve and a profit reserve.88 
Statutory retained earnings formed the source for the profit reserve. 
Amendment to the CC in 1962 increased the contribution to the statutory profit 
reserve from one twentieth of cash dividends to one tenth. (1962 CC Art. 288) 
Five items were established in 1950 as sources for the capital reserve: share 
premium, paid-in surplus over non-par shares89, asset revaluation profit90, profit 
from capital reduction, and profit from merger. At the time, asset revaluation 
profits (holding gains) were fiercely debated because scholars with a more legal 
orientation did not think that holding gains possess the nature of “capital” in the 
way that the other four items do, and should therefore be treated as profits, i.e. 
be subject to taxation and be distributable. The questions what items of capital 
surplus should be distributable and in what order capital surplus can be used up 
for different purposes, if at all, represented another source for vehement and 
lengthy discourse between legal and accounting scholars. Again, those who 
were the then more modern accounting scholars took the stance that most of the 
capital surplus should not be distributable (Sugino, 1998, p. 22). 
Profit reserves were considered distributable as they consisted of 
retained income. The order of sources for the recovery of losses would be 
voluntary reserves, profit reserves and finally capital reserves (Sugino, 1998, p. 
23). Since the 1950 amendment to the CC, companies could choose, by 
ordinary majority in the board of directors’ meeting, to transfer the whole or part 
of the legal reserve back into the capital stock (1950 CC Art. 293-3-1). This new 
capital could be used to issue gratis shares to existing shareholders because the 
1950 CC also introduced stock dividends and stock splits. Purchasing treasury 
stock was not allowed in Japan and could therefore not be used for stock 
dividends. 
From a business perspective it is interesting to note that gratis share 
distributions were not taxed (because they were paid for by the capital reserve), 
whereas stock dividends were subject to taxation (because they came out of the 
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profit reserve) (Sugino, 1998, p. 27-28).91 In theory stock dividends are used in 
case a company has accumulated earnings but does not have the cash available 
to distribute these earnings (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 459). 
Although recognised by accounting scholars as merely a reclassification of 
ownership interests, the general view among corporate managers in Japan at 
the time was that these additions to capital stock represented free capital 
increases (Sugino, 1998, p. 23; Nakamura, 1999, p. 87). Since the CC had 
established no upper limit to the share premium that could be added into the 
capital reserve, one could think that standard setters actually encouraged 
corporate managers to consider share premium and paid-in surplus as potential 
no-cost capital. 
For reasons that have been discussed in Chapter 2, Japan’s post-war 
economic reconstruction was increasingly financed by debt rather than by equity. 
Scrap and build policies aided by the Special Taxation Measures Law promoted 
capital investment in certain areas through accelerated depreciation measures. 
Ohta (1961a, p. 28-29) warned against dangers of the large-scale investments 
that were necessary for industrial modernisation and rationalisation in answer to 
the challenge of trade liberalisation, such as inflationary pressure and economic 
instability. Most of the investments in plant and equipment were financed through 
loans. Especially during the high-growth era, the main bank system played an 
important part in the distribution of financial resources and the functioning of 
financial regulations, thereby substituting the market for control (Okada, 1999, p. 
87). It is therefore not surprising that political influence in the regulatory process 
favoured creditor protection over shareholder protection. 
 The general idea was that equity is risk capital in return for which 
shareholders receive limited liability and the right to dismiss directors if they 
disagree with a company’s management policies. Creditors on the other hand 
have no such rights, and are at a distinct disadvantage to shareholders (Takeda, 
2003, p. 116-118 and 120-122).92 Therefore they need to be protected against 
the influence of shareholders, who were feared to have an opportunistic and 
speculative nature93, on corporate management. 
 When management and ownership are not strongly separated, as is the 
case with many small kabushiki kaisha, creditors are indeed in a position that is 
more vulnerable to shareholders’ moral hazard. With minimum capital 
requirements of JPY 3 million and a minimum of one founder, it was very easy to 
establish a joint stock company. This explains why there are roughly five 
hundred times more joint stock companies than there are listed joint stock 
companies. 
 Accounting standards for creditor protection in this period included the 
establishment of provisions (hikiatekin) by the CC in 1962. Hikiatekin are the 
third area of discrepancy between the CC and the BAP where one can clearly 
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see the discrepancies within the Japanese accounting system. According to 
Ohta (1961b, p. 5), for a long time hikiatekin accounts were not well understood 
except by accounting scholars. Tax laws considered reserves and hikiatekin as 
retained earnings. Therefore, contributions to these accounts were treated as 
taxable profits. After World War II, depreciation allowances and allowances for 
irrecoverable accounts94 came to be recognised, but not the hikiatekin of a 
liability nature. Legal scholars reasoned that an item on the credit side of the 
balance sheet and that is not a capital accounts item, must be a liability. But if 
there is no particular claimant for the hikiatekin, it cannot be a liability. 
 Art. 287-2 of the 1962 CC read: “When recording a provision for specific 
expenditures95  or losses in the liabilities section of the balance sheet, its 
purpose shall be clarified in the balance sheet. When using this provision for a 
purpose other than the one for which it was established, the reasons for doing so 
shall be recorded in the profit and loss statement.” Art. 287-2 marked the birth of 
“specific provisions” (tokutei hikiatekin). Under the BAP, provisions of a liability 
nature had to meet the conditions that the expenditures were highly likely to take 
place, found their cause in the previous accounting period, could be reasonably 
estimated, and the expenses could be matched with revenues (Annotations to 
the BAP, Note no. 18). An amendment to the BAP in 1963 got rid of the fourth 
condition so that provisions for losses and contingent losses could be 
established as well (Taguchi, 1970, p. 53-54). Provisions are in theory used to 
retain funds inside the company for anticipated losses or expenditures, but 
among business practitioners, the leading interpretation of CC Art. 287-2 was 
that provisions could be used for mere profit retention.96  Indeed the very 
introduction of provisions into the CC had come about under notoriously strong 
pressure from the business community (Taguchi, 1970, p. 54). As the Special 
Measures Taxation Law followed the broad interpretation of hikiatekin, it allowed 
a large number and a broad range of provisions. Taguchi explains this stance as 
useful from the perspective of economic policy (Taguchi, 1970, p. 55). 
 The newly established provisions were partly countered by the extended 
scope of deferred assets that were recognised under the CC. To organisation 
costs97 (1938 CC Art. 286), bond issuing premium98 (1938 CC Art. 287), interest 
during construction99 (1938 CC Art. 291-3), and share issuing costs (1950 CC 
Art. 286-2, 1962 CC Art. 286-4), were added start-up costs100 (1962 CC Art. 
286-2), bond issuing costs (1962 CC Art. 286-5), and experimental research and 
development costs (1962 CC Art. 286-3). From a creditor perspective, 
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recognising deferred charges as assets in the balance sheet may cause the 
substance of assets that serve as collateral to be compromised (Okada, 1999, p. 
124-125). Art. 290 of the CC was amended in 1962 to explicitly state the 
calculation method for the maximum amount of dividend payout as: net assets 
minus the total of capital stock, capital and profit reserves, this period’s 
contribution to the profit reserve (i.e. 10 percent of cash dividends), and if 
applicable the deferred charges of Art. 286-2 and 286-3 mentioned above. After 
which directors bonuses still had to be paid (Sugino, 1998, p. 33). It seems fair to 
say that these amendments represent a big step towards creditor protection and 
away from protecting the rights of shareholders. 
 Although independent audits by an audit firm or CPA have been required 
by the SEL since 1949, the CC introduced independent audits only for large 
companies who already received independent audits under the SEL in 1974. 
Consolidated financial statements were also audited by an independent auditor 
under the SEL since 1978. Practical reasons for unification of the Japanese 
financial accounting system became more urgent because of the general 
agreement that it would be too costly if the independent audits under the CC and 
SEL had to be conducted separately. 
 
1980-1996 
An amendment to the CC in 1981 restricted the use of provisions so that mere 
profit retention was no longer allowed. CC Art.287-2 was amended to read: 
“Provisions for specific expenditures and losses can be recorded in the liabilities 
section of the balance sheet only to the extent that the amount corresponds with 
the expenditure or loss for the business year.” Most companies would recognise 
provisions and allowances to the extent and for the maximum amount allowed by 
the Corporation Tax Law and the Special Measures Taxation Law. Through this 
amendment the CC forced the tax laws to take a narrower interpretation. 
 As of 1981 hikiatekin were divided into allowances and provisions under 
the Special Measures Taxation Law and others. Examples of the former are 
special depreciation allowances (Art. 52-3) and provisions for losses from 
overseas investments (Art. 55). These belong in the liabilities section and are 
called junbikin. Examples of the latter are provisions for warranties and service 
charges, returned goods, bonuses, and retirement benefits. All are called 
hikiatekin and are recorded in the liabilities section as well. Allowances for 
doubtful accounts and sales discounts are negative hikiatekin and are recorded 
in the assets and liabilities sections respectively (Hirose, 1998, p. 277-283). 
 In the 1970s the par-value stock system had become hollowed out. 
Although non-par stock had been allowed since 1950, most companies issued 
par-value stock with a par-value of JPY50. This represented about one month’s 
salary in 1940 (Katagi, 2003, p. 54), but in 1980 that was already much less than 
a middle-school child’s weekly allowance.101 The par-value would go into capital 
stock, and the share premium into capital surplus. During the high-growth era 
actual paid-in capital would be much higher than par value, so by 1980 capital 
stock would be much smaller than capital surplus. Dividends were usually five 
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yen per share (10% of par value), and managers came to consider the share 
premium as no-cost capital that they used to pay stock dividends. 
 In order to deal with this situation the 1981 CC amendment required half 
of the paid-in capital to go into the capital stock. For non-par stock that had been 
issued at the time of establishment of a company, half of the amount over 
JPY50,000 was to be accounted for as capital stock. At the same time, the “unit 
stock system” (tan’i kabu seido) was introduced. This means that companies had 
to issue stock in units of at least JPY50,000 (Sugino, 1998, p. 39-43). So for 
shares with a par-value of JPY50, a company would have to issue one thousand 
shares in one unit. In addition, in order to be allowed to pay stock dividends, net 
assets per share had to be more than JPY50,000 after distribution of the gratis 
shares. As a consequence, after 1982 there was trend away from stock 
dividends towards stock splits (Sugino, 1998, p. 43-46). In 1990 an amendment 
to the CC effectively abolished stock dividends (Nakamura, 1999, p. 88). 
 Although preventing the capital stock from hollowing out as described 
above could be considered a measure of shareholder protection, it actually 
serves creditors well too (Katagi, 2003, p. 56). As the earned surplus is based on 
the capital stock (a maximum of one fourth of the capital stock) an increase in 
capital stock will lead to an increase in non-distributable earned surplus (Sugino, 
1998, p. 54-55). 
 In a response to the US demands made during the structural 
impediments talks an emergency revision of the CC was carried out in 1993. The 
demands were: 
1. improved access to company accounts for shareholders (lowering the 
threshold for inspection of the books from 10 percent of the shares to 1 
percent) 
2. a longer period between the invitation to the annual shareholders meeting 
and the actual meeting (from 2 weeks to one month) 
3. the establishment of an auditing committee consisting of directors from 
outside of the company 
4. relaxation of the rules limiting purchase and holding of treasury stock in 
order to further dissolution of mutual shareholdings 
5. the establishment of a system that will guarantee voting right of non-resident 
shareholders 
Actual amendments consisted of the following. Reduced litigation costs for 
shareholders (Art. 267-4). Shareholders possessing at least 3 percent instead of 
10 percent of a company’s shares can ask for inspection of the company 
accounts (Art. 293-6). The maximum period for a statutory auditor was increased 
from two to three years (Art. 273). The limit to issuing corporate bonds was lifted 
(Art. 297) (Kawamoto et al., 2002, p. 49). 
Up until the 1994 amendment to the CC the purchase of treasury stock 
had been forbidden, except in four cases: 
1. for the purpose of share elimination (Art. 210.1),  
2. in case of merger or at the time of transfer of total operations to another 
company (Art. 210.2),  
3. when the shares are necessary to exert control over the company (Art. 
210.3),  
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4. to repurchase the shares from opposing shareholders at the time of a 
merger. 
In 1994, two more occasions in which repurchase of treasury stock was 
permitted were added. One was in order to transfer the stock to employees (Art. 
210 No.2). The second was an exception for joint stock corporations that limit 
transfer of stock in their articles of incorporation (Art. 210, No. 3). For example 
when shareholder A intends to transfer his shares to B, but B does not get the 
board of directors’ approval for the transfer, the company may repurchase the 
treasury stock. Another example is when a stockholder dies and the successor 
who inherited the stock wishes to sell them. The reason is that it may prove 
difficult to find a buyer for shares in a company that limits transfer of its stock 
(Nakamura, 1999, p. 89). 
The 1994 amendment to Art.210 of the CC relaxed the regulations for 
the purchase of treasury stock as above. A maximum of 5 percent of outstanding 
shares could be purchased as treasury stock. Although the CC did not prescribe 
any accounting treatment, Note 18 to the FSR stipulated that treasury stock shall 
be recorded in the current assets section of the unconsolidated balance sheet. In 
other words treasury stock was meant to be held for a maximum of one year. 
Disclosure was only required if the amount was more than 1 percent of the 
amount of total assets (FSR Note 19). 
Relaxing the restrictions on the purchase of treasury stock permitted 
corporate management more flexibility in reorganisation. Restructuring 
procedures had become increasingly necessary because many companies and 
financial institutions were in trouble due to the prolonged economic depression. 
 
1996-2003 
From 1997, the Commercial Code allows repurchase of treasury stock for the 
purpose of capital reduction (Art. 212, No. 2). Procedures for capital reduction 
were established in “The Law Regarding Exceptions to the Commercial Code 
Concerning the Elimination of Shares” issued on May 21, 1997 as law number 
55. This decision needed approval of the general shareholders meeting as well 
as the board of directors. As an alternative way of dealing with stock options, 
since 1997, the Commercial Code gives employees the right to subscribe to 
newly issued stock (art. 280-19) (Nakamura, 1999, p. 89). 
The 1997 amendment to the CC allowed the purchase of treasury stock 
for the purpose of stock options. Because hitherto treasury stock had been 
classified as a current asset, a problem arose due to the fact that stock options 
usually have maturities of more than one year. In the unconsolidated balance 
sheet prepared under the CC treasury stock with a maturity of less than one year 
was to be recorded in the current assets section, and treasury stock with a 
longer maturity was to be recorded in the fixed assets section. Losses or profits 
on sale were disclosed as non-operating income. In consolidated financial 
statements (prepared under the SEL) treasury stock appeared in the balance 
sheet deducted from stockholders equity (Ito, 1998, p. 368-369). The CC treated 
treasury stock as assets because it adhered to the legal entity concept where 
any asset that can be sold should be treated as an asset for the purpose of 
creditor protection. An amendment to the CC in June 2001 constituted a shift 
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toward the economic entity perspective which treats treasury stock as a capital 
reduction.  
Simplified procedures for mergers were established. Art. 56 says that a 
joint stock corporation can be the result of a merger. According to Art. 408, a 
merger contract shall be approved by the general shareholders meeting. Merger 
procedures were laid out in Art. 408-2, Art. 412, and 414. Art. 413-3 stipulated 
that new shares issued by the company shall not exceed 5 percent of the total 
number of its shares outstanding. 
Under the previously mentioned “Law Regarding Exceptions to the 
Commercial Code Concerning the Elimination of Shares” companies who had 
profits for distribution could purchase treasury stock for the purpose of 
elimination of profits. (CC Art. 212) After the 1998 revision, companies could also 
use capital reserves (shihon junbikin) for the elimination of shares (Art. 288 No. 
2-1-4). 
Revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 1997 lifted the ban on holding 
companies. In order to facilitate the establishment of holding companies, the 
Commercial Code was amended to allow conversion (Art. 352 to 363) and 
transfer (Art. 364 to 372) of stocks. Rationalisation of the system for mergers and 
providing a legal framework for mergers necessitated rules for full transfer of 
operations (Art. 245-5). The process for company split ups is regulated by Art. 
373 and Art. 374-1 to 31. 
In 2001 the Commercial Code was amended three times. The first 
amendment concerned abolishing the tan’i stock system and replacing that with 
the tangen stock system102. The former provided a bottom limit of JPY50,000 to 
the amount (value) of shares to be issued in one unit. The latter provides a 
maximum number of shares that can be issued per one unit, and one unit 
represents one vote in the general shareholders meeting. The unit and the 
maximum number of units are to be determined and laid down in the articles of 
corporation. One unit cannot exceed 1,000 shares or 0.5 percent of the total 
number of shares issued (Art. 221-1). Thus also the system of par-value shares 
has been abolished. Shareholders that own less than one unit of stock have no 
voting rights and no right to ask questions in the annual shareholders meeting 
(Kawachi, 2003, p. 39). 
Lifting the restrictions on purchasing and holding treasury stock (Art. 
210) constitutes a major item of the amendment. Hitherto, decisions on treasury 
stock had to be made by the general shareholders meeting. From now on, the 
decision to purchase treasury stock and what to do with it are at the discretion of 
the board of directors (Art. 211). Treasury stock will no longer appear in the 
balance sheet as an asset, but as a negative item in the capital section. 
In an attempt to increase a company’s methods of raising capital, the 
second amendment to the Commercial Code allows a greater variety of shares 
that a company can issue. Convertible stock, mandatory convertible stock (the 
issuing company decides when the conversion takes place), shares with limited 
voting rights, preferred or subordinated shares greatly expand the range that a 
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 Both tan’I and tangen translate into English as “unit”. The Ministry of Justice translates tan’i 
stock system as “lot” stock system, and tangen stock system as “voting unit” stock system. See 
“Japanese Corporate Law: Drastic Changes in 2000-2001 & the Future” at http://www.moj.go.jp. 
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company can choose from (Art. 222 No. 2 to 10).  
Furthermore, redefinition of the legal concept of warrants enables 
companies to sell stock purchase warrants as separate and independent 
securities. Unlike before, stock options may now be granted to people other than 
employees or directors of the issuing company. (Art. 280-19 to 38) The same 
system applies to bonds with warrants attached (Art. 341-2 to 15). 
Another important aspect of the second amendment made it possible to 
incorporate information technology into the disclosure system. Companies are 
required to present their financial statements to the Ministry of Justice in 
electronic form (Art. 33-2, and Art. 281). Shareholders who are unable to attend 
the annual shareholders meeting can submit their vote per computer (Art. 
239-3). 
The last amendment to the Commercial Code in 2001 may bring about 
important changes in the corporate governance system of joint stock 
corporations. Directors’ responsibilities have been alleviated somewhat, and the 
function and position of statutory auditors has been strengthened somewhat. 
Statutory auditors no longer have the obligation to attend every board meeting, 
but if there is a need and they neglect their duty to express their opinion on 
certain matters, they may be held liable for possible negative consequences for 
the company (Art. 260-3). 
As for the number of outside statutory auditors before the revision, Art. 
18 of the Law concerning the exceptions to the Commercial Code required at 
least one out of four statutory auditors to be from outside the company. The 
concept of “outside” was understood as not having been an employee of the 
company concerned or one of its subsidiaries in the five years up to the 
appointment. Presently, in case there are more than three statutory auditors, at 
least half of them should be from outside. “Outside” meaning never having been 
employed at the company concerned or at one of its subsidiaries (Ohta, 2002, p. 
182). The term for statutory auditors has been extended from three to four years 
(Art. 273-1). 
Shareholders can file a complaint against a company’s directors when 
they suspect negligence, if they have held stock in the company for more than 
six months (Art. 267-1). Directors can be made to pay for neglecting their duties 
and thus damaging the company for a maximum of four years of salary, two 
years of salary for outside directors, and six years of salary for representative 
directors (Art. 266-18). 
The mechanics and institutions of corporate governance constitute the 
central issue of the 2001 amendment to the CC. Some consider the Heisei 
recession as having partly originated in failure of the governance system. 
Therefore, these new regulations may have a beneficial impact on companies’ 
ability to overcome the recession. 
The 2002 amendment has given large companies (with a capital stock of 
over JPY500 million) and so-called large companies (with a capital stock of 
between JPY100 million and JPY500 million) having ten or more directors 
including one outside director 103 , the choice to change their governance 
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incorporation, which of course can only be amended through a decision by the general 
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structure by establishing committees (Special Law for the Revision of the 
Commercial Code, Art. 21-5). Having changed its articles of incorporation, the 
company may then establish three committees named appointment committee, 
auditing committee, and compensation committee. The purpose of these 
committees is to alleviate the board of directors of some of its responsibilities. 
Responsibilities of the appointment committee include deciding on the 
proposal for appointment or removal of directors to be presented to the general 
shareholders meeting. The auditing committee audits the operations of officers 
and directors, and performs the internal auditing of the accounts. In addition, the 
auditing committee decides on the choice of external auditor. Furthermore, the 
board of directors has the authority to appoint an auditing committee (Special 
Law Art. 21-8-2-1) in lieu of the statutory auditor under the old system. 
Remuneration of directors and officers is the main task of the compensation 
committee (Kawachi, 2003, p. 92-93). 
In case of important issues such as amending the articles of 
incorporation, decisions are not made by a simple majority of the votes (half plus 
one) but by a special majority (two thirds) (Art.343-1). At least one third of the 
shareholders with voting rights have to cast their vote, otherwise the decision 
cannot be taken (Art. 343-2). Hitherto, half of the voting rights had to be 
represented in the vote. One might say that passing decisions has become 
easier. Interesting is that this decision has been motivated by the idea that in the 
days to come more and more shares will be held by smaller shareholders. 
Large companies that are not a “company with committees” but do have 
more than ten directors including one outside director, may establish an 
“Important Assets Committee” (Special Law Art. 1-3). This committee will make 
the decisions concerning the acquisition or disposition of important assets, or 
concerning large borrowings (Takagi, 2002, p. 27). 
Already in 1997 the CC had been amended to allow the purchase of 
treasury stock for the purpose of stock retirement and capital reduction using the 
capital reserve. As of 2001 the CC allowed the purchase of treasury stock 
irrespective of the purpose, as long as it was within the limit of the distributable 
earnings amount (Art.210) (Katagi, 2003, p. 61). After revision the CC required 
the total of profit reserve and capital reserve to be a maximum of one fourth of 
capital stock (Art.288). This is a return to what it was before 1950, and it means 
an effective reduction of the size of the legal profit reserve.  
The annual shareholders meeting can decide by an ordinary majority to 
use the part of the legal reserve that is over the minimum of one fourth of stated 
capital stock (Takeda, 2003, p. 505) for the purpose of repayment to 
shareholders or for compensation of losses (Art.289). Repayment of contributed 
capital had been forbidden except in case of capital reduction and stock 
retirement. 
In sum, creditor protection has been a dominant concern in Japan’s 
accounting system. This took the form of explicit dividend restrictions, a liberal 
stance toward reserves and discretionary provisions (particularly between 1962 
and 1981), the possibility to use share premium and paid-in-surplus as no-cost 
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capital (until 1981). The introduction of consolidated financial statements under 
the SEL represented a first step toward increased disclosure for shareholders 
and future investors. Over the years the focus of accounting standards has 
shifted more toward shareholder protection and transparency. 
Especially since 2001 the CC enables companies to choose corporate 
governance institutions that are deemed more transparent. Furthermore, 
shareholders have more possibilities for recourse. Illustrative of the fact that 
Japan has had a long history of marked prevalence of creditor protection is 
Takeda’s remark that the risky nature of shareholder capital has gradually diluted. 
He called this phenomenon the “debtisation of equity”.104 Allowing the purchase 
of treasury stock for the purpose of stock options in 1997 prepared the way for 
the 2001 shift in the CC from considering treasury stock as an asset to treating it 
as a capital reduction. In essence, this means departure from the legal entity 
concept toward the economic entity concept. 
 
3.1.4. Status of consolidated financial statements 
 
1945-1980 
Irrespective of Japan’s history of zaibatsu and keiretsu, consolidation accounting 
was only scarcely practised, starting from 1960. The first company in Japan to 
issue consolidated financial statements was Hitachi Co. Ltd. aiming to be 
permitted to have its shares traded in New York via American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs). The US SEC permitted Sony ADRs to be traded over the 
counter on June 6, 1961. Hitachi ADRs were allowed from July 1963. From 1964, 
in cases such as mergers or changes of financial year, the Tokyo and Osaka 
Stock Exchanges requested submission of consolidated financial statements. 
Such was the consequence of several financial failures of affiliated companies of 
large listed corporations that had practised window dressing.105 
As there were no standards concerning consolidated financial 
statements, the Finance Minister asked the BADC to deliberate on codification of 
standards for strengthening the auditing system, and standards for consolidated 
financial statements. The BADC issued the “Opinion Relating to Consolidated 
Financial Statements” and the “Notes to the Opinion Relating to Consolidated 
Financial Statements” on May 19, 1967. However, as the BADC noted in its 
“Opinion”, consolidated financial statements were new to Japan and generally 
accepted accounting practices with regard to the preparation thereof had to be 
reinvestigated and formulated in the stage of systemisation. 106  First and 
foremost, the “Opinion” stressed the importance of consolidated financial 
statements. Secondly, it provided consolidated accounting standards on: 
1. general principles 
2. the scope of consolidation 
3. differences in accounting periods between parent and subsidiary 
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 BADC, (1967/5/19) “Opinion Relating to Consolidated Financial Statements” 
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companies 
4. differences in the adoption of accounting principles between parent and 
subsidiary companies 
5. the preparation of consolidated balance sheets 
6. minority interests 
7. the preparation of consolidated profit and loss statements 
8. information to be included in footnotes 
9. tax payment 
The “Explanatory Notes to the Opinion Related to Consolidated Financial 
Statements” laid out the consolidation process in detail. These standards served 
companies issuing consolidated financial statements until the next BADC 
opinion on this subject. 
Finally, on June 24, 1975, the BADC issued the “Opinion Relating to the 
Systemisation of Consolidated Financial Statements”. The MOF adopted the 
“Opinion on Systemisation” on October 30, 1976, and from April 1977 Japanese 
companies were to issue consolidated financial statements as supplementary 
documents to the parent company financial statements under the Securities and 
Exchange Law. The provisions were laid out in the “Ministerial Ordinance 
Concerning Terminology, Forms and Methods of Preparation of Consolidated 
Financial Statements” as Ministerial Ordinance No. 28.  Until a thorough 
revision of the consolidation accounting system in 1997, the standards provided 
by the “Opinion on Systemisation” remained the basis of the system for twenty 
years (Morita et al., 2000, p. 6). 
Ministerial Ordinance No. 28 additional clause No. 2 (issued in 1976 as 
additional clause No. 3), stated that for the time being, consolidated financial 
statements according to US-GAAP and filed with the SEC in the US, if 
recognised and approved by the Japanese Finance Minister, could be issued 
instead of consolidated financial statements according to Japanese financial 
accounting standards. 
 
1980-1996 
The perceived importance of consolidated financial statements increased slowly. 
Initially, consolidated financial information was to be submitted within four 
months from the closing date. For unconsolidated financial statements the term 
was three months. This discrepancy ceased to exist from April 1, 1988. 
Furthermore, from April 1, 1991, consolidated financial statements were to be 
submitted as independent statements rather than as supplementary documents 
following an amendment of the Disclosure Ordinance107 on December 25, 1990 
(Morita, 1999, p. 46). 
According to Art. 10 of the Standards for Consolidated Financial 
Statements108 (CFS), the equity method applied to investments in associated 
companies and unconsolidated subsidiaries. Exceptions were, companies 
excluded from consolidation on grounds of non-going concern or restart, or of a 
temporary majority of voting rights (CFS Art. 5), or where voting rights of over 20 
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percent of the total were merely temporary (CFS Art. 10). However, many 
companies valued their investments in associates at the historical cost price, and 
considered dividends received as income from investments, like they did in 
unconsolidated financial statements. It was perfectly legal to do so as additional 
clause No. 2 read: “For the time being, it is possible not to apply Art. 10.” The 
equity method became the enforced standard from April 1, 1983, after repulsion 
of additional clause No. 2. 
In May 1989, the BADC issued its “Opinion Related to the Disclosure of 
Segmental Information”. Subsequently, on September 20 of the same year, the 
Ministry of Finance amended the Disclosure Ordinance to incorporate the 
BADC’s opinion statement into the law. For the time being, it was possible not to 
disclose operating profits or losses per geographical segment (Morita et al., p. 7). 
From April 1, 1990, companies under the SEL were required to disclose sales 
and operating income or loss per industry, and per geographical segment 
(domestic and overseas), as well as total overseas sales (exports). 
The “Disclosure Opinion” considered it necessary to provide segmental 
disclosure as part of the financial statements so the information would fall under 
the obligatory external audit. Nevertheless, the “Disclosure Opinion” stated that it 
was unavoidable to provide segmental disclosure as additional information for 
now, and that the auditing of segmental disclosure needed to be reconsidered 
within the next five years. From April 1, 1993, following an amendment of the 
“Standards for Consolidated Financial Statements” (Art.15-2) on March 3, 
segmental disclosure was to be included in the notes to the financial statements. 
And thus became a part of the securities report that had to be submitted to the 
MOF and therefore became subject to external audits under the SEL.  
Art. 15-2 prescribed considerable increase of the contents of segmental 
disclosure as follows. Disclosure per business segment included sales, 
operating profits or losses, total assets, depreciation expenses, and capital 
expenditures. Actual enforcement of disclosure of operating profits or losses per 
industry started from April 1, 1994. Business segment disclosure of assets, 
depreciation expenses and capital expenditures was mandatory from April 1, 
1995. Geographic segment disclosure consisted of sales, operating profits, and 
assets. Until April 1, 1997, companies could choose not to disclose these items 
per region or country of residence for their subsidiaries. Instead they disclosed 
these items for the home country (Japan) and for all overseas countries lumped 
together (Morita, 1999, p. 47-48). 
Other amendments to the consolidated disclosure system are as follows. 
From 1985, companies were required to submit an “Outline of business results 
and important items related to the circumstances of the business group” as an 
attachment to the consolidated financial statements.  
The Fifth Structural Impediments Initiative meeting held from June 25 to 
June 28 1990 resulted into significant nominal enhancement of consolidated 
disclosure requirements. A major point on the agenda for Japan was the 
so-called keiretsu problem. From the viewpoint of US investors, for whom 
consolidated accounts were the rule, the relations between companies within 
keiretsu were rather opaque. In order to improve transparency for foreign 
investors, creditors, and potential business partners, the Japanese government 
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promised the following improvements.  
1) Disclosure of related-party transactions at par with FASB Statement 
No.57. 
2) Disclosing consolidated financial statements in the primary annual 
statement rather than as an attachment. 
3) Segmental disclosures (Saito, 1995, p. 18-23) 
And thus, following the Fifth Structural Impediments Initiative, due to amendment 
of the “Disclosure Ordinance” on December 25, 1990, the MOF required the 
un-audited disclosure of transactions with related parties109 as of April 1, 1991, 
appended to the consolidated financial statements. Art. 1-27-5 of the Disclosure 
Ordinance required disclosure of the parent company, subsidiaries, associated 
companies and their parent and subsidiary companies, the main shareholders, 
and names of people or companies that have an important influence of business 
and financial policies of the company. However, these disclosures were not 
subject to an independent audit. 
The above mentioned independent status of the consolidated financial 
statements since April 1, 1991, as well as the segmental disclosure requirements 
that were not really required, and related party disclosures are a consequence of 
the Structural Impediments Initiative. 
Consolidated research and development activities disclosures became 
mandatory from April 1, 1993. The next year saw an enlargement of the scope of 
consolidation due to abolishing the 10% rule. Hitherto, companies were at liberty 
to exclude subsidiaries from consolidation or applying the equity method, if their 
sales, assets or profits amounted to less than 10 percent of the group total 
(Morita, 1999, p. 48). 
 
1996-2003 
The Accounting Big Bang entailed an overhaul of the accounting system as part 
of which consolidated financial statements became the primary financial reports. 
Following its exposure draft in February 1997, the BADC issued its “Opinion 
Related to the Revision of the Consolidated Financial Statements System” in 
June of the same year. One part was concerned with the completion of the 
disclosure system, and the second part dealt with the revision of the 
“Consolidated Accounting Principles”. 
Completion of the disclosure system was to be attained through 
reversing the positions of consolidated and unconsolidated accounts, attaching 
higher importance to consolidated accounts. Furthermore through the 
introduction of consolidated cash flow statements, consolidated interim financial 
statements, and consolidated temporary reports, and through making these 
(except for the latter) subject to external audits (Nomura, 1999, p. 10). 
Other new aspects included the disclosure of contingencies and 
post-balance sheet events on a consolidated basis, the disclosure of business 
results and the situation of the business group along industry lines. The contents 
of the second part included: revision of the scope of consolidation and of 
disclosure of minority interests, adoption of tax effect accounting, clarification of 
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the consolidation process and rules for differences in accounting treatment, and 
a revision of the disclosure format (Morita, 1999, p. 49-51). Related party 
disclosures are included in the notes to the consolidated financial statements 
since April 1, 1999. 
Amendment of the related Ministerial Ordinances, new Ministerial 
Ordinances, and new JICPA guidelines in place, the provisions of the “Opinion 
Related to the Revision of the Consolidated Financial Statements System” 
became legally enforceable from April 1, 1999. Changes in regulations related to 
consolidated financial statements forced companies to adopt a group-oriented 
approach to management. These changes include: 1. Primary status of 
consolidated financial statements including the new consolidated cash flow 
statement, 2. taxation on a consolidated basis, 3. and the introduction of 
consolidated financial statements for large companies under the CC. 
Pondering why it took so long for consolidated financial statements 
requirements to be introduced (from around 1965 to 1978), and why it has taken 
even longer for consolidated financial statements to receive full primary status 
under both the SEL and the CC (from 1978 until 2004), the following 
explanations come to mind. In the 1960s Japan faced the scandals related to 
window dressing such as Sanyo Special Steel Company’s fraudulent bankruptcy 
which made the need for consolidated financial statements and better auditing 
apparent. At the same time, thin capitalisation of Japanese companies invited 
the threat of hostile foreign takeovers. The answer was found in stable mutual 
shareholdings. Stable shareholders were Japanese individuals or corporations 
who could be counted upon to hold on to their shares irrespective of losses, low 
or no dividends, and attractive offers by foreign interests. It worked very well, as 
was demonstrated in 1989 when T. Boone Pickens was unable to obtain more 
than 26 percent of the voting shares of Koito Manufacturing Company (Lowe, 
1990, p. 7). 
The business community stalled the introduction of consolidated 
financial statement standards as long as it could, and when they were finally 
there, consolidated financial statements disclosed hardly any information in the 
notes. Secondary status, lower disclosure requirements, and consolidation 
standards regarding the scope of consolidation rendered Japanese consolidated 
financial statements incomparable because of the 10 percent rule, and because 
legal ownership and control were often detached. Stable shareholdings 
developed before the introduction of consolidated financial statement standards 
that adopted consolidation requirements based on legal control rather than 
effective control, thus encouraging mutual interlocking shareholdings as a 
means to defend against hostile take-overs. 
The fact that the CC finally adopted consolidated financial statements for 
large companies in 2002 (effective from April 1, 2004) and that for these 
companies taxation on a consolidated basis was introduced seems to indicate 
that these changes only took place when they were deemed advantageous to 
Japanese corporations in order to lower the tax burden. It appears that the 
changes did not take place primarily for the purpose of supplying information to 
investors and other interested parties, but rather to suit the needs of the 
businesses preparing the financial statements. Another motivation is presenting 
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the image that Japanese accounting standards are now at par with those of the 
rest of the advanced world. 
 
 
3.2. Accounting Concepts and Approaches 
Accounting theory, in as far as it exists, is not clear on what determines the 
choice for certain concepts and approaches. At the very least, one may expect 
the choices in accounting concepts on which the system is based and the 
approaches that the system follows to be in conformity with the characteristics of 
the accounting system. In practice however, seemingly contrarian approaches 
are not always mutually exclusive. 
 
3.2.1. Determining profits 
If one chooses to determine profits for the period based on a comparison of 
beginning and ending owners’ equity, the so-called balance sheet approach or 
asset-liability approach, it is very important to determine the value of equity 
correctly, and in times of inflation value assets at market prices rather than at 
historical cost prices. The resulting net worth is instrumental in the legal entity 
concept especially from the viewpoint of creditors. It is also close to economic 
income defined as disposable income. Until the 1930s the asset-liability 
approach was general practice in the US (Robinson, 1991, p. 107), and until the 
start of the post-war period in many other countries including Japan. In the 
1980s the asset-liability approach was adopted again by the FASB as the basis 
for its accounting standards, but this time it was not necessarily linked with 
current cost (Robinson, 1991, p. 107-108). 
If, on the other hand, one chooses to determine profits as the difference 
between revenues and expenses, the balance sheet becomes a tool for 
matching the revenues and expenses for the period correctly. This is called the 
income statement approach but is probably better known as the transactions 
approach (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 139). Income determined as 
the result of the transactions approach is closer to the concept that views a 
company as an economic entity. Confusingly, income thus defined is viewed as 
accounting income rather than economic income. Application of the realisation 
principle prohibits the inclusion of unrealised holding gains or losses in the 
estimation of profits for the period. Hence the historical cost price for the 
valuation of assets is the most conservative choice. 
 
1868-1945 
As the accounting provisions in the Commercial Code were modelled on the 
Franco-German continental type of regulation, it viewed a company as a legal 
entity and it followed the balance sheet approach for the determination of profits. 
1890 Commercial Code, Art. 32 literally requires assets to be valued at “the 
current price or the market value”110, the 1899 Commercial Code Art. 26 says to 
use “the price at the time of preparation of the inventory” (= current price), 1911 
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Commercial Code Art. 26-2, reads that the valuation “is not to exceed the price 
at the time of preparation of the inventory”, thus establishing the current price as 
a maximum, which is not the same as the lower-of-cost or market rule. This 
remained unchanged in 1938 Commercial Code Art. 34, which adds that fixed 
assets for business use shall be valued at the cost price depreciated by a proper 
amount. Judging from the above one could conclude that since 1911 valuation at 
cost price was the rule. Any revaluation gains would be taxed, which is why 
revaluation was not generally practiced. 
After revision in 1938 the CC recognised organisation expenses 
(Art.286), bond discounts (Art. 287), and pre-operating period interest (Art. 
291-3) as deferred charges. This change may first be viewed as a first tiny step 
toward increased influence by accountants in the regulatory process. Secondly, 
it implies recognition of the fact that a company is also an economic entity. 
 
1945-1980 
In addition to the accounting system under the Commercial Code (CC), in 1949 
a new accounting system under the Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) was 
introduced for listed corporations. The CC still followed the balance sheet 
approach to determining profits, whereas the SEL introduced the matching 
principle and valuation principally at cost basis.111 So the SEL required the 
practice of accrual accounting, and followed the income statement approach to 
the determination of profits. This was obviously a very confusing situation for 
listed companies having to present their shareholders with a set of financial 
statements in accordance with the CC, and having to present the Ministry of 
Finance with a set of financial statements following the Business Accounting 
Principles (BAP) and the SEL. CC amendment in 1950 recognised new share 
issuing expenses as deferred charges. Under the old CC these had been 
deducted from the share premium part in the legal reserve (Fujita, 1991, p. 166). 
In addition the legal reserve was divided into a legal capital reserve and a legal 
profit reserve (Fujita, 1991, p. 73). The implications with regard to creditor 
protection have been discussed in the section 3.1.3. and consequences for 
operating capital maintenance will be discussed in section 3.2.2. 
The BADC issued several opinions on the unification of the system, but it 
took twelve years for this particular discrepancy between the CC and the SEL to 
be resolved by an amendment to the CC. As of 1962, the CC followed an income 
statement approach to the determination of profits. The basis for valuation 
changed to historical cost price, with the obligation to use the lower of cost and 
market price for inventories in case the current price was remarkably lower than 
the acquisition or manufacturing price and the price was not expected to recover. 
In case it was considered possible that the price could recover, the 
lower-of-cost-and-market rule was allowed but not compulsory. (1962 CC Art. 
285-2) The same applied to investments in bonds (Art. 285-5) and stocks (Art. 
285-6).  
At the same time Art. 288-2-3 was deleted, which means that since 1962 
revaluation reserves and provisions were no longer allowed as a part of the 
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 Valuation of inventories was to be at the lower of cost or market price. For marketable 
securities the SEL required realisable value. See Fujita (1991), p. 156. 
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capital reserve. Valuation profits were forbidden (Hirose, 1998, p. 153), as is 
consistent with the realisation principle. In case of application of the 
lower-of-cost-and-market rule there was still a possibility for upward revaluation 
if the price did turn out to recover after all, by use of the araikae method.112 This 
translates as “wash and change” method which roughly corresponds to the 
indirect method113 that uses an allowance account. Under this method the 
current price at the time of market value recovery is compared to the historical 
cost price instead of the price at the time of the write-down. The allowance 
account can be used for upward revaluation to a maximum of the historical cost 
price. Another method allowed in case of write-downs when using the 
lower-of-cost-and-market rule is the kirihanashi114 or cut-off method in which 
case the loss ends up in the income statement under cost of goods sold, 
non-operating expenses, or special losses. 
In order to facilitate period matching the CC allowed the use of 
provisions for the first time in 1962, and also extended the scope of deferred 
assets to include bond issuing expenditures, R&D expenditures, and start-up 
costs (see section 3.1.3.). The ambiguous formulation of provisions enabled an 
interpretation to include any profit retentions as long as they were specific. 
Furthermore, 1950 CC Art. 290 specified the calculation method for the 
maximum amount that can be paid out as dividends. 
1974 saw an amendment to the CC that was mainly meant to unify the 
audit systems of the CC and the SEL. With respect to the determination of profits 
it is important to note that the preparation of an inventory list was no longer 
required, and that the lower of cost and market valuation of the shares of 
subsidiaries was no longer allowed (Arai, 1999, p. 126-127). Instead, historical 
cost applied to investments in subsidiaries. 
 
1980-1996 
In 1981, another amendment to the CC took place. It required the specific 
purpose for provisions to be disclosed and did away with specific provisions 
merely for the purpose of profit retention. Other aspects of this amendment have 
been discussed in section 3.1.3. Throughout the whole period the transactions 
approach to the determination of profits and accrual accounting reigned 
supreme. 
 
1996-2003 
Market value or fair value became an accepted valuation method for financial 
assets through an amendment of the CC in 1999 that is effective as of March 
2001. This amendment occurred in order to bring about harmonisation with 
international standards (Takeda, 2003, p. 148). It also supported the “Accounting 
Standards for Financial Instruments” that were issued by the BADC in January of 
1999 (Katagi, 2003, p. 83). 
The temporary “Law Pertaining to the Revaluation of Land” of March 31, 
1998 is a special measure that enables financial institutions and other 
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companies to boost their equity capital. It was meant to be temporary, but has 
been extended twice already. A maximum of two thirds of the holding gain can be 
used to purchase treasury stock, but is not supposed to be paid out as dividends 
(Katagi, 2003, p. 86). 
“Accounting Standards for the Impairment of Fixed Assets” were issued 
by the BADC in August 2002, and are effective from April 1, 2005. They 
represent another step away from the historical cost principle and towards a 
more static balance sheet function, in line with international developments. 
In sum, true to her code-law country nature, Japan’s financial accounting 
system embraced the legal entity concept of enterprise because the regulators 
from the Ministry of Justice were legal specialists. Japan’s accounting system in 
the form of the Commercial Code adopted the balance sheet approach to 
determining profits because from a legal standpoint this is best for creditors in 
case of a dispute or liquidation. Starting in 1938 the CC recognised deferred 
charges, indicating increased influence from accounting professionals. 
The schizophrenic situation where the CC adhered to the balance sheet 
approach and the SEL adopted the income statement approach lasted from 
1948 until 1962 when the CC unequivocally adopted historical cost price 
valuation, extended the scope of deferred charges and allowed the use of 
“specific provisions” very liberally. The scope for the use of specific provisions 
was narrowed considerably through amendment to the CC in 1981. Recent 
introduction of fair value accounting for financial instruments (2001) and the 
impairment of assets (2005) means a partial return to the balance sheet 
approach toward the determination of income. This time the shift is not motivated 
by the legal entity concept and creditor protection, but related to risk assessment 
and investment decisions. Due to the subjective nature of discount rates used in 
determining fair value it actually represents a shift toward seeing the company as 
an economic entity rather than a legal entity. 
 
 
3.2.2. Capital maintenance 
Another choice that needs to be made is one regarding the determination of 
income for distribution concerns the approach to capital maintenance. Profit 
according to the concept of operating capacity capital maintenance results only 
when after providing for physical replacement of productive capacity a financial 
increase in net worth occurs. Money capital maintenance is attained if there is an 
increase in the money amount of net assets. In both cases profits cannot be the 
result of transactions with shareholders or owners. Physical capital maintenance 
corresponds with valuation at current cost or replacement value which is also 
used under the asset-liability approach to profits. Money capital maintenance 
traditionally comes with valuation at historical cost and the income statement or 
transactions approach to profit. Financial capital maintenance is a concept in 
between money capital and physical capital maintenance because it adjusts for 
purchasing power parity (Elliott and Elliott, 1996, p. 61). Both physical and 
financial capital maintenance have the consequence of protecting creditors’ 
interests. 
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There are two aspects to the concept of capital maintenance. One aims 
at protecting the continuity of a business by making sure that profits for 
distribution are not the result of inflation, by creating a revaluation reserve. Since 
1962 the Japanese CC has not allowed revaluation provisions or reserves to be 
established as part of the capital reserves, and has only recognised revaluation 
reserves in exceptional cases which will be discussed below. Inflation has not 
been a serious problem for the past twenty odd years in Japan. Consequently, in 
recent times the choice for physical or monetary capital maintenance 
approaches has become a theoretical problem rather than a practical one, 
except in the case of foreign currency translation and the valuation of securities 
at market value. 
The other aspect aims at protecting creditors through the creation of 
statutory or legal reserves that cannot be paid out as dividends. Paid-in capital is 
usually not allowed to be distributed as dividends to shareholders. Theoretically, 
capital and legal reserves serve to protect creditors from undue income 
distributions and revaluation provisions serve to avoid a hollowing-out of a 
company’s assets. Distributable reserves can be provisions or reserves 
appropriated for specific purposes. An accounting system’s approach to the 
distribution of capital surplus and earned surplus depends very much on its 
stance towards creditor protection. See section 3.1.3. for a discussion of this 
type of capital maintenance. 
 
1868-1945 
As we have seen in section 3.2.1., the 1890 CC stipulated valuation of assets at 
market price. In 1911 an amendment changed the general valuation basis to a 
maximum of current cost. From 1938 the CC added that fixed assets for 
business use were to be valued at the cost price depreciated by a proper amount. 
Valuation increases were subject to taxation. In 1911 the CC swung from current 
cost valuation to historical cost valuation embracing a not so strict monetary 
capital maintenance concept in the process. 
 The 1899 CC required that a legal reserve be established to which five 
percent of every period’s profits and the total of share premiums should be 
added until the reserve amount reached twenty-five percent of the company’s 
total capital stock. (1899 CC Art.194) Dividend payments were only allowed after 
profit retention into the legal reserve and were not allowed when the legal 
reserve had been used for the recovery of losses. (1899 CC Art.195) 
  
1945-1980 
After World War II inflation soared. As part of a successful attempt to address 
this problem revaluation of fixed assets was allowed three times. In this special 
case, the CC allowed a revaluation reserve. So after the war, the Commercial 
Code followed an operating capital maintenance approach whereas the new 
SEL (and BAP) supported monetary capital maintenance by adhering to 
valuation at the historical cost price. As in the case of the approach to 
determining profits in section 3.2.1., this particular discrepancy continued until 
the amendment to the CC in 1962. By adopting the historical cost valuation basis, 
the CC shifted to monetary capital maintenance. Although the 
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lower-of-cost-or-market price was allowed, it was only mandatory when it was 
perceived that there was no chance that the market price would recover from an 
extreme drop. Many company managers took an optimistic stance and did not 
use this option. 
However, the choice of cost calculating methods such as lifo or fifo still 
gave companies a way to mitigate the effects of inflation. In the same way, in the 
times of adverse exchange rates after the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods 
system, companies could choose for either the historical exchange rate or the 
current rate of conversion.115 
 
1980-1996 
Throughout this period both the SEL and the CC adhered to the concept of 
monetary capital maintenance. Even though stock prices came crashing down 
hard in 1990 and 1991 still many companies did not use the 
lower-of-cost-or-market rule. This turned hidden reserves into hidden losses. 
Creditors such as banks and other lenders should have been protected by the 
lower-of-cost-or-market rule by keeping assets without substance from the 
balance sheet. Instead, the perverted corporate governance structures that were 
the consequence of relationship investing and lending without the proper checks 
and balances in place led many companies to insolvency and brought Japan’s 
financial system close to a collapse. 
 
1996-2003 
The Accounting Standards for Financial Instruments (ASFI) issued by the BADC 
in 1999, established fair value as the valuation basis for financial instruments. 
Holding gains or losses on securities for trading purposes shall be included in 
net income for the period. (ASFI No. 3-2-1) Financial instruments that are held to 
maturity shall be valued at amortised cost. (ASFI No. 3-2-2) Stocks of 
subsidiaries or associated companies are to be valued at cost price (ASFI No. 
3-2-3), but written down in case of a significant drop in value that is not expected 
to recover. (ASFI No. 3-2-6) Other securities are to be stated at fair value. 
Holding gains and losses shall be calculated according to the araikae method116 
and shall be directly recorded in a separate part of the equity section of the 
balance sheet after adjustment for the tax effect. However, a second method is 
allowed according to which holding gains are recorded in the equity section of 
the balance sheet after deduction of a deferred tax liability like under the first 
method, but losses go into the computation of net profits for the period. (ASFI No. 
3-2-4) 
Revaluation of land holdings was temporarily allowed under the Law 
Pertaining to the Revaluation of Land117 , so that financial institutions and 
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oil shocks. See: Ono (1996), Chapter 2. 
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 Calculation of the valuation gain or loss according to the araikae method (洗い替え方式) 
means that the current price at the time of a possible recovery shall be compared to the original 
cost price at the time of initial valuation rather than with the price of the first write-down. 
117
 (土地の再評価に関する法律) The MOJ established this temporary law on March 31, 1998 
and it was effective immediately for a period of four years. 
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companies could boost their shareholders equity. A maximum of two thirds of the 
revaluation reserve could be used to purchase treasury stock (Takeda, 2003, p. 
499; Katagi, 2003, p. 86). The CC had not allowed revaluation reserves since 
1962. Therefore, the new revaluation reserves represent a move toward 
physical/financial capital maintenance, as is in accordance with the international 
trend. 
In sum, after World War II Japan adhered in practice mainly to the 
money capital maintenance concept and since 1962 this was also the formal 
stance. The loose interpretation of the lower-of-cost-or-market rule enabled 
companies and financial institutions to carry investments at cost on their balance 
sheets where they should have been marked down to market. It must have been 
simpler for external auditors to condone this optimistic interpretation than to 
loose a client because of a dispute over what is just or what is lawful. 
Since 2000 financial instruments shall be carried at fair value. Holding 
gains or losses on trading securities go into the computation of net income. Held 
to maturity financial instruments shall be valued at amortised cost. Stocks of 
subsidiaries or associated companies in the unconsolidated balance sheet shall 
still be valued at cost price, and associated companies shall be written down 
when the market price drops significantly and is not expected to recover. Holding 
gains on other securities go into a valuation reserve, holding losses are either 
deducted from the revaluation reserve or are deducted from income for the 
period. 
Temporarily revaluation of land holdings was allowed in order to boost 
shareholders equity. However, the fact that a maximum of two thirds of this 
reserve could be used to purchase treasury stock indicates that it is a measure 
designed to give companies flexibility to deal with their bad loan problems. 
 
3.2.3. Definitions of liabilities and equity, and distribution of income 
concepts 
Related to the approaches to determining what profits for distribution are, is the 
question who should be the beneficiary of a company’s profits. At the one end of 
the spectre there is the proprietary theory, according to which shareholders are 
the owners of the company and are therefore entitled to the company’s net 
assets including its profits. At the other end there is the entity theory, also called 
the stakeholder concept, which assumes that there is no difference between 
liabilities and owners’ equity and thus creditors, shareholders and even company 
employees can receive the profits (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 305). 
In section 3.1.3., we have seen that from the perspective of creditor 
protection legal reserves are instrumental in the determination of distributable 
income under the CC (Art. 290). What constitutes net worth depends on the 
definitions of liabilities and equity. Furthermore income distribution concepts 
define which items are shown as expenses or as profits for distribution. A 
Japanese conceptual framework has only been developed in 2004. In the period 
before that one has to look for clues to the definitions adhered to on an 
item-by-item basis. 
For example, does an accounting system treat subsidies, donations by 
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third parties or shareholders, wholly or partially pardoned debt as liabilities, 
equity or neither? If they are treated as liabilities or as a separate 
non-liabilities/non-equity group it indicates an inclination towards the entity 
theory. On the other hand, inclusion in the equity section shows adherence to the 
proprietary theory. Another question would be whether interest payments, 
employee remunerations, or tax expenditures appear in the profit and loss 
statement as income for distribution, or are they regarded as expenses? The 
former case indicates the entity concept of income distribution, whereas the 
latter signifies the proprietary concept. 
 
1868-1945 
Although both theories were only formalised in the 1920s118, profits seem to 
have been distributed based on the proprietary theory in the early period. 
According to Sakurai, the proprietary concept formed the basis for the 
Commercial Code and the Corporate Income Tax Law after World War II. 
Government grants and other amounts donated by non-shareholders were 
regarded as profit reserve rather than as capital reserve (Sakurai, 2001, p. 
1716-1717). In 1934 the Financial Management Committee of the Temporary 
Industrial Rationalisation Bureau in the Ministry of Commerce issued the 
Working Rules for Financial Statements 119 . Rule number 39 of the rules 
pertaining to the inventory states that in order to arrive at net worth (junzaisan) 
one should subtract the amount of debt from the amount of total assets (Arai, 
1989, p. 51). This seems to indicate the proprietary concept. On the other hand, 
directors’ bonuses are regarded as distribution of income (Arai, 1989, p. 62). 
When the Japanese government started to favour the munitions industry 
after 1937 the actual distribution of profits was more towards employees than 
shareholders. Therefore one can say that at least during the war-time economy, 
in reality the entity concept which is related to the stakeholder concept of 
corporate governance ruled the distribution of profits. 
 
1945-1980 
After World War II the proprietary theory formed the basis for the CC and tax 
laws, but the entity concept formed the basis for the Business Accounting 
Principles (BAP) and the SEL. That is to say, the BAP considered funds 
contributed by other parties than shareholders as “other capital surplus”120 
rather than as earned surplus as was the stance of the CC and tax laws. The 
latter two considered only paid-in capital as the capital that should be maintained 
(Takeda, 2003, p. 509-510). Examples of these funds are donations, subsidies 
or pardoned debt. The reason that the BAP adhered to the entity concept is that 
it was modelled on US law. 
 In 1974 the BAP were amended to harmonise its principles with the CC. 
BAP Annotation no.2-2 stipulates that items until then had resided under capital 
surplus, but that are not in conformity with the CC’s definition of capital shall fall 
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under “other retained earnings”. Art.65 of the Financial Statement Regulations121 
stipulated the line items to be disclosed under “other retained earnings” (Takeda, 
2003, p. 510-511). Notwithstanding the above director’s bonuses were still 
considered a distribution of profits. For assets bought with government subsidies 
etc. companies could also choose to disclose the value of such assets reduced 
by the amount of the subsidy (BAP Annotation no.24). 
 Actual dividend payout practices during this period indicated an 
inclination toward the entity concept of profits. Dividends were generally low 
because the aim was to pay dividends of five yen per share. The main bank 
system and mutual shareholdings enabled the development of a situation where 
debt repayments and retained earnings for internal financing were considered 
more important than dividend payments. In other words, the interests of creditors 
and employees dominated in the process of determination of distributable 
earnings (Ito, 1998, p. 205). This could be considered an expression of the 
stakeholder concept of corporate governance. 
 
1980-1996 
Over this period the official accounting approach to the distribution of profits did 
not change. Dividends payable as a percentage of shareholders equity was 4.46 
percent in 1975, 3.82, 2.90, 2.24, 1.81 percent in 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 
respectively (Sugino, 1998, p. 133). However, towards the end of the 1980s the 
stakeholder concept of corporate governance started to show signs of strain 
under the influence of internationalisation of capital markets as the percentage of 
foreign shareholders increased. 
 
1996-2003 
The official accounting approach to the distribution of profits remained the same; 
the proprietary concept. Although in the previous periods the actual dividend 
payout behaviour tended more toward the stakeholder concept, the 2001 
amendment to the CC reduced the extent of dividend restrictions. Since 2001 a 
maximum of one half of the share issuing price can be added to the capital 
reserve. In addition, the legal reserve consisting of the total of the profit and 
capital reserves can be a maximum of one fourth of total capital stock (2001 CC 
Art. 288). Hitherto there had been no maximum for the capital reserve, and the 
maximum for the profit reserve alone was one fourth of total capital stock 
(Takeda, 2003, p. 504-505). This can be understood as a step away from 
creditor protection (see section 3.1.3.) and toward the shareholder governance 
model. For corporate governance developments in this area see Chapter 2, 
section 2.5. 
 In sum, the Commercial Code has officially always adopted the 
proprietary approach to definitions of equity, liability and the distribution of 
income. Since 1938 practice moved toward the entity concept under the 
influence of the stakeholder concept of corporate governance that was 
advocated by the government. After the War the BAP and the SEL followed the 
entity concept as it was imported from the US, but adopted the proprietary 
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concept in 1974 as a reconciliatory concession to the CC. Explicit limits to 
dividend payouts since 1950 for the purpose of creditor protection as well as 
corporate governance practices ensured ever decreasing dividend payout ratios. 
The 2001 amendment to the CC effectively mitigated the effect of dividend 
restrictions. Shareholders are now in a better than ever position to receive 
dividends, if only companies would turn profitable again. 
 
3.2.4. Clean and dirty surplus concepts 
According to the all-inclusive (clean surplus) concept of profit, net profits for the 
period are calculated based on recurrent and non-recurrent transactions and 
events. In case of the operating concept of profit, net profits are shown only on 
the basis of operating or recurrent transactions and events. Non-recurrent profits 
or losses result in increase or decrease of equity respectively, which are shown 
in a surplus statement. 
 
1868-1945 
In accordance with its purpose to determine profits for distribution, the CC 
embraced the all-inclusive concept of profits. This approach fit well with the 
narrow interpretation of equity. Note that in the late 19th century the 
current-operating concept of profits had not yet been developed. 
 
1945-1980 
At their establishment, the BAP and the Financial Statement Regulations (FSR) 
adopted the current operating perspective to the determination of profits to be 
shown in the profits and loss statement. The purpose of this perspective is to 
give insight into the performance of a company’s management. So until the 
amendment of the BAP and FSR in 1974, there existed two different concepts 
side by side. When the CC introduced the rule that large companies had to be 
audited by an independent accounting firm or CPA, the BAP and FSR were 
amended to unify the audit systems under the CC and the SEL. One aspect of 
this attempt at unification was the adoption of the all-inclusive concept of profits 
(Ito, 1998, p. 210). 
 
1980-1996 
Both the CC and the BAP/SEL followed the all-inclusive concept. During this 
period there were no major developments in this area in Japan. In the US, the 
FASB released its Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts “Recognition and 
Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises” in 1984. In an 
attempt to broaden the scope of measurement of operating income the FASB 
introduced the definition of “comprehensive income” (Schroeder, Clark and 
Cathey, 2001, p. 111). 
 
1996-2003 
Since December 1997 SFAS No.130 required the reporting of comprehensive 
income with the same prominence as other financial statements. A net 
disclosure technique is required for minimum pension liability adjustments, and a 
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gross disclosure technique is required for other items of comprehensive income 
(Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 117). In Japan only the companies that 
issue their consolidated financial statements in accordance with US-gaap 
disclose comprehensive income. 
 IAS 108 regulates disclosure of comprehensive income. Because the 
EU has adopted IFRS per January 2005 and will require foreign (including 
Japanese) companies to report their financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS from 2007, we are presently witnessing a fairly heated debate in Japan 
about comprehensive income, recycling equity items into profits or losses, and 
fair value accounting.  
A quote from the Keidanren website illustrates the Japanese stance: 
“Even if considered from the perspective that the value of information on 
comprehensive income is extremely high, according to current Japanese 
standards, the items of comprehensive income, including changes in the fair 
value of financial instruments and the foreign exchange adjustment account, are 
included in the shareholders' equity section of the balance sheet. It is therefore 
possible for users of financial statements to obtain information on 
comprehensive income. In addition, if recycling is prohibited, information on net 
income based on the realization concept would not be available, thus making it 
impossible to measure income resulting from the cost of a company's 
investment.”122 In January of 2005 the IASB and the Accounting Standards 
Board of Japan have agreed to embark on a convergence project. 
In sum, the Commercial Code followed the all-inclusive concept of profit 
in the pre-war period. Inconsistency between the BAP and the CC arose 
because the BAP introduced the current-operating concept of profits to Japan. 
Since 1974 the BAP and SEL also adopted the all-inclusive concept. Japanese 
businesses seem reluctant to disclose comprehensive income even though 
recent accounting standards for investments, financial instruments, treasury 
stock and mergers would make disclosure valuable information for investors. 
This reluctance is made clear by the above mentioned statement by the 
Keidanren. 
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3.3. Accounting standards and regulations in response to 
internationalisation 
 
1868-1945 
“Bank Bookkeeping Methods” was a document issued by the Ministry of Finance 
in 1873 because in that year the First National Bank was established. Together 
with Fukuzawa Yukichi’s “Methods of Bookkeeping” it introduced the principles 
of double entry bookkeeping into Japan. Joint stock corporations were 
established on the basis of the Commercial Code (CC) since 1890, and had to 
present their financial statements to their shareholders accordingly. 
The requirements of the CC lacked detailed prescriptions for the 
preparation of financial reports. The Business Operation Tax law (1896) and later 
the Business Operation Income Tax Law (1926) provided some additional 
guidance. Very detailed provisions came in 1934 with the Working Rules for 
Financial Statements by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. These were part 
of a rationalisation effort following the crisis years of the late 1920s and were not 
codified. 
 During the war with China and later the Pacific War, accounting 
standards came in the form of special taxation measures (since 1937) or as 
detailed cost estimation standards favouring munitions industries. 
The Japanese Commercial Code was based on the German 
Commercial Code. Karl Friedrich Hermann Roesler 123  drafted the old 
Commercial Code in 1890. The parts concerning companies, bills and 
bankruptcies were implemented in 1893, the other parts following in 1898, to be 
replaced by the new Commercial Code in 1899. The old Commercial Code had 
been considered too foreign and disregarded Japanese customs of business 
practise (Fujita, 1991, p. 43). 
Articles 190 to 193 of the new Commercial Code covered the 
accounting matters. Art. 190 required the preparation and submission of an 
inventory of assets (zaisan mokuroku), a balance sheet (taishaku taishouhyou), 
a business report (eigyou houkokusho), an income statement (son-eki 
keisansho), and a proposal for income appropriation (junbikin oyobi ri-eki mata 
wa risoku no haitou ni kansuru gian) to the statutory auditors before the day of 
the general shareholders meeting.  
Deposit of the above mentioned financial statements plus a statutory 
auditor’s report, at the company office before the day of the shareholders 
meeting was mandated by Art. 191. Art. 192 required approval of the financial 
statements by the general shareholders meeting and publication in a gazette. 
Finally Art. 193 stipulated that upon approval by the general shareholders 
meeting, the company would be deemed to have released the statutory auditors 
and directors from their responsibility (Sakurai, 2001, p.1695). 1899 CC Art.26 
stipulated valuation at current cost, and 1911 CC Art.26 says valuation at no 
higher than current cost. 
One important aspect of Roesler’s draft that remains a characteristic of 
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the Japanese accountability system until today, is the relationship between the 
board of directors, the statutory auditors and the general shareholders meeting 
(Motoki, 1999, p. 93-94). Both the statutory auditors and the directors are 
appointed by the general shareholders meeting, who can also discharge them 
before their term expires. 
 
1945-1980 
The Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) was issued in a hurry in 1947, and 
amended in 1948 in order to facilitate the reopening of the stock exchanges in 
accordance with GHQ conditions. In the following year the Business Accounting 
System Measures Investigating Committee issued the Business Accounting 
Principles (BAP)124 and the Working Rules for Financial Statements (WRFS). As 
these were not laws, they had to be made into enforceable law. The Business 
Accounting Deliberation Committee (BADC) incorporated the standards into the 
Financial Statement Regulations (FSR) in 1950. 
 Art.193 of the SEL requires companies to prepare financial statements in 
accordance with the FSR, have them audited by an independent CPA or audit 
firm (SEL Art.193-2), and present them included in the securities report to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (to the Minister of Finance after 1952) 
within three months after the closing of the business year (SEL Art.24).125 In 
1950 the FSR required publicly traded companies to prepare a balance sheet, 
profit and loss statement, a surplus statement and a surplus appropriation 
statement, plus supporting schedules (FSR Art.1). The formats were fixed 
according to the FSR Formats126. 
 Measurement standards do not exist in the FSR. The FSR are 
concerned with the terminology, formats and preparation methods of financial 
statements. Valuation and measurement of assets and liabilities are stipulated 
by the BAP. However, as these have no legal status, measurement under the 
SEL is actually ruled by the CC. 
From 1950 to 1962 there was confusion on this point because the BAP 
that were supposed to be a reference point for the CC and SEL alike differed 
from the CC with regard to valuation (see section 2.4.). The BADC claimed that 
because the BAP are a summary of the gist of generally accepted accounting 
practices and customs, companies should follow its principles even if the BAP is 
not enforced by law.127 In reality it was a document motivated by aspiration and 
ideals. At the time there was no such thing in Japan as generally accepted 
accounting practices and customs. Furthermore, the BAP introduced the 
concept of a surplus that was divided in earned surplus and capital surplus. In 
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 This is a document similar to “A Statement of Accounting Principles” by Sanders, Hatfield and 
Moore in 1938. However, in the Japanese case there was no mentioning of consolidated 
financial statements. Fujita (1991), p. 138. 
125
 Other occasions where the MOF requires financial statements to be presented are at the 
registration of a company’s stock or in the prospectus when a company plans to issue new 
shares, or in the case of a change in listing status. 
126
 財務諸表等規則様式 
127
 Business Accounting System Measures Investigation Committee (July 9, 1949) 企業会計原
則の設定について (Regarding the Establishment of the Business Accounting Principles), point 
number 2. 
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addition the Working Rules for Financial Statements required supporting 
schedules which were also a first in Japan (Chen, 1999, p. 10-11 quoting 
Kurosawa 1959, p. 280). 
In the same year the CC was amended to make a distinction in the 
balance sheet between capital and earned surplus in order to adopt a financial 
capital maintenance stance like that of the SEL. The CC also recognised the 
costs of new share issues as deferred charges (see section 2.4.1.). 1950 was 
also the year when the BADC issued the Audit Standards and the Working Rules 
for Performing Audits, which were both again revised in 1956. Because there 
were many doubts about how to interpret the BAP and the FSR, the BADC 
issued the Annotations to the BAP in 1954.  
1962 saw the BADC issue the Cost Estimation Standards. This was also 
the year of the first major amendment to the CC as a step to unify both 
accounting systems. The CC adopted accrual accounting by allowing the use of 
specific provisions and extended the scope of deferred assets to a total of eight 
items. Valuation at historical cost basis became the norm, and the inventory of 
assets was no longer required. In addition, the CC explicitly stipulated the 
calculation of the maximum amount that could be paid out as dividends. Since 
then it was very clear that the CC was the main law in the Japanese financial 
accounting system. 
Under the FSR a surplus statement had been required since 1950. In 
1963, the BAP and FSR were amended so that the word “surplus statement” 
was now replaced by “earned surplus statement” more commonly called 
“retained earnings statement”. Instead of preparing a separate earned surplus 
statement, companies were allowed to combine the earned surplus statement 
with the profit and loss statement (Chen, 1999, p. 52). 
 The 1974 revision of the CC was meant to bring the audit system in line 
with the requirements of the SEL. Thus since 1974, the CC requires large joint 
stock corporations that have their financial statements audited by an 
independent audit company or CPA under the SEL, to do the same for its 
financial statements under the CC. As a compromise toward the CC, the BAP 
changes from the entity concept to the proprietary concept with regard to the 
distribution of profits. For the profit and loss statement, the BAP also moves 
toward the CC by adopting the all-inclusive concept of profits. 
Then, in 1976 the BADC issues the Consolidated Financial Statement 
Regulations (C-FSR) which are effective from 1978 and give consolidated 
financial statements secondary status, followed by the Interim Financial 
Statement Regulations (I-FSR) in 1977, effective from 1979. Under the C-FSR 
companies are required to prepare a consolidated balance sheet, profit and loss 
statement, statement of retained earnings which may also be combined with the 
profit and loss statement. 
As the Bretton-Woods system had broken down in 1971, and two oil 
shocks had taken place in 1973 and 1978, the BADC’s Accounting Standards for 
Transactions in Foreign Currencies came just in time to accommodate the 
Foreign Exchange Law of 1980 which largely deregulated foreign exchange 
transactions. 
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1980-1996 
In 1981 the CC was amended to clarify the use of provisions, and to address the 
problem of the par-value stock system hollowing out (see section 2.4.2.). From 
1983, the FSR requires the adoption of the equity method for unconsolidated 
subsidiaries. The BADC issued an Opinion of the Disclosure of Segment 
Information in 1988. Its Opinion became effective as of 1991 but adoption was 
voluntary until 1993. From 1994 to 1997 disclosure of segment information 
became mandatory in three steps. 
 Between 1989 and 1990 the US and Japan held bilateral talks to solve 
trade and other disputes within the framework of the Structural Impediments 
Initiative. From the US side there were, among others, demands for increased 
financial disclosure standards and strengthening the rights of shareholders. As a 
consequence of which related party disclosures were introduced in 1992. 
Segmental disclosures are sometimes thought to have been a result of the talks, 
but the Opinion on Segment Disclosures had already been issued in 1988, and 
took nine years to be fully implemented. Segment disclosure applied to 
consolidated financial statements only, and its format is fixed. 
 The BADC Opinon on Accounting for Lease Transactions established 
the rule that a lease is a financial lease only when the ownership title is 
transferred to the lessee. All other leases were to be accounted for as operating 
leases. The Opinion was effective from the year ending March 1995. Under the 
CC financial leases are accounted for in the same way. The JICPA made a 
format to present an overview of the lease assets. 
 
1996-2003 
As Prime Minister Hashimoto announced the financial big bang in 1996, it 
seemed like the economy was on its way to recovery. However, in 1997 and 
1998 the financial system was in a precarious situation to an extent that it had 
never been before (see section 2.6.4.). Financial institutions in particular needed 
to get rid of bad loans and carry out reforms in order to guarantee their survival. 
To that purpose tax effect accounting and further relaxation of restrictions of the 
purchase of treasury stock were introduced. Together with the relaxation of the 
Anti-monopoly Law this enabled financial institutions to establish holding 
companies. 
 The introduction of consolidated cash flow statements, making 
consolidated financial statements the primary financial statements under the 
SEL, introducing fair value accounting for financial instruments and some types 
of securities were aimed at increasing management of company groups as a 
whole, and at unravelling cross-shareholdings. Changing the scope of 
consolidation to the basis of real control instead of control based on 
shareholdings was a measure meant to end the practice of passing on losses to 
unconsolidated subsidiaries or associated companies. Consolidated financial 
statements were also required under the CC from the companies that already 
had to produce them under the SEL. These companies could also opt for 
taxation on a consolidated basis. 
 Accounting standards for retirement benefits were also part of the 
accounting big bang and had been long due. With pension reserves being an 
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estimated 14 trillion yen short (Fujii, 2002, p. 95-96), this had been a particular 
area that made it hard for investors to assess company performance and risk. 
Accounting standards for asset impairment were issued in 2002, and were the 
last project carried out by the BADC. Asset impairment accounting starts to apply 
in 2007. 
 Amendments to the CC in 2002 and 2003 enabled companies to choose 
a corporate governance structure that resembles the US model. It also tried to 
increase the number and influence of outside directors in the companies that 
choose to stick with the Japanese model. 
 The establishment of a private sector accounting standard regulatory 
body (the Accounting Standards Board of Japan) in July of 2001 marked a 
departure from Japan’s historical legacy as a code law country. However, in 
reality we will have to see how new accounting standards are developed and 
adhered to. Because the public is not used to self-regulation it may be 
interesting to see how corporate managers and directors perceive their 
responsibility to disclosure information. 
Although most of the accounting regulations under the CC have been 
moved to Commercial Code Enforcement Regulations in 2003, accounting 
standards under the CC still need to be endorsed by the Ministry of Justice if no 
longer by the Diet. Furthermore, the laws that are already in place are not likely 
to soon be replaced by a regulatory framework on private footing. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusions for Part 1 
In sum, the Commercial Code as the basis of all accounting regulation in Japan 
owes its very existence to Japan’s attempt to catch up with the West. Her 
accounting system’s development clearly followed the macro-economic pattern 
commensurate with the code-law nature of her legal system. Especially after 
World War II both the code-law legal system and Japan’s Ministry of Finance 
favoured creditors over shareholders and arms-length investors in order to build 
up Japan’s economy. The Securities and Exchange Law and the Business 
Accounting Principles were meant to democratise capital markets. However, 
faced with neglect by the Ministry of Finance and a financial system biased 
toward bank financing and the fact that its rules did not have any legal meaning, 
the Business Accounting Principles were temporarily reduced to relative 
insignificance in 1962. 
The definite settlement of accounts principle and the newly introduced 
specific provisions ensured that the determination of distributable income which 
is the purpose of the CC accounting standards actually minimised taxable 
income as well as income for distribution. Lacking transparency and strong 
independent auditing function, already in the early 1960s window dressing had 
become rampant. After more than ten years, in 1974 did the Commercial Code 
introduce independent auditing, but only for companies that already were subject 
to independent auditing under the SEL. Late introduction of consolidated 
financial statements and their secondary status are another example of the clout 
of the business community and the lack of political power of shareholders. It is 
very clear that when Japan’s capital and financial markets were closed off and 
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protected by heavy regulation, financial accounting system development was 
characterised by political influence from macro-economic planners and business 
managers. Accounting academia spent most of their time pondering unification 
of accounting under the CC and SEL systems. 
Since exports were important to Japanese companies, inevitably Japan’s 
financial and capital markets slowly opened up and were even more gradually 
deregulated. The 1980s were a golden age for Japan’s economy and 
businesses. Companies could venture overseas and do all the things they were 
not allowed to do at home. For Japan’s accounting system the 1980s were a 
time when very little happened. Independent audit requirements centred on the 
relatively few listed companies, the public sector did not use independent 
auditors, so the number of CPAs was kept as low as possible. Statutory auditors 
did not necessarily have any knowledge of accounting, and management 
accounting practices were very much a product of in-company training 
(Sakagami, Yoshimi and Okano, 1999, p. 350-351). The hierarchical structure in 
Japan’s universities caused the majority of accounting professors in the 1980s to 
be of the generation who had diligently studied the German language and the 
German accounting system of the early 20th century. Younger scholars did study 
the American accounting system, but at the time they were too junior to be 
influential. The regulators of the Ministry of Justice held on to the legal entity 
concept, and the BADC did not spontaneously issue standards. Overall the 
system produced very few people who recognised the growing influence of the 
international market and acted upon it. 
International political pressure for transparency in the second half of the 
1980s yielded little result. At the time the booming stock market attracted many 
speculative investors. Bullish markets made everybody look like a successful 
and knowledgeable investor or financial engineer. When the boom got busted 
and the bull turned bearish regulators and investors alike hoped for an eventual 
market recovery. By not taking action the situation actually worsened to the point 
where a number of banks and securities companies collapsed under their bad 
loan burden and international rating agencies downgraded Japanese 
government bonds. 
No longer able to bail out failing companies without loosing credibility 
under the watchful eyes of the international financial community, Japan’s 
government decided on far-reaching reform. The financial system was 
deregulated, the power of the MOF curtailed, and the international market forces 
were finally allowed to play their part in the market for financial information 
disclosure. International market forces are felt strongest by those companies 
operating in and dependent on the international market for resources. 
The privately funded ASBJ replaced the publicly funded BADC as the 
body to set accounting standards. Nevertheless, Japan firmly remains a 
code-law country. Therefore, the accounting standards issued by the ASBJ will 
have to function in the framework that is constituted by both the Commercial 
Code and the Securities and Exchange Law. This means that the views of the 
company as a legal entity and an economic entity will have to co-exist within the 
same accounting system. Since the definite settlement of accounts principle no 
longer universally applies there is a better chance that presenting a fair picture of 
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companies’ performance and financial situation will lead to increased 
decision-usefulness of accounting information in the financial statements. 
However, the main purpose of accounting under the Commercial Code is still 
reconciling stakeholders’ interests. As we have seen in sections 3.1.3. and 3.2.3. 
protection of creditors’ interests is no longer as prevalent as it used to be. Explicit 
dividend restrictions still exist but have a much higher ceiling. 
As for the distribution of income concept adhered to, the move toward 
the shareholder governance model indicates a good chance that it will be the 
proprietary concept in name and in practice. Primary status for consolidated 
financial statements is another sign that the economic entity concept now has a 
firm place in Japan’s accounting system and perhaps in Japan’s society too. 
More disclosure in consolidated financial statements and transparency of 
corporate governance structures are good for shareholders and investors as well 
as creditors. 
Independent auditing is going to take up a more important place in 
Japan’s accounting system. The number op CPAs is expected to increase 
drastically as requirements have been changed and thresholds lowered. I am 
hopeful that an increasing number of CPAs will value the benefits of professional 
integrity higher than the costs of possibly antagonising superiors or customers. 
Japanese culture does not encourage independence, open criticism or 
disharmony in professional dealings or private relationships. However, if the 
accounting system is changing because of international market forces and 
resource dependency, Zarzeski (1996, p. 35) may be right to think that even 
culture could change under the same influences. 
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Chapter 4: The US and Japan’s Financial Accounting 
Systems 
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4.1.2. Sources of Japanese consolidated financial accounting standards 
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4.2.4. Measurement: liabilities 
4.3. Summary 
 
 
4.0. Introduction 
Part 1 presented an inquiry into how Japan’s accounting system has responded 
to the demands of a changing international business environment. We found that 
national paradigms spurred on by international political factors influenced 
Japan’s accounting development from 1868 to 1980 more than anything else. 
The choice for a macro-economic oriented pattern of accounting development 
seems therefore appropriate. From 1980 until 1996 the national political 
influence of businesses dominated accounting development, or rather the lack of 
it. At the same time, international market forces were at work bringing about 
gradual deregulation of financial and capital markets. These forces pushed 
financial accounting standards development in Japan into a more 
micro-economic pattern from 1996 onward. As a result we find more standards 
that support the economic entity concept of companies that stresses disclosure 
of useful information to investors and shareholders, where hitherto the legal 
entity concept had ensured a high level of creditor protection. Furthermore, since 
2001 Japan has a private accounting standard setting body that functions 
alongside and within the code-law legal system. 
Against this background of greatly improved financial accounting and 
disclosure standards, Part 2 seeks to answer the questions: “Has 
internationalisation of business, financial and capital markets brought about 
convergence of financial accounting and disclosure standards between 
US-GAAP and JP-GAAP? In what ways and to what extent has convergence 
come about?” Chapter 4 seeks to analyse the differences and similarities of both 
accounting systems, and Chapter 5 focuses on comparison of the consolidated 
disclosure systems. Paragraphs 4.1.1., 4.1.2., and 4.1.3. compare the 
development patterns of the US and Japanese financial accounting systems with 
regard to the environmental factors and functions of accounting regulation and 
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information. Characteristics of the US and Japanese accounting systems are 
compared in paragraphs 4.1.4. and their accounting concepts are compared in 
4.1.5. Recognition and measurement standards form the topic of comparison 
between both countries in Section 4.2. Recognition and measurement standards 
for consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements are the same because 
consolidated financial statements are prepared using the unconsolidated 
financial statements. It is in presentation and disclosure where the differences 
between unconsolidated and consolidated financial statements arise. 
Chapter 5 is concerned solely with comparison of the standards for 
disclosure in consolidated financial statements under US-GAAP and JP-GAAP. 
This comparison is not necessarily exhaustive, but is conducted with reference 
to the research problems of this dissertation. It therefore seeks to analyse and 
eventually quantify the difference in disclosure requirements in consolidated 
financial statements according to US-GAAP and JP-GAAP. In cases where 
Japanese consolidated disclosure requirements do not exist but unconsolidated 
requirements do exist these shall be mentioned. These cases serve to illustrate 
the secondary nature of consolidated financial statements in Japan and at the 
same time to indicate that unconsolidated disclosure requirements were 
extensive. 
Matrix 2 will aid reading through chapters 4 and 5. As there are still 
differences in accounting and disclosure requirements of both systems, these 
too will be addressed in chapter 5. Finally in chapter 5, matrix 2 will be converted 
into the disclosure sheet that I used to measure voluntary disclosure between 
1985 and 2003 for the fifty-two sample companies that constitute the population 
for the empirical study in chapter 6. A summary and the conclusions for Part 2 
will be found in chapter 5. 
 
 
4.1. Comparison of the accounting concepts and approaches, and 
the functions of accounting standards in Japan and the US 
4.1.1. Brief outline of the US accounting system 
By the 19th century, bookkeeping expanded into accounting because ongoing 
business organisations increasingly replaced isolated ventures. The notion 
emerged that the owner’s original contribution plus profits or minus losses 
indicated net worth. Concepts of cost and income and capital maintenance had 
not yet been developed, but the emergence of joint stock corporations created 
the need to distinguish between capital and income. These developments took 
place mainly in Europe, but in the second part of the 19th century, the Industrial 
Revolution arrived in the US and brought with it the need for formal accounting 
procedures and standards. At the time, anyone could claim to be an accountant, 
stock markets were a place for speculation, and large monopolies controlled 
segments of the US economy. Corporate abuses contributed to the need for 
development of financial and later physical capital maintenance concepts. At the 
International Congress of Accountants in 1904 the American Association of 
Public Accountants was formed, which was in 1916 reorganised into the 
American Institute of Accountants (AIA). Accounting practice during the 1920s is 
said to have placed too much emphasis on the needs of management, as a 
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consequence of which the stock market crashed in 1929 (Schroeder, Clark and 
Cathey, 2001, p. 3-5). 
In the USA the stock market crash of 1929 led to the establishment of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by the Congress in 1933. This 
event can be regarded as a watershed in US business and accounting practice. 
Before the SEC established its rules, maintaining standards of good accounting 
practice had been a matter of individual discretion. After, accounting principles 
applied to companies listed on stock exchanges still allowed freedom of choice, 
but emphasised disclosure of accounting practices in order to increase 
transparency and usefulness of accounting numbers. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), or 
actually its predecessor the AIA, had started working with the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) to issue accounting principles and pronouncements in 1930. 
After intense debate the SEC delegated its authority to establish US Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) to the AIA. But it had the final say in 
deciding accounting practice by refusing company accounts that deemed to be 
of lesser quality.128 If ever there was a time when US accounting standards 
could have been set by public regulators, this was it. Although the idea was to 
develop a theoretical framework of accounting, the general view in 1937 was 
that if accountants did not come up with a coherent set of rules the SEC would. 
The AIA somewhat hurriedly published a study by Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore 
called A Statement of Accounting Principles. As this was simply a survey of 
existing accounting practice, it was quite controversial (Schroeder, Clark and 
Cathey, 2001, p. 6). Nevertheless, it also provided the authoritative source on 
which the Japanese Business Accounting Principles (BAP) were based (Matsui, 
1998, p. 29). 
Accrual accounting was advocated by Paton and Littleton in 1940 as 
superior to cash-based accounting (Beaver, 1998, p. 2). Under this approach, 
which is similar to Eugen Schmalenbach’s dynamische Bilanz approach, the 
balance sheet serves as a transitory tool to match revenues and expenditures in 
the profit and loss statement. Since then much effort has been spent on deciding 
which accrual method is best. 
In 1937 the AIA and the American Society of Certified Public 
Accountants merged to form the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA). Pronouncements in the form of Accounting Research 
Bulletins (ARB) were issued by the AICPA’s Committee on Accounting 
Procedure and formed the first generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
The AICPA formed the Accounting Principles Board (APB) in 1959. In issuing 
Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 43, it revised and incorporated all 
previous ARBs. Criticism from the SEC did not wane, and in 1972 the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was established. Members of the FASB 
included accountants as well as representatives from other interest parties, 
whereas the APB had consisted of accountants only. 
In the USA there is only one financial accounting system, and 
consolidated financial statements are the rule. Only companies that have no 
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 For a history of the development of the US accounting system see Fisher et al. (2001), p. 
2861-2871, or Roberts, Weetman and Gordon (1998), p. 455-456. 
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subsidiaries issue unconsolidated financial statements. There are no laws 
regulating the publication of consolidated or unconsolidated financial statements. 
US-GAAP, embodied in ARB43 and ARB51, Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
Opinions, and the Statements of Financial Accounting Standards issued by the 
FASB, are the product of private sector regulatory activities. 
Before the establishment of the Consolidated Financial Statement 
Regulations in Japan in 1976, the following accounting standards related to the 
consolidation of financial statements in the US had already been issued. 
(June 1953) AIA, ARB43: Restatement and revision of Accounting Research 
Bulletins 
(August 1959) AICPA, ARB51: Consolidated Financial Statements 
(December 1966) AICPA, APB10: Omnibus Opinion-1966 
(August 1970) AICPA, APB16: Business Combinations 
(August 1970) AICPA, APB17: Intangible Assets 
(March 1971) AICPA, APB18: The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments 
in Common Stock 
ARB43 set rules for the accounting treatment of businesses in foreign 
countries and foreign currency translations (Ch.12). ARB51 explained the 
purpose of consolidation, and provided guidelines for the consolidation process. 
APB10 amended ARB51 in that it made mandatory the equity method for 
unconsolidated subsidiaries within the US. APB16 provided the standards for the 
use of the purchase method and the pooling of interests method for business 
combinations. APB17 stipulated amortisation of goodwill. APB18 dealt with the 
application, accounting treatment and disclosure of the equity method (Nomura, 
1999, p. 58-59). 
The phrase “generally accepted accounting principles” became part of 
the wording of the certificate issued by CPAs. Therefore Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) No. 5 was issued in 1975 to clarify what it meant that financial 
statements are “fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting standards”. SAS No. 5 was followed by SAS No. 43, and later 
amended by SAS No. 69. US-GAAP consists of four levels of sources of which 
the highest are FASB Statements, FASB Announcements, SEC Rules and 
Interpretive Releases and the old APB and ARB unless they have been 
amended (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 15-16). 
Portfolio diversification had been common practice even before the 
development of portfolio theory started by Markowitz in 1952. However, with the 
advent of capital asset pricing theory around 1965 investors gained important 
tools for constructing portfolios in accordance with their risk preferences. Since it 
had proven very hard to establish consensus on the best measurement and 
reporting methods, the emphasis shifted from economic income measurement to 
providing information that is useful for investors to base their decisions on. This 
is demonstrated by the FASB’s Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 
1: Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises (SFAC 1) in 1978 
(Beaver, 1998, p. 4). The instrumental role of information in market efficiency as 
documented in the pricing of pension assets and obligations, fair value of 
investment securities and financial instruments, and nonperforming loans 
(Beaver, 1998, p. 135) gave regulators a motive to raise disclosure standards. 
 115 
In other words, in 1978 the FASB’s Conceptual Framework project of 
which SFAC 1 was the first of seven pronouncements, adopted a 
decision-usefulness approach. That is, as summarised by Kieso and Weygandt, 
“The objectives of financial reporting are to provide information that is: (1) useful 
to those making investment and credit decisions who have a reasonable 
understanding of business and economic activities; (2) helpful to present 
potential investors, creditors, and other users in assessing the amounts, timing 
and uncertainty of future cash flows; and (3) about economic resources, the 
claims to those resources, and the changes in them” (Kieso and Weygandt, 1998, 
p. 36). Inherently problematic is the fact that historical-cost-based financial 
statements have to be used to predict future returns. In order to help investors 
predict future returns, information has to be relevant and reliable, as was the gist 
of a Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2: Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information (SFAC 2) issued in May 1980 (Scott, 
1997, p. 148-159). “For information to be relevant, it should have predictive or 
feedback value, and it must be presented on a timely basis. (…) Accounting 
information is reliable to the extent that it is verifiable, is a faithful representation, 
and is reasonably free of error and bias” (Kieso and Weygandt, 1998, p. 38). In 
order to be useful, information should be comparable between companies, and 
be prepared in a consistent manner over time. 
Assets, liabilities, equity, investment by owners, distributions to owners, 
comprehensive income, revenues, expenses, gains and losses were identified 
as elements of financial statements and defined by the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 3: Elements of Financial Statements of Business 
Enterprises (SFAC 3) in December of 1980. Already in December 1985 SFAC 3 
was superseded by Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6: 
Elements of Financial Statements (SFAC 6). Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No. 5: Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of 
Business Enterprises (SFAC 5) established recognition and measurement 
criteria and practical guidance on the topic in December 1984. These criteria are 
based on the definitions of the elements of financial statements. 
In 1984 SFAC 5 concluded that a statement of cash flows should be part 
of the financial statements. As a result SFAS No. 95 was issued in 1987. Also in 
the measurement process, in recent years the matching concept emphasises 
flows, and reports stock as residuals. Put differently, to a certain extent we find a 
shift away from the income statement approach toward the balance sheet 
approach again (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 139). Examples of 
current values in financial accounting in the US are; discount amortisation on 
long-term bonds (APB 21 since 1971), leases (SFAS 13 since 1977), and 
pension obligations (SFAS 87 since 1986). More recent examples include; 
postretirement benefits (SFAS 106 since 1990), impaired loans (SFAS 114 since 
1993), capital asset impairment accounting (SFAS 121 since 1995), and 
financial instruments (FSAS 80 since 1984, SFAS 105 since 1990, SFAF 107 
since 1992, and SFAS 115 and SFAS 119 since 1994) (Scott, 1997, p. 58-59). 
These will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Within the Conceptual 
Framework Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7: Using Cashflow 
Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements was issued in 
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February of 2000 in order to provide guidelines on how to deal with problems 
related to accounting for risk, fair values, and asset impairment. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was established in the wake of 
the Enron and other scandals. It addresses issues such as auditor 
independence, corporate responsibility, and increased disclosure of transactions 
involving management and principal stockholders. Furthermore, it established a 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. SOX may be viewed as a piece of 
legislation that serves to compensate the failure of the market for information 
that comes about when information asymmetry causes moral hazard. It remains 
to be seen how effective these regulations are. 
 
4.1.2. Sources of Japanese consolidated financial accounting 
standards 
Notwithstanding a long history of large company groups starting with zaibatsu 
during the Taisho period (1911-1926) and vertical and horizontal keiretsu after 
World War II, consolidated financial statements only started to emerge from 
1960. Companies such as Hitachi and Sony issued them to have their shares 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange via American Depository Receipt 
(ADRs). In May 1965, the Minister of Finance ordered the BADC to investigate 
codification of consolidated financial statements as well as strengthening the 
audit system after window dressing practices by Sunwave Co. Ltd. and Sanyo 
Mining Company had led to a chain of bankruptcies in 1964 and 1965 (Kuroda, 
2001, p. 1817). 
 The Working Rules for Performing Audits were indeed revised in 1965. 
Although the BADC issued its Opinion on Consolidated Financial Statements 
(Consolidation Opinion) on May 19, 1967, it stated that consolidated financial 
statements were new to Japan, and that generally accepted accounting 
practices with regard to the preparation thereof had to be reinvestigated and 
formulated in the stage of systemisation (BADC, 1967/05/19). The Opinion on 
the Codification of Consolidated Financial Statements and the Principles for 
Consolidated Financial Statements plus its Annotations only followed on June 24, 
1975. Actual Codification took place when the MOF issued the Consolidated 
Financial Statement Regulations on October 30, 1976 (Kuroda, 2001, p. 1818). 
The system started from the period ending March 31, 1978. In total, the process 
had taken more than ten years, due to opposition by the business community 
(keidanren) and diversity of opinions within legal and academic communities. 
 In accordance with the Consolidation Opinion’s recommendations, 
consolidated financial statements were to be presented as supplementary 
documents to the registration statements or the annual security reports issued 
by listed companies under the SEL. Shareholders received unconsolidated 
financial statements based on the Commercial Code (on the basis of which 
dividends were declared) from the company directly, and were only able to peek 
into a company’s consolidated financial statements about a month after the 
annual shareholders meeting. 
Due to a revision of the Ministerial Ordinance for Registration129 the 
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consolidated financial statements had to be submitted at the same time as the 
Securities Report, and together with the “Important items regarding the situation 
of the company group” 130  and “Overview of the company group’s 
performance”131 altogether under a heading reading “Consolidated Information” 
from April 1988 onwards. Its supplementary status only changed when due to a 
revision of the Ministerial Ordinance for Disclosure132 consolidated financial 
statements had to be included in the Securities Report itself as of April 1991. 
 Disclosure requirements were still less extensive than the requirements 
for unconsolidated financial statements. However, over time the perceived 
importance of financial information on a consolidated basis increased, as did 
disclosure requirements. Officially, from 2001, consolidated financial statements 
are the primary statements whereas the unconsolidated financial statements are 
secondary. With the scope of consolidation based on effective control rather than 
the percentage of shares held, the framework is set for company group 
management. It may take a few years for customs and mindset to fully adapt to 
this challenge. 
 Individual financial statements under the SEL are prepared according to 
the Financial Statement Regulations and their Annotations. Until 2002, the CC 
prescribed the measurement and recognition standards. Since then these can 
be found in the Commercial Code Enforcement Regulations, although the BAP 
provide the foundation for these standards. Furthermore, financial accounting 
statements shall be prepared in accordance with the new requirements after the 
accounting big bang. The individual financial statements shall then be 
consolidated in accordance with the Principles for Consolidated Financial 
Statements and based on the Consolidated Financial Statement Regulations 
(C-FSR). Since the year ending in March 2000, consolidated cash-flow 
statements shall also be prepared. 
In principle, the unconsolidated financial statements of a parent 
company and its subsidiaries shall be prepared based on the same accounting 
standards (BADC, 1975, No. 3-3) so that upon consolidation the information 
presented will be consistent. The JICPA states that no adjustment is necessary 
when an overseas subsidiary uses a different accounting treatment than its 
parent company, except when the accounting method is obviously not rational. In 
that case the reason for adjustment and the amount of the adjustment have to be 
disclosed in a note (JICPA, 1997). 
 The Principles for Consolidated Financial Statements plus their 
Annotations present the purpose of consolidation, the general accounting 
principles underlying consolidation, the general standards regarding scope of 
consolidation, differences in accounting periods, and unity of accounting 
standards between parent company and subsidiaries, as well as the standards 
for preparation of the consolidated financial statements. These standards 
describe the mechanics of consolidation of the balance sheet, the income 
statement, and the retained earnings statement. 
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The C-FSR stipulate the terminology, forms, and preparation methods 
for consolidated financial statements like the FSR do for individual financial 
statements. For cash-flow statements there are the separate Standards for the 
Preparation of Cash-flow Statements. 
 
4.1.3. Functions of accounting standards in the US and Japan 
If accounting is the language of business, differences in accounting standards 
arise from differences in business practices and environments. The US simply 
grew to be a common law country because she started out as a British colony, 
inherited notions of freedom and democracy, and then fought for her own 
independence. In Japan, the government could have chosen to adopt a 
common-law system, given the fact that the 1872 National Bank Act was drafted 
by the Scotsman Alexander Shand. In the 1880s the Japanese government 
opted for a German type code law system instead, because this suited the 
purpose of government-led economic development better. Japan had a lot of 
economic and geo-political catching up to do and was keen on doing so as 
quickly as possible. 
 In the US private enterprise was thus mainly financed raising capital 
through the market. Until the stock market crash in 1929, financial reporting in 
the US had been without any regulation and was generally an anything goes 
affair like in most other places at the time. Still in Japan the market still had to be 
made, trusted and accepted. Quite another problem was the availability of 
savings. In Japan savings were scarce, which is one reason why initially in the 
1870s and 1880s banks issued notes and created inflation. The same problem 
resurfaced after World War II, and this time a similar solution was found in the 
shape of the printing presses and special purpose banks, again with inflation as 
a result. 
 After the war, the US were the victorious, rich nation, Japan was the 
defeated, destitute nation. Shareholders in the US were vocal and their rights 
were perceived to be important. In Japan banks and company directors were 
very powerful, shareholders were not. Furthermore, every individual was 
supposed to make sacrifices for the common good, which was to erase the 
shame of defeat in the Pacific War by attaining economic prosperity. Very soon 
after World War II, leverage increased, and the percentage of individual 
shareholders dropped. Although in both countries an important function of 
accounting standards was to calculate distributable earnings, US companies 
sought to maximise profits and shareholder value, Japanese companies 
maximised market share. Unlike in the US where accounting regulation was 
mainly a private sector affair, during the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese 
accounting system served primarily as a tool for macro-economic policies. 
Application of the definite settlement of accounts principle in combination with 
taxation measures that stimulated capital investment made sure that Japanese 
companies had much to gain from minimising profits. 
 While in the US the FASB issued SFAC 1 in 1978 as part of the 
Conceptual Framework project, around the same time Japan for the first time 
introduced consolidated financial statement requirements. A Japanese 
Conceptual Framework did not materialise until September 24, 2004. At the end 
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of the 1970s the US can be characterised as a market economy and Japan as 
an economy in the process of slowly and perhaps somewhat reluctantly shifting 
from strong regulation to financial deregulation. It is therefore no surprise that 
since 1978 Japan rapidly fell far behind the US in terms of the quality of the 
information produced by her financial accounting system. Between 1980 and 
1996, when the old paradigm was no longer functioning very well but the new 
paradigm had not been defined yet, Japanese regulators adopted a piecemeal 
approach to accounting standard setting. At the same time, in the US many new 
accounting standards were established in order to deal with the challenges of 
internationalisation of business, financial and capital markets, new financial 
instruments, and old problems such as moral hazard. 
 Opaque corporate governance and financial disclosure systems caused 
the near collapse of Japan’s financial system in the mid-1990s. Japan’s financial 
big bang and the ensuing overhaul of her accounting system were almost 
complete when the world was demonstrated the shortcomings of corporate 
governance and audit systems in the US. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is an 
attempt to address these problems. It seems fair to say that presently in both 
countries the prime function of financial accounting is to provide useful, reliable, 
and relevant information for investment and credit decisions.133 The function of 
accounting standards both in the US and Japan is therefore to ensure the 
usefulness, relevance, and reliability of financial accounting information. 
 
4.1.4. Characteristics of the accounting systems in the US and Japan 
This section compares some characteristics of the accounting systems in the US 
and Japan in order to illustrate that different environments produce different 
accounting systems. Within the timeframe between 1985 and 2005, one can 
clearly see that internationalisation has induced a movement of the 
characteristics of the Japanese accounting system to grow more similar to the 
characteristics of the US accounting system. On the other hand, recently one 
could detect greater importance attached to public sector involvement in 
accounting regulation in the US. 
 
Regulatory system 
Traditionally, accounting regulation in the US has been a private sector affair. 
The government only intervened when things went terribly wrong. Thus, the 
Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission owe their existence to the stock market crash of 1929 
(Scott, 1997, p. 5). More recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a 
regulatory response to the Enron and other debacles that duped many 
shareholders, employees and customers. 
 In Japan on the other hand, accounting regulation was in the hands of 
the public sector and has only been transferred to the private sector Accounting 
Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) in 2002. Until then, formulation of accounting 
standards under the Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) had been the task of 
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the Business Accounting Deliberation Council under the Ministry of Finance. It 
was then up to the Ministry of Justice whether or not to incorporate these 
standards into the Commercial Code (CC). As the CC and SEL accounting 
systems are generally perceived in Japan to have ultimately different purposes, 
true unification of the systems proved very elusive. However, shifting 
measurement and other accounting standards from the CC to the Regulations 
Pertaining to the Implementation of the Commercial Code increases the chance 
that unification of the two accounting systems will be attained. 
 
Purpose of financial statements 
As we have seen in section 4.1., in the US the purpose of financial statements 
was clarified in SFAC 1 in 1978. Financial statements shall provide information 
that is useful, reliable and relevant for investment, credit and other decisions. 
The information shall enable its users to assess the amounts, timing and risk of 
cash-flows, the value of economic resources, and the claims to these resources. 
There is basically one financial accounting system and the financial statements 
serve all external users. 
 In Japan the financial accounting system under the Commercial Code is 
said to aim at adjustment of the interests of creditors and shareholders. It mainly 
protects the interests of creditors by means of capital maintenance taking the 
form of dividend restrictions.134 Disclosure of information has never been the 
territory of the CC because financial statements under the CC have traditionally 
not been widely available. Many companies did not even fulfil the obligation to 
publish their financial statement under the CC in a gazette, and obviously could 
get away with it. 
 The Japanese Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) states its purpose as 
“to bring about fair floating, trading and other transactions in marketable 
securities, and smoothen the flow of securities in order to contribute to proper 
operation of the national economy, and to the protection of investors.” (1949 SEL 
Art. 1) There are those who consider the SEL a special law to the CC, because it 
possesses the character of a disclosure law.135 However, as both laws have 
been established for different purposes and are administrated by different 
ministries, this seems a convenient explanation of an ad hoc nature. Accounting 
under the SEL is supposed to be in accordance with the Business Accounting 
Principles (BAP) which have no legal status, but cannot go against the 
accounting standards of the CC because these do have legal status. 
 
Creditor and shareholder protection 
In the US creditor protection constitutes mainly of legal capital requirements. 
Generally, creditors are thought to have become increasingly adept at protecting 
themselves through the use of ratio requirements, compensating balances, bond 
ratings, loan syndication, close monitoring, and legal enforcement mechanisms. 
Disclosure of relevant and reliable information is supposed to help investors, 
shareholders, and creditors make investment and credit decisions. 
 On the other hand, for most of the post-war period, in Japan creditors 
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were thought to need protection against the speculative nature of shareholders 
and the opportunistic nature of corporate management. Legal capital 
requirements were regarded as insufficient and were supplemented by explicit 
dividend restrictions under the CC. The SEL does aim at protecting shareholders 
through disclosure of accounting information, but its accounting measurement 
standards have traditionally been subordinate to those of the CC because the 
accounting standards as laid out in the BAP had no legal status. 
 
Consolidated financial statements 
Ever since joint stock companies created subsidiaries consolidated financial 
statements have been the norm in the US. For Japanese accounting standard 
setters, consolidation accounting presented a challenge that took thirteen years 
to overcome. Already in March 1965 the MOF entrusted the BADC with task of 
investigating the establishment of a consolidated financial statement system. On 
May 19, 1967 the BADC issued its Opinion on Consolidated Financial 
Statements. 136  It was meant as a general guideline for or introduction to 
consolidated financial statements, and recommended preparation of the 
necessary environment for consolidated financial statements. 
The challenge should be sought in protest from Japanese business 
organisations because consolidation would reduce their scope for income 
smoothing. Regarding the Opinion on Consolidated Financial Statements, 1: 
Details on the Deliberation of 1967 quotes a reaction from the business 
community to a previous draft as follows: “We recognise the necessity and 
inevitability of a consolidated financial statements system. However, it is difficult 
to approve of prompt implementation, we need time to nurture consolidation 
practice and set up an environment for consolidation.” Consolidation accounting 
applied from April 1978, but only under the SEL. It then took another twenty-five 
years or so for consolidated financial statements to be introduced under the CC, 
and replace unconsolidated financial statements’ primary position under the 
SEL. 
 
4.1.5. Accounting concepts and approaches in the US and Japan 
Income measurement 
Both the US and Japan used the transactions approach to determining profits. 
That is to say, both countries adhere to the historical cost principle, practice 
accrual accounting, and summarise the income-related transactions for a period 
in an income statement. However, in 1985 the definitions of assets, liabilities and 
equity in SFAC No. 6 replaced those of APB4. Defining assets as probable future 
economic benefits rather than economic resources, liabilities as probable future 
sacrifices of economic benefits rather than economic obligations, and equity as 
residual interest in the assets of an entity after deduction of liabilities, the FASB 
adopted an “asset-liability approach to the measurement of stocks and flows that 
is prevalent in many subsequent standards” (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, 
p. 141).  
Especially during the 1990s the matching concept has increasingly 
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come to emphasise flows instead of stocks. In other words, assets and liabilities 
are accounted for with regard to the uncertainty of the cash flows they are 
expected to produce or consume. Current cost and net realisable value replace 
historical cost in the case of loan or capital asset impairment. Market price and 
fair value replace historical cost in the case of financial instruments. 
Japan too abandoned the strict historical cost convention when she 
carried out the accounting big bang between 1998 and 2001. With the 
introduction of the Japanese Conceptual Framework in 2004 definitions of 
assets, liabilities, and equity became similar to those in SFAC No. 6. 
 
Capital maintenance 
As inflation has not been a problem in either the US or Japan, capital 
maintenance in relation to inflation accounting has not played a significant role 
over the period under discussion. Both countries adhere to the financial capital 
maintenance approach. Capital maintenance for the purpose of creditor 
protection has been discussed above. 
 
Definitions of liabilities and equity and distribution of income concepts 
Until the FASB issued Accounting for Contributions Received and Contributions 
Made (SFAS No. 116) in 1993, donated assets were recorded at their fair market 
value and an equity account named “donated capital” or “donated assets” 
recorded a similar amount (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 242). 
Presently, both countries adhere mainly to the proprietary concept of income 
distribution. For example, donated assets or contributions are considered 
revenue rather than capital (SFAS116, par. 8).137 Interest payments, employee 
remunerations (except for directors’ bonuses), and tax expenditures are 
considered expenses rather than income for distribution. According to Fujii (1997, 
p. 53) because shareholders bear the legal rights and obligations, the CC 
formally adopts the proprietary concept but in reality the entity concept applies. 
 
Clean or dirty surplus, and comprehensive income 
APB Opinion No. 9 adopted a modified all-inclusive concept of profits approach. 
“A number of subsequent pronouncements require irregular items to be 
highlighted so the reader of financial statements can better determine the 
long-run earning power of the enterprise” (Kieso and Weygandt, 1998, p. 155). 
Examples of items not disclosed in the traditional income statement are: foreign 
currency translation adjustments, unrealised holding gains and losses on 
available-for-sale securities. In order to disclose all changes in equity resulting 
from transactions and events other than those resulting from investments by and 
distributions to owners, SFAS No. 130 requires comprehensive income to be 
reported with the same prominence as other financial statements for fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 1997 (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 117). 
 In Japan too, the income statements are prepared in accordance with 
the all-inclusive concept of profits. Income statements show operating profits, 
recurrent profits (profits resulting from operating and non-operating activities), 
                                                   
137
 Fisher, Iannaconi and Lechner (2001, p. 2908) classified donated assets as additional paid-in 
capital. 
 123 
special (unusual) profits and losses, and net profits before and after taxes. 
Presently there is no requirement to report comprehensive income. Rather, the 
business community as represented by Keidanren opposes the disclosure of 
comprehensive income arguing that the information is readily available in the 
financial statements. However, as a result of the convergence project with the 
IASB it is possible that their position will have to change. 
 
Full disclosure 
The full disclosure principle “calls for financial reporting of any financial facts 
significant enough to influence the judgement of an informed reader” (Kieso and 
Weygandt, 1998, p. 1342). In the US the accounting profession has adopted the 
full disclosure principle. Materiality and cost-benefit considerations impose 
constraints on full disclosure. Voluntary disclosure is usually motivated by 
cost-benefit considerations only. 
 Formally, according to the Financial Statement Regulations 138 
(accounting under the SEL) financial statements had to be prepared, and 
information had to be disclosed, in such a way that it would present a true picture 
of the company’s financial situation and business performance (FSR Art. 5-1), 
and that it would not be misleading interested parties’ judgement about the 
financial and business situation of the company concerned (FSR Art. 5-2). For 
consolidated financial statements the corresponding articles are C-FSR Art. 4-1 
and 4-3.139 Although this indicates a much more minimalist interpretation of 
disclosure than in the case of the US, strict adherence to these rules would 
already greatly benefit the quality of the information presented. 
 
 
4.2. Comparing recognition and measurement 
4.2.1. Recognition of revenue and expenses 
In both countries revenue is usually recognised at the point of sale (Schroeder, 
Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 72; Takeda, 2003, p. 219). Other possibilities for the 
timing of revenue recognition are when services are performed or when cash is 
received. Revenue for mining products and agricultural products is often 
recognised at production basis or crop basis respectively. For long-term projects 
there are the percentage-of-completion method and the completed-contract 
method. If the total costs can be reasonably estimated the first method is 
preferred in the US. In Japan companies were free to choose either. Since April 
1998 the Corporation Tax Law requires the percentage-of-completion method 
(Sakurai, 2001, p. 1747). 
 Through the matching process costs are capitalised, charged to 
expenses, or written off as losses depending on whether they produce revenue 
or not in present or future periods. Of course the mechanisms are the same in 
Japan and the US. 
 
4.2.2. Recognition of assets and liabilities 
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US accounting standards criteria for recognising assets and liabilities in the 
balance sheet require first and foremost meeting the definition of assets as 
possible future economic benefits and liabilities as possible future sacrifice of 
economic benefits in SFAC No. 6. In order to maintain a sharp distinction 
between debt and equity accountants developed classification criteria. For 
example if a financial instrument has a maturity date and maturity value, in which 
case it would be classified as a liability (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 
306-310). In 2003 the FASB issued Accounting for Financial Instruments with 
Characteristics of Liabilities, Equity or Both (FAS150), however, it has postponed 
amendment of the definition of liabilities in SFAC No. 6 because further 
deliberation is deemed necessary. FAS150 classifies financial instruments as 
liabilities when there is an obligation on the part of the issuer to redeem, repay, 
or settle. 
 In Japan, there was no explicit definition of assets and liabilities to aid in 
determining recognition criteria until the Japanese Conceptual Framework (JCF) 
in 2004. Presently the JCF defines assets as economic resources that are the 
result of past transactions or events, and that are under control of the reporting 
entity (JCF item 4). Liabilities are defined as obligations to transfer or give up 
economic resources under the reporting entity’s control as a result of past 
transactions or events (JCF item 5) (Kawamura, 2005, p. 66). 
 
4.2.3. Measurement of assets 
Generally, valuation of assets shall be at historical cost price both in Japan and 
the US. The definition of assets in SFAC No. 6, par. 25 reads “Assets are 
probable future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as 
a result of past transactions or events”. Because these future economic benefits 
are supposed to contribute to future net cash flows, valuation of assets has 
come to be regarded in terms of their influence on future cash flows in addition to 
past cash flows represented by the historical cost price. 
In the US, historical cost price valuation for inventories is always subject 
to the lower-of-cost-or-market rule. In Japan, the lower-of-cost-or-market method 
is mandatory only when two conditions are met. First, if the market value has 
declined substantially, and second, if the decline in value is expected to be 
permanent. Otherwise the lower-of-cost-or-market method is optional. (until 
2002 CC Art. 285-2, in 2003 amendment to the CC moved to CC Implementation 
Regulations, No. 28) The tax regulations consider a 50 percent decline 
“substantial” and allowed deduction of the loss from taxable income (Sakurai, 
2001, p. 1751). 
 Marketable securities in the US were divided into current assets and 
fixed assets (investments). Accounting for Certain Marketable Securities 
(FAS12) issued in December 1975 required the marketable equity securities 
classified as current assets to be valued at the lower of their aggregate cost or 
aggregate market value. Losses were to be charged against income. “If losses 
had been previously recorded, a subsequent recovery of market value was to be 
reported as income to the extent of previously recorded losses” (Schroeder, 
Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 212). Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and 
Equity Securities (FAS115) became effective for fiscal periods starting after 
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December 15, 1993. FAS115 classified equity and debt securities into (1) trading 
securities, (2) securities available for sale, and (3) securities held to maturity. 
Trading securities are to be valued at fair value, and all unrealised holding gains 
and losses are to be included in earnings. Securities available for sale shall be 
value at fair value, but unrealised holding gains and losses shall be reported as a 
component of other comprehensive income. Held-to-maturity securities shall be 
reported at amortised cost. 
 When an investing company has significant influence over the financing 
and operating decisions of an investee company the investment shall be 
recorded using the equity method. Significant influence is thought to exist when 
the investor company holds between 20 and 50 percent of the investee 
company’s stock. 
In Japan, the Commercial Code (CC) required valuation of bonds (CC 
Art. 285-5) and stocks (CC Art. 285-6) at acquisition cost until the introduction of 
Accounting Standards for Financial Instruments (ASFI) valid from April 1, 2000. 
For years ending March 31, 2000 or before, the lower-of-cost-or-market rule 
applied in the same way as for the valuation of inventories. Because of the loose 
interpretation of the lower-of-cost-or-market rule, it happened that many 
companies did not disclose the huge amounts of unrealised holding losses that 
had been caused by the market decline in the wake of the burst of the bubble 
economy. Valuation losses were treated as non-operating expenses or 
extraordinary losses (Sakurai, 2001, p. 1753). Unrealised holding gains were not 
recognised or in any way disclosed, but served as hidden reserves increasing 
the scope for earnings management. Since 1983 the equity method has been 
required for unconsolidated subsidiaries and for companies of which the investor 
company holds between 20 and 50 percent of its common stock. 
 The new Accounting Standards for Financial Instruments in Japan were 
influenced by FAS115 and IAS39, and classifies securities as trading securities, 
held-to-maturity securities, stocks of subsidiary and associated companies, and 
other securities. Trading securities are bought and sold for profit making and are 
therefore to be recorded at fair value, and holding gains or losses are to be 
included into the calculation of net profit for the period. Held-to-maturity 
securities are to be reported at amortised cost. Stocks of subsidiaries or 
associated companies are to be valued at cost. Other securities are to be 
recorded at fair value, and holding gains or losses are to be measured using the 
araikae-method, and can be either recorded directly in the equity section of the 
balance sheet (after adjustment for the tax effect), or in case of holding losses 
may also be treated as a loss in calculating net income for the period. (ASFI No. 
3-2) 
 Tangible fixed assets are valued at historical cost price both in the US 
and Japan. Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets to be Disposed 
Of (FAS121) issued in 1995 requires companies “to review long-lived assets 
(including intangibles) for impairment whenever events or changes in 
circumstances indicate that the book value may not be recoverable.” 
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4.2.4. Measurement of liabilities 
In SFAC No. 6 liabilities are defined as “probable future sacrifices of economic 
benefits arising from present obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets or 
provided services to other entities in the future as a result of past transactions or 
events” (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 141). Payables and current 
maturities are recorded at face value. ABP Opinion No. 21 (Interest on 
Receivables and Payables) requires interest to be calculated where it is not 
stated, for long-term notes payable (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 220 
and 321). 
 In Japan too liabilities are recorded at face value. Interest on notes 
receivable is not commonly charged or recorded. 
 
 
4.3. Summary 
Chapter 4 has presented a comparison of the accounting systems of the US and 
Japan with regard to characteristics, functions, conceptual approaches of these 
systems, and their recognition and measurement standards. The research 
question of part 2 of this dissertation is concerned with whether or not 
convergence of accounting standards between Japan and the US has been 
taking place over the years. In answer to this question chapter 4 has found that 
the internationalisation of business financial and capital markets has led the 
functions of accounting standards to become more similar. This is largely due to 
changes in Japan’s accounting environment, such as deregulation of the 
financial system, and the systemic shift toward a market economy. These 
changes forced regulators to reconsider how accounting standards could best 
serve the Japanese economy. 
Characteristics and conceptual approaches have converged in a similar 
manner, especially after the accounting big bang, the establishment of the ASBJ, 
and most recently the ASBJ Conceptual Framework. Differences between the 
ASBJ Conceptual Framework and the FASB Conceptual Framework involve the 
qualitative characteristics of financial accounting information, and definitions of 
the elements of financial statements, and recognition and measurement. 
According to the FASB Framework accounting information should be 
decision-useful, relevant and reliable. The ASBJ Framework states that 
accounting information should be decision-useful, reliable, and produced based 
on internally consistent accounting standards. Tsumori (2005, p. 5-6) claims that 
the importance attached to internal consistency of accounting standards is the 
largest difference between the ASBJ Framework and overseas frameworks.140 
This is supposed to have originated in hard lessons learned through the 
accumulation of historical experience as a code law country plagued by internal 
inconsistencies of its accounting standards.141 
In the FASB Framework definitions of financial statement elements as 
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well as decision-usefulness of information form the basis for measurement and 
recognition. The ASBJ Framework on the other hand, bases measurement and 
recognition of assets on the definitions of elements of financial statements, 
decision-usefulness of the information, and what it calls ‘internal consistency’ of 
accounting standards. Recognition of revenue and expenses depends on the 
definition of net profits as investment results free from risk (Kawamura, 2005, p. 
70). Hitherto Japanese accounting standards religiously adhered to the 
realisation principle, and now they changed the terminology used in the FASB 
Framework from ‘realised’ or ‘realisable’ into ‘free from risk’. 
Based on the above, one could say that very recently both accounting 
systems have come closer than ever before. However, the Japanese accounting 
system as exemplified by its new Conceptual Framework seeks to strike a 
balance between maintaining its own identity whilst fitting in internationally in 
order to provide a level playing field for Japanese companies that are 
participating in international markets. Chapter 5 will investigate the situation for 
the US and Japanese disclosure systems. 
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Chapter 5: The US and Japan’s Financial Disclosure 
Systems 
5.0. Introduction 
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5.3.1. Subsequent events, contingent liabilities, bills discounted and notes 
endorsed, and provisions related to contracts 
    5.3.2. Segmental disclosure 
  5.3.3. Leases 
    5.3.4. Related party disclosures, claims to unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
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    5.3.5. Marketable securities and investments 
    5.3.6. Derivatives and hedging 
    5.3.7. Retirement benefits and pensions 
    5.3.8. Earnings per share and net worth per share 
    5.3.9. Deferred taxes 
    5.3.10. R&D expenditures 
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    5.3.12. Asset impairment 
    5.3.13. Business combinations 
5.4. Auditing 
5.5. Remaining differences between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP 
5.6. Explanation of the disclosure sheet 
5.7. Summary and conclusions 
 
 
5.0. Comparison of disclosure standards between US-GAAP and 
JP-GAAP 
Chapter 4 has shown that the characteristics and underlying concepts of the 
Japanese accounting system have grown more similar to those of the US 
accounting system. This change has most likely been caused by Japan’s shift 
from state-led “political capitalism” characterised by a strictly regulated economy 
to “rational capitalism” in the form of a market economy in the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s.142 Rationality implies that under rational capitalism, the 
role of publicly available information is much larger than under political 
capitalism. In this chapter the focus will be on the disclosure systems of both 
countries, particularly disclosure in consolidated financial statements.  
In the US full disclosure meant that information had to be disclosed 
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 Here I borrow Weber’s typology of capitalism as it is explained in Swedberg (1998), p. 46-49. 
Political capitalism has three modes: (a) predatory political profit-making, which could be used to 
finance wars, (b) continuous profit-making through the use of force or domination, for example 
monopolies, and (c) profit-making due to unusual dealings with political authorities, such as in 
the case of bribing or more specifically Japanese amakudari, the practise where companies give 
attractive jobs to retiring bureaucrats in order to benefit from their contacts inside the ministries. 
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when it was thought that it would influence investors’ decisions. Japan, on the 
other hand had an accounting system based on the Commercial Code (CC). 
Because the CC was aimed at the protection of creditors and their interests over 
those of shareholders and other investors by calculating distributable end 
taxable income, disclosure of information that is useful to investors played a 
minor role. Disclosure in the Japanese accounting system was based on the 
Securities and Exchange Law (SEL). The SEL, through the accounting 
standards in the Financial Accounting Regulations (FSR) and the Consolidated 
Financial Statement Regulations (C-FSR), had the best interests of shareholders 
in mind. But its role was secondary to the CC in terms of accounting standards 
related to recognition and measurement. Article 15 of the C-FSR requires the 
disclosure of information that is not specified by the C-FSR but that is deemed 
necessary for the interest parties to make proper judgements about the 
company’s financial situation and management under the heading of ‘additional 
information’143. It is probably due to the unspecific nature of Art. 15 of the C-FSR, 
that very few companies ever disclosed ‘additional information’. 
 This chapter compares the disclosure standards for annual financial 
statements under US-GAAP with the disclosure standards for annual 
consolidated financial statements in Japan between 1985 and 2003. Specifically, 
the focus for comparison is on the information disclosed in the notes and 
supporting schedules to the consolidated financial statements. Within the 
perspective of this dissertation, the comparison of US and Japanese accounting 
and disclosure standards for consolidated financial statements serves two 
purposes. The first is to illustrate that the information disclosed in consolidated 
financial statements produced under US-GAAP was superior in quality and 
quantity to that under JP-GAAP between 1985 and 2003. As such, this chapter 
does not presume to present an exhaustive comparison of the US and Japanese 
accounting and disclosure systems. Secondly, comparing Japanese 
consolidated financial accounting and disclosure standards with what in both the 
US and Japan were presumed to be the highest standards in the world creates a 
means for quantifying voluntary disclosure in Japan. 
In order to present a more complete picture of the change in status of 
consolidated financial statements in Japan, reference will be made to the 
differences between disclosure standards for consolidated financial statements 
under the SEL, unconsolidated SEL and occasionally even CC disclosure 
standards. The US-GAAP table, the SEL-consolidated table, and the 
SEL-unconsolidated table in the appendix to Chapter 5 present an overview of 
the regulations that will be discussed in this chapter. The disclosure index that is 
presented at the end of this chapter is then used in chapter 6 in order to 
investigate relations between accounting disclosure, the cost of capital, and 
corporate governance structures. 
Comparisons will be made of the financial statements required, 
disclosure of accounting policies, accounting changes, notes to the financial 
statements, and supplementary schedules. Since disclosure of information is 
only useful as long as it is reliable, true, and in accordance with accounting 
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standards, this chapter also compares the audit systems of both countries. 
Remaining differences between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP will be discussed, and 
the disclosure score sheet that is used in chapter 6 will be explained, followed by 
a summary and conclusions on the level and nature of convergence between the 
accounting and disclosure systems of both countries.  
Here the period of analysis is the same as the period of the empirical 
analysis in Part 3, which is from 1985 to 2003. Although consolidated financial 
statements have been required under the Japanese SEL since 1978, Japanese 
consolidated disclosure standards between 1978 and 1985 changed very little. 
The most important change was the equity method being made mandatory for 
the valuation of unconsolidated subsidiaries since 1983. Data collection for all 
the sample companies was more complete from 1985. Therefore I chose 1985 
as the starting point for the empirical analysis of Part 3 as well as for measuring 
the extent of convergence between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP in Part 2. 
Generally, financial disclosure according to US-GAAP has been 
considered to be of higher quality and more extensive than that under JP-GAAP. 
US-GAAP does not distinguish between consolidated and unconsolidated 
disclosure. JP-GAAP considered consolidated financial statements of secondary 
nature and disclosure standards were minimal until this situation was addressed 
between 1998 and 2001. 
Appendix II, Table A presents an overview of JP-GAAP for consolidated 
financial statements, Table B lists the disclosure requirements under US-GAAP, 
and Table C shows JP-GAAP for unconsolidated financial statements. The 
requirements are discussed throughout this chapter, and the tables clearly show 
the years in which regulations apply or when there were no regulations present. 
 
 
5.1. Financial statements required 
Financial statements required under US-GAAP over the period from 1985 to 
2003 include consolidated financial statements only, except in cases where a 
company does not have subsidiaries. According to SFAC No. 5 a full set of 
financial statements should include (1) a statement of financial position at the 
end of the period, (2) a statement of earnings for the period, (3) a statement of 
cash-flows, and (4) a statement of changes in stockholders’ equity. Notes to 
each financial statement are an integral part of the set. 
In 1985 US-GAAP in the form of APB Opinion No. 19 still required a 
statement of changes in financial position, which was replaced by a cash-flow 
statement in 1987 when the FASB issued FAS95 “Statement of Cash Flows”. 
The introduction of comprehensive income with prominent status necessitated a 
statement of changes in stockholders equity. Hitherto, companies had only 
issued a statement of changes in stockholders equity when there were large 
changes, otherwise they issued a retained earnings statement or appended 
retained earnings information to the income statement. 
Art. 1 of the Consolidated Financial Statement Regulations (C-FSR) in 
Japan required the presentation to the Ministry of Finance of a consolidated 
balance sheet, a consolidated income statement, and a consolidated surplus 
statement which could also be combined with the income statement (Art. 71). 
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The statements had to include an audit report by an independent auditor or 
accounting firm. As of fiscal year 2000 in addition a consolidated cash-flow 
statement was added, followed by supporting schedules for bonds and long-term 
borrowings. 
Unconsolidated financial statements were to include a balance sheet, 
income statement, a statement regarding the distribution of profits or the 
disposition of losses, and supporting schedules (Art. 1 of the Financial Statement 
Regulations, FSR). There were fourteen supporting schedules in total with 
details on (1) marketable securities, (2) tangible fixed assets, (3) intangible fixed 
assets, (4) investments in marketable securities of associated companies, (5) 
capital contributions to associated companies, (6) loans to associated 
companies, (7) bonds, (8) long-term borrowings, (9) loans from associated 
companies, (10) capital stock, (11) capital surplus, (12) legal reserves and 
voluntary reserves, (13) depreciation expenses, and (14) provisions. All of the 
above were subject to an independent audit. Supplementary schedules for 
intangible fixed assets and depreciation expenses were abolished in 1993. 
The Commercial Code required an unconsolidated balance sheet, 
unconsolidated income statement, unconsolidated business report and an 
unconsolidated proposal pertaining to the distribution of profits or the disposition 
of losses to be presented to the general shareholders meeting (CC Art. 281). 
Only companies with a capital stock over 500 million yen or liabilities over 20 
billion yen had to present an audit report by an independent auditor to their 
shareholders. 
 
 
5.2. Disclosure of accounting policies, accounting changes, 
disclosure changes, and the scope of consolidation 
APB Opinion No. 22, “Disclosure of Accounting Policies” recommends 
disclosure of the accounting policies followed by the reporting entity and the 
methods used in applying these policies in a “Summary of Significant Accounting 
Policies” preceding the footnotes or as a first footnote. Disclosure is particularly 
important in case of (1) existing alternative accounting treatments, (2) principles 
and methods that are particular to the reporting entity’s industry, or (3) unusual 
or innovative applications of US-GAAP (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 
520). 
Examples of significant accounting policies include: consolidation 
method and basis of presentation, fiscal year, what constitutes cash and cash 
equivalents, cost flow method used for inventories, condition of plant assets, 
valuation method for plant assets and intangibles, depreciation methods used, 
pension and retiree benefit plans, income taxes, the use of estimates, 
reclassifications. More recent additions are: classification of investments, fair 
values of financial instruments, and derivative financial instruments. 
 C-FSR Art. 13 requires disclosure of items related to the consolidation, 
such as the scope of the consolidation, use of the equity method, differences in 
accounting periods with consolidated subsidiaries, accounting policies, 
cancellation of investment and capital accounts, unrealised intra-group profits, 
consolidated overseas subsidiaries, distribution of income, and inter-period tax 
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allocation upon consolidation. Disclosure of changes in accounting policies and 
disclosure methods are required by C-FSR Art. 14. 
 Art. 26 of the C-FSR Instructions, which are the predecessor to the 
C-FSR Guidelines, lists the following items for which the accounting policies 
should be disclosed: (1) valuation standards and measurement of assets, (2) 
fixed assets that are depreciated and the depreciation method used, (3) 
standards for reporting provisions, (4) the currency conversion standard used for 
overseas assets or liabilities, and (5) since 1994, the treatment of leases. 
 In the US a subsidiary is a company in which its parent company has a 
controlling interest, which is a voting interest of more than 50 percent. In the 
unconsolidated parent company financial statements investments in subsidiaries 
are accounted for using the equity method. In 1987 FAS94 “Consolidation of All 
Majority-Owned Subsidiaries” amended ARB 51 “Consolidated Financial 
Statements” issued in 1959. For fiscal years after December 1988, FAS94 
“requires consolidation of all majority-owned subsidiaries even if it has 
‘non-homogenous’ operations, a large minority interest or a foreign location” 
(FAS94, Summary). 
The only exception presently allowed is when a parent company is 
precluded from exercising control. For example, in case the subsidiary is in legal 
reorganisation or in bankruptcy control rests with the courts or a court-appointed 
trustee irrespective of the fact that the parent company owns the majority of the 
voting stock. Differences in fiscal periods should not preclude consolidation of a 
subsidiary. If the difference is more than three months, adjustments will have to 
be made. For the time being, the FASB holds on to the concept of legal control 
even though it is not unthinkable that it will shift to the concept of effective control, 
as Japan has recently done. 
 Article 5 of the Consolidated Financial Statement Regulations (C-FSR) in 
Japan requires all subsidiary companies to be included in the consolidation, 
except when control (50 percent of voting stock) does not exist if the subsidiary 
is in reorganisation or bankruptcy, or when control is merely temporary, or when 
it is feared that consolidation of a company will be misleading interested parties’ 
judgement about (the financial and business situation of) the company group 
concerned. Until March 1994 companies could be excluded from consolidation if 
their assets, sales or profits were less than 10 percent of the group total (Kuroda, 
2001, p. 1831-1832; Morita, 1999, p. 48). Since 1994 exclusion based on 
immateriality is no longer decided by mechanically applying a percentage, but 
based on whether or not exclusion would influence interested parties’ 
judgement. 
Amendment to the “Consolidated Financial Statement Principles”144 on 
November 24, 1998 changed the scope of consolidation from legal control to 
effective control. In other words, even if the parent company does not own the 
majority of voting stock but effectively controls the decision-making organ of a 
subsidiary company, that company will have to be included in the consolidation. 
This could be the case when (1) the parent company exercises control in the 
general shareholders meeting because there are other shareholders who do not 
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exercise their control, (2) the parent company exercises control in the general 
shareholders meeting through co-operation of shareholders such as the parent 
company’s directors or related companies, (3) the majority of the board of 
directors of the subsidiary company is made up of present or former directors or 
employees of the parent company, or (4) contracts exist that give the parent 
company control over the subsidiary company’s financial affairs or business 
policies.145 
 
 
5.3. Notes and supporting schedules 
Notes under US-GAAP do not typically concern only the balance sheet, the 
income statement or any other financial statement, but concern accounting or 
disclosure items or issues. Notes to the balance sheet, notes to the income 
statement and other notes is the classification customarily used under JP-GAAP 
because the FSR, C-FSR, and CC-R present the accounting standards in 
chapters that are each devoted to a separate financial accounting statement. 
 In the US, supporting schedules do not have a fixed format and are used 
in the notes to clarify or give a detailed breakdown of financial statement items. 
On the other hand, in Japan supporting schedules have fixed formats in 
accordance with the requirements of the FSR, C-FSR, and CC-R, the former two 
of which were decided by the JICPA, and the latter by the MOJ. Certainly, the 
formats of Japanese financial statements and supporting schedules make for 
superb comparability. Notes, however, can be disclosed in the form of footnotes 
or endnotes (C-FSR Art. 16), and for many under the CC-R their contents may 
also appear in the balance sheet as a separate item. This practice reduces 
comparability considerably. 
 
5.3.1. Subsequent events, contingent liabilities, bills discounted and 
notes endorsed, and provisions related to contracts 
FAS5 Accounting for Contingencies was issued in March 1975 and effective for 
fiscal years starting on or after July1, 1975. It requires the disclosure of loss 
contingencies such as: (1) the collectibility of receivables, (2) obligations related 
to product warranties and product defects, (3) risk of loss or damage of 
enterprise property by fire, explosion or other hazards, (4) threat of expropriation 
of assets, (5) pending or threatened litigation, (6) actual or possible claims and 
assessments, (7) guarantees of indebtedness of others, (8) obligations of 
commercial banks under ‘standby letters of credit’, (9) agreements to repurchase 
receivables (or the related property) that have been sold. (FAS5, par. 3) 
Estimated losses from contingencies may be accrued if the loss is probable and 
the amount can be reasonable estimated. (FAS5, par. 8) If no accrual is made, 
the contingency shall be disclosed if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
loss will occur. (FAS5, par.10) 
In Japan, disclosure of contingent liabilities was required for 
unconsolidated financial statements under the SEL (FSR Art. 58), but for 
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consolidated financial statements under the SEL disclosure was required only 
since 1999 by C-FSR Art. 39-2. Separate disclosure in the notes to the 
consolidated financial statements of contingent liabilities in the form of bills 
discounted and notes endorsed was mandatory through C-FSR Art. 39-2 
(changed into C-FSR Art. 39-3 in 1999). C-FSR Art. 44 required disclosure of 
provisions related to contracts with creditors that are included in the “other 
retained earnings” section of the balance sheet. Only since 2002 does 
accounting under the SEL require the disclosure of collateralised assets and 
liabilities for consolidated financial statements (C-FSR Art. 34-3). Disclosure of 
collateralised assets and borrowings was required for the unconsolidated 
financial statements (FSR Art. 43 for assets) and (FSR Art. 57 for borrowings). 
 
5.3.2. Segmental disclosure 
FAS14 “Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise” was issued 
in December 1976, amended by FAS18 (November 1977), FAS24 (December 
1978),     FAS30 “Disclosure of Information about Major Customers” (August 
1979), which were all superseded by FAS131 in 1997. Under FAS14 segment 
disclosures included sales, operating profit, and identifiable assets per business 
segment and per geographic segment. Other segment disclosures included 
depreciation and amortisation, and capital expenditures per business segment, 
as well as information on income from a company’s main customers, and 
exports. 
In Japan, segment information was considered proprietary information. 
Therefore companies that issued financial statements in accordance with 
US-GAAP sometimes would not disclose segment information before 1993. 
From April 1, 1990 sales and operating income per business and geographic 
segment were to be disclosed as un-audited supplemental information. 
Mandatory disclosure of externally audited segment information was introduced 
stepwise between 1993 and 1997 by C-FSR Art. 15-2. Disclosure of sales and 
operating profits or losses per business segment started per April 1, 1994. 
Business segment disclosure of assets, depreciation expenses and capital 
expenditures was made mandatory from April 1, 1995. At the same time 
geographic segment disclosure of sales, operating profits and assets was 
required. For the time being, companies could choose to disclose these items for 
the home country (Japan) and for all overseas countries lumped together. From 
April 1, 1997 geographic segmental disclosure was to be broken down into 
regions. 
 
5.3.3. Leases 
In the US, already in 1949 ARB No.38 required the disclosure of lease 
transactions in a footnote. APB Opinions No. 5 “Reporting Leases in Financial 
Statements of Lessees” (1964) and No. 7 “Accounting for Leases in Financial 
Statements of Lessors” (1966) were meant to tighten up the conditions under 
which a lessee would have to capitalise the leased asset. This marked a clear 
occasion where the issue of form-versus-substance moved into the direction of 
substance-over-form (Flegm, 1984, p. 91). The FASB issued FAS13 “Accounting 
for Leases” in November 1976, and FAS98 “Accounting for Leases” as an 
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amendment to FAS13 and other pronouncements in May 1988. FAS13 and 
FAS98 stipulate the criteria to decide whether the lease is a capital (finance) 
lease or an operating lease. In the first case the leased property shall be 
recorded as an asset in the balance sheet of the lessee, and in the second the 
lessor is the owner of the property and the lessee shall merely charge the rental 
fee to expense. 
 In Japan there were no accounting standards with regard to leases 
except for in the tax laws until 1995. Leasing in Japan set off later than in the US. 
As a means of off-balance sheet financing it was considered good for capital 
investment which was a major macro-economic goal. However, in the 1970s and 
1980s the tax authorities realised that a large part of all capital assets in the 
country was leased property, and that the treasury lost out on corporation tax 
income. So the tax authorities set out to redress that problem. C-FSR15-2 since 
1995 introduced lease accounting standards similar to the ones in the US. 
International and US accounting standards for leases are presently being 
scrutinised, so one might expect that the existent standards will need to be 
revised fairly soon. 
 
5.3.4. Related party disclosures, claims to unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, obligations to unconsolidated subsidiaries 
In March 1982 the FASB issued FAS57, which defines related party transactions 
as transactions between: 
a. a parent company and its subsidiaries 
b. subsidiaries of a common parent 
c. an enterprise and trusts for the benefit of the of employees 
d. an enterprise and its principal owners, management, or members of their 
immediate families 
e. affiliates 
Disclosure of material related party transactions in the financial statements shall 
include: 1. the nature of the relationship, 2. a description of the transactions, 3. 
the amounts of the transactions, 4. the amounts due from or to related parties, 
and the terms and manner of their settlement. 
Japanese related party disclosures in consolidated financial statements 
between April 1, 1991 (fiscal 1992) and 1998 were based on the Disclosure 
Ordinance by the Ministry of Finance. However, these were un-audited. They 
could be viewed as a way to pacify US demands made during the Structural 
Impediment Talks. Since 1999 C-FSR Art. 15-4 requires related party transaction 
disclosure on par with FAS57. Related party disclosures in Japanese 
consolidated accounts that have been required since the beginning included 
claims toward unconsolidated subsidiaries (C-FSR Art. 34) and obligations to 
unconsolidated subsidiaries (C-FSR Art. 39). 
Related party disclosures on an unconsolidated basis under the SEL 
included: 1. claims toward related companies (FSR Art.39), 2. obligations to 
related companies (FSR Art. 55), 3. sales to related companies (since 1987, 
FSR Art.74), 4. non-operating income from related companies (since 1987, FSR 
Art. 91), 5. non-operating expenses to related companies (since 1987, FSR Art. 
94). 
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5.3.5. Marketable securities and investments 
Since 1975, FAS12 required equity securities that were not accounted for under 
the equity method or consolidation to be valued at the lower-of-cost-or-market 
value at an aggregate portfolio level. These portfolios were to be recorded in the 
balance sheet as current or non-current equity investments. A change in the 
market value of the current equity investments portfolio would be reflected in the 
income statement. On the other hand, a change in the market value of the 
non-current equity investments portfolio would be reflected in the stockholder’s 
equity section of the balance sheet. In any case, the difference between cost and 
current market value of investments in stock had to be disclosed. FAS12 did not 
deal with debt securities, but traditionally bonds were valued at the 
lower-of-cost-or-market value.  
FAS115 superseded FAS12 in December 1993. Companies have to 
classify their equity and debt securities as trading securities, 
securities-available-for-sale, and securities-held-to-maturity. Trading securities 
are valued at fair value, in which case unrealised holding gains and losses are 
recognised in earnings. Securities-available-for-sale shall be reported at fair 
value, but unrealised holding gains or losses are no part of net income but are 
reported as a component of comprehensive income. Investments in 
held-to-maturity securities such as straight bonds are to be valued at amortised 
cost. 
 In Japan companies were free to choose cost or the 
lower-of-cost-or-market price for the valuation of all securities. Disclosure of 
market value in the notes to the consolidated financial statements was not 
required. In the supporting schedules to the unconsolidated financial statements 
marketable securities were broken down in stocks, bonds (public, national and 
regional), and other securities. For stocks disclosure requirements concerned 
description, price per share, number of shares, total cost price, and the value at 
which the stocks are recorded in the unconsolidated balance sheet. Disclosure 
regarding bonds included description, total face value, total cost price, and the 
value of the bonds in the unconsolidated balance sheet. Concerning other 
securities companies needed to list a description, the cost price and the value in 
the unconsolidated balance sheet. (FSR Form 1) 
 From the year 2000 C-FSR Art.15-6 requires valuation of and disclosure 
regarding securities that is similar to FAS115. Trading securities shall be valued 
at fair value, and unrealised holding gains or losses are to be reflected in the 
income statement. Held-to-maturity securities shall be valued at amortised cost. 
Shares in subsidiaries and associated companies are valued at cost in the 
unconsolidated financial statements. Subsidiaries are subject to consolidation 
but associated companies shall be valued according to the equity method in the 
consolidated financial statements. Other securities, such as holding a stake of 
up to 15 percent in a company but without yielding significant influence on that 
company’s financial and business affairs, appear in the unconsolidated and 
consolidated balance sheets at fair value. Unrealised holding gains or losses are 
reflected in the equity section of the balance sheet, while taking the tax effect 
into account. 
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5.3.6. Derivatives and hedging 
In 1990 the FASB issued FAS105 “Disclosure of Information about Financial 
Instruments with Off-Balance Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with 
Concentrations of Credit Risk”. The information required by FAS105 includes the 
face, contract, or notional principal amount of financial instruments that create an 
off-balance sheet liability. Further disclosure requirements include the nature 
and terms of the instruments and their credit and market risk, cash requirements 
and related accounting policies, information regarding the maximum possible 
loss, collateral requirements, and the concentration of credit risk from an 
individual counterparty. FAS107 “Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial 
Instruments” was issued in 1991. It extended FAS105’s disclosure standards by 
requiring disclosure of the fair value of financial instruments including assets and 
liabilities both recognised and not recognised in the balance sheet. 
 Effective from December 1994, FAS119 required disclosure about 
derivative financial instruments, futures, forwards, swap and option contracts. 
Furthermore, it required distinction between financial instruments for trading 
purposes and for other purposes, and it required dis-aggregation of the 
information. Already in 1999, FAS133 superseded FAS119. It requires an entity 
to recognise all derivatives as assets or liabilities in the balance sheet at fair 
value. In case of a fair value hedge earnings shall reflect the extent to which the 
hedge is not effective. In case of a cash flow hedge, a gain or loss is reported in 
comprehensive income and subsequently reclassified in earnings when the 
forecasted transaction affects earnings. Foreign currency hedges of net 
investments in foreign operations are treated the same as the above two, 
depending on which case is appropriate. For derivatives that are not hedging 
instruments, gains or losses are recognised in earnings for the period. 
 In Japan there were no special rules for derivative financial instruments 
until the Accounting Standards for Financial Instruments146 were pronounced in 
January of 1999, effective from fiscal 2000. On May 29, 1990 the BADC issued 
its “Opinion on Accounting Standards for Futures and Options Transactions”.147 
It advocated valuation of futures, options and marketable securities at fair value 
for companies that issued financial statements in accordance with the SEL. This 
information was supplementary in nature and was not audited (Sakurai, 2001, p. 
1771). Only since 1998 does FSR Art.8-8 required disclosure in a note to the 
unconsolidated financial statements. Information to be disclosed was based on 
the BADC Opinion and included a description, the purpose, risk, the type of 
transaction, contract price, and the fair value of the asset or liability. C-FSR 
Art.15-7 requires disclosure in the notes to the consolidated financial statements 
in accordance with the Accounting Standards for Financial Instruments since 
April 1, 2000. Fair value is required except when a company uses deferral 
accounting for its hedging activities. From 2000, notes to unconsolidated 
financial statements need to include information on financial instruments only 
when the company does not prepare consolidated financial statements. 
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5.3.7. Retirement benefits and pensions 
Prior to FAS87 “Employers’ Accounting for Pensions” (issued in December 1985), 
pension plans were not capitalised. The balance sheet only reported an asset or 
liability for the pension plan if the amount actually paid to the pension fund during 
the year was different from the amount reported as pension expense. Pension 
costs charged to income were to be disclosed (FAS36 “Disclosure of Pension 
Information: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 8”, issued in May 1980)). FAS87 
adopted a capitalisation approach although it still retains certain features of 
non-capitalisation (Kieso and Weygandt, 1998, p. 1097). 
Components to be included in the net cost recognised for a period by an 
employer sponsoring a defined benefit pension plan (FAS87 par.20): 
a. service cost 
b. interest cost 
c. actual return on plan assets 
d. amortisation of unrecognised prior service cost 
e. gain or loss to the extent recognised 
f. amortisation of the unrecognised net obligation or unrecognised net asset 
Measurement of assets at fair value as of measurement date (FAS87 par.49) 
Under a defined contribution plan, the contribution called for a period constitutes 
also the cost for that period (FAS87 par.64). 
Disclosed in the financial statements are:  
If the amount paid to pension funds is less than the amount recorded as pension 
expense, the difference will be recorded as a liability item in the balance sheet 
under the name of Accrued Pension Cost, or Due to Pension Fund. If the amount 
paid is more than the amount recorded as pension expense, the difference will 
appear in the balance sheet as an asset named Prepaid Pension Cost, Deferred 
Pension Expense or Prepaid Pension Expense. If the accumulated benefit 
obligation exceeds the fair value of the pension plan assets, the difference will 
appear in the B/S as a liability. 
Disclosure in the notes to the financial statements includes: a description 
of the pension plan, the components of the pension cost, a schedule reconciling 
plan status with amounts in B/S, including: plan assets at fair value, PBO, ABO 
and VBO, amounts of unrecognised service costs and unrecognised gain or loss, 
additional or remaining liabilities, and the amount of deferred pension expenses 
or accrued pension cost in the B/S. Furthermore, the notes to the balance sheet 
will disclose the weighted average discount rate, the rate used to measure the 
PBO, and the weighted average expected long-term return on plan assets (Kieso 
and Weygandt, 1998, p. 1115-1116). 
 For many years, most Japanese corporations supported pension 
schemes based on defined benefits, to which most companies contributed the 
maximum amount charged to income allowed by the tax laws. The defined 
benefits per employee constituted of a lump sum payment equal to several times 
the annual salary, depending on the years of service. The maximum amount 
allowed to be charged to income was 40 percent of the total payments if all 
employees were to voluntarily leave at the end of the year. As a consequence 
retirement benefit liabilities came to be understated. 
More and more companies are changing to defined contribution pension 
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schemes. These are also transferable in case one changes jobs. The Standards 
Related to Accounting for Retirement Benefits (SRARB)148, effective from April 1, 
2000, are largely comparable with the provisions of FAS87. Retirement benefit 
costs include: service costs, interest costs, return on plan assets, and the 
amortisation of unrecognised prior service costs and the net asset or liability 
(SRARB par.3-2). C-FSR Art. 15-8 requires retirement benefit disclosure in the 
consolidated financial statements. 
 
5.3.8. Earnings per share and net worth per share 
Since 1969, earnings per share disclosure requirements in the USA were based 
on APB15. Primary earnings per share and fully diluted earnings per share were 
to be disclosed on the face of the income statement (APB15 par.12 and 16). 
Criticism saying that the calculation methods were too complicated induced the 
FASB to issue FAS128 in February 1997, around the same time that the IASC 
issued IAS33. 
 C-FSR Art.65-2 and C-FSR Art. 44-2 require Japanese companies to 
disclose earnings per share and net worth per share respectively. Since 1995 
diluted earnings per share have to be included (C-FSR Art. 65-2-2). 
 
5.3.9. Deferred taxes 
APB11 governed accounting for deferred income taxes from 1967. FAS37 
amended APB11 in 1980. FAS96 superseded FAS37 from December 15, 1988. 
However, FAS109 reinstated FAS37 again in 1992. FAS109 par. 8b states that a 
deferred tax liability or asset is recognised for the estimated future tax effects 
attributable to temporary differences and carry-forwards. Deferred taxes shall be 
determined for each tax-paying component separately according to five steps 
laid out in paragraph 17. Included in income from continuing operations are 
valuation differences resulting from a change in judgement about the realisability 
of the valuation allowance (FAS109 par.26). Charged or credited to equity are: 
a. adjustments of the opening balance of retained earnings due to accounting 
changes or correction of errors 
b. gains and losses included in comprehensive income but excluded from net 
income (such as foreign currency translation adjustments under FAS52) 
c. increases or decreases in contributed capital 
d. expenses for stock options recognised differently for tax and for financial 
statement purposes (FAS109 par.36) 
Presentation: The enterprise shall separate deferred tax liabilities and assets 
into a current and a non-current amount. (FAS109 par.41) 
Disclosure:  
a. the total of deferred tax liabilities measured in procedure (b) of paragraph 17 
b. the total of deferred tax assets measured in procedures (c) and (d) of 
paragraph 17 
c. the total valuation allowance recognised for deferred tax assets determined in 
procedure (e) of paragraph 17 
d. the net change during the year of the valuation allowance 
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e. the approximate tax effect of each type of difference and carry-forward that 
gives rise to a significant portion of deferred tax liabilities and assets (before 
allocation of valuation allowances) (FAS109 par.43) 
Disclosed in the financial statements or the notes thereto are: 
a. current tax expense or benefit 
b. deferred tax expense or benefit 
c. investment in tax credits 
d. government grants 
e. benefits of operating loss carry-forwards 
f. tax expense resulting from allocation to the contributed capital, or to reduce 
goodwill or other non-current intangible assets of an acquired entity 
g. adjustments of a deferred tax liability or asset for enacted changes in tax laws, 
tax rates, or in the tax status of the reporting entity 
h. adjustments of the beginning-of-the-year balance of a valuation allowance 
because of a change in circumstances that causes a change in judgement 
about the realisability of the related deferred tax asset in future years (FAS109 
par.45) 
For most of the period under discussion, the Japanese Commercial 
Code did not allow rational inter-period income tax allocations. Under the SEL 
deferred taxes were permitted in the consolidated financial statements (C-FSR 
Art. 11) for the purpose of consolidating overseas subsidiaries. 
 Effective from April 1, 2000, tax effect accounting became mandatory for 
both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts. Although partly the result of a 
tendency towards international harmonisation of accounting standards, the tax 
effect accounting standards were a direct consequence of the bad loan problem 
faced by Japanese financial institutions. Having to write off huge bad loans, 
financial institutions needed ways to write off those bad loans and allocating the 
losses over several periods so as not to endanger their existence. The BADC 
issued the Tax Effect Accounting Standards (TEAS) on October 30, 1998. From 
April 1, 2000 the Tax Effect Accounting Standards were made effective and 
applicable to all companies. The TEAS consist of the following four parts: 
1. Recognition of temporary differences explains that temporary differences 
may arise due to timing differences, revaluation of assets where the valuation 
difference is added to or deducted directly from the reserves, or upon 
consolidation (TEAS 2-1). 
2. Accounting treatment of deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities 
prescribes that deferred tax assets or liabilities have to be recorded except in 
cases where the future payment or collection amount cannot be estimated, 
furthermore the amounts need to be reviewed every accounting period. The 
difference between the deferred tax assets and liabilities shall be compared 
at the beginning and the end of the accounting period. The increase or 
decrease shall be recorded as the adjustment amount (TEAS 2-2). 
3. Disclosure methods for deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities states 
that a distinction shall be made between current deferred tax assets and 
investments and other assets, and current and fixed liabilities (TEAS 2-3-1). 
4. Items to be disclosed in the notes include explanations for the occurrence of 
the deferred tax assets and or liabilities, item by item explanations for the 
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main causes in case of a large discrepancy between the legal tax rate and 
the effective tax rate (TEAS 2-4-2). TEAS 2-4-4 requires mention of a 
post-balance sheet date change in the tax rate, and the effects of the new tax 
rate. 
Furthermore, there are eight explanatory notes. Number 2 explains that 
future deductions from earnings arise in case of capitalisation of bad loan 
reserves, pension reserves, and depreciation reserves, or in case of cancellation 
of unrealised profits on internal transactions with subsidiaries upon consolidation. 
Additions to income result from distribution over time of the allowances under the 
Special Taxation Measures Law, according to number 3. When the tax rate is 
amended the deferred tax assets and liabilities shall be recalculated based on 
the new tax rate (Number 6). 
 
5.3.10. R&D expenditures 
FAS2 “Accounting for Research and Development Costs” prescribes that all 
R&D costs are charged to expense when incurred. Total R&D costs shall be 
disclosed separately, usually in a footnote providing supplementary earnings 
information. FAS68 “Research and Development Agreements” centres on R&D 
activities carried out by one company on behalf of another company. Financial 
risk is borne by the company that is obliged to pay for the R&D activities 
irrespective of the outcome of the research, and thus results in a financial 
liability. 
 In Japan, testing, research and development costs were to be expensed 
as incurred, or capitalised as a deferred asset to be amortised within five years. 
Unconsolidated financial statements under the SEL disclosed technological 
research costs149 in the income statement included in general administrative 
expenses or separately after selling expenses and general administrative 
expenses (FSR Art. 86). In consolidated financial statements the item sales and 
general administrative expenses usually appears as one item in the income 
statement, but had to be disaggregated into sales expenses and general 
administrative expenses in the notes (C-FSR Art. 5). Other items for separate 
disclosure included depreciation expenses and amounts added to allowances 
(C-FSR Guidelines No. 77). These other items were subject to a materiality 
threshold of 10 percent. In sum, there were no requirements to disclosure R&D 
expenses in the consolidated financial statements until 1999 when C-FSR Art. 
55-2 was added after the BADC issued “Accounting Standards Concerning 
Research and Development Expenses”150. The new rules require R&D costs to 
be expensed as incurred. R&D costs for software developed for a company’s 
own use, or the master version of software developed for commercial purposes 
may be capitalised and depreciated using a rational method and over a 
reasonable period. 
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5.3.11. Long-term borrowings and bonds 
In the US instruments with both liability and equity characteristics are accounted 
for by separating both components and treating the debt component as a liability, 
and the call option or warrant component as an equity instrument. APB No. 14 
does not assign any portion of the issuance proceeds to the equity or conversion 
feature (Fisher et al., 2001, p. 2940). FAS47 “Disclosure of Long-term 
Obligations requires disclosure of the combined aggregate amount of maturities 
and sinking fund requirements for all long-term borrowings. Furthermore, FAS47 
required the disclosure of the amount of redemption requirements for all issues 
of capital stock that are redeemable at fixed or determinable prices on fixed or 
determinable dates. Other disclosure requirements include an explanation of the 
loan and the interest rate, the dates of interest and maturity payment, the total 
amount estimated to be repaid within the next five years, and the conditions in 
the loan contract. FAS150, issued in 2003, addressed the increasingly 
complicated issue of classification of the instruments combining debt and equity 
characteristics again. It suggests that SFAC6 may need to be revised as to the 
definition of liabilities. This is presently a task under consideration. 
 Extinguishment of debt leads to gains or losses which FAS4 “Reporting 
Gains and Losses from Extinguishment of Debt” classifies at extraordinary items 
in the income statement. Required disclosures include a description of the 
extinguishment transactions and the source of funds used for this purpose, the 
income tax effect in the period of extinguishment, and the per-share amount of 
the gain or loss net of the tax effect. In case of troubled debt restructuring FAS15 
requires disclosure by debtors as follows. A description of the changes in the 
terms of the loan and the features of settlement, the aggregate gain and the 
income tax effect, the per-share amount of the gain net of the income tax effect, 
and the aggregate gain recognised on related transfer of assets (Schroeder, 
Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 335). 
 Japanese financial accounting standards for consolidated financial 
statements did not require disclosure of details regarding bonds and long-term 
borrowings. Unconsolidated financial statements under the SEL were supposed 
to present supporting schedules for bonds and long-term borrowings. For bonds 
this information included a description of the bond, issue date, total issuing 
amount, amount repaid, outstanding balance, issue price, stated interest rate, 
mortgage, maturity date, and remarks such as foreign currency denomination 
(FSR Supporting Schedule Format No.7). Disclosure regarding long-term 
borrowings according to FSR Supporting Schedule Format No. 8 required the 
name of the creditor, the balance at the beginning of the period, increase for the 
period, decrease for the period, the balance at the end of the period, and 
remarks such as the type of collateral. 
 Since fiscal 2001 C-FSR requires supporting schedules providing 
information on bonds and borrowings for the consolidated financial statements 
as well. C-FSR Supporting Schedule Format No. 9 requires a description of the 
bond, the date of issue, the balance at the end of the previous period, the 
outstanding balance at the end of the period, stated interest rate, mortgage, 
maturity date, and remarks such as foreign currency denomination, details 
regarding the conversion option in case of convertible bonds and regarding the 
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issuing of new shares in the case of bonds with warranties attached. Important is 
also the requirement to disclose the amount of interest expected to be paid the 
next five years. Format No. 10 for the supporting schedule on borrowings etc. 
requires the disclosure of the balance at the end of the previous period, the 
balance at the end of the present period, the average interest rate, the maturity 
date (if applicable), and remarks separately for borrowings that are classified as 
short-term borrowings, the current portion of long-term borrowings, long-term 
borrowings (excluding the current portion), other interest-bearing liabilities.151  
 
5.3.12. Impairment of long-lived assets and loans 
Since December 1994 FAS114 “Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a 
Loan – an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 15” requires the difference 
between the recorded investment value (the principal plus accrued interest) of 
impaired unsecuritised debt and the net realisable value (the expected future 
cash-flows discounted at the loan’s effective interest rate) to be recognised by 
creating a valuation allowance and making a corresponding charge to bad debt 
expense. In subsequent periods impairment is re-measured to reflect significant 
changes, which are in turn reflected in the valuation allowance account in the 
balance sheet and as an adjustment to bad debt expense. The carrying value of 
the loan may never be written up to exceed the original investment amount. 
Disclosures at each balance sheet date include the recorded investment in the 
impaired loans, the beginning, ending balance, increase and decrease in the 
valuation allowance account (FAS114), as well as the company’s policy 
regarding the recognition of interest income from impaired loans (FAS118). 
 FAS121 “Accounting for the Impairment of Long-lived Assets and Assets 
to Be Disposed Of” after December 1995 states that impairment of long-lived 
assets occurs when the carrying amount is not recoverable. When events or 
changes in circumstances indicate that the book-value may not be recoverable 
by the sum of the future cash-flows expected to result from the use of the asset 
and its eventual disposal, companies are required to review tangible and 
intangible fixed assets for impairment. In this case the company shall decrease 
the value of the long-lived asset and recognise a loss for the difference between 
the carrying amount and the recoverable amount. FAS121 required disclosure of 
the impaired assets and the reasons for the impairment, the amount of the 
impairment loss and method of estimation, the location of the impairment loss in 
the income statement, and the business segments that are affected by the loss. 
FAS144 “Accounting for the Impairment or the Disposal of Long-Lived Assets” 
supersedes FAS121 from December 15, 2001. The new rules do not recognise 
impairment of goodwill (FAS142), and introduce the concept of 
probability-weighted cash-flow estimation. 
 The historical cost basis for valuation and measurement was so strongly 
entrenched in Japan that many companies were even reluctant to adopt the 
lower-of-cost-or-market rule. It is therefore not surprising that accounting for the 
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impairment of assets and loans is a new addition to Japan’s financial accounting 
standards. In August 2002 the BADC issued its “Opinion of the Establishment of 
Accounting Standards for the Impairment of Fixed Assets”.152 Early adoption of 
impairment accounting was possible from April 1, 2004, but adoption is 
mandatory from March 2006. Discussion of the Japanese standards therefore is 
outside the scope of this study. 
 
5.3.13. Business combinations 
APB Opinion No. 16 “Business Combinations” established rules to account for 
mergers and acquisitions using the pooling-of-interests and the purchase 
methods. All transactions involving the exchange of cash for voting stock had to 
be accounted for using the purchase method. In this case all the assets of the 
acquired company shall be recorded at their market value. The liabilities of the 
acquired company shall be deducted from this amount. Any excess between the 
acquired net assets and the cash amount paid is accounted for as goodwill. 
Goodwill was then amortised in a period not exceeding 40 years.  
In the case of exchange of voting stock the pooling-of-interests method 
could be used if the combination met each of the twelve criteria concerning 
attributes of the combining companies, the manner of combining interests, and 
the absence of planned transactions that would make the exchange look like a 
merger but a purchase in substance (Schroeder, Clark and Cathey, 2001, p. 476; 
FAS141, Summary). When using the pooling-of-interests method to account for 
a business combination the parent company records its investment in the 
acquired company at the book value of its net assets. Goodwill does not arise. 
The subsidiary’s retained earnings at the date of the exchange become part of 
consolidated retained earnings, and the subsidiary’s earnings for the year of 
acquisition become part of consolidated income. FAS141 “Business 
Combinations”, effective for business combinations starting after June 30, 2001, 
no longer allows the pooling of interest method. Furthermore, goodwill shall no 
longer be amortised. Instead it is subject to regular impairment tests and shall be 
carried at a value that does not exceed its fair value. A fixed intangible asset 
shall only be recognised apart from goodwill if it arises from contractual or legal 
rights, or if it can be separated from the acquired entity and sold, transferred or 
licensed (FAS141 Par. 39). 
 Disclosure requirements regarding business combinations include the 
name and a description of the acquired company, the method of acquisition and 
the details of the exchange (in case of the pooling-of-interests method; the kind 
and number of shares issued), the effect of including the acquired company’s 
profits, in case of the purchase method; the amount of goodwill recorded and the 
amortisation method. 
 In Japan there was no comprehensive set of accounting standards for 
business combinations until the Accounting Standards Board of Japan issued its 
Accounting Standard No. 2 on October 31, 2003. Because hitherto the 
Commercial Code did not specify any rule for the valuation of a newly acquired 
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subsidiary except not to exceed market value, valuation was left to corporate 
management’s discretion. The purchase method and the pooling-of-interest 
method have their Japanese equivalents in the “Contribution in Kind Theory” and 
the “Unified Character Theory”153 respectively. Part of the logic behind these 
names may get lost in translation so an explanation is in order. The first theory 
considers the transfer of stock from the shareholders of the acquired company a 
capital contribution in kind, whereas the second theory regards the exchange of 
stock in the case of a merger as the way in which the equities of the two 
companies involved gain the character of a unified entity (Takeda, 2003, p. 882). 
Goodwill arising from the use of the purchase method was to be amortised in 5 
years in the unconsolidated accounts and in 20 years in the consolidated 
accounts. Due to the fact that the Tax Laws considered revaluation of the 
acquired company’s assets as taxable income, most Japanese companies used 
the pooling-of-interests method. However, some companies chose to revalue the 
acquired company’s assets in order to offset the parent company’s losses 
(Katagi, 2003, p. 160-161). 
 Surplus arising from merger was allowed to go into the capital reserve154 
of the acquiring company (CC Art. 288-2-5), the acquired company’s legal profit 
reserve155 and its other earned surplus (retained earnings)156 were allowed to 
be transferred to the legal profit reserve and the other earned surplus account of 
the successor company. Disclosure of the contract of a business combination 
was to be in the business report, not in the notes to the financial statements and 
did not include the effect on profits of the acquiring company. The new Japanese 
accounting standards for business combinations will not be discussed here for 
lack of relevance to the period 1985 to 2003. 
 
 
5.4. Auditing 
US federal securities laws require all companies whose securities are publicly 
traded to file annual reports including a standard auditor’s report with the SEC on 
form 10-K within 90 days of the closing of the books. Annual reports to 
shareholders include the same independent auditor’s report. All these 
documents are publicly available from the SEC, the issuing companies and 
sometimes public libraries as well. Independent audits shall be carried out by a 
certified public accountant (CPA). In the case of public companies, independent 
audits are carried out by CPA firms that are a member of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA, which requires additional quality control standards to be 
followed. Independence is defined as not having any type of financial interest in 
the company under audit (Fisher et al., 2001, p. 2980). The Enron and other 
scandals illustrated that independence had been compromised, after which the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act was introduced in 2002 to address this issue. 
 In Japan independent audits were a consequence of the introduction of 
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the Securities and Exchange Law after WW II. The Commercial Code introduced 
first required independent audits in 1974 for companies with a capital stock of 
JPY100 million or more. In practice this meant mostly the companies that were 
already subject to independent audits by the SEL. Prior to 1974, the CC had 
required audits by a company’s statutory auditor only. Since 1981 the CC 
requires independent audits of companies with a capital stock of more than 
JPY500 million or total liabilities of JPY20 billion (what the CC calls “large 
corporations”). Individual annual financial statements, consolidated annual 
financial statements, and individual semi-annual financial statements had to be 
independently audited under the SEL. Independent audits of consolidated 
semi-annual financial statements under the SEL are required since April 1, 2000 
(Sakurai, 2001, p. 1786-1794). 
 This study is concerned with large corporations only. It is therefore very 
important to note that the Commercial Code does not recognise the need for 
financial statements of large corporations to be approved by their annual 
shareholders’ meeting. If the statutory auditor and the audit corporation agree 
that the financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the law, the 
annual shareholders’ meeting does not need to give their approval. They only 
need to give their approval regarding the proposal for the appropriation of 
retained earnings. Although the audits under the CC and the SEL are in effect 
one and the same audit, the financial statements under the SEL are not 
presented to the general shareholders’ meeting but to the stock exchanges and 
the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (presently to the FSA). 
 
 
5.5. Summary of differences between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP for 
consolidated financial statements 
From the above it will have become clear that in 1985 the difference in 
disclosure requirements for annual consolidated financial statements between 
US-GAAP and JP-GAAP was substantial. The gap widened when the disclosure 
standards under US-GAAP increased whereas JP-GAAP remained fairly 
stagnant until the accounting big bang that took place in the wake of the financial 
big bang. Since then the gap has grown smaller to the extent that we can speak 
of convergence between the two systems. 
 Looking at the disclosure score sheet in Appendix II, Table D the grey 
areas indicate accounting and disclosure standards existing under US-GAAP 
without the existence of any disclosure requirements under JP-GAAP. The 
US-GAAP sheet indicates the main sources for the disclosure standards, and 
the C-FSR sheet indicates the disclosure requirements under JP-GAAP for 
consolidated financial statements in accordance with the Securities and 
Exchange Law. The FSR and CC sheets indicate the sources of disclosure 
requirements for unconsolidated financial statements under the Securities and 
Exchange Law and the Commercial Code respectively. 
 A mere glance at these sheets already indicates that US-GAAP added a 
cash-flow statement in 1987, a comprehensive income statement in 1998, 
disclosure of pension liabilities and assets in 1987, disclosure of derivative 
financial instruments in 1990, and the impairment of assets in 1994. On the other 
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hand, the white spaces on the C-FSR sheet clearly show that under JP-GAAP a 
cash-flow statement was not required until 2000, a comprehensive earnings 
statement is still not required, disclosure regarding bonds and borrowings 
started only in 2001, disclosure on leases and business and geographic 
segments from 1995 (although the latter in earnest from 1997), related party 
transactions, deferred taxes, R&D expenses, and contingent liabilities in 1999, 
marketable securities and derivative financial instruments in 2000, and 
retirement benefits and collateralised assets and liabilities in 2001. Each of these 
items has been discussed in detail in the corresponding paragraphs in this 
chapter. 
 Differences that remain include topics discussed above such as 
comprehensive earnings, and the valuation of long-term investments in equity 
stakes of less than 15 percent (at historical cost rather than fair value). More 
differences between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP remain and are the subject of 
periodic comparison by the large accounting firms. The present convergence 
project that is being carried out by the ASBJ and the IASB shall undoubtedly 
lead to further interesting developments. 
 
 
 
5.6. Explanation of the disclosure score sheet 
As mentioned above, the disclosure sheet in Appendix II, Table D shows grey 
fields that indicate existing disclosure and accounting standards under JP-GAAP 
for consolidated annual financial statements. The white fields indicate the margin 
for voluntary disclosure of financial statements such as a cash-flow statement, or 
of notes to the financial statements or supporting schedules. I filled in a printed 
sheet for each of the fifty-two companies in the sample, for which I read through 
the nineteen annual financial statements of every company. For every voluntary 
disclosure item I encountered I wrote down a Y indicating yes, and the number of 
the note in the financial statement. For every year I added up the Ys and the total 
number would indicate the disclosure score of the company for that particular 
year. Voluntary disclosure here does not mean qualitative information in the 
business report, but it means for example quantitative disclosure of contingent 
liabilities in the notes to the balance sheet of a trading company in the year 1990. 
Another example would be a note disclosing quantitative information regarding 
derivatives or retirement benefits in 1988. Each of these would be worth one 
point. 
This immediately indicates two of the main weaknesses of the disclosure 
measure in this study. Firstly, there is the problem of bias and inconsistency in 
evaluating and transcribing the disclosure items. 157  Secondly, there is the 
problem of weighting the items in the disclosure score. All disclosure measures 
are subject to bias and inconsistency to some extent. However, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, my outcomes for the relation between the cost of equity 
and disclosure between 1996 and 2000 are similar in direction if not in extent to 
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the outcomes in the study by Suda, Shutou and Ohta (2004a and 2004b). 
Therefore, I assume that the possible bias and inconsistencies in my disclosure 
measure are comparable the ones in the disclosure measure produced by the 
SAAJ. 
 
 
5.7. Conclusions of Part 2 
In Part 1 concluded that the internationalisation of business has had a profound 
influence on the development of Japan’s financial accounting system. 
International political factors between 1868 and 1980 provided a rationale to 
adopt a macro-economic stance toward accounting standard setting. Because 
Japan had an interest in becoming a developed country as quickly as possible it 
developed some kind of state-led “political capitalism”. While the Japanese 
business community (such as Keidanren) strived to maintain the status quo 
internationalisation continued. This had the consequence that Japan’s financial 
accounting system did not change much between 1980 and 1996, but 
international business, financial and capital markets changed greatly. When 
Japan’s financial system seemed on the verge of collapse the Japanese 
government took action and carried out an overhaul of the financial system 
starting in 1996 and the financial accounting system starting in 1998. The big 
bang has brought about a financial accounting system that has more 
characteristics of a micro-economic orientation toward accounting development. 
Such a shift is a prerequisite for convergence of JP-GAAP toward US-GAAP. 
Part 2 answers the questions whether internationalisation of business, 
financial and capital markets has brought about convergence of financial 
accounting and disclosure standards between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP, and 
how convergence has come about as follows. Chapter 4 concluded that due to 
internationalisation of business, financial and capital markets, the role of public 
disclosure of financial information to shareholders and potential investors has 
gained importance over creditor protection. The introduction of fair value has 
brought Japan’s measurement and recognition standards closer to US-GAAP. As 
the role of public disclosure has increased in importance, Japan’s disclosure 
standards for consolidated annual financial statements too have shifted toward 
US-GAAP. Convergence in this sense means a categorical shift from lower 
accounting and disclosure standards to higher standards. A convergence project 
between the IASB and the ASBJ is currently under consideration. The outcome 
of this project is going to be very interesting. 
 As for the matter of the extent of convergence, the disclosure sheet, 
which is the basis for the disclosure scores in Chapter 6, shows that after the 
year 2000 there has been considerably less room for audited voluntary 
disclosure in the financial statements, the notes and the supporting schedules. 
Therefore the maximum possible voluntary disclosure scores after the year 2000 
are low. However, the FASB and the ASBJ are very actively working on 
improving accounting and disclosure standards. It is possible that the FASB, the 
IASB and the ASBJ will work more closely together in the future. 
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6.0. Introduction 
Part 1 of this dissertation explored the influence of internationalisation on 
accounting development in Japan. International political events played a 
significant role in firmly establishing the macro-economic approach to accounting 
development and regulation between 1868 and 1980. Internationalisation of 
capital and financial markets took place at an unprecedented rate in the 1980s 
and 1990s but in that period internal political clout of businesses prohibited the 
accounting system from responding to these changes until in 1996 the financial 
big bang was announced and the accounting big bang followed. From 1996 
onward the accounting system was allowed to become more responsive to the 
market and to take on a micro-economic approach to accounting regulation. Part 
2 of this study found that convergence between Japanese and US accounting 
and disclosure standards has taken place in the sense that the Japanese 
standards moved towards the US standards, particularly since the year 1998.    
 Part 3, or Chapter 6 is concerned with quantifiable economic rationales 
for voluntary disclosure. In the previous chapter we developed a disclosure index 
that will be used here as a variable to quantify consolidated voluntary financial 
disclosure in Japan between 1985 and 2003, and test if there is a negative 
correlation between disclosure and the cost of capital. Factors related to the 
degree of internationalisation of financing and corporate governance that may be 
influencing the cost of capital or the propensity for voluntary disclosure will also 
be investigated. 
 Section 6.1. provides an overview of studies into the relation between 
disclosure and the cost of capital and other factors that possibly influence 
disclosure policies. The research questions are stated in section 6.2., followed 
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by the formulation of the hypotheses in section 6.3. In section 6.4., I discuss 
sample and period selection, and description of the models, variables and 
summary statistics follows in section 6.5. Section 6.6. presents the empirical 
results, and section 6.7. summarises the chapter and presents the conclusions 
for Chapter 6. 
 
 
6.1. Related studies 
In recent years studies into the relation between the disclosure of accounting 
and other information and the cost of debt and/or equity capital have enjoyed 
increased popularity. Examples are Botosan (1997), Botosan & Plumlee (2000) 
for the relation between disclosure and the cost of equity capital, or Sengupta 
(1998) for the relation with the cost of debt. In Japan, Suda, Shutou and Ohta 
(2004a and 2004b) performed tests of both associations, inspired by and 
modelled on Botosan and Sengupta’s studies. 
 Botosan (1997) and Botosan & Plumlee (2000) sketch a theoretical 
framework primarily based on Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991),  Dechow et al. (1996), and Healy and Palepu (1993 and 
1999) as follows. On the one hand cost of capital is reduced by increased stock 
market liquidity (proxied by the bid-ask spread) due to increased disclosure. On 
the other hand greater disclosure reduces estimation risk and thereby investors’ 
required rates of return. Sengupta (1998, p. 459-460) suggests that firms are 
charged lower risk premiums as a result of a perceived “lower likelihood of 
withholding value-relevant unfavourable information.” Suda, Shutou and Ohta 
(2004a and 2004b) follow the above examples fairly closely, but carry out the 
exercises for the case of Japan. 
 Botosan (1997) documents an association between her self-constructed 
measure of disclosure and a cost of equity capital estimate based on the clean 
surplus concept and the “EBO valuation formula” for firms with low analyst 
following (which also happen to be considerably smaller companies with a lower 
beta) after controlling for beta and firm size. Botosan and Plumlee (2000) find the 
cost of equity capital decreasing with regard to disclosure in annual reports, but 
not for more timely disclosures such as the quarterly report. Their analysis 
covers the period between 1986 and 1996. This time they use the disclosure 
measure from the Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) reports. Sengupta (1998) uses the same disclosure measure to produce 
results indicating that firms with higher quality disclosure enjoyed better bond 
ratings, and a lower cost of debt. 
 Suda, Shutou and Ohta (2004a, p 38; 2004b, p. 66) proxy for disclosure 
level using the Securities Analysts Association of Japan (SAAJ) Reports. Their 
analyses for both the association between disclosure and the cost of equity 
(Chapter 1), as well as between disclosure and the cost of debt (Chapter 2) 
cover the period from 1995 to 2000. In both cases they find a significant negative 
association, indicating that it pays off to make use of what they call the 
“disclosure opportunity”.  
In Chapter 3 of that same book, Suda, Otomasa and Matsumoto (2004a) 
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test associations of voluntary disclosure of consolidated interim reports of 
September 1998 with trading volume, with beta as an indicator of risk, and with 
errors in analyst forecasts of recurrent profits.158 They conclude that companies 
that voluntary issue consolidated interim statements enjoyed a higher liquidity of 
their stocks, and a lower cost of equity capital, and that the level of information 
asymmetry (proxied by the level of accuracy of analyst forecasts) was lower. 
Then in Chapter 4, Suda, Otomasa and Matsumoto (2004b) embark on a 
quest to find if the companies that voluntarily issued the interim financial 
statements in September 1998 have any relevant common financial 
characteristics. Furthermore, they try to explain what the strategic motives for 
this voluntary disclosure are. They test the hypothesis that corporate managers 
of these firms intend to signal good news (signalling hypothesis). In addition they 
test the agency cost hypothesis (the larger the agency costs, the more important 
the role of information is perceived to be). Thirdly, they test the stock 
compensation hypothesis (companies that have introduced the stock option 
system are expected to voluntarily disclose good news). A fourth test concerns 
the corporate governance hypothesis (companies with more verbal shareholders 
are supposed to engage in better quality and more timely disclosure). And finally, 
they test what they call the direct financing hypothesis (companies that are more 
dependent on direct financing will try to reduce their cost of raising capital or 
funds by being more forthcoming with information). 
Good news is supposed to be signalled through the rate of return on 
equity (roe). Suda, Otomasa and Matsumoto (2004b) proxy for agency costs 
using the book-to-price ratio, and for growth using growth in sales, based on a 
study by Kallapur and Trombley (1999). A dummy variable indicates whether or 
not a company chose to implement a stock option system by September 1998. 
Foreign investors are thought to be more demanding in terms of timely 
disclosure and appropriate corporate governance. Suda, Otomasa, and 
Matsumoto (2004b) use the percentage of shares held by foreign investors as a 
variable to test the corporate governance hypothesis. The direct financing 
hypothesis is tested using the ratio of bonds issues in 1998 and 1999 to total 
assets, and the ratio of new share issues in 1998 and 1999 to total assets. Suda, 
Otomasa and Matsumoto (2004b, p. 103) claim to have found that all five of their 
hypotheses have explanatory power, but the strongest are the corporate 
governance, direct financing, and the stock compensation hypotheses. 
Suda (2004), tests the signalling, agency, corporate governance and 
direct financing hypotheses. He differentiates companies that voluntarily issue 
consolidated interim financial statements, companies that use tax effect 
accounting, companies that do both, and companies that do neither. 
Consolidated financial interim financial statements were required from April 1, 
2000. The standards for tax effect accounting were set in December 1998, but 
applied from March 2000. Suda (2004, p. 119) finds that the corporate 
governance and direct financing hypotheses hold the strongest, but that there is 
some evidence to support the signalling hypothesis. 
 
                                                   
158
 Consolidated interim financial statements were required from April 1, 2000. 
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6.2. Research Questions 
In an attempt to understand what motivates corporate managers to disclose 
more financial information than the legal minimum required, this study asks the 
following research questions: 
1) Have companies that issued their consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with higher disclosure standards enjoyed a lower cost of capital? 
2) Is there a relation between disclosure levels and corporate governance 
factors? 
Findings by the prior studies discussed in section 6.1. indicate that such may be 
the case. There may be relations between the cost of equity capital and 
disclosure proxies and between the cost of debt and disclosure proxies. This 
study investigates correlations between the weighted average cost of capital and 
a voluntary disclosure proxy in Japan. 
 This study analyses the case of Japan because she offers us an 
opportunity to compare companies issuing consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with US-GAAP with companies following JP-GAAP since 1978. It is 
therefore possible to analyse the associations between disclosure and the cost 
of capital and between disclosure and company characteristics such as capital 
and ownership structure over a longer time-span. As markets change (see Part 
1) and convergence progresses (see Part 2) the above associations can be 
expected to change as well.  
 
 
6.3. Hypothesis formulation 
6.3.1. Theoretical Framework 
Presently there is not a very well-developed theoretical framework in which to 
place research into the motivations for voluntary disclosure, or more specifically 
the relation between voluntary disclosure of financial information and the cost of 
capital.159 It is certainly within the realm of transaction cost economics because 
of the information asymmetry between corporate managers and users of 
financial statements and other corporate disclosure involved. Full financial 
disclosure could solve the adverse selection problem that stems from 
information asymmetry, but managers may fear that it would result in a loss of 
competitive advantage for their company. 
 Without any doubt agency theory applies because of the moral hazard 
that is inherent in the relationship between corporate managers and outside 
investors or creditors. This problem cannot even in theory be solved. It can only 
be mitigated by expensive contracts and monitoring mechanisms. Managers 
may choose not to disclose bad news for what they perceive as the benefit of the 
company as well as for private reasons. Or they may manipulate earnings or 
other numbers upwards or downwards if they think it serves the company or 
themselves. Disclosing overly optimistic forecasts may result in very costly 
                                                   
159
 Verrecchia also states that there is no comprehensive theory of disclosure in Verrecchia 
(2001), p. 98. 
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litigation suits.160 Based on the above, voluntary disclosure decisions should 
therefore be viewed as the outcome of professional and private analyses 
weighing costs and benefits and risk and return by corporate managers. 
 The optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities is a 
challenge for any economy because of information and incentive problems 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001, p. 407). Accounting and disclosure regulations aim to 
mitigate information problems. Contracts and corporate governance structures 
are used to provide solutions to incentive problems (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p. 
409-410). Voluntary disclosure of financial information therefore addresses the 
first problem, and transparency of corporate governance structures helps solve 
the second. 
 What is the mechanism through which increased disclosure is negatively 
associated with cost of capital? Information asymmetry between companies and 
investors or creditors causes uncertainty with respect to companies’ financial 
situation, corporate performance and business prospects. In turn uncertainty 
about the level of risk regarding an investment’s future returns invites higher risk 
premiums. Uncertainty affects a stock’s liquidity because stock market players 
(as opposed to investors for the long term) are more likely to invest in companies 
which they perceive to be easily divestible in case they need their cash for other 
purposes. Empirical evidence for this mechanism is found by Welker (1995, p. 
810 and 822) in a negative association between a disclosure proxy and the 
bid-ask spread, and by Amihud and Mendelson (1986, p. 246) who document 
that liquidity-increasing financial policies reduce the opportunity cost of capital 
and increase the value of the firm. 
 Although not statistically significant, the findings in Welker (1995, p. 
804 ) seem to indicate that the coefficients of the negative association between 
disclosure and liquidity are larger for firms with higher levels of shares held by 
institutional investors. These firms also experience larger bid-ask spreads. 
Welker (1995, p. 823) equates larger institutional shareholdings with higher 
levels of informed trade. The importance of Welker’s study is that it points out 
correlations between disclosure and liquidity as well as between disclosure and 
ownership structure. As mentioned above, liquidity is associated with perceived 
risk and influences the cost of capital. Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (2002, p. 3, 6 
and 23) found ownership structure to be associated with capital structure in the 
sense that at low levels of managerial ownership a large presence of external 
block-holders leads to higher debt ratios. At high levels of managerial ownership, 
managers will have incentives to lower non-diversifiable employment risk by 
reducing debt to sub-optimal levels in order to ensure the continued viability of 
the firm. It is possible that the results of this Australian study would not have 
been obtained in the Japanese case. Japanese managers were very powerful 
even in the absence of managerial ownership. Employees of large corporations 
enjoyed the benefits of lifetime employment. Nevertheless, institutional block 
ownership and high debt ratios are characteristics of many Japanese 
companies. 
     According to Dhaliwal (1990, p. 80 and 84), highly leveraged firms 
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 Until recently that was not very likely in Japan because lawsuits by shareholders were being 
discouraged by prohibitive costs and were thus rare. 
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have a distinct preference for accounting standards that allow flexibility to reduce 
volatility of reported earnings or net tangible assets in order to circumvent 
restrictive debt covenants. With regard to disclosure, Zarzeski (1996, p. 24) 
found support for the hypothesis that “Companies with lower debt ratios are 
expected to have higher levels of investor-oriented disclosures.” The idea behind 
this hypothesis is that companies with higher debt ratios are likely to share more 
private information with their creditors (Zarzeski, 1996, p. 31). Solving 
information asymmetry problems through private information sharing is thus 
associated with dependence on debt or more particularly indirect financing. On 
the other hand, in the case of direct financing there is more reliance on and thus 
a stronger demand for public information. Similar findings are presented by Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000). 
  Similarly, in the case of higher levels of relationship investing where 
larger percentages of a company’s shares are held by banks and companies 
within the same keiretsu, private information sharing is expected to reduce the 
need for public information disclosure. On the other hand, when larger 
percentages of shares are held by foreign and individual investors the demand 
for and thus the level of public information disclosure is expected to be higher. 
 
6.3.2. Formulation of the hypotheses 
As we have seen in section 6.1., there is some empirical support for negative 
associations between disclosure and the cost of equity, and between disclosure 
and the cost of debt. If that is the case, one expects the same hypothesis to hold 
for the relation between voluntary disclosure and the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) as well. As this chapter’s main aim is to find a quantifiable 
economic rationale for corporate managers’ decisions to voluntarily disclose 
financial information, it will first investigate the WACC which is the cost of capital 
that matters to corporate managers in the process of economic value creation. 
 Discounting the expected cash flows to the firm at the firm’s weighted 
average cost of capital estimates the value of the firm. Firm value is thus a 
function of cash flows and the WACC. Both of which are usually influenced by 
the degree of leverage (Damodoran, 2002, p. 404). Tax deductibility of interest 
payments is the reason why leverage influences a firm’s cash flow. Higher risk of 
costly financial distress associated with a high degree of leverage raises the 
required rate of return of equity as well as the cost of debt, and thus at a certain 
point offsets the tax advantage of leverage and decreases firm value (Brealy and 
Myers, 1996, p. 213). 
 As debt and equity represent two different corporate governance 
systems, the first corporate governance choice a corporation makes is its degree 
of leverage. According to Williamson (1996, p. 180, 184-185), debt is a 
governance structure that works through arms length rules such as the 
obligation to make regular interest payments, meet liquidity requirements, in 
some cases the demand for compensating balances, and possible liquidation in 
the event of default. Equity represents a governance structure that on the one 
hand is more forgiving because shareholders are residual claimants, and equity 
lasts the life-time of the firm. However, through the decision-reviewing and 
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monitoring functions of the board of directors, the equity governance structure is 
much more intrusive. 
 The debt-equity mix is both the result of financing and corporate 
governance decisions. As we have seen in Chapter 2, since World War II, 
Japanese companies have become more highly levered. Companies that are 
more actively raising capital at international markets (listed on foreign stock 
exchanges) are expected to depend less on borrowing and more on equity 
capital. These companies are likely to attract a higher percentage of foreign 
shareholders and to be more actively engaged in voluntary disclosure. 
 Resource dependence is probably what motivates the managers of 
these companies to seek funds at international capital markets. Larger 
corporations need more funding because they invest more in productive capacity. 
Other motives may be related to the public image that a company wants to be 
associated with, such as an image of international success, or of being at par 
with international standards. In the international arena it also matters to facilitate 
comparison with competitors. Larger companies that occupy a leading position 
in their industry may be less concerned about proprietary costs. It is also 
possible that in Japan, where banks are creditors to and shareholders in the 
same companies, the move toward international capital markets signifies 
emancipation from the main bank system and relationship investing. 
 In sum, the research hypotheses to be tested are: 
1. ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the cost of capital 
and the disclosure proxy (motivation for voluntary disclosure) 
2. there is a positive association between the disclosure proxy and foreign 
shareholder percentage, and between disclosure and overseas stock-market 
listing (international standard are higher and foreign shareholders more 
demanding) 
3. there is a negative association between disclosure and the percentage of 
shares held by the 10 largest shareholders, and between disclosure and the 
percentage of shares held by individual shareholders (proxy for interlocked 
shareholding where demand for disclosure is lower due to private information 
sharing, and individual shareholders have less clout) 
 
 
6.4. Period and sample selection 
6.4.1. Period of analysis 
Although consolidated financial statements under the SEL have been required 
since 1978, the analysis starts with 1985 and ends in 2003. For the companies 
issuing their financial statements in accordance with US-GAAP data is available 
for the whole period from 1978 to 2003. This is not always the case with some 
JP-GAAP companies, simply because at that time they may not have been listed 
at the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange yet. For most companies in the 
sample data is available since 1984, which is also the time that Japan’s financial 
markets had largely been deregulated.  Usually accounting years in 
Japan start on April 1 of year A and end on March 31 of year B. So data that I 
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labelled for the year 1985 are for the accounting period ending on March 31, 
1985. A few companies have different accounting periods or have changed their 
accounting periods at some time between 1985 and 2003. Because my sample 
is small as it is, I could not permit myself the luxury of excluding these 
companies from the sample. The fact that the analysis covers nineteen years will 
make up for these possible differences. 
 
6.4.2. Sample selection 
There are fifty-two companies in the sample. It includes companies from nine 
different industries, of which the largest and the second largest are electronics 
and general trading respectively. Within the sample there are two sub-groups. 
Twenty-six companies in the US-GAAP group and twenty-six companies in the 
JP-GAAP group. Both groups have been constructed matching for industry, and 
to the extent possible for size. However, most of the companies in the US-GAAP 
group are the largest in their industry. In several cases I have had to compromise 
comparability in size to find matching JP-GAAP companies for which data were 
available over the whole period. So I chose matching companies that were the 
remaining largest in the industry. For a list of all the sample companies and how 
they are matched, please refer to Appendix III, Table A. 
 
 
6.5. Model and variable description 
6.5.1. Model 1 
Firstly, pooled cross-sectional regressions following Model (1) test the 
hypothesis that there is a negative association between the WACC and 
disclosure.  
 
Model (1)    wacc = β0 + β1disc + β2 a-beta + β3 ln assets + β4lev + β5 btm 
 
The WACC is estimated as the weighted average of the debt capital after taxes 
and the cost of equity capital using the following formula:  
 
ecd kdkdWACC ∗−+−∗∗= )1()1( τ  
 
where d  is the ratio of debt to total capital, dk  is the cost of debt before taxes, 
cτ  is the marginal tax rate, and ek  is the cost of equity. Although the weights 
should be based on market-values for making investment decisions, this study 
uses book-values.  
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I have estimated the cost of equity using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM): 
 
)( rfrmrfr −+= β  
 
rf is the risk-free rate of return, rm is the market rate of return, and β is the 
market beta. (rm – rf) is also known as the risk premium.161 I chose the CAPM 
cost of equity because estimations based on the dividend discount model, 
average realised rate of return, and free cash flow to equity imputations result in 
a negative cost of equity for various sample companies in many observations. 
This is due to the fact that several of the sample companies produced severe 
losses.162 
 Market beta estimations are based on the “Rates of Return on 
Investment 2003” CD-Rom issued by the Japan Institute for Securities and 
Economic Research.163 Monthly rates of return regressed over a period of sixty 
months produce a beta thought to be valid at January 1 of the next year. 
Because for several companies betas turned out to be negative in a number of 
years, I have used adjusted betas. Adjusted betas164 are estimated as follows: 
a-beta = 0.35 + (beta x 0.65). 
 An approximation of the cost of debt is taken from the Nikkei Electronic 
Economic Data System (NEEDS) database (consolidated financial statements) 
and is the ratio of interest expenses to interest bearing liabilities.165 The tax rate 
used in the estimation is the marginal tax rate as provided by the MOF website. 
 Table 3 presents an overview of the independent variables which will be 
discussed below. 
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 Japan Institute for Securities and Economic Research (2003) “The Rates of Return on 
Investment 2003” CD-rom provided market rate of return, which I averaged from 1953 to 1980, 
and reduced the outcome by the average 10-year government bond interest rate over 1980 in 
order to arrive at a risk premium for 1980. For the 1981 risk premium I averaged the rate of return 
over the 1954-1981 period, and reduced the outcome with the average 10-year government 
bond interest rate in 1981, etc., etc. I used the average for the period 1954-2003, which was 4.4 
percent, as the fixed risk premium. 
162
 Suda, Shutou and Ohta (2004a) use a cost of equity estimation based on the residual income 
valuation model inspired by Botosan (1997), using analyst forecasts of recurrent profits in the 
kaisha shikihou (Japan Company Handbook). But in several periods a number of my sample 
companies even had negative recurrent profits. 
163
 The Japanese name is 株式投資収益率 2003 年 by 財団法人日本証券経済研究所. 
164
 Damodaran (2002), p. 186, mentions similar methods being used by Bloomberg and other 
services providing beta estimates. Damodaran calls this practice arbitrary and not particularly 
useful. However, negative betas push the CAPM cost of equity downwards and sometimes even 
into the negative, which distorts the view presented by estimations of average cost of equity 
capital, and these in turn distort the weighted average cost of capital estimates. 
165
 有利子負債率(Yuurishifusai rishiritsu), usually to be found on line number 719 in the NEEDS 
database for consolidated financial statements. In five observations (out of the 988) this number 
was missing so for these I used the number in the NEEDS database for unconsolidated financial 
statements, or if that was also missing I took the average of this number for the year before and 
the year after the missing observation. Bond ratings for all of the companies over the whole 
period from 1985 to 2003 were very hard to come by. Therefore I chose this proxy based on the 
assumption that the book value of debt is close to its market value. 
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Table 3: Independent variables of Model (1) 
abbreviation name 
disc Disclosure score 
d-disc Disclosure dummy variable    = 1 for US-GAAP company                
= 0 for JP-GAAP company 
a-beta Adjusted company beta 
Ln assets Company size measured as the natural log of its total assets 
lev Leverage: debt to total capital ratio in bookvalues 
btm Book-to-market ratio of equity 
 
Voluntary disclosure level: disc and d-disc 
Disclosure score is indicated by a company’s score in the voluntary disclosure 
index that has been developed in Chapter 5. The score is based on the 
information in the notes and supporting schedules to the consolidated financial 
statements. Performing the regression replacing the disclosure score with 
disclosure dummy variable serves to compare the US-GAAP and JP-GAAP 
group-specific results with the total sample results. 
 
Market risk: a-beta 
Adjusted beta controls for market risk because the higher the market risk the 
higher the returns required by investors and creditors (i.e. cost of equity and debt 
capital).  
 
Company size: ln assets 
Company size is a variable that is generally found to have a negative association 
with cost of capital and a positive association with disclosure. Examples of the 
former are Ou and Penman (1989) and Fama and French (1992), examples of 
the second are Cooke (1991) and Botosan (1997). Following Suda, Shutou and 
Ohta (2004a and 2004b), in this study the proxy for size is the natural logarithm 
of the book-value of assets. 
 
Book-to-market ratio: btm 
Besides beta and size, Fama and French’s three factor model also includes the 
book-to-market ratio, which, according to Penman (2003, p. 106), they 
conjecture to be a factor for risk. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991, p. 1761) 
documented a positive correlation between returns and the book-to-market ratio 
with Japanese monthly data from 1971 to 1988. Their interpretation was that the 
“noise in reported earnings, related to Japanese accounting standards, may also 
help to explain why the book to market ratio has such a strong influence.” Suda 
(2004) and Suda, Otomasa and Matsumoto (2004b) use the book-price ratio as 
a proxy for agency cost and find a negative association with disclosure, but they 
did not test any association with the cost of equity or the cost of debt. Although it 
is clear that the book-to-market ratio is important, it is less clear why and how 
this is so. The book-to-market ratio in the above regression models simply 
serves as a control variable because of its significant correlation with the WACC. 
 In order to see if the associations between the variables in Model (1) 
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remain stable over the 19 year period, panel regressions are performed adding 2 
year time period dummy variables to the models. Base period is 1985-1986, and 
the final period from 2001 to 2003 is three years instead of two.  
 
6.5.2. Model 2 
Model (2) tests hypothesis 2 and 3. Dependent variable is the disclosure score 
(disc). The independent variables include leverage, percentage of shares held by 
foreign investors, by financial institutions, by block-holders, by individual 
shareholders, and a dummy variable indicating overseas listing.  
 
Capital structure: 
Leverage (lev) is the ratio of total debt to total assets estimated using the 
consolidated financial statement data from the NEEDS database. Leverage and 
disclosure are expected to have a negative correlation because shareholders 
require more financial disclosure than creditors.  
 
Ownership structure: 
Percentages of shares held by foreign shareholders (for), financial institution 
shareholders (fin), the largest ten shareholders (10Lsh), and individual 
shareholders (ind) are estimated based on unconsolidated financial statement 
data from the NEEDS database. Based on the theory discussed above, foreign 
shareholders and overseas listings are expected to have a positive association 
with disclosure, and block-holders and individual shareholders a negative. 
Financial institutions are expected to be positively correlated to disclosure. 
 
Overseas listing: 
The final independent variable in this regression model is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not a company was listed overseas or not, and is called 
(d-ov). It indicates a more active attitude towards international capital markets, 
and is expected to be positively associated with disclosure. 
 
 
Model (2)   disc= β0 +β1 lev + β2 for + β3 fin + β4 10 Lsh + β5 ind + β6 d-ov  
 
 
In order to assess if the associations between disclosure dependent variable 
and the corporate governance independent variables remain stable over the 19 
year period, panel regressions are performed adding 2 year time period dummy 
variables to the models. Base period is 1985-1986, and the final period from 
2001 to 2003 is three years instead of two. In case the associations are not 
stable over time, regressions of the cross-sectional data per year will provide 
insight into the nature of these changes. 
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Table 4: Regression variables of Model (2) 
abbreviation Name 
disc Disclosure score 
lev Leverage: debt to total capital ratio in book-values 
for Percentage shares held by foreign shareholders (unconsolidated) 
fin Percentage shares held by financial shareholders (unconsolidated) 
10Lsh Percentage shares held by 10 largest shareholders (unconsolidated) 
ind Percentage shares held by individual shareholders (unconsolidated) 
d-ov Dummy variable indicating overseas listing 
 
6.5.3. Descriptive statistics 
Appendix III, Table B presents a year-by-year statistical summary for all the 
variables. Below follows an item-by-item discussion of the descriptive statistics. 
 
Cost of Capital 
Figure 4 shows that the mean WACC has decreased from 6.1 percent in 1985 to 
2.7 percent in 2003. In the same period the mean CAPM cost of equity went 
down from 11.1 percent in 1985 to 5.9 percent in 2003. The average cost of debt 
decreased from 7.75 percent in 1985 to 2.53 in 2003. (See Appendix III, Table B, 
panel a) Two points are particularly interesting to note. First, between 1987 and 
1992 WACC means were lower than the 10-yr government bond rates. In other 
words, the WACC was even lower than the risk-free rate of return. Second, the 
CAPM cost of equity rose sharply after the burst of the bubble. This rise can be 
seen in the cost of debt and the WACC as well albeit more vaguely. 
Nevertheless, after a peak in 1991 all cost of capital measures declined again 
falling below the 1989 levels in 1995. Such can be considered a consequence of 
the zero-interest rate policy. 
 
Figure 4: Cost of capital 
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The JP-GAAP group had a consistently lower mean WACC and cost of debt than 
the US-GAAP group. The CAPM cost of equity was lower for the JP-GAAP 
group from 1985 to 1990 after which the US-GAAP group enjoyed a lower CAPM 
cost of equity. As expected, beta and adjusted beta show the same pattern. (See 
Appendix III, Table B, panel b) These findings give a preliminary indication that if 
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there is a cost of capital benefit to higher disclosure levels, it may be found in the 
cost of equity but not in the WACC or the cost of debt. 
 
Disclosure level 
Average disclosure scores in Appendix III, Table B, panel a show a clear 
binomial distribution toward the two sub-groups, where that of the US-GAAP 
group is much higher than that of the JP-GAAP group. From 2000 we see that 
the disclosure gap closes as the accounting and disclosure standards in Japan 
are raised. 
 
Size 
Company size is characterised by a wide range and a large standard deviation 
(Appendix III, Table B, panel c). US-GAAP group companies are larger and this 
difference is significant at the 1 percent level in each and every year. Average 
firm size increased gradually until 1998 and seems to have declined somewhat 
since then. This pattern is the same in both sub-groups. 
 
Leverage 
Average financial leverage in book-values was 66 percent in 1985, declined 
slightly to return to 66 percent again in 1990, declined to 63 percent in 2000, but 
was up to 66 percent again in 2003. Because general trading companies are 
geared for an average of 98 percent or so, Figure 5 also shows mean leverage 
without general trading companies as “ex-trading” which is about 5 percent lower 
than the mean that includes the general trading companies. From Appendix III, 
Table B, panel c we learn that the range is somewhere between 80 and 90 
percent, and the standard deviation about 20 percent. Leverage appears very 
much to be related to industry. This is one reason why the companies in the 
sample are matched for industry.  
 
Figure 5: Financial leverage (at book-values) 
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Looking at Figure 5, we see that US-GAAP group mean leverage is lower than 
that of the JP-GAAP group. The difference is significant at the 1 percent level in 
every year. From 1996 to 2000 the gap between the US-GAAP and JP-GAAP 
groups was widening but since then it has started to close again. 
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Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity  
Average book-to-market ratios came down gradually from 0.51 to 0.33 between 
1985 and 1989. When the asset-inflated bubble burst the average shot straight 
up to 0.69. After 1996 there is not a clear pattern anymore, but it shows an 
extreme high in 2002 at 0.82. Until 1996 the average book-to-market ratio was 
slightly higher for the US-GAAP group, but between 1997 and 2001, the average 
was considerably lower for the US-GAAP group. The range grows wider in 1991 
when the maximum value reaches 1 for the first time, and continues to grow as 
the maximum grows (Appendix III, Table B, panel c). 
 
Corporate governance variables  
The percentages of shares held by foreign, financial, the 10 largest, or individual 
shareholders show interesting patterns that we can find in Appendix III, Table B, 
panel d. On average, foreign shareholders held 15 percent of all shares in 1985. 
This percentage dropped to 7 percent in 1989 and then very slowly started to 
increase again from 10 percent in 1992 to 20 percent in 2000. Here we see a 
marked difference in the averages of both subgroups, where the US-GAAP 
group mean reached 26 percent and the JP-GAAP group mean reached 15 
percent.  
Financial shareholders held an average of 47 percent of all shares in 
1985 and 46 percent in 2003. In the meantime the average was around 55 
percent between 1989 and 1991, and then slowly decreased again. The 
difference between the US-GAAP and JP-GAAP groups is the largest between 
1988 and 1990. 
The percentage of shares held by the 10 largest shareholders remains 
fairly stable over time. The only slight decrease is noticeable between 1999 and 
2001. The block of shares is around 34 percent for the US-GAAP group and 39 
percent for the JP-GAAP group. 
Individual shareholders held about 21 percent of all shares in 1985 and 
about 24 percent in 2003. It looks like individual shareholders were particularly 
uninterested in the stock market between 1994 and 1998. From the second half 
of the 1990s individual shareholders held more stock in the JP-GAAP group than 
in the US-GAAP group. 
The dummy variable indicating whether or not a company is listed on an 
overseas stock exchange is stable over time. We see that most of the 
companies in the US-GAAP group are listed abroad, whereas many companies 
in the JP-GAAP group are only listed in Japan. 
 
6.5.4. Correlations 
Correlations between all the independent variables of Model (1) and (2) are 
shown in Table 5 and 6. As expected we find a moderately strong correlation 
between disclosure and size, between leverage and risk, and between leverage 
and size. 
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Table 5: Correlations Model (1) 
disc adj beta ln assets leverage BTM
disc 1
adj beta -0.100 1
ln assets 0.321 0.189 1
leverage -0.068 0.313 0.390 1
BTM -0.049 0.074 0.058 -0.086 1
 
 
 
In Table 6 we see that the percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders 
shows moderately strong negative correlations with financial shareholders and 
individual shareholders. Block-shareholding is negatively correlated with 
individual shareholders and overseas listings. 
 
 
Table 6: Correlations Model (2) 
for sh fin sh 10Lsh ind sh d-ov
for sh 1
fin sh -0.423 1
10Lsh 0.060 -0.053 1
ind sh -0.313 -0.384 -0.408 1
d-ov 0.153 0.135 -0.373 -0.041 1
 
 
 
6.6. Empirical results 
6.6.1. Empirical results for Model 1 
Table 7 shows the results of the pooled regressions, and Table 8 presents the 
outcomes of the cross-sectional regressions. Unexpectedly, Table 7, Panels A, B 
and C all show positive rather than negative associations between the WACC 
and disclosure that are significant at the 1 percent level. The other variables 
have the expected signs and are all significant.  
Furthermore, the time effects are significant in all periods. This indicates 
that the WACC has decreased dramatically and the conclusion based on the 
regressions with pooled data that companies with higher disclosure levels have 
a higher WACC may need to be fine tuned for some periods. The regressions 
using a disclosure group dummy variable instead of the disclosure proxy 
variable produce very similar results. Panel B shows that the only difference are 
somewhat higher coefficients for the relation between the WACC and disclosure 
group, and slightly lower t-statistics even though they are all significant. The 
US-GAAP group did have a higher WACC than the JP-GAAP group. 
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Table 7: Estimation Results for Model (1): Pooled Data Regressions, 
independent variable WACC 
Intercept disc d-disc adj beta ln assets leverage BTM
Panel A: without time- or group-effects (OLS)
Coefficients 9.667 0.064 0.439 -0.196 -4.570 -0.838
t Stat 22.584 7.290 3.165 -5.657 -23.019 -8.165
Panel B. without time-effects, with group-effect (OLS)
Coefficients 9.431 0.309 0.349 -0.160 -4.597 -0.885
t Stat 21.161 3.739 2.484 -4.360 -21.890 -8.481
Panel C: with time-effects, without group-effect (OLS)
Coefficients 8.073 0.016 1.526 -0.018 -5.430 -0.097
t Stat 34.248 3.354 18.374 -0.983 -51.143 -1.681
Time-effects of Panel C
Period 87-88 89-90 91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 2001-2003
Coefficients -1.053 -0.433 -0.249 -1.363 -1.935 -2.618 -2.660 -2.933
t Stat -12.408 -5.262 -2.868 -16.658 -23.662 -31.714 -31.956 -37.062
 
Model for Panel A: wacc = β0 + β1disc + β2 a-beta + β3 ln assets + β4lev + β5 btm 
Model for Panel B: wacc = β0 + β1d-disc + β2 a-beta + β3 ln assets + β4lev + β5 btm 
Model for Panel C: wacc = β0 + β1 disc + β2 a-beta + β3 ln assets + β4lev + β5 btm + β6 d87-88 + β7 
d89-90 + β8 d91-92 + β9 d93-94 + β10 d95-96 + β11 d97-98 + β12 d99-00 + β13 d01-03 
 
 
Looking at the results of the cross-sectional data in Table 8 we find that 
companies disclosing more information enjoyed a lower WACC in the first three 
years only. This relation was statistically significant in 1985 and 1986. In the 
other sixteen years, companies that were more forthcoming with information 
experienced a higher WACC, and from 1990 to 1995 this relation was significant. 
Risk and leverage show the expected signs in all years, with adjusted beta being 
significant in fifteen years, and leverage in all years. The coefficients for size are 
positive from 1985 to 1989, and significant in the first three years. From 1990 
they are negative and only significant from 1994 to 1996. From 1987 to 1991 the 
association with the book-to-market ratio is positive and significant between 
1987 and 1989. In the other years the association was negative, and significant 
in five out of eleven years, particularly in 2002 and 2003.166 
 There are three things remarkable about these results. Firstly, the 
outcomes do not support the hypothesis that more voluntary disclosure leads to 
a lower cost of capital. On the contrary, they give evidence that the WACC 
increases with higher disclosure levels, and has been higher for the US-GAAP 
group since 1988. Secondly, the sign of the association of size with the WACC is 
positive from 1985 to 1989, after which it stays negative. These results are 
statistically significant in the 1985-1987 and 1994-1996 periods. And thirdly, the 
negative association of the book-to-market ratio with the WACC since 1992 is 
somewhat puzzling. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991, p. 1742) documented 
                                                   
166
 Although residual plots did not indicate a problem with heteroskedasticity, Appendix III,Table 
C presents the t-statistics based on White’s standards errors. Using White’s standard error 
slightly increases the number of years where the results are significant. 
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“a reliably positive impact on expected returns” based on 1971-1988 data. The 
results of present study indicate that this relation only holds when expected 
returns are positive, or when the market is bullish. 
These results refute the first research hypothesis and are contrary to the 
results in Suda, Shutou and Ohta (2004a and 2004b) for both the cost of equity 
and the cost of debt. Performing the regressions with the cost of equity and the 
cost of debt will enable comparison with Suda, Shutou and Ohta’s results. Figure 
6, 7, 8 and 9 below show the partial coefficients of yearly cross-sectional 
regressions following Model (1) with dependent variables wacc, coe and cod. 
Appendix III, Tables D and E present the regression results for the regressions 
on the cost of equity and the cost of debt. 
Figure 6 shows that companies with higher disclosure scores enjoyed a 
lower cost of debt from 1985 to 1987, and a higher cost of debt from 1988 until 
2003. Coefficients were statistically significant in 1986, and from 1990 until 1998. 
Furthermore, we find a negative albeit non-significant association between the 
cost of equity and disclosure in 1986 and 1987, from 1992 to 1999, and again in 
2003. Looking at the influence of the control variables on the cost of capital in 
Figure 7, we find that larger companies had a higher WACC between 1985 and 
1989, but a lower WACC between 1990 and 2003. This was the same for the 
cost of debt. Larger companies enjoyed a lower CAPM cost of equity in all years 
except 1988 to 1991. 
As can be expected, Figure 8 shows a lower WACC for more highly 
leveraged companies in all years. Except for the period between 1988 and 1991, 
leverage increases the cost of equity which is in conformity with finance theory. 
Leverage and the cost of debt show a negative association in all years except for 
the periods 1987-1992, and 1994-1996. 
The book-to-market ratio and the WACC show a negative association in 
all years except between 1987 and 1991 in Figure 9. In 1987 and in the period 
1992-2001 the cost of equity and the book-to-market ratio were negatively 
associated. Between the cost of debt and the book-to-market ratio there was a 
positive association from 1985 to 1991, since then the sign of the association 
became negative. 
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Table 8: Estimation results for Model (1), dependent variable: WACC 
Intercept disc adj beta ln assets leverage BTM
Panel A: Cross-sectional regressions (OLS)
1985 6.820 -0.043 1.162 0.309 -8.447 -0.529
6.28 -1.76 3.76 2.97 -12.71 -0.95
1986 5.276 -0.039 1.277 0.296 -7.223 -0.201
5.660 -1.941 4.580 3.493 -13.698 -0.408
1987 4.579 -0.011 0.829 0.166 -5.351 1.399
4.473 -0.487 1.712 1.754 -10.448 2.192
1988 4.481 0.003 0.755 0.104 -4.303 1.761
3.811 0.115 1.554 1.046 -6.827 2.007
1989 4.685 0.004 0.428 0.106 -4.086 1.840
5.628 0.238 1.007 1.308 -7.500 2.245
1990 8.392 0.038 0.376 -0.069 -4.582 0.924
8.440 1.970 1.020 -0.706 -7.125 1.203
1991 8.675 0.048 1.802 -0.119 -4.896 0.127
8.303 2.634 3.602 -1.284 -7.530 0.217
1992 7.473 0.043 1.561 -0.001 -5.197 -0.705
4.738 1.860 2.178 -0.005 -6.590 -1.348
1993 8.548 0.032 1.092 -0.127 -5.133 -0.069
7.009 2.176 2.034 -1.528 -9.751 -0.192
1994 8.673 0.026 1.045 -0.127 -5.610 -0.311
8.608 2.300 2.281 -1.947 -13.674 -0.927
1995 8.751 0.022 0.757 -0.154 -5.081 -0.223
7.843 1.850 1.406 -2.302 -12.011 -0.691
1996 7.788 0.017 1.174 -0.118 -5.298 -0.362
8.828 1.422 2.623 -2.102 -14.639 -1.042
1997 6.171 0.019 1.635 -0.082 -4.801 -0.403
8.410 1.610 3.833 -1.639 -15.257 -1.991
1998 4.640 0.019 2.130 -0.045 -4.631 -0.259
7.140 1.729 6.205 -0.963 -17.277 -1.935
1999 5.434 0.018 1.779 -0.045 -5.321 -0.064
6.218 0.949 4.440 -0.711 -13.942 -0.863
2000 5.326 0.029 1.644 -0.033 -5.248 -0.113
6.943 1.015 5.493 -0.556 -16.797 -0.906
2001 5.497 0.046 1.700 -0.070 -4.689 -0.354
7.001 1.000 7.232 -1.153 -15.993 -2.145
2002 6.192 0.060 1.592 -0.080 -5.395 -0.425
6.635 0.889 5.989 -1.127 -15.137 -2.432
2003 6.652 0.076 1.433 -0.093 -5.673 -0.778
6.142 1.008 4.760 -1.160 -13.259 -2.553
Note: T-statistics are in small fonts
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Figure 6: Partial coefficients of disclosure regressed on cost of capital variables 
coefficients of disc regressed on coe, wacc, and cod with other factors constant
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Figure 7: Partial coefficients of size regressed on cost of capital variables 
influence of size on wacc, coe, and cod, with beta, btm, lev and disc held constant
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Figure 8: Partial coefficients of leverage regressed on cost of capital variables 
influence of leverage on wacc, coe, and cod, with beta, size, btm, and disc held constant
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Figure 9: Partial coefficients of the book-to-market ratio regressed on cost of capital variables 
influence of btm on wacc, coe, and cod, with other factors held constant
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6.6.2. Empirical results for Model 2 
Table 9 and Table 10 show the regression results for model (2). Table 9, Panel A 
displays the results when pooled over the whole period from 1985 to 2003, Panel 
B shows the results with time effects. Table 10, Panel A presents the outcomes 
of the yearly cross-sectional regressions. 
 
 
Table 9: Estimation results for Model (2): Pooled Regressions, dependent variable: disc 
Intercept leverage for sh fin sh 10Lsh indiv sh d-ov
Panel A: without time-effects (OLS) 
coefficients 10.634 -3.481 0.103 2.824 -16.458 -7.729 3.746
t-stat 5.725 -5.429 0.062 1.622 -8.018 -3.595 13.629
Panel B: with time-effects (OLS)
coefficients 7.138 -2.509 7.539 3.974 -14.695 -2.578 3.618
t Stat 4.108 -4.205 4.507 2.475 -7.754 -1.288 14.280
Time-effects of Panel B
87-88 89-90 91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 2001-2003
coefficients 0.292 0.626 0.995 0.891 0.816 0.554 -1.237 -3.793
t Stat 0.617 1.363 2.010 1.901 1.741 1.178 -2.624 -8.711
 
Model for Panel A: disc = β0 + β1lev + β2 for + β3 fin + β410Lsh + β5 ind +β6 d-ov 
Model for Panel B: disc = β0 + β1lev + β2 for + β3 fin + β410Lsh + β5 ind +β6 d-ov +β7 dY87-88 
+ β8 dY89-90 + β9 dY91-92 + β10 dY93-94 + β11 dY95-96 + β12 dY97-98+ β13 dY99-00+ β14 
dY01-03 
 
 
In Table 9, Panel A, we see that leverage, relationship shareholdings and 
individual shareholdings show a significant and fairly strong negative association 
with disclosure. Foreign shareholdings show a positive but non-significant 
association, financial shareholdings a positive association that is only significant 
at the 10 percent level. Overseas listing status has a positive and significant 
association with disclosure.  
Panel B indicates that the coefficient of the association between 
disclosure and percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders increases and 
also becomes significant when controlling for periods. In addition, the coefficient 
and t-value for the percentage of shares held by financial institutions increase, 
whereas the significance of individual shareholdings decreases. 
Figure 10 is a visual display of the coefficients in Table 10, Panel A. Here 
is clearly visible that as expected, companies with a higher percentage of their 
shares held by foreign shareholders disclose more information. Especially 
between 1989 and 1998 the coefficients were very high. Overseas listing is also 
positively associated with disclosure over the whole period. 
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Figure 10: Coefficients of corporate governance variables regressed on disclosure scores 
coefficients of corporate governance variables associated with disclosure
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On the other hand, companies with a large percentage of their shares 
held by block-holders disclosed significantly less information, particularly 
between 1988 and 2000. Higher leverage, ceteris paribus, was also associated 
with lower levels of disclosure until 2000. A higher percentage of shares held by 
individual shareholders too is associated with lower disclosure scores. 
Interestingly, a higher percentage of shares held by financial institutions is 
related to higher disclosure between 1985 and 1996, but then the relation 
changes. From the summary statistics in Appendix III, Table B we understand 
that between 1987 and 1990 financial institutions held an average of 51 to 56 
percent of a company’s shares. This is higher than before or after the Bubble 
period. 
Because the residual plots indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
Appendix III, Table F shows the t-statistics based on White’s standard errors. We 
find that the significance increases for leverage, foreign shareholders, and 
block-holders after adjustment for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 10: Estimation results for Model (2): Cross-sectional Regressions, 
dependent variable: disc 
Panel A: Intercept leverage for sh fin sh 10Lsh indiv sh d-ov
1985 2.491 -2.563 3.186 5.175 -5.908 2.832 4.279
0.261 -0.906 0.461 0.598 -0.632 0.247 3.728
1986 4.542 -3.188 3.099 6.053 -8.952 -1.263 3.845
0.510 -1.159 0.428 0.798 -0.919 -0.114 3.231
1987 7.934 -3.458 6.209 5.896 -14.453 -6.826 3.592
0.993 -1.281 0.854 0.840 -1.661 -0.711 3.184
1988 5.824 -2.989 7.685 7.940 -13.732 -4.278 3.259
0.637 -1.046 0.997 1.036 -1.452 -0.354 2.846
1989 6.214 -4.970 15.342 11.286 -16.816 -5.420 3.267
0.623 -1.610 1.712 1.411 -1.661 -0.423 2.752
1990 7.845 -4.903 22.219 8.194 -19.405 -6.536 4.654
0.753 -1.532 1.666 0.993 -1.850 -0.471 3.842
1991 9.254 -3.399 22.942 5.956 -22.220 -6.530 4.654
0.896 -1.063 1.905 0.688 -2.123 -0.463 3.731
1992 11.699 -3.739 17.849 3.838 -23.301 -6.143 4.257
1.217 -1.174 1.606 0.452 -2.428 -0.481 3.477
1993 10.845 -2.796 14.406 2.721 -21.281 -7.812 4.819
1.005 -0.819 1.215 0.282 -1.975 -0.571 3.587
1994 12.692 -2.686 10.540 2.009 -22.940 -11.902 5.070
1.143 -0.770 0.921 0.201 -2.063 -0.842 3.855
1995 12.272 -2.569 12.554 1.466 -22.403 -11.105 4.924
1.107 -0.818 1.144 0.149 -2.039 -0.793 3.887
1996 11.262 -2.188 12.321 0.668 -20.002 -11.654 5.069
1.012 -0.651 1.129 0.067 -1.797 -0.826 3.967
1997 12.840 -2.647 7.332 -1.090 -20.177 -8.630 4.731
1.196 -0.825 0.740 -0.116 -1.764 -0.708 3.872
1998 16.959 -5.075 6.261 -1.054 -26.958 -7.106 4.291
1.792 -1.745 0.719 -0.122 -2.643 -0.695 3.580
1999 14.015 -3.707 6.766 -1.242 -23.458 -6.795 3.374
1.798 -1.451 0.979 -0.173 -2.801 -0.814 3.360
2000 5.770 -0.763 4.292 1.564 -11.009 -1.615 1.848
1.216 -0.508 1.075 0.370 -2.132 -0.306 2.846
2001 5.749 0.388 0.198 -1.290 -7.953 -5.815 1.222
1.727 0.393 0.076 -0.498 -2.087 -1.555 2.703
2002 0.687 -0.255 2.314 0.817 -3.195 0.907 1.139
0.388 -0.313 1.271 0.448 -1.281 0.666 3.056
2003 2.050 -0.158 2.818 0.387 -5.241 -0.442 0.825
0.932 -0.180 1.442 0.195 -1.653 -0.208 2.003
note: T-Statistics are in small fonts
 
 
 
6.7. Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter we have tested associations between cost of capital measures 
and disclosure scores, and between disclosure scores and corporate 
governance measures. The first hypothesis was that firms with higher disclosure 
scores will enjoy a lower WACC. This seems to have been the case in the period 
between 1985 and 1987, but no longer in the period afterwards. Instead, the 
association between disclosure and the WACC shows significant and positive 
coefficients between 1990 and 1998. This outcome goes against the hypothesis 
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and warrants further study. We have found that between 1990 and 1998 
companies with higher disclosure levels had a particularly high cost of debt 
which was statistically significant. From 1992 to 1999 companies that were more 
forthcoming with financial disclosure enjoyed a lower cost of equity. However, 
the coefficients of this relation were not statistically significant. Leverage and 
WACC show a negative correlation that goes beyond the tax shield advantage. 
 Looking back at the correlations in Appendix III, Table C, we find that the 
correlation between the disclosure scores and the cost of capital measures are 
all positive and that this is the strongest in the correlation with the cost of debt. In 
other words, companies with higher disclosure scores have a higher cost of debt. 
This is confirmed by the regression results. On the other hand, the correlation 
between the disclosure scores and leverage is negative, which means that 
companies with higher disclosure scores show lower gearing and the other way 
around. Multiple regression outcomes show the associations between the 
WACC and disclosure holding the other independent factors constant. The 
positive association between the WACC and disclosure is therefore not the 
result of tax benefits due to a lower cost of debt enjoyed by higher leveraged 
companies that disclose less information. If corporate managers choose to 
disclose more information publicly but their firms do not enjoy a WACC 
advantage, a rationale must be found elsewhere. For this purpose we turn to 
internationalisation, financing and corporate governance factors. 
 As for the second hypothesis, the findings indicate that companies that 
are actively raising funds on international capital markets indeed do disclose 
more financial information. As we have seen in Chapter 5 disclosure 
requirements on stock exchanges in the US were higher than those in Japan. 
Although the coefficients for the overseas listings dummy have grown smaller 
since 2000 because a convergence of the disclosure requirements, they remain 
statistically significant. In addition, companies where foreign shareholders hold a 
larger percent of all outstanding shares disclose more information. This 
association was particularly strong in the period right after the collapse of the 
bubble economy and gradually grew weaker until its lowest point in 2001. 
Internationalisation of capital and financial markets has brought about the 
development of global disclosure standards in Japan. Those Japanese 
companies that are actively participating in global financial and capital markets 
could not wait for Japanese accounting standards to catch up and proactively 
raised the bar. Why these companies chose to be more actively raising funds at 
international markets is partly explained by shareholder structure and capital 
structure. 
Findings related to the third hypothesis indicate that companies where a 
large part of the shares is held by the ten largest shareholders, which is thought 
to be a proxy for relationship shareholding, disclose significantly less information. 
The coefficients of this association are the strongest between 1989 and 1999, 
but are significant from 1987 to 2001. It appears therefore that in this period 
companies whose shares are mainly held by companies within a company group 
depended on private information exchange rather than public information 
disclosure, and chose to publicly disclose the legally required minimum amount 
of financial information. Furthermore, companies that depend more on debt 
 174
financing and less on equity financing also have lower disclosure scores, 
indicating that creditors too must have their information needs met by private 
exchange. Japanese companies increasingly depend on bonds rather than bank 
loans, which partly explains the decreasing coefficients of the association 
between disclosure and leverage. The other part of the explanation is the 
decreasing disclosure differential due to the convergence in accounting and 
disclosure standards. 
Present study has not tested the direct financing hypothesis in the way 
Suda, Otomasa and Matsumoto (2004b) have using new the ratio of bond and 
equity issues to total capital. Nevertheless, from the negative association 
between disclosure and leverage as well as relationship shareholding, we can 
deduce that companies more dependent on indirect financing address 
information asymmetry through private information exchange rather than public 
disclosure. 
 In sum, this study has failed to find conclusive evidence for the 
hypothesis that higher disclosure by Japanese companies issuing their financial 
statements in accordance with US-GAAP is motivated by a WACC advantage. 
Rather, there seems to have been a WACC disadvantage to disclosing more 
information. Like Suda, Shutou and Ohta (2004a), this study finds a negative 
association between the cost of equity and disclosure between 1996 and 1999 
(and in the years 1986-1987, 1992-1999, and 2003 to be precise) although not 
for the year 2000. But the coefficients are small and non-significant. Bear in mind 
that their disclosure proxy was the score in the SAAJ reports whereas this study 
uses a self-constructed proxy based on voluntary disclosure in consolidated 
financial statements only. Furthermore, Suda, Shutou and Ohta (2004a) 
estimated the cost of equity based on the “EBO valuation formula”, whereas I 
use the CAPM cost of equity. Unlike Suda, Shutou and Ohta (2004b), in this 
study the association between the cost of debt and the disclosure proxy yields 
positive coefficients. Their estimation of the cost of debt was the yield to maturity 
on new debt issues whereas I used the ratio of interest expenses to interest 
bearing liabilities. From a theoretical perspective their estimation method is 
better than mine, but for most of the period from 1985 to 2003 my method is 
probably closer to what Japanese managers may have referred to as the cost of 
debt before taxes. 
 Firmer conclusions regarding the relation between the cost of capital and 
disclosure practices require further study over a longer time-span where data is 
more easily available. Certainly the periods leading up to and right after the 
collapse of the bubble economy were subject to a degree of market failure and 
should perhaps not be analysed within the framework of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. Sakaibara et al. (1988) found the Japanese capital market to be 
efficient. If this is true, than private information exchange must be as effective as 
public disclosure in making a market efficient. It is also possible that the stock 
market was only efficient for the part that was actually liquid. Depending on the 
estimates the part of the Japanese stock market was held in mutual 
shareholding arrangements ranged between 40 to 75 percent. Market efficiency 
studies comparing capital markets in economies with bank-based financial 
systems with those in market-based financial systems could yield further insight. 
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 Finally, although not surprisingly, this study finds that actively raising 
funds at international financial and capital markets and a higher percentage of 
shares held by foreign shareholders are associated with higher disclosure levels. 
This is important because it indicates that internationalisation of financial and 
capital markets leads to convergence of financial accounting standards, or 
“global standards”. Similarly, internationalisation of product markets causes 
standardisation of products and related services. The two phenomena may be 
connected seeing that more companies in the US-GAAP company group are 
household names in many countries all over the world than companies in the 
JP-GAAP group. In trying to answer why some Japanese companies choose the 
costs of higher disclosure levels over the advantages of private information 
exchange, we find that capital structure (debt versus equity) and ownership 
structure play important roles. Debt financing is considered risky for creditors, 
they either require informal information exchange in the case of bank lending, or 
a high degree of public information supply in the case of the increasingly popular 
bond financing. Ownership structure predicts disclosure levels based on 
relationship investing or dispersed shareholder ownership. The former requires 
lower public disclosure levels because of private information exchange, but the 
latter requires maximum public disclosure levels in order to solve the information 
asymmetry and agency problems. 
 
 
 
 
 176
 
 
 
 
 177 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
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7.0. Summary 
The METI Study Group on the Internationalisation of Business Accounting 
issued a report in 2004 claiming that the accounting standards under JP-GAAP 
should be accepted as equal to those under IFRS and even closer to US-GAAP. 
Part 1 of this study investigated the role of internationalisation of business, 
financial and capital markets in the process of convergence between JP-GAAP 
and US-GAAP. Subsequently, Part 2 assessed the extent of the above 
mentioned convergence. Finally, Part 3 empirically explored economic rationales 
for voluntary disclosure practiced by Japanese companies between 1985 and 
2003. Below follow a discussion of the findings in each of the three parts, and 
recommendations for further research. 
 
 
7.1. The role of internationalisation in Japan’s financial accounting 
system development 
Part 1 identified four crises that were caused by international political or 
economic events, and that triggered a response in the form of institutional 
change affecting financial accounting development in Japan. The first crisis was 
the threat of colonisation by the West, which prompted Japan’s response in the 
form of rapid modernisation and industrialisation since the Meiji Restoration in 
1868. State-led economic development explains the macro-economic policy 
oriented pattern of accounting development. Japan’s choice for a code-law legal 
system was logical because it facilitated a speedy catch-up by a country that had 
a tradition of feudalism rather than democracy. 
 Macro-economic policies centred on investment in heavy industries and 
infrastructure financed by National Banks and the stock market. The Meiji-Taisho 
(1868-1926) economy as it is called by Teranishi (2005, p. 41) left corporate 
financing largely to the market. Direct financing was prevalent in the modern 
corporate sector whereas the indigenous and agricultural sectors depended on 
indirect financing through banks and merchants. Taxation was modernised to 
increase reliance on income tax. Corporate governance was of the shareholder 
model although in the 1920s there was already a difference between zaibatsu 
and non-zaibatsu firms. For thirty out of the seventy-seven years between 1868 
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and 1945 Japan had been involved in ten major wars.167 In the 1930s the 
war-economy took shape and aimed at fixed capital formation in munitions 
industries. Banks and taxation became the vehicle for financing these industries 
and corporate governance systems increasingly marginalised shareholders for 
the benefit of other stakeholders such as employees and creditors. 
 Accounting standards served as a means to calculate taxable income 
and income for distribution. The Japanese accounting system was characterised 
by the definite settlement of accounts (Massgeblichkeit), the Special Measures 
Taxation Law, and explicit dividend restrictions for creditor protection. 
Characteristics of accounting standards at the time include the balance sheet 
approach to the determination of profits, operating capital maintenance, the 
all-inclusive concept of profits, and the proprietary concept of ownership. A 
company was viewed as a legal entity rather than an economic entity, which 
follows from the fact that accounting standards were set by legal specialists 
rather than accounting specialists. 
The second crisis was Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, as a 
consequence of which her territory was occupied by the Allied Occupation forces. 
This was exactly what she had been striving to avoid since 1868. Japan’s 
response was to give the highest priority to economic growth and development. 
Strong military influence in schools, companies and everyday aspects of life, 
mixed with Japan’s style of Confucianism created a kind of totalitarianism that is 
exemplified by the kamikaze pilots. This was the world that the early post-war 
generation of managers and business leaders as well as the workers had grown 
up in. It made for a Japanese style of democracy where all individuals were 
supposed to work together for the common good without complaining or causing 
any disharmony. The common good was perceived to be Japan’s economic 
growth and prosperity. In this environment, state-led capitalism worked well. 
Economic policy gave priority to fixed capital formation in productive 
capacity and heavy industries, made possible by directing savings into 
investment through the main-bank centred financial system. Taxation sacrificed 
equity for incentive measures and special depreciation measures. The 
main-bank system made for a stakeholder governance system where 
shareholders were marginalised, which worked very well in the high-growth 
period from 1955 to 1980. 
In this period the role of financial accounting was limited to the 
computation of earnings for distribution and taxation and supporting economic 
policies. Discrepancies between the accounting systems of the Commercial 
Code and the Financial Statement Regulations under the Securities and 
Exchange Law dominated academic accounting activity. Many accounting 
scholars in Japan were more interested in measurement, recognition and 
creditor protection issues than in the problems concerning disclosure and 
decision-usefulness of accounting information.168 
                                                   
167
 Taiwan Expedition (1874), Satsuma Rebellion (1877), Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), First World War (1914-19), Siberian Expedition (1918-25), 
Shantung Expeditions (1927-28), Manchurian Incident (1931-33), China Incident 1937-41), and 
the Second World War (1941-45). (Morishima, 1982, p. 96). 
168
 For a detailed discussion of this schism between Japan’s accounting systems see Chapter 3, 
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 The third crisis was cumulative, and because the Japanese government 
hoped for a soft landing it resulted in the fourth crisis. Internationalisation of 
financial and capital markets progressed quickly in the 1980s. Trade frictions 
prompted the Structural Impediments Initiatives, the Yen-Dollar Agreement and 
the Plaza Accord. Japan responded with piece-meal deregulation. 
Economic policy consisted of a loose monetary and fiscal policy, low 
interest rates and a strong yen due to the Plaza Agreement. When the 
asset-inflated bubble economy burst an attitude of forbearance exacerbated the 
problems until the financial system destabilised and the main-bank system 
crumbled in the second half of the 1990s. By this time financial accounting 
standards were lagging behind and unable to cope with ongoing developments 
such as the use of financial instruments and window dressing. 
Internationalisation of business, financial and capital markets in the 
1980s and early 1990s had pushed Japan into market-capitalism without the 
necessary institutions functioning as they should. The institutional structure 
included property rights protection laws, a large stock market, financial 
deregulation, boards of directors, general shareholders meetings, statutory and 
independent auditors, and two financial accounting systems plus the strong 
influence of the tax laws. However, main bank monitoring had hollowed out, the 
general shareholders meeting had been marginalised, the boards of directors of 
many large companies consisted mainly of internally promoted directors, and 
internally promoted representative directors had almost all the power. In addition 
to that, the emphasis on harmony in Japanese culture does not encourage 
people to voice criticism, so moral hazard loomed equally large in the period 
when the speculative bubble inflated as in the period after its collapse. 
 The fourth crisis occurred when the financial system was discredited and 
destabilised in front of the whole world. Banks and securities companies went 
bankrupt, and government bond ratings lowered. This time Japan responded 
with institutional change, the financial big bang, and the accounting big bang. 
Structural and institutional reform started in 1996, as part of which the 
financial big bang and the accounting big bang came about. The Financial 
Services Agency took over tasks related to the oversight of the financial system 
and dealing with the bad loans problem from the Ministry of Finance and was 
placed directly below the Cabinet Office. Reform of the financial accounting 
system included first of all measures that helped companies and financial 
institutions to deal with bad loans in the form of introducing tax effect accounting 
and temporary measures for land revaluation. 
The introduction of fair value accounting for financial instruments, 
consolidated cash flow statements, making consolidated financial statements the 
primary statements and expanding the scope of consolidation were meant to 
unravel mutual shareholdings and make managers take into account the 
performance of the whole company group. Lifting the ban on holding companies, 
allowing the purchase of treasury stock, and establishing a system for company 
tie-ups and split-ups facilitated corporate restructuring and mergers and 
acquisitions. Giving companies the option of taxation on a consolidated basis 
                                                                                                                                                     
or for a brief outline the Matrix in Appendix I, Table A. 
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made it possible to reduce their tax burden. Amendments to the CC in 2001 and 
2002 were aimed at improving transparency of corporate governance and gave 
companies the chance to adopt a corporate governance structure with more 
outside directors and different committees so as to limit the power of internally 
promoted representative directors. 
In 2001 the Financial Accounting Standards Foundation and the 
Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) were established as the private 
accounting standard setting body. Accounting standards for the disclosure of 
post-retirement obligations, financial instruments, and more recently asset 
impairment improve the disclosure system in order to help investors assess risk 
more accurately and make better investment decisions. Amendments to the CC 
have made it possible for part of the legal reserves to be used for capital 
reduction and to be paid out to shareholders. 
All in all the Japanese accounting and disclosure system has been 
greatly improved and corporate governance has potentially become much more 
transparent. Nevertheless, the overhaul the accounting system predominantly 
affects large listed companies. Small and medium-sized companies and even 
part of the large companies, even if they are joint-stock companies only need to 
prepare financial statements in accordance with the CC. Therefore, they do not 
have to prepare consolidated financial statements, audit requirements are a lot 
less stringent, and corporate governance structures have not become more 
transparent. On the other side of the spectrum are the companies that have 
issued their financial statements in accordance with US-GAAP since 1978. 
These are the twenty-five companies that are voluntarily more forthcoming with 
information, that for the larger part are less squeamish about proprietary 
concerns, and that have pro-actively created their own level playing field in the 
international capital markets before the government decided to do it for them. 
 When the big bang was more or less completed in 2001, the Enron 
scandal happened. The American accounting and audit system lost credibility, 
and the general opinion in Japan was that the Japanese accounting system had 
certainly achieved international equality and comparability. In 2002 the EU 
announced that companies using EU capital markets would have to issue 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS or standards deemed equivalent. It 
was therefore hard to swallow that Japanese accounting standards would have 
to be investigated with respect to the question of equivalence. After about a year 
of complaints from Japanese businesses and efforts by keidanren, the FSA and 
the ASBJ to convince the EU and the IASB that Japan’s accounting standards 
are on par with IFRS, the ASBJ and the IASB have decided to embark on a 
convergence project in January 2005. 
 
 
7.2. Convergence between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP 
Chapters 4 and 5 concluded that convergence between US-GAAP and 
Japanese accounting standards has been realised to a certain extent. Purely 
from an accounting perspective the Japanese accounting big bang was mainly a 
matter of catching up with international developments in the disclosure of 
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pension liabilities and assets, fair value of financial instruments, the impairment 
of assets (from 2007), and the long overdue status of consolidated financial 
statements including consolidated cash-flow statements. These changes reflect 
the increased importance of the decision-usefulness of accounting information. 
From an economic perspective it was more a matter of removing 
obstacles created by the definite settlement of accounts principle. The 
introduction of tax effect accounting meant that companies could present their 
capital investments and financial results reflecting economic corporate 
performance rather than taxation measures. From a corporate governance 
perspective the amendments to the CC improved the position of shareholders 
versus that of creditors, and gave companies the chance to disperse the power 
within the board of directors so that there would be more checks and balances. 
Finally, from an institutional perspective it represents a departure from the 
traditional legalistic approach where enterprises are predominantly viewed as 
legal entities instead of economic entities. The new ASBJ is a private accounting 
regulatory authority. Although it still remains to be seen how the ASBJ’s 
accounting standards will be incorporated into the Commercial Code and how 
the accounting profession as well as the general public reacts to accounting 
standards that are not codified. 
 Based on Chapter 5 we can conclude that the disclosure gap between 
US-GAAP and JP-GAAP for consolidated financial statements was large 
between 1978 and 1990. It was even larger between 1991 and 1998, but since 
then it has narrowed considerably. Because in Japan consolidated financial 
statements were the secondary statements, disclosure requirements in the form 
of supporting schedules for individual financial statements were more extensive. 
New differences between US-GAAP and JP-GAAP are the disclosure of 
comprehensive income and the requirements by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Old 
differences are recognition criteria for operating and financial leases, disclosures 
of changes in capital stock and retained earnings, the scope of consolidation, the 
use of the equity method, the valuation of securities and inventories, accounting 
for intangibles. 
 
 
7.3. Economic rationales for voluntary accounting disclosure 
Reducing information asymmetry through voluntary disclosure is premised to be 
motivated by economic rationales. In this study voluntary disclosure is the type 
of audited information that is voluntarily disseminated irrespective of whether it is 
good or bad news. Signalling good news could be a motive for voluntary 
disclosure when a company wants to issue new shares (which in itself is usually 
considered bad news for existing shareholders), or when a company wants to 
avoid debt covenants. Signalling bad news is generally done when a company 
issues a profit warning in fear of litigation. But when a company issues voluntary 
information irrespective of its nature it either signals supreme confidence or it 
does not signal anything and is therefore motivated by other concerns. 
 Reduced information asymmetry through public disclosure lowers 
estimation risk and transaction costs. Chapter 6 therefore tested the hypothesis 
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that companies with higher voluntary disclosure levels enjoy a lower weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC). Disclosure scores on a self-constructed 
disclosure index were regressed on the WACC controlled for beta (market risk), 
size, leverage and the book-to-market ratio. Between 1985 and 1989 there was 
indeed a negative association with the WACC but no longer after 1990. The 
influence of leverage on the WACC was of course extremely large due to the tax 
effect. As leverage is also a corporate governance choice, I decided to 
investigate the relation between disclosure and corporate governance. 
 Part 2 of this study showed that improvement of financial accounting and 
disclosure had been an issue in the Structural Impediment Initiative talks. It 
follows therefore that companies that are more active at international capital 
markets may be more accommodating toward the information needs of foreign 
investors. Regressions of leverage, the percentages of the types of shareholders 
(as an indication of corporate governance influencing disclosure) and a dummy 
for overseas listing status as independent variables on the disclosure score as 
the dependent variable showed an overwhelming disparity between percentage 
of shares held by foreign investors and overseas listings on the positive side, 
and leverage and the percentage of shares held by the ten largest shareholders 
on the negative side. In other words, companies that are listed abroad and that 
have a larger percentage of their shares held by foreign investors indeed show 
high disclosure scores. Companies that are to a higher degree financed by debt 
and that have a larger percentage of their shares held by the ten largest 
shareholders, exhibit lower disclosure scores. 
 Furthermore, it is very clear that these differences have grown smaller in 
size and significance since 2000. This is caused because the differences in the 
voluntary disclosure scores have become very small since 2000. Most of the 
accounting regulations of the big bang became effective in the year ending 
March 2000 and to a large extent convergence between JP-GAAP and 
US-GAAP was realised. 
 Nevertheless, my tentative conclusion with regard to managers’ 
motivations to voluntarily disseminate financial information regardless of its 
nature is as follows. Factors related to corporate governance including larger 
dependence on equity financing, actively raising capital at foreign stock markets 
and a larger percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders may have 
outweighed cost of capital considerations. This conclusion applies to the 
situation in Japan for the period between 1985 and 2003. In order to determine 
general applicability similar tests need to be carried out in other accounting 
environments. 
 
 
7.4. Institutions, information asymmetry and moral hazard 
Commensurate with Japan’s position as a late developer in the 1870s and again 
after World War II, the state substituted for the functions of the market to a large 
extent. The shift from state-led capitalism toward rational (market) capitalism 
progressed over several decades, spurred on by financial deregulation and 
internationalisation.  Structural reform became unavoidable in 1996, and has 
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since then taken place at the institutional level in Japan’s financial system as 
well as in her accounting regulatory system. It is now up to the market 
participants to let financial accounting information fulfil its role in reducing 
information asymmetry within and across boarders. 
 This study has shown that the characteristics of financial accounting 
standards and information change according to the role that information plays. 
Public disclosure of financial and other information gains in importance in 
mitigating information asymmetry problems and costs with increased 
dependence on capital markets. On the other hand, in the case of relationship 
investing the main purpose of accounting standards is the calculation of 
distributable income, because information asymmetry problems are addressed 
through internal communication. As the bad loans and jusen problems in Japan 
and the Enron and other debacles in the US have shown, both systems are 
vulnerable to moral hazard, dishonesty and even criminal intent. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been devised to address these problems in the US, but 
Japan has not come up with an equivalent as of yet. 
The outcome of the empirical study that Japanese companies with 
higher disclosure levels actually pay a WACC premium goes against theory. My 
findings that leverage in the JP-GAAP group is still as high as before the year 
1998 is disconcerting for two reasons. First, it goes against what is commonly 
thought to be true. Second, the companies in the JP-GAAP group can only 
display such high leverage if they are not concerned about bankruptcy costs. If 
the Japanese financial system has truly been deregulated and geared toward 
direct financing since the Big Bang, finance theory dictates lower debt to total 
capital ratios and certainly no WACC premium on higher disclosure levels. 
Hopefully things have changed since 2004. Perhaps in the future reduced 
information asymmetry will indeed translate into a WACC advantage. But that is 
a question for another study. 
Globalisation and internationalisation are products of multinational 
companies and of advances in information technology. Foreign pressure caused 
Japan to open up her boarders in 1853 and ever since she found herself divided 
with regard to the question of how to deal with the challenge of assimilating new 
institutions and technologies without loosing her own culture. She has always 
found a way to do so effectively although as a consequence of which a dual 
structure appeared in her economy. In the same way a dual structure appeared 
in her accounting system. It will be very interesting to watch the developments as 
the influence of IFRS increases, because most of the complaints voiced by the 
business community can be regarded as a sign that they do not want to loose 
their own culture. Will Japan’s accounting system ever be truly unified? 
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Appendix I 
 
Table A: Matrix for Chapter 2 
Matrix 1 1868-1945 1945-1980 1980-1996 1996-2004
2 Environmental Factors
2.1. international relations 
learning from the W est, fukoku kyouhei, 
war (in total about 30 years over this 
period) and imperialism (East Asian 
Greater Prosperity Sphere)
Allied occupation forcing democratisation, 
technology imports, Korean war and US 
procurements, oil dependency, Nixon shock, 
trade frictions, yen-dollar agreement
Plaza Accord, internationalisation of financial 
markets, inflating the bubble, Gulf war, fall of 
Berlin wall,  collapse of the bubble, 
JPY90/USD1, 1995 Japan premium
Asian financial crisis (1997), Moody's 
downgrades Japanese government bonds, 
Japan's SDF employed in Iraq's 
reconstruction (2002), tensions with China 
and North-Korea
2.2. economic growth and development
start of industrialisation, upswings due to 
wars, rise of zaibatsu, development of 
overseas territories, war economy
taming inflation and increase productive 
capacity in major industries, loose monetary 
and fiscal policies, 1960s technology rather 
than cheap labour, savings directed into 
investment, export promotion, end of Bretton-
W oods, 1973 and 1978 oil shocks
slower but stable economic growth, loose 
monetary policy, low interest rates, asset 
inflation, bubble collapsed end of 1989, GDP 
growth down to zero, bad loan problem 
surfaces, strong yen, slower exports
deflation, bad loans destabilise financial 
system, government bond rating lowered, 
announcement of financial big bang, 
deregulation, some signs of recovery but not 
very clear
2.3. financial system
national banks were the means to finance 
development, stock companies induced 
need for accounting standards, from 1931 
the financial system served more and 
more the war-economy
strict financial controls until 1970s, 
compartmentalisation, democratisation of 
capital markets led to SEL, disbanding 
zaibatsu by SCAP, overloan and 
overborrowing, mutual shareholdeing and 
keiretsu, stocks unattractive for individuals 
increasing independence from banks, Plaza 
Accord: low discount rate, asset inflation, 
bubble punctured in 1989, bad loan and 
juusen problem , nikkei came down, denial 
and forbearance
interest rates near zero, juusen problem 
addressed, Japan premium, banks in trouble, 
bank mergers, need for transparency, big 
bang deregulation, free, fair,  and g lobal 
standards
2.4. taxation system
tax system became money based, taxes 
serve military purposes, income tax and 
corporation tax established; need for 
accounting rules
Shoup report, soon equity sacrificed for 
incentive measures, enterprise rationalisation 
promotion law; special depreciation 
measures, special measures taxation law, in 
1970 deficits emerge
accelerated depreciation gave way to tax 
credits, differences between tax laws, CC 
and SEL became more pronounced
reduction of corporate tax rates, from 2004 
consolidated taxation for large companies
2.5.
corporate 
governance 
structures
zaibatsu and non-zaibatsu dichotomy
main bank system, CC protects creditors 
rather than shareholders, large KK do not 
need annual shareholder meeting 's 
agreement
main bank system crumbling , corporate 
governance void in large KK, slowly 
increasing importance of shareholders
after big bang shareholders better protected, 
CC amended for more external directors, 
auditing
2.6. Paradigms from avoiding colonisation to imperialism becoming an economic power confusion and forbearance creating a level playing field
2.7.
Functions of 
Accounting 
Standards
modernisation and industrialisation, 
development of colonies, building a war-
economy
resource distribution, directing investment in 
productive capacity through main banks, 
dividend restrictions
coping with international developments, 
piecemeal deregulation
free, fair and global standards, transparency, 
steps toward full disclosure
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Table A: Matrix for Chapter 3 
3.1. Characteristics
3.1.1. regulatory authorities Franco-German system (MOJ), war-time economy, communist influence SCAP, MOJ and MOF, and BADC MOJ and MOF, and BADC
MOJ and MOF, and BADC, new: FASF, 
ASBJ, JICPA, SESC (securities and 
disclosure)
3.1.2. standards, rules and regulations
Tax laws and CC, since 1940 also Special 
Measures Taxation Law
Tax laws (Massgeblichkeit), CC, and SEL; 
discrepancies (measurement, recognition, 
capital surplus, provisions, deferred charges, 
independent audits, distribution of income, 
and partly unification
Tax laws, CC, and SEL; discrepancies, and 
further unification
CC, SEL, introduction of tax effect 
accounting , numbered accounting standards 
by the ASBJ, Conceptual Framework since 
2004
3.1.3. creditor protection CC dividend restrictions
dividends restrictions, capital and legal 
reserves, provisions, deferred charges, no 
treasury stock allowed
dividends restrictions, capital and legal 
reserves, provisions, deferred charges, 
treasury stock restriction relaxation
relaxation of dividend restrictions and capital 
and legal reserves, reduction of provisions 
allowed
3.1.4.
status of 
consolidated financial 
statements
unconsolidated financial statements only 
for each and every company (parent or 
subsidiary)
unconsolidated only until 1978, then 
consolidated, but only as secondary 
statements, 1978-1983 equity method not 
mandatory
consolidated only secondary, unconsolidated 
disclosure much more extensive, bad loans 
problem hard to quantify because 
circumvention of consolidation
2000: under SEL consolidated financial 
statements main, also consolidated cashflow 
statements, consolidated interim f/s, 
consolidated taxation, since 2003 CC 
introduced consolidation requirement for 
3.2. Accounting Concepts and Approaches
3.2.1. determ ining profits static; assets at market value CC: static, SEL: dynamic, in 1962 CC to dynamic, accrual accounting accrual accounting
accrual accounting, but static approach 
toward valuing financial instruments
3.2.2. capital maintenance operating capital maintenance, CC did not allow retained earnings
CC: operating , SEL: nominal,  in 1950 CC 
shift to financial capital maintenance, since 
1962 revaluation reserve as part of capital 
reserve not allowed
financial capital maintenance
financial capital maintenance,  relaxation of 
capital surplus for distribution in case of 
marketable securities holding gains and land 
revaluation holding gains
3.2.3.
definitions of 
liabilities and equity, 
and distribution of 
income concepts
proprietary concept, during the war in 
practice shift to entity concept
CC: proprietary, SEL(BAP and FSR): entity, 
in 1974 SEL shift to proprietary concept as a 
compromise. Actual dividend payout 
practices inclined toward stakeholder/entity 
concept
proprietary concept, but director bonuses in 
distribution of profits. Actual dividend payout 
practices inclined toward stakeholder/entity 
concept
increased importance of shareholders in the 
actual distrbution of income
3.2.4. clean and dirty surplus concepts all-inclusive concept of profits
CC: all-inclusive, BAP: operating concept of 
profits, in 1974 BAP shifts to all-inclusive but 
demands P/L and surplus statement
all-inclusive concept of profits
all-inclusive concept of profits, international 
developments on the disclosure of 
comprehensive income
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Appendix I, Table B: Long-term economic indicators
Year
G N E  (at 
m arket prices 
:C urrent 
prices)
G ross 
dom estic fixed 
capital 
form ation
S urplus of 
nation on 
current 
account
E xports plus 
factor incom e 
received from  
abroad
Im ports plus 
factor incom e 
paid abroad
D iscount rate 
on com m ercial 
bills B O J
O rdinary 
savings postal 
interest
U S D /100Y overall price index 1934-
1936 base
percentage of 
change from  
the previous 
year in G N E
明治18年 1885 806 97 -3 42 45 6.94 6.00 81 3/4
19 1886 800 101 6 55 49 5.84 4.20 72 3/4 -0.7
20 1887 818 100 -8 59 67 5.48 4.20 73  － 2.3
21 1888 866 133 -6 74 80 6.75 4.20 72 1/2 5.9
22 1889 955 141 0 78 78 6.94 4.20 73 1/2 10.3
23 1890 1056 153 -32 65 97 6.57 4.20 74 3/4 10.6
24 1891 1139 160 13 89 76 6.21 4.20 75  － 7.9
25 1892 1125 153 14 102 88 5.84 4.20 65 1/2 -1.2
26 1893 1197 165 -4 100 104 6.21 4.20 54 1/2 6.4
27 1894 1338 220 -15 125 140 7.67 4.20 57 1/4 11.8
28 1895 1552 251 -7 150 157 6.94 4.20 46 3/4 16.0
29 1896 1666 303 -68 135 203 7.30 4.20 49 5/8 7.3
30 1897 1957 402 -101 191 292 8.03 4.20 48 1/8 17.5
31 1898 2194 426 -171 200 371 7.30 4.80 48 1/2 12.1
32 1899 2314 376 12 257 245 6.94 4.80 49 1/4 5.5
33 1900 2414 391 -74 259 333 8.76 4.80 49  － 4.3
34 1901 2484 379 6 310 304 8.76 4.80 49 1/8 0.469 2.9
35 1902 2537 335 16 332 316 6.21 4.80 49 3/8 0.474 2.1
36 1903 2696 366 -14 370 384 5.84 4.80 49  － 0.504 6.3
37 1904 3028 364 -141 383 524 7.30 5.04 48 5/8 0.530 12.3
38 1905 3084 517 -337 401 738 8.03 5.04 49 1/8 0.569 1.8
39 1906 3302 540 -35 540 575 6.57 5.04 49 1/4 0.586 7.1
40 1907 3743 634 -16 617 633 7.30 5.04 49 1/4 0.632 13.4
41 1908 3766 663 -88 506 594 7.30 5.04 49 1/4 0.609 0.6
42 1909 3780 597 -17 539 556 5.84 5.04 49 3/8 0.581 0.4
43 1910 3925 689 -69 587 656 4.75 4.20 49 1/4 0.588 3.8
44 1911 4463 860 -99 619 718 5.48 4.20 49 1/4 0.610 13.7
45 1912 4774 857 -110 727 837 6.57 4.20 49 1/4 0.646 7.0
大正 2年 1913 5013 861 -107 844 951 6.57 4.20 49 1/8 0.647 5.0
3 1914 4738 806 -17 799 816 7.30 4.20 49 1/4 0.618 -5.5
4 1915 4991 793 216 1004 788 7.30 4.80 48 7/8 0.625 5.3
5 1916 6148 1035 605 1646 1041 5.84 4.80 50  － 0.756 23.2
6 1917 8592 1816 937 2356 1419 5.11 4.80 50 1/2 0.951 39.8
7 1918 11839 2702 799 3016 2217 6.57 4.80 51 3/8 1.246 37.8
8 1919 15453 2937 333 3242 2909 8.03 4.80 50 5/8 1.526 30.5
9 1920 15896 3596 -111 2984 3095 8.03 4.80 49 5/8 1.678 2.9
10 1921 14886 2868 -273 2065 2338 8.03 4.80 48  － 1.296 -6.4
11 1922 15573 2975 -190 2388 2578 8.03 4.80 47 7/8 1.267 4.6
12 1923 14924 2500 -536 2184 2720 8.03 4.80 48 7/8 1.289 -4.2
13 1924 15576 2929 -689 2665 3354 8.03 4.80 42  － 1.336 4.4
14 1925 16265 2704 -252 3272 3524 7.30 4.80 40 3/4 1.305 4.4
15 1926 15975 2862 -379 2985 3364 6.57 4.80 46 7/8 1.157 -1.8
昭和 2年 1927 16293 2892 -131 2981 3112 5.48 4.80 47 3/8 1.099 2.0
3 1928 16506 2743 -135 3033 3168 5.48 4.80 46 1/2 1.106 1.3
4 1929 16286 2815 77 3300 3223 5.48 4.80 46 1/8 1.075 -1.3
5 1930 14671 2322 47 2486 2439 5.11 4.20 49.367 0.885 -9.9
6 1931 13309 1946 -76 2029 2105 6.57 4.20 48.871 0.748 -9.3
7 1932 13660 2030 -13 2466 2479 4.38 3.00 28.120 0.830 2.6
8 1933 15347 2466 -15 3092 3107 3.65 3.00 25.227 0.951 12.3
9 1934 16966 2923 -59 3580 3639 3.65 3.00 29.511 0.970 10.5
10 1935 18298 3346 167 4158 3991 3.65 3.00 28.570 0.994 7.9
11 1936 19324 3622 191 4580 4389 3.29 3.00 28.951 1.036 5.6
12 1937 22823 5661 -568 5401 5969 3.29 2.76 28.813 1.258 18.1
13 1938 26394 7977 -641 5283 5924 3.29 2.76 28.496 1.327 15.6
14 1939 31230 9822 94 6298 6204 3.29 2.76 25.984 1.466 18.3
15 1940 36851 11698 42 7192 7150 3.29 2.76 23.437 1.641 18.0
S ource: Chapter 3 of the Historica l S tatistics of Japan CD-rom, Japan S tatistica l Association
 
Note: Amounts in million yen. 
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Appendix I, Table B: Long-term economic indicators (continued)
Year
G N E  (at 
m arket prices 
:C urrent 
prices) 3)
G ross 
dom estic fixed 
capital 
form ation
S urplus of 
nation on 
current 
account
E xports plus 
factor incom e 
received from  
abroad
Im ports plus 
factor incom e 
paid abroad
D iscount rate 
on com m ercial 
bills B O J
O rdinary 
savings postal 
interest
U S D /100Y overall price index 1934-
1936 base
percentage of 
change from  
the previous 
year in G N E
24 1949 3375 557 -110 217 327 5.11 2.76 208.8  …
25 1950 3947 694 105 469 364 5.11 2.76   361.05 246.8  16.9
26 1951 5444 1035 209 909 699 5.84 2.76   361.05 342.5  37.9
27 1952 6261 1276 69 789 720 5.84 3.96   361.05 349.2  15.0
28 1953 7059 1554 -81 789 870 5.84 3.96   360.80 351.6  12.7
29 1954 7829 1696 -29 854 882 5.84 3.96   360.80 349.2  10.9
30 1955 8622 1703 75 979 904 7.30 3.96   360.80 343.0  10.1
31 1956 9725 2289 -19 1189 1208 7.30 3.96   360.80 358.0  12.8
32 1957 11082 2948 -211 1338 1549 8.40 3.96   360.80 368.8  14.0
33 1958 11520 2939 168 1318 1150 7.30 3.96   360.80 344.8  4.0
34 1959 12926 3435 142 1531 1390 7.30 3.96   359.80 348.3  12.2
35 1960 15487 4670 61 1774 1713 6.94 3.96   359.60 352.1  19.8
36 1961 19125 6370 -339 1860 2199 7.30 3.60   361.80 355.7  23.5
37 1962 21203 7140 -7 2142 2148 6.57 3.60   359.60 349.7  10.9
38 1963 24475 7886 -264 2349 2613 5.84 3.60   362.40 356.0  15.4
39 1964 28917 9389 -147 2889 3036 6.57 3.60   358.80 356.7  18.1
40 1965 31954 9764 366 3563 3197 5.48 3.60   361.40 359.4  10.5
41 1966 36821 11344 499 4165 3666 5.48 3.60   362.90 368.1  15.2
42 1967 43569 13968 -5 4468 4473 5.84 3.60   362.20 374.7  18.3
43 1968 51599 17333 440 5528 5088 5.84 3.60   358.15 377.9  18.4
44 1969 59670 20919 829 6819 5990 6.25 3.60   358.05 385.9  15.6
45 1970 70708 24771 784 8273 7489 6.00 3.60   357.95 399.9  18.5
46 1971 79272 27214 2089 9896 7807 4.75 3.60   315.70 396.7  12.1
47 1972 90651 31298 2141 10377 8236 4.25 3.36   302.50 399.9  14.4
48 1973 111091 40658 50 12126 12076 9.00 3.84   281.00 463.3  22.5
49 1974 132362 45236 -1247 19453 20700 9.00 4.32   301.60 608.7  19.1
50 1975 145654 44870 -95 20255 20350 6.50 3.84   306.15 626.8  10.0
51 1976 164420 48755 1178 23836 22657 6.50 3.84   293.70 658.3  12.9
52 1977 185622 55982 2949 25562 22613 4.25 2.88   241.05 670.8  12.9
53 1978 204404 62147 3625 24105 20480 3.50 2.40   195.40 653.8  10.1
54 1979 221547 70171 -1724 27903 29627 6.25 3.36   241.00 701.5  8.4
55 1980 240176 75821 -2227 35707 37934 7.25 4.08   204.80 826.2  8.4
56 1981 257363 78941 1503 41814 40311 5.50 3.60   221.10 837.7  7.5
57 1982 269629 79987 2119 44479 42360 5.50 3.12   236.75 852.7  5.0
58 1983 280257 79217 5328 43486 38158 5.00 3.12   233.45 833.7  4.0
59 1984 298084 82973 8705 50019 41314 5.00   252.05 831.5  6.4
60 1985 323,541 90168 11,039 46,177 35,137 5.00   201.35 822.4  7.5
61 1986 338,674 94223 13,281 38,058 24,777 3.50 167.04 86.7 4.7
62 1987 352,530 101047 10,561 36,180 25,619 2.50 142.72 86.7 4.1
63 1988 379,250 114749 8,239 37,431 29,191 2.50 1.68 128.01 87.3 7.6
heisei 1 1989 408,535 128168 6,237 42,273 36,036 3.25 138.20 89.3 7.7
2 1990 440,125 142239 4,173 45,863 41,690 5.25 145.14 92.1 7.7
3 1991 468,234 149057 7,547 46,668 39,121 6.00 134.29 95.1 6.4
4 1992 480,492 146782 10,398 47,288 36,891 3.25 126.51 96.7 2.6
5 1993 484,234 142008 10,766 44,109 33,344 2.75 1.56 110.53 98 0.8
6 1994 490,005 138676 9,883 44,270 34,387 1.75 1.00 101.39 98.6 1.2
7 1995 496,922 138099 6,958 45,230 38,272 1.75 0.50 93.83 98.5 1.4
8 1996 509,984 145023 2,539 49,561 47,022 0.5 0.25 109.18 98.6 2.6
9 1997 520,939 146163 5,758 56,074 50,316 0.5 0.25 121.76 100.4 2.1
10 1998 514,595 138330 9,444 55,051 45,607 0.5 0.25 131.19 101 -1.2
11 1999 507,224 133595 7,892 51,144 43,251 0.5 0.10 113.22 100.7 -1.4
12 2000 511,462 134739 7,316 55,256 47,940 0.5 0.08 108.34 100 0.8
13 2001 505,847 130311 3,174 52,567 49,393 0.1 0.04 122.15 99.3 -1.1
14 2002 497,897 120465 6,412 55,829 49,417 0.1 0.02 124.55 98.4 -1.6
15 2003 497,485 119108 7,976 58,882 50,907 0.1 0.01 115.58 98.1 -0.1
S ource: Chapter 3 of the Historica l S tatistics of Japan CD-rom, Japan S tatistica l Association
 
Note: Amounts in billion yen. 
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Appendix I:  Table C: Military Capital Formation 
Year Ohkawa et al GNEDFCF MCF %  GDFCF %  growth MCF
明治18年 1885 806 97 7 7.22
19 1886 800 101 5 4.95 -28.57
20 1887 818 100 5 5.00 0.00
21 1888 866 133 6 4.51 20.00
22 1889 955 141 7 4.96 16.67
23 1890 1056 153 8 5.23 14.29
24 1891 1139 160 8 5.00 0.00
25 1892 1125 153 7 4.58 -12.50
26 1893 1197 165 6 3.64 -14.29
27 1894 1338 220 25 11.36 316.67
28 1895 1552 251 24 9.56 -4.00
29 1896 1666 303 22 7.26 -8.33
30 1897 1957 402 53 13.18 140.91
31 1898 2194 426 63 14.79 18.87
32 1899 2314 376 64 17.02 1.59
33 1900 2414 391 60 15.35 -6.25
34 1901 2484 379 44 11.61 -26.67
35 1902 2537 335 30 8.96 -31.82
36 1903 2696 366 33 9.02 10.00
37 1904 3028 364 59 16.21 78.79
38 1905 3084 517 78 15.09 32.20
39 1906 3302 540 64 11.85 -17.95
40 1907 3743 634 70 11.04 9.38
41 1908 3766 663 80 12.07 14.29
42 1909 3780 597 65 10.89 -18.75
43 1910 3925 689 64 9.29 -1.54
44 1911 4463 860 77 8.95 20.31
45 1912 4774 857 80 9.33 3.90
大正 2年 1913 5013 861 81 9.41 1.25
3 1914 4738 806 86 10.67 6.17
4 1915 4991 793 74 9.33 -13.95
5 1916 6148 1035 75 7.25 1.35
6 1917 8592 1816 139 7.65 85.33
7 1918 11839 2702 228 8.44 64.03
8 1919 15453 2937 290 9.87 27.19
9 1920 15896 3596 377 10.48 30.00
10 1921 14886 2868 429 14.96 13.79
11 1922 15573 2975 356 11.97 -17.02
12 1923 14924 2500 241 9.64 -32.30
13 1924 15576 2929 192 6.56 -20.33
14 1925 16265 2704 243 8.99 26.56
15 1926 15975 2862 199 6.95 -18.11
昭和 2年 1927 16293 2892 202 6.98 1.51
3 1928 16506 2743 220 8.02 8.91
4 1929 16286 2815 187 6.64 -15.00
5 1930 14671 2322 173 7.45 -7.49
6 1931 13309 1946 176 9.04 1.73
7 1932 13660 2030 309 15.22 75.57
8 1933 15347 2466 356 14.44 15.21
9 1934 16966 2923 427 14.61 19.94
10 1935 18298 3346 466 13.93 9.13
11 1936 19324 3622 518 14.30 11.16
12 1937 22823 5661 1607 28.39 210.23
13 1938 26394 7977 3157 39.58 96.45
14 1939 31230 9822 3617 36.83 14.57
15 1940 36851 11698 4195 35.86 15.98
S ource: Chapter 3 of the Historica l S tatistics of Japan CD-rom, Japan S tatistica l Association
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Appendix I, Graph A: Official discount rates in Japan and the USA 
Official discount rates Japan and USA
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Data source: Bank of Japan, downloadable statistics 
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Appendix II 
Table A: JP-GAAP consolidated disclosure requirements 
SEL-consolidated 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 consolidated B/S c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1
2 consolidated P/L c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1
3 cons. retained earnings statementc-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1
4 cons.cash-flow statement c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1
5 statement of changes in stockholders equity
6 comprehensive earnings statement
7 SS:bonds c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1
8 SS-borrowings c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1 c-fsr1
9 scope of consolidation c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13 c-fsr13
10 N: subsequent events c-fsr14.2 c-fsr14.2 c-fsr14.2 c-fsr14.2 c-fsr14.2 c-fsr14.2 c-fsr14.2 c-fsr14.2
11 N: additional information c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15 c-fsr15
12 N: segment disclosure c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2 c-fsr15.2
13 N: leases c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3 c-fsr15.3
14 N: related party transactions discl. Or.discl. Or. discl. Or. discl. Or. discl. Or. discl. Or. discl.  Or. c-fsr15.4 c-fsr15.4 c-fsr15.4 c-fsr15.4 c-fsr15.4 c-fsr15.4
15 N: tax effect accounting c-fsr15.5 c-fsr15.5 c-fsr15.5 c-fsr15.5 c-fsr15.5 c-fsr15.5
16 N: marketable securities c-fsr15.6 c-fsr15.6 c-fsr15.6 c-fsr15.6 c-fsr15.6
17 N: derivatives c-fsr15.7 c-fsr15.7 c-fsr15.7 c-fsr15.7 c-fsr15.7
18 N: retirement benefits c-fsr15.8 c-fsr15.8 c-fsr15.8
19 N: claims to uncons. Subsidiariesc-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 c-fsr34 cancelled cancelled cancelled cancelled cancelled
20 N: collateralised assets/liabilities c-fsr34.3 c-fsr34.3 c-fsr34.3
21 N: obligations to uncons. Subsidiariesc-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 c-fsr39 cancelled cancelled cancelled cancelled cancelled
22 N: bills discounted and endorsed notesc-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.3 c-fsr39.3 c-fsr39.3 c-fsr39.3 c-fsr39.3 c-fsr39.3
23 N: contingent liabilities c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2 c-fsr39.2
24 consolidation adjustment accountc-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40 c-fsr40
25 minority interest c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41 c-fsr41
26 treasury stock c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43 c-fsr43
27 N: provisions related to contracts c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44 c-fsr44
28 N: net assets per share c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2 c-fsr44.2
29 deferred taxes c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45 c-fsr45
30 sales & general administration expendituresc-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55 c-fsr55
31 R&D expenses ? ? c-fsr55.2 c-fsr55.2 c-fsr55.2 c-fsr55.2 c-fsr55.2 c-fsr55.2
32 N: net profits per share c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2 c-fsr65.2
33 cash-flow statement c-fsr67-84 c-fsr67-84 c-fsr67-84 c-fsr67-84 c-fsr67-84
34 US-GAAP MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 MOF28 c-fsr87-90 c-fsr87-90
interim c-fsr interim c-fsr interim c-fsr interim c-fsr interim c-fsr
N= note to the financial statements
SS= supporting schedule
c-fsr consolidated financial statement regulations
Disclosure Ordinance
MOF additional regulation
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Table B: US-GAAP disclosure requirements 
US-GAAP 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 B/S APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51
2 P/L APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51
3 retained earnings statement APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51 APB51
4 statement of changes in stockholders' equity
5 cash-flow statement APB19 APB19 APB19 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95 FAS95
6 comprehensive earnings statement FAS130 FAS130 FAS130 FAS130 FAS130 FAS130 FAS130
7 N: accounting/disclosure policies APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22 APB22
8 N: accounting changes APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20 APB20
9 N: prior period adjustments APB20 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16 FAS16
10 scope of consolidation APB51 APB51 APB51 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94 FAS94
11 equity method APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18 APB18
12 N: subsequent events FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5
13 N: collateralised assets/liabilities FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5
14 N: bills discounted and endorsed FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5
15 N: contingent liabilities FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5
16 N: provisions related to contracts FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5 FAS5
17 N: segmental disclosure FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14 FAS14
18 N: leases FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13
19 N: related party transactions FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57 FAS57
20 N: foreign currency translation FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52 FAS52/133 FAS52/133 FAS52/133FAS52/133 FAS52/133 FAS52/133
21 N: tax effect accounting FAS37 FAS37 FAS37 FAS96 FAS96 FAS96 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109 FAS109
22 N: marketable securities FAS12 FAS12 FAS12 FAS12 FAS12 FAS12 FAS12 FAS107 FAS107 FAS107 FAS107 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125
23 N: derivatives/hedging FAS105 FAS105 FAS107 FAS107 FAS107 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125 FAS125
24 N: retirement benefits FAS36 FAS36 FAS36 FAS36 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106 FAS106
25 N: pensions APB8 APB8 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87 FAS87
26 N: treasury stock ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43 ARB43
27 N: earnings per share APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 APB15 FAS127 FAS127 FAS127 FAS127 FAS127 FAS127
28 N: R&D expenditures FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2 FAS2
29 N: asset impairment FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS13 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114 FAS114
30 N: stock options APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 APB25 FAS123 FAS123 FAS123 FAS123 FAS123 FAS123 FAS123 FAS123 FAS123
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Appendix II, Table C: JP-GAAP unconsolidated disclosure requirements
SEL-unconsolidated 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 B/S fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1
2 P/L fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1
3 proposal to the distribution of earnings fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1
4 cashflow statement fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1 fsr1
5 SS: marketable securities fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
6 SS: fixed assets fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
7 SS: intangible assets fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108
8 SS: securities in related companies fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
9 SS: investments in related companies fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
10 SS: loans to related companies fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
11 SS: bonds fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
12 SS: long-term borrowings fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
13 SS: borrowings from related companies fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
14 SS: capital stock fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
15 SS: capital surplus fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
16 SS: earned surplus fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
17 SS: depreciation costs fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108
18 SS: hikiatekin (provisions/allowances) fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr108 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118 fsr118
19 accounting policy fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2 fsr8-2
20 accounting changes fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3 fsr8-3
21 N: subsequent events fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4 fsr8-4
22 N: additional information fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5 fsr8-5
23 N: leases fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6 fsr8-6
24 N: marketable securities fsr8-7 fsr8-7 fsr8-7 fsr8-7 fsr8-7 fsr8-7 fsr8-7 fsr8-7 fsr8-7
25 N: derivatives fsr8-8 fsr8-8 fsr8-8 fsr8-8 fsr8-8 fsr8-8 fsr8-8
26 N: profit or loss from equity method fsr8-9 fsr8-9 fsr8-9 fsr8-9 fsr8-9
27 N: related party transactions fsr8-10 fsr8-10 fsr8-10 fsr8-10 fsr8-10
28 N: tax effect accounting fsr8-12 fsr8-12 fsr8-12 fsr8-12 fsr8-12
29 N: retirement benefits fsr8-13 fsr8-13 fsr8-13 fsr8-13 fsr8-13
30 revaluation of fixed tangible assets fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42 fsr42
31 N: claims toward unconsolidated subsidiaries fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39 fsr39
32 N: collateralised assets fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43 fsr43
33 N: collateralised borrowings fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57 fsr57
34 N: obligations to uncons. Subsidiaries fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55 fsr55
35 bills discounted+endorsed notes fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2 fsr58-2
36 N: contingent liabilities fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58 fsr58
37 N: sales to related companies
38 non-operating income from related companies fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91 fsr91
39 N: non-operating expenses to related companies fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94 fsr94
40 N: net earnings per share fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2 fsr95-5-2
fsr = financial statement regulations
N  = note to the financial statements
SS = supporting schedule
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Appendix II, Table D
Disclosure Score Sheet 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 consolidated B/S
2 consolidated P/L
3 cons. retained earnings statement
4 statement of changes in stockholders equity
5 consolidated cash-flow statement
6 SS:bonds
7 SS-borrowings
8 1. scope of consolidation
9 2. method of consolidation
10 3. differences in period
11 4.accounting treatment:  asset valuation
12 4. accounting treatment: depreciation methods
13 4. accounting treatment: hikiatekin
14 4. accounting treatment: foreign currency translation
15 4. accounting treatment: leases
16 4. accounting treatment: hedge accounting
17 5. consolidated subsidiaries
18 6. amortisation of consolidation account
19 7. profit distribution items
20 8. scope of cash-flow funds
21 changes in disclosure
22 N: subsequent events
23 N: additional information
24 N: segment disclosure
25 N: leases
26 N: related party transactions
27 N: tax effect accounting
28 N: marketable securities
29 N: derivatives
30 N: retirement benefits
31 going concern premise
32 accumulated depreciation
33 breakdown of intangible assets
34 accumulated depreciation of intangible assets
35 breakdown of deferred assets
36 N: claims to uncons. Subsidiaries
37 N: collateralised assets/liabilities
38 N: obligations to uncons. Subsidiaries
39 N: bills discounted and endorsed notes
40 N: contingent liabilities
41 consolidation adjustment account
42 minority interest
43 treasury stock
44 N: provisions related to contracts
45 N: net assets per share
46 deferred taxes
47 sales & general administration expenditures
48 R&D expenses
49 N: net profits per share
50 Notes to the cash-flow statement
51 asset impairment
52 others
53 total
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Appendix III 
 
Table A. List of Sample Companies 
number company name number company name
2282 nippon ham 2284 itoham
3591 wacoal 3002 gunze
4901 fuji photo 4902 konica
6301 komatsu 6302 sumitomo heavy
6326 kubota 6361 ebara
6501 hitachi 6504 fuji denki
6502 toshiba 6506 yasukawa denki
6503 mitsubishi electr. 6702 fujitsu
6586 makita 6703 oki
6645 omron 6753 sharp
6701 nec 6765 kenwood
6752 matsushita 6770 alps denki
6758 sony 6792 japan victor
6762 TDK 6841 yokogawa denki
6764 sanyo 6845 yamatake
6773 pioneer 6902 denso
6971 kyocera 6952 casio
6981 murata mfg 6945 fanuc
7267 honda 7203 toyota
7751 canon 7731 nikon
7752 ricoh 7753 minolta
8001 itochu 8003 tomen
8002 marubeni 8004 nichimen
8031 mitsui bussan 8020 kanematsu
8058 mitsubishi corp 8063 nissho iwai
8264 itoyokado 8267 aeon
 
Note: company numbers are as used by the Japan Company Handbook (会社四季報) and 
presently also by the NEEDS database. 
 
Table B: summary statistics, panel a
W ACC 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 6.1 5.6 4.5 4.3 4.4 5.3 5.6 5.2 4.6 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.7
median 6.2 5.5 4.5 4.2 4.4 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.4
st-dev 1.8 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3
min 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.7 3.5 4.0 3.6 2.7 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.3
max 10.1 8.9 8.1 7.3 6.5 7.8 8.3 8.4 7.9 7.7 7.1 6.8 5.9 5.5 6.6 6.3 6.5 7.5 7.7
sec 6.30 5.84 4.79 4.56 4.68 5.58 5.90 5.42 4.73 4.36 4.12 3.77 3.38 3.21 3.50 3.60 3.35 3.32 2.98
jp 5.97 5.33 4.31 4.03 4.19 4.97 5.35 5.04 4.43 4.10 3.90 3.61 3.17 2.85 3.09 3.08 2.88 2.78 2.48
COE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 11.1 9.8 8.2 7.7 8.0 9.6 10.0 9.4 8.6 8.5 7.8 7.5 6.6 6.0 6.5 6.5 5.9 6.1 5.9
median 11.4 10.0 8.1 7.4 7.6 9.4 9.8 9.5 8.6 8.4 7.8 7.4 6.7 5.9 6.4 6.4 5.9 6.1 5.7
st-dev 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.5
min 8.0 6.7 6.5 6.2 6.5 7.6 8.5 7.9 7.2 7.1 6.6 6.1 4.9 3.7 3.9 3.6 2.7 2.8 2.6
max 13.3 11.7 10.2 10.5 10.5 12.9 11.9 11.0 10.3 10.1 9.4 9.1 7.9 7.4 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.6 8.6
sec 11.2 10.0 8.5 8.0 8.2 9.9 10.0 9.2 8.3 8.2 7.5 7.2 6.4 5.8 6.1 6.2 5.8 6.0 5.8
jp 10.9 9.6 7.9 7.5 7.7 9.4 10.1 9.6 9.0 8.8 8.1 7.8 6.8 6.2 6.7 6.6 6.1 6.2 5.9
COD 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 7.75 7.01 5.88 5.46 5.39 6.17 6.54 6.20 5.13 4.12 4.20 3.81 3.45 3.34 3.60 3.09 3.06 2.92 2.53
median 7.39 6.82 5.69 5.33 5.49 6.15 7.01 6.59 5.22 4.21 4.08 3.74 3.19 3.12 3.06 2.72 2.71 2.31 1.95
st-dev 2.32 2.12 2.38 2.33 1.86 2.03 2.27 2.50 1.63 1.18 1.27 1.26 1.30 1.45 2.45 2.07 1.62 3.47 3.24
min 4.12 2.71 1.48 2.06 1.61 1.65 1.60 1.90 1.75 1.67 1.56 1.29 1.43 0.93 0.99 0.60 0.78 0.53 0.42
max 16.34 15.50 16.41 14.99 10.06 10.86 10.68 16.49 9.22 7.30 7.79 7.56 7.26 9.47 16.05 14.98 11.06 26.19 24.12
sec 7.83 7.13 6.09 5.78 5.67 6.63 7.02 6.67 5.49 4.39 4.50 4.03 3.69 3.71 3.94 3.45 3.32 3.36 2.91
jp 7.67 6.90 5.67 5.14 5.12 5.70 6.05 5.73 4.78 3.85 3.90 3.59 3.21 2.99 3.29 2.76 2.82 2.50 2.18
DISC 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 4.73 4.63 4.63 4.69 4.90 5.21 5.58 6.04 5.69 5.92 5.94 6.06 5.92 5.77 4.63 3.90 2.31 1.15 1.13
median 6 6 6 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 5.5 6 6.5 3.5 2 4.5 2 1 0
st-dev 4.20 4.14 4.14 4.25 4.44 4.76 4.96 4.78 5.11 5.21 5.13 5.21 4.84 4.81 4.12 2.36 1.50 1.23 1.28
variance 17.65 17.18 17.10 18.02 19.74 22.68 24.60 22.86 26.14 27.17 26.29 27.19 23.41 23.12 16.98 5.58 2.26 1.51 1.65
min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
max 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 13 13 11 8 6 4 4
sec 8.52 8.50 8.50 8.73 9.15 9.81 10.38 10.69 10.65 11.00 10.92 11.12 10.62 10.60 8.76 6.00 3.64 2.32 2.36
jp 0.64 0.77 0.77 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.77 1.38 0.73 0.85 0.96 1 1.23 1.30 0.81 1.96 1.07 0.07 0
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Table B: summary statistics, panel b
ADJ BETA 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 1.03 0.99 0.79 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.82 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.95 1.01 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.08 1.11
median 1.11 1.04 0.77 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.78 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.02 1.06 1.06
st-dev 0.34 0.30 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.30 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.33
min 0.35 0.29 0.41 0.30 0.37 0.21 0.48 0.57 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.57 0.49 0.49 0.42 0.30 0.31 0.38
max 1.54 1.43 1.25 1.29 1.28 1.40 1.25 1.29 1.34 1.33 1.34 1.36 1.24 1.32 1.55 1.54 1.60 1.65 1.73
sec 1.07 1.05 0.86 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.96 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.06 1.09
jp 0.99 0.94 0.72 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.84 0.97 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.05 1.13 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.12
BETA 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 1.03 0.98 0.67 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.73 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.90 0.99 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.10 1.14
median 1.16 1.06 0.64 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.67 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.99 1.05 1.06 1.04 1.10 1.09
st-dev 0.54 0.48 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.38 0.47 0.51 0.53
min -0.01 -0.10 0.09 -0.07 0.03 -0.21 0.19 0.35 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.10 -0.07 -0.06 0.04
max 1.82 1.66 1.38 1.45 1.42 1.62 1.38 1.45 1.41 1.43 1.39 1.38 1.34 1.50 1.84 1.83 1.93 1.99 2.12
sec 1.08 1.07 0.78 0.56 0.61 0.57 0.71 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.94 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.09 1.14
jp 0.98 0.88 0.55 0.39 0.46 0.41 0.75 0.94 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.96 1.04 1.15 1.12 1.06 1.12 1.14
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Table B: summary statistics, panel c
SIZE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 13.415 13.441 13.503 13.591 13.731 13.891 13.974 14.009 13.986 13.968 13.995 14.060 14.100 14.139 14.110 14.088 14.116 14.084 14.037
median 13.127 13.184 13.251 13.372 13.493 13.599 13.762 13.792 13.864 13.956 14.023 14.104 14.146 14.218 14.085 14.053 14.113 14.053 13.866
st-dev 1.225 1.184 1.164 1.172 1.204 1.246 1.242 1.216 1.204 1.194 1.196 1.198 1.208 1.203 1.199 1.191 1.208 1.223 1.239
min 11.330 11.460 11.469 11.612 11.750 11.920 12.059 12.053 12.098 12.109 12.118 12.159 12.176 12.188 12.110 12.095 12.096 12.106 11.864
max 15.654 15.569 15.638 15.835 16.068 16.273 16.295 16.144 16.058 16.083 16.157 16.244 16.357 16.444 16.507 16.617 16.679 16.806 16.848
sec 13.806 13.840 13.918 14.009 14.157 14.341 14.423 14.465 14.436 14.420 14.456 14.534 14.574 14.554 14.537 14.525 14.581 14.563 14.548
jp 12.992 13.042 13.087 13.172 13.305 13.441 13.525 13.554 13.535 13.516 13.533 13.586 13.626 13.755 13.715 13.683 13.685 13.641 13.564
LEV 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.66
median 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.70
st-dev 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23
min 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.10
max 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
sec 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.61
jp 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70
BTM 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 0.514 0.460 0.412 0.369 0.328 0.404 0.531 0.688 0.664 0.559 0.616 0.536 0.616 0.759 0.784 0.649 0.719 0.823 0.745
median 0.471 0.438 0.406 0.360 0.345 0.394 0.529 0.678 0.659 0.571 0.598 0.501 0.596 0.656 0.550 0.551 0.588 0.746 0.693
st-dev 0.187 0.166 0.140 0.119 0.111 0.129 0.165 0.219 0.202 0.165 0.182 0.162 0.244 0.352 0.904 0.491 0.375 0.441 0.309
variance 0.035 0.027 0.020 0.014 0.012 0.017 0.027 0.048 0.041 0.027 0.033 0.026 0.060 0.124 0.818 0.241 0.140 0.195 0.096
min 0.156 0.174 0.183 0.157 0.102 0.163 0.195 0.247 0.288 0.279 0.316 0.275 0.230 0.327 0.111 0.130 0.081 -0.774 0.249
max 0.873 0.901 0.765 0.616 0.602 0.773 1.025 1.314 1.288 0.964 1.074 0.911 1.352 2.070 6.414 2.885 1.842 1.913 1.517
sec 0.552 0.496 0.432 0.391 0.358 0.446 0.579 0.737 0.697 0.584 0.641 0.566 0.609 0.727 0.605 0.555 0.708 0.828 0.796
jp 0.473 0.425 0.392 0.348 0.298 0.362 0.483 0.638 0.631 0.534 0.590 0.507 0.623 0.789 0.960 0.738 0.731 0.820 0.698
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Table B: summary statistics panel d
for sh% 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19
median 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.19
st-dev 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
min 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
max 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.50
sec 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24
jp 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14
fin sh% 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.46
median 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.45
st-dev 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
min 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.27
max 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.64
sec 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.46
jp 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.46
10L sh% 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37
median 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.36
st-dev 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
min 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.23
max 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.59
sec 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.34
jp 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39
indiv sh% 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
mean 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.24
median 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.22
st-dev 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.11
min 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07
max 0.37 0.41 0.46 0.38 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.41 0.51 0.88 0.50
sec 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.22
jp 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.25
 
 Table C: Estimation Results for Model (1), dependent variable: WACC
T-statistics based on White's standard errors in small font
Year Intercept disc adj beta ln assets leverage BTM
Panel A: Cross-sectional regressions (OLS)
1985 6.820 -0.043 1.162 0.309 -8.447 -0.529
123.72 -2.19 5.53 3.45 -21.64 -1.07
1986 5.276 -0.039 1.277 0.296 -7.223 -0.201
98.38 -2.48 6.20 4.02 -23.84 -0.50
1987 4.579 -0.011 0.829 0.166 -5.351 1.399
41.38 -0.71 2.83 2.01 -16.70 3.02
1988 4.481 0.003 0.755 0.104 -4.303 1.761
32.38 0.17 2.78 1.12 -13.13 3.15
1989 4.685 0.004 0.428 0.106 -4.086 1.840
74.65 0.31 1.76 1.98 -16.33 3.97
1990 8.392 0.038 0.376 -0.069 -4.582 0.924
105.65 2.43 1.75 -1.27 -14.52 1.88
1991 8.675 0.048 1.802 -0.119 -4.896 0.127
105.20 3.17 5.48 -2.29 -13.61 0.36
1992 7.473 0.043 1.561 -0.001 -5.197 -0.705
51.78 2.19 3.12 -0.01 -17.79 -1.48
1993 8.548 0.032 1.092 -0.127 -5.133 -0.069
169.02 2.63 3.56 -3.13 -22.81 -0.27
1994 8.673 0.026 1.045 -0.127 -5.610 -0.311
123.83 0.12 15.64 -8.22 -11.70 -4.25
1995 8.751 0.022 0.757 -0.154 -5.081 -0.223
223.88 2.37 2.51 -4.50 -27.49 -0.94
1996 7.788 0.017 1.174 -0.118 -5.298 -0.362
192.59 1.86 3.21 -3.42 -27.55 -1.29
1997 6.171 0.019 1.635 -0.082 -4.801 -0.403
146.00 2.25 4.88 -2.48 -27.37 -2.51
1998 4.640 0.019 2.130 -0.045 -4.631 -0.259
106.60 2.34 7.34 -1.33 -25.88 -2.28
1999 5.434 0.018 1.779 -0.045 -5.321 -0.064
66.54 1.30 6.48 -0.99 -17.93 -1.88
2000 5.326 0.029 1.644 -0.033 -5.248 -0.113
79.24 1.43 6.35 -0.74 -19.52 -1.21
2001 5.497 0.046 1.700 -0.070 -4.689 -0.354
109.29 1.30 7.22 -1.57 -18.24 -2.75
2002 6.192 0.060 1.592 -0.080 -5.395 -0.425
51.79 1.25 6.89 -1.56 -12.24 -3.20
2003 6.652 0.076 1.433 -0.093 -5.673 -0.778
43.47 1.48 6.96 -1.51 -11.29 -3.41
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Table D: Estimation Results for Model (1), dependent variable: CAPM cost of equity
Year Intercept disc beta ln assets leverage BTM
Panel A: Cross-sectional regressions (OLS)
1985 8.554 0.007 2.755 -0.044 0.317 0.011
13.79 0.51 23.74 -0.72 0.80 0.03
1986 7.139 -0.009 2.754 -0.014 0.216 0.138
13.14 -0.75 26.15 -0.27 0.69 0.48
1987 6.417 -0.002 2.838 -0.015 0.149 -0.061
23.15 -0.28 34.33 -0.61 1.12 -0.37
1988 6.316 0.000 2.854 0.003 -0.010 0.041
132.16 0.38 227.77 0.86 -0.40 1.16
1989 6.359 0.000 2.854 0.004 -0.015 0.082
84.16 0.31 117.62 0.60 -0.30 1.13
1990 8.040 0.001 2.830 0.012 -0.053 0.139
38.43 0.38 58.50 0.59 -0.41 0.89
1991 7.931 0.000 2.860 0.000 -0.006 0.013
485.05 0.33 539.23 0.23 -0.57 1.34
1992 6.958 -0.002 2.848 -0.002 0.061 -0.092
41.81 -0.57 52.29 -0.15 0.66 -1.52
1993 6.422 -0.003 2.702 -0.024 0.280 -0.218
15.80 -0.62 20.57 -0.77 1.43 -1.62
1994 6.664 -0.005 2.525 -0.050 0.457 -0.272
12.58 -0.73 14.13 -1.28 1.89 -1.33
1995 6.443 -0.006 2.328 -0.069 0.610 -0.332
11.06 -0.75 11.05 -1.69 2.43 -1.67
1996 6.388 -0.012 1.900 -0.072 0.849 -0.411
8.67 -1.08 7.33 -1.33 2.55 -1.21
1997 5.169 -0.014 1.858 -0.042 0.886 -0.249
7.86 -1.18 7.54 -0.82 3.03 -1.21
1998 4.212 -0.013 1.996 -0.033 0.697 -0.137
6.46 -1.06 9.43 -0.65 2.48 -0.92
1999 4.347 -0.016 2.031 -0.043 0.949 -0.004
5.81 -0.94 9.99 -0.73 2.96 -0.06
2000 4.027 0.007 2.381 -0.037 0.665 -0.098
6.66 0.32 17.04 -0.77 2.79 -0.99
2001 3.436 0.000 2.477 -0.023 0.581 -0.158
4.81 0.00 19.52 -0.42 2.24 -1.07
2002 3.218 0.006 2.575 -0.023 0.454 0.128
4.70 0.12 21.41 -0.45 1.76 0.98
2003 2.686 -0.032 2.517 -0.007 0.581 0.087
3.02 -0.51 16.31 -0.11 1.68 0.34
Note: T-statistics in small font
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Table E: Estimation Results for Model (1), dependent variable: cost of debt 
Year Intercept disc adj beta ln assets leverage BTM
Panel A: Cross-sectional regressions (OLS)
1985 -2.566 -0.099 0.742 0.755 -1.025 1.107
-0.68 -1.18 0.69 2.09 -0.44 0.57
1986 -5.190 -0.113 0.029 0.986 -1.459 0.838
-1.47 -1.50 0.03 3.08 -0.73 0.45
1987 -7.962 -0.052 0.594 0.767 1.097 6.180
-2.04 -0.63 0.32 2.13 0.56 2.55
1988 -7.949 0.004 -0.948 0.679 3.203 7.403
-2.01 0.04 -0.58 2.03 1.51 2.51
1989 -5.645 0.007 -1.464 0.467 4.488 8.334
-2.08 0.12 -1.06 1.76 2.52 3.11
1990 0.832 0.110 -2.436 0.234 4.106 1.130
0.24 1.65 -1.89 0.69 1.83 0.42
1991 1.488 0.118 1.945 -0.007 4.336 0.084
0.41 1.86 1.11 -0.02 1.91 0.04
1992 0.972 0.124 1.008 0.245 2.463 -2.195
0.18 1.58 0.41 0.60 0.92 -1.24
1993 3.237 0.084 0.867 0.146 -0.693 -1.512
0.77 1.64 0.47 0.51 -0.38 -1.22
1994 5.152 0.078 0.075 -0.123 1.268 -1.210
1.64 2.21 0.05 -0.61 0.99 -1.16
1995 9.680 0.087 -1.439 -0.372 1.556 -0.665
2.69 2.24 -0.83 -1.73 1.14 -0.64
1996 10.507 0.082 -1.055 -0.399 0.340 -1.419
3.71 2.16 -0.73 -2.21 0.29 -1.27
1997 7.187 0.091 0.819 -0.281 -0.657 -1.080
2.77 2.19 0.54 -1.58 -0.59 -1.51
1998 5.066 0.096 2.167 -0.193 -1.692 -0.810
1.94 2.12 1.57 -1.04 -1.57 -1.50
1999 6.040 0.022 2.309 -0.073 -5.566 -0.485
1.41 0.24 1.17 -0.23 -2.97 -1.33
2000 5.381 0.044 -0.182 -0.018 -2.902 -0.271
1.45 0.32 -0.13 -0.06 -1.93 -0.45
2001 6.863 0.154 0.558 -0.200 -2.471 -0.456
2.39 0.91 0.65 -0.90 -2.30 -0.75
2002 9.290 0.255 0.229 -0.230 -4.749 -0.754
1.57 0.59 0.14 -0.51 -2.10 -0.68
2003 10.943 0.272 0.566 -0.320 -5.527 -1.648
1.95 0.70 0.36 -0.77 -2.50 -1.05
Note: T-statistics in small font
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Table F: Estimation Results for Model (2)
 T-statistics based on White's standard errors in small font
year Intercept lev for fin 10Lsh ind d-ov
Panel A: Cross-sectional regressions (OLS)
1985 2.491 -2.563 3.186 5.175 -5.908 2.832 4.279
-9.52 0.98 1.37 -1.70 0.49 4.46
1986 4.542 -3.188 3.099 6.053 -8.952 -1.263 3.845
-12.44 0.95 1.58 -2.57 -0.23 4.05
1987 7.934 -3.458 6.209 5.896 -14.453 -6.826 3.592
-3.81 2.01 1.68 -4.39 -1.29 3.87
1988 5.824 -2.989 7.685 7.940 -13.732 -4.278 3.259
-1.07 1.75 1.99 -3.89 -0.51 3.40
1989 6.214 -4.970 15.342 11.286 -16.816 -5.420 3.267
-3.77 2.78 2.37 -3.26 -0.67 3.33
1990 7.845 -4.903 22.219 8.194 -19.405 -6.536 4.654
-2.69 2.54 1.46 -3.27 -0.76 5.26
1991 9.254 -3.399 22.942 5.956 -22.220 -6.530 4.654
-61.44 3.21 1.05 -3.73 -0.84 5.32
1992 11.699 -3.739 17.849 3.838 -23.301 -6.143 4.257
-35.19 3.15 0.75 -4.13 -0.88 5.04
1993 10.845 -2.796 14.406 2.721 -21.281 -7.812 4.819
-35.08 2.61 0.49 -3.74 -1.17 5.26
1994 12.692 -2.686 10.540 2.009 -22.940 -11.902 5.070
-73.09 2.39 0.38 -4.12 -1.78 5.61
1995 12.272 -2.569 12.554 1.466 -22.403 -11.105 4.924
-93.88 2.91 0.26 -4.06 -1.67 5.72
1996 11.262 -2.188 12.321 0.668 -20.002 -11.654 5.069
-72.57 2.94 0.12 -3.82 -1.77 5.67
1997 12.840 -2.647 7.332 -1.090 -20.177 -8.630 4.731
-79.20 1.97 -0.21 -3.43 -1.58 5.43
1998 16.959 -5.075 6.261 -1.054 -26.958 -7.106 4.291
-310.13 1.98 -0.20 -4.63 -1.65 5.20
1999 14.015 -3.707 6.766 -1.242 -23.458 -6.795 3.374
-139.72 3.06 -0.27 -5.00 -2.18 4.90
2000 5.770 -0.763 4.292 1.564 -11.009 -1.615 1.848
-9.17 2.41 0.63 -3.23 -0.68 3.96
2001 5.749 0.388 0.198 -1.290 -7.953 -5.815 1.222
2.51 0.19 -0.80 -3.73 -3.96 3.98
2002 0.687 -0.255 2.314 0.817 -3.195 0.907 1.139
-0.51 2.30 0.60 -2.09 1.18 4.44
2003 2.05 -0.16 2.82 0.39 -5.24 -0.44 0.82
-1.79 2.50 0.25 -3.03 -0.34 3.13
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